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2ABSTRACT
This work is a study of the administration of the North- 
Province
West Frontierf\from 1901 to 1919* Two aspects of the admini­
stration have been dealt, with: the British Governments re­
lations with the tribes of the frontier, and some important 
aspects of the civil administration of the settled districts 
of the Province- The first chapter deals with the formation 
of the Province by Curzon in 1901, and his new frontier policy*
The second chapter in analysing the Government's relations with 
the three most important Pathan tribes, the Kahsuds, the Afridis 
and the Mohmands, shows haw the new policy worked. The period 
1915--1919 was dominated by the events of the First World War, 
the impact of which on the Frontier has been described in the 
third chapter. The fourth chapter traces the development of the 
means of communication such as roads and railways, which were 
built primarily with military and strategic objectives. The fifth 
and the sixth chapters describe the new land system introduced 
by the British in the settled districts and the Government's 
efforts to develop agriculture by irrigation projects. Educational 
development formed an important item in the civil administration 
of the Province? the course of this development and the edu­
cational policy of the Government constitute the theme of the 
last chapter.
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7INTRODUCTION
Thanks to its geographical position the North-West Frontier 
Province played an outstanding role in the history of British 
India. The region which constituted the province'*' is situated 
between 31° and 36° north latitude and between 69° and 74° east 
longitude. The extent of the Provinoe, from north to south was 
408 miles and from east to west 279 miles, the total area being 
approximately 38,919 square miles. To its north lay the Hindu- 
ICush, to the south Baluchistan and the Dera Ghazi Khan district 
of the Punjab; Kashmir and the Punjab lay to its east and Af­
ghanistan to its west. Except the district of Hazara and part
of Kohistan which were cis-Indus, the rest of the Province was
©
2
trans-Indus.
The Province had a double boundary, the one administrative, 
and the other political. The former separated the five administered 
districts from the'tribal territory and extended to the foot of
1
In 1955 the Province ceased to exist, as it merged in the 'one- 
unit1 scheme of Pakistan.
2 *For the Geography of the Province, see Census of India. 1911.
vol. XIII. N.W.F.P.. pp. 5-7; ibid.. p.192, vol. XIV, pp. 7-9;
Imperial Gazetteer of India. 1908, Provincial series. N.W.F.P.,
pp. 1-5, 11; O.H.k .Spate, India and Pakistan, pp. 432-451; David
Dichter, The North-West Frontier of West Pakistan.
8the mountains, The latter boundary, known as the ’’Durand Line” 
marked off Afghanistan from British India, The intervening area 
between the two boundaries was - and still is - occupied by 
Pathan tribes.
The Province had two political divisions: the five regularly 
administered districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Hera
Ismail IChan with a total area of 13,419 square miles, and the
/
tribal territory with five political agencies - the Malakand, the 
Khyber, the Kuiram, Northern Waziristan and Southern Waziristan 
and five ’tribal areas’. The Malakand agency included the front­
ier Chieftainships of Chitral, Dir and Nawagai. Theiribal terri­
tory had an area of 25*500 square miles.
The physical features of the North-West Frontier Province 
presented an extremely complex and varied picture. There were 
three principal geographical divisions: first, the cis-Indus
district of Hazara extending north-eastwards into the Himalayas.
Its northern section was hilly, while the southern part opened 
out into the fertile plains of the Punjab, Second, the comparatively 
narrow strip between the Indus and the hills, in which area lay, 
from north to south, ihe four districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu 
and Dera Ismail Khan. The tribal territory between the districts 
and the Afghan frontier formed the third division containing a 
terrain, rugged* rocky and wild with lofty mountains and between
9them deep, narrow and inaccessible valleys, The Political 
Agency of Dir, Swat and Chitral lay between the Hindu Kush 
and the border of Peshawar made up of mountains and valleys 
with but scanty cultivation. To Chitral*s south lay the hills 
of Dir and Bajaur and the fertile valleys of the Swat and 
Panjkora rivers. The Mohmand hills, vrh®-ch. were mostly without 
vegetation, flanked the Malakand agency on the south-western 
side. Further south was the narrow gorge of the Khyber pass 
linking Jamrud,on the Peshawar border, with the eastern boundary 
of Afghanistan at Landi Khana. Still further south lay Tirah, 
the home of the Afridis and Orakzais. The Kuiram agency, a 
fertile valley, was situated to the west of the Khyber agency 
and extended from the high peak of the Sikafam and the Paiwar- 
Kotal passes to the western end of the ^iranzai valley of the 
Kohat district. Further south could be seen the hilly area of 
Waziristan, the Tochi valley and the plain of Wana. The Y/azir 
hills joined another mountain range, the Sulaimans, which 
dominated the Deraj at.
The north-western hills of the Province had some very im­
portant passes*** serving for centuries as routes of invasion and
1
T.H.Holdich, The Indian Borderland - The Gates of India.
See also Strategical Epitome of Routes on and beyond the H.W. 
Frontier of India, P.S.D.L., B.252; A. S. Beveridge, ”The Khyber 
Pass as the Invader’s Road for India”, J.R.G.A.S., 1926, pp. 250- 
65, 368-74*
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trade between Central Asia aid the plains of the sub-continent. 
These passes invested the Province with great strategic and 
political importance? Baroghil and Borah, the two important 
passes, lay in the northern zone of the Hindu Kush ranges, 
the former leading into the Pamirs and the latter into Afghani­
stan. Further south lay a route leading fran the Kunar valley 
into Bajaur, Swat and the Peshawar plain. In tee southern zone 
of the Hindukush lay the famous Khyber pass, the maiifroute of 
communication between Afghanistan and the sub-continent. Further 
south the peiwar ICotal and Shut ar gar dan passes led to Kabul 
and Ghazni. Then there were the Tochi and Gomal passes, the 
latter much used by trade caravans from Afghanistan.
The Indus, which entered the Province north of the Black 
Mountains, was the principal river, draining almost the entire 
territory of the Province,'*' and forming about two hundred miles 
of its eastern boundary. Besides, the mountain streams of Hazara 
flowing into the Indus, the river was fed by its most important 
tributary, the Landai. The Kabul river was another important 
source of water supply for the Province. Bising in the Hindu Kush 
range about fortyfive miles west of Kabul, the river flowed east­
wards, crossed the Mojimand hills and entered tee Peshawar district
■j
With the exception of Kunhar river in Hazara which falls into 
the Jhelum river.
at War sale. The Bara river, which issued from the hills of Tirah
south of the Safed Koh range and drained the Afridi country,
fell into the Kabul river, and so did the Yarkhun, Chitral, Itunar
Panjkora and Swat rivers which drained the territories of Ghitral
Dir, Swat and Bajaur. The Kurram river flowed down from the
southern slopes of the Safed Kbhf. and after crossing the Kuiram
valley and the Lower Wazir hills entered into the Bannu district.
The Tochi or the Gambila river watered North Waziristan.
In population the North-West Frontier was^the smallest
1province of British India. The 1921 census showed its total 
individual-8- as 5>076,476. Of these about ninety two per cent 
were Muslims and over seven per cent were Hindus and Sikhs. As 
for the inhabitants of the Province, Dr. Davies has rightly ob­
served that
No ethnological problem is more complicated and in­
tricate than that which is presented by the North- 
West Frontier of India.5
Pathans predominated, including the tribes of the Yusufzais,
Mohmands, Afridis, Shinwaris, Orakzais, Turis, Bangashs, Wazirs,
A
Baluchistan (799,625), Ajmer-Merwara (495,271), and Coorg 
(163,858) had smaller populations than the North-West Frontier 
Province. Census of India. 1921. vol. XIV. N.W.F.P.. p.11.
2It was estimated that the tribal territory contained fifty- 
six per cent of the total -population, ibid.
^C.C.Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier. 1890-1908.
p.37.
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Mahsuds, Bhittanis, Daurs, Khattacks aid Bannuchis. The cis-
Indus district of Hazara had a mixed population, mainly of
Indian origin such as the Awans, Gujars, Tanaolis, Dhunds, and
Kashmiris. In the Dera Ismail Khan district, the Baluchi and
Jat tribes predominated. The Pathans of the settled districts
and of the tribal territory were similar, culturally, linguistically
and racially, but the former were regarded as far less unruly
X
and fierce than the latter.
The Tribal Territory
The administration of the Frontier region under the Sikhs
(1818-1849) had been of the ‘’loosest typo”* The Sikhs
possessed but little influence in the trans-lndus 
tracts, and what influence they had was confined 
to the plains. Even here they were obeyed only in 
the immediate vicinity cf their forts which studded 
the country. 2
■j
For a detailed ethnology of the Horth-¥est Frontier, see the 
following works: Davies, op.cit.. pp. 37-70; Olag Caroe,
The Pathans. pp. 3-42; J.W. Spain, The Fathan Borderland, pp. 
39-100; H.G.Raverty, Ethnological Rotes on Afghanistan;
G. Robertson, The Kafirs of the Hindu Kush; R. Warburton,
The Tribes of the Khyber Range: Afridis. Mullagoris. Shinwaris; 
R.R.H. Merit. Report on Mohmands; L.W.King, Monograph on the 
Orakzai country and clans; H.A.Rose, A Glossaiy cf the Tribes 
and Castes of the Punjab; A.H.McMahon, Report on the Trib.es of 
Dir. Swat and Bajaur - together with the Utman-Khel and Sam 
Ranizai; F. Barth, Political leadership among Swat Pathans.
2
Davies, op.cit., p.21.
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The Sikhs failed to establish peace and order in the frontier;
the prevailing lawlessness among the tribes, their bitter
feuds leading to incessant violence and their unwillingness
to pay revenue which led to frequent armed encounters with
1the rulers created a state of continuous anarchy.
On the annexation of the Punjab by the British in 1849? 
the task of establishing peace and order, the ensurancecf the 
security of life and property, therefore, fell to the lot of 
the Punjab authorities who were entrusted with the administration 
of the Frontier region. This administration had two aspects: 
the management of the tribes in order to ensure the security 
of the settled districts from frequent tribal raids; and the 
civil administration of the settled districts. This arrangement 
continued until the formation of the North-West Frontier Province 
in 1901.
TKe British policy on the North-West Frontier passed through/
various stages. For over a quarter of a century, after the an­
nexation of the Punjab, the Punjab Government followed what came 
to be known as the 1 close-border' policy. The main feature of
Census of India,,, 1911 > vol. XIII, N.W.F.P., pp. 28-9.
2
The relative merits and demerits of the 1 close border1 policy 
on the Punjab frontier had often been compared with another 
system adopted on the Sind frontier in dealing with the Baluch 
tribes. Ite exponent was Captain Sandeman. In 1877 the Baluchistan 
Agency was created and Sandeman was appointed the first Agent
1 4
the policy was to guard the border closely with a view to keeping 
raids and consequent reprisals by military expeditions to the 
minimum. Won-aggression on tribal territory and non-interference 
in tribal affairs were the declared objects of this policy. For 
defensive purposes a military force, called the Punjab Frontier 
Force was raised under the supreme control of the Government of 
the Punjab which in 1886 was amalgamated with the regular army.
The existing forts were repaired and new ones were built along 
the administrative boundary and were connected together by a 
military road. At the same time, various conciliatory measures 
were adopted. Agreements were made with the tribes obliging them 
to maintain peaceful and friendly relations with the Government 
in return for subsidies and allowances. The tribesmen were allowed 
entry into British territory and to trade freely, but British
flie
to I Governor-General in Baluchistan. The policy which Sandeman 
followed was described as "one of friendly and conciliatory inter­
vention”. He occupied the central points in the agency by troops 
and linked those points by good roads. He made friends with the 
Baluch chiefs and made them responsible for the control of their 
tribes. Railway and telegraph development was also undertaken.
For discussion on the respective policies, see Davies, op.cit.. 
pp. 33-5; Philip Woodruff, The Men who ruled India. The Guardians, 
pp. 143-9; "Sind and Punjab Frontier Systems” by H.B.Frere,
22 March 1876. P.S.M.. A. 12; H.T.Lambrick, John Jacob of Jacobabad. 
Appendix B, .pp. 404-15*
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officers were instructed not to cross into tribal territory.-1- 
The tribesmen, however, frequently broke these agreements and 
obliged the Government to stop the allowances, impose fines or 
blockades and, when all these proved unavailing, to send ex­
peditions into tribal territory. Between 1849 and3899, the 
Punjab Government had to undertake as many as sixty two ex­
peditions. ^
But this policy had to be abandoned in favour of what
came to be known as the forward Policy* of the 'Nineties*.
The Russian expansion in Oentral Asia and her advance towards
the borders of Afghanistan alarmed the British who regarded
the Russian threat as "a very real” and " a very close'* danger
3to the frontier of India. Consequently the defence of India 
had to be organised and this could be achieved by the occupation 
of the "scientific Frontier" based on the ICabul/Kandahar line.^”
1
Davies, op.cit., pp. 18-36; L. Harris, British Policy on the 
North-West Frontier of India. 1889-1901. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of London, I960, pp. 19-20.
2A complete list of expeditions is given in Harris, op.cit.,
Appendix G, pp. 433-40. See also Frontier and Overseas Expeditions 
from India, vol. I; Tribes North of the Kabul River, vol. II, 
North-West Frontier: Tribes Between the Kabul and Gomal Rivers,
P.S.D.L., B.234; H.L.Nevill, Campaigns on the North-West Frontier, 
1849-1908; H.C.Wylly, From the Black Mountain to Waziristan.
■^ Lytton to Salisbury, 16 July 1877, B.M. Add. MSS. 39164, vol. 
CCXXXIV, Lazard Papers. Quoted by Harris, op.cit., p.384.
4This was the strategic line which the Government cf India was to
1 6
It was, therefore, necessary to control the passes in the 
north-western hills, to improve the communication both in tribal 
and British territory and to set up advanced military posts in 
the tribal region with a view especially to facilitate the occupa­
tion of the strategic line. The implementation of this policy 
involved the establishment of a workable relationship with
1the .Amir of Afghanistan and control over the frontier tribes.
Under Lansdowne (1888-1894) and Elgin (1894-1899) the
Government cf India took new measures for the defence of India.
2A forward policy was followed in tribal territory. The Govern­
ment had already acquired control of the Khyber Pass during the 
Second Afghan War (1878-80). In 1878 the Khyber Agency was created
3
and the Political Agent conducted relations with the tribes of 
the Agency. In 1890, agreements were made with the Shiranis, 
Mahsuds and the Darwesh IChel to open the Gomal pass in South 
Waziristan for traffic. To guard the pass, tribal levies were 
raised and levy posts built. In 1891, the Samana range was oc-
occupy in case of a Russian move towards India or In the event 
of domestic troubles in Afghanistan. See for details, Harris, 
op.cit., pp. 384-96.
1
Imperial Gazetteer of India, N.W.P.P.. p. yj)
2 ■
A lucid discussion is given in Harris, op.cit.t pp. 22-41.
3
Afridis, Orakzais, Mullagoris, Shilmanis and Shinwaris.
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cupied enabling the Government to dominate the Miranzai valley 
and Southern Tirah. Here also posts were built and occupied 
by the tribal militia. In 1892, the Turis let the British 
acquire their country where a political agency was set up and 
the area was brought under direct administration. The Kurram 
militia was raised in3893* The acquisition of the Kurram 
valley gave the British command of the Kurram route leading 
over the Peiwar Kotal pass to Ghazni and Kabul.
These forward moves on the In&o-Afghan border alarmed the 
Amir of Afghanistan and aroused his suspicions of the intentions 
of the Government of India, Considerable uncertainty prevailed 
regarding the respective spheres of influence of the two govern­
ments over the tribes* To xesolve this, in 1893> the Durand 
Agreement was concluded for the delimitation of the boundary 
between India and Afghanistan. In 1894» a section cf the bound­
ary from the Bashghal mlley on the borders of Kafiristan to Nawa 
ICotal on the junction of Bajaur and the Mohmand country was de­
marcated. Further south the demarcation could not be carried 
out as the Amir was not prepared to accept the British proposals 
regarding the Mohmand territory. The section from the Kabul river 
to Sikaram (Safed Koh) was also left undemarcated and it was 
not until 1919 > after the conclusion of the Third Afghan War,
-i
Davies, on.cit. pp. 71-91; R.I.Bruce, The Forward Policy and 
its results,: H. Harris, op.cit.
that this "sebtlxoh >was::;‘r defined. From ICurram to the GomaL 
river the line was demarcated in 1894-95, Hut only when an 
expedition was undertaken against the Mahsuds, whose country, 
the South Waziristan, was made a Political Agency in I896.
The Mahsud allowances were redistributed in return for their 
promise to maintain the peace and security of the Gomal Pass, 
the construction of militia posts in a few places and their 
undertaking to desist from raids into the British areas. In 
October 1895, at the request of the Daurs and Wazirs of the 
To'chi valley, the Government occupied their country and con­
stituted it into the Worth-Waziristan Agency. The Daur valley, 
like the Kurram valley, was brought under direct administration.
Simultaneously, the forward policy was pursued in the 
north as well; the object was to secure control of passes in 
the Eastern Hindu Kush. Since 1878 the British had exercised 
some influence in the area through the Maharaja of Kashmir, a 
dependent ally of the Government of India. In 1889, the Gilgit 
agency was formed. In 1892, taking advantage of the death cf 
the ruler of Chitral and the anarchy that followed, garrisons 
were stationed at Chalt and Hunza. Three years later, Chitral's 
external relations were taken over by the Government of India
•j
Harris, op.cit.. pp. 108-137; Davies, op.cit.. pp. 158-62.
See also P. Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand.
and a permanent garrison placed at Ohitral. British, troops also
guarded the Malakand pass and the Swat river crossing. The
construction of a road connecting Peshawar with Chitral through
the Malakand pass, Swat and Bir was begun in 3395* '^ he Khan of
Dir and the tribes of Dir were given allowances in return for
their undertaking to protect communications in their areas,
to provide tribal levies to guard military posts and to allow
the movement of British troops for relief operations. This led
to the creation of the Malakand agency in 1896 consisting of
1
Dir, Swat and Chitral. Unlike other agencies, which were under
the Punjab Government, the Malakand Agency was put under the
2
direct control of the Government of India.
The active forward move inthe tribal territory during the 
’nineties’ alarmed the tribesmen who feared that the Government 
were out to destroy their cherished independence. Their reaction 
took the form of a great tribal uprising in 1897 involving the 
Darwesh Khel Waziris, the Swatis, the Mohmands, the Afridis and 
Orakzais. This led the Government to undertake seven military 
operations against the tribesmen in which 70,000 troops were
Davies, op.cit., pp. 80-88.
2Lower Swat was directly administered by the Government while 
Chitral, Bir and Bajaur had chiefs who were the allies of the 
Government.
20
engaged. The operations were ’’long, arduous and costly".^ The 
events of 1897 brought home to the Government the fact that 
the frontier policy needed revaluation. Elgin’s viceroyalty 
having come to an end in 1898, Curzon launched upon a new 
frontier policy with far-reaching results not only on British 
relations with the tribes but on the administration of the settled 
districts.
Administrative Territory
The problem which the Punjab Government faced inthe so-called 
settled districts was of civil administration. After the annexa­
tion, the trans-Indus plains between the Indus and the hills had 
been divided, for administrative purposes, into five districts,
stretching from north to south into the districts of Peshawar,
2
Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan. Including
the cis-Indus district of Hazara, all six became the frontier
districts of the Punjab. They were organised into two divisions,
the Peshawar division in 1850 and the Derajat Division in 1861,
3each under a Commissioner. A simple but efficient and forceful 
1Davies, op.cit.. pp. 91-8; Harris, op.cit., pp. 275-7. For offi­
cial published account of the operations, see G.V.Kemble, Operations 
of the Tochi Field Force, 1897-98; H.P.Walters, Operations of the 
Tirah Expeditionary Force, 1897-98; H.P.Walter, Operations of the 
Malakand and Buner Pield Porces, 1897-98. Also see H.D. Hut chin son,
The Campaign in Tirah; W.S.Churchill, The story of the Malakand Pield Force.
^Dera Ghazi Khan was on the border of the Baluch country.
■^ The Peshawar Division included Hazara, Peshawar and Kohat districts
21
administration based on the non-regulation system was introduced
t
Under this system the district officers had more extensive 
criminal powers than in a regulation province.^ In addition, 
the Deputy Commissioners of the frontier districts conducted re­
lations with the tribesmen of the adjoining tribal areas. After 
the qystem of tribal agencies came into force,' they were left 
with only a few "tribal tracts" bordering their districts.
The British administrators introduced reforms in all branches
of administration including the police, justice, land revenue,
3
public works and education etc. in the new territory. But during
and the Deraj at Division consisted of Bannu, Dera Ismail IChan 
and Dera Ghazi Khan. Imperial Gazetteer of India, U.W.F.P., 
pp. 19, 58.
T^he Cambridge History of India, vol. VI, pp. 90-5, 292.
^See pp. ^ 5-4.
3
The following works give some interesting accounts of the early 
administrative activitieefin the Punjab with special reference 
to the British officers who formulated and carried them through. 
They also throw floodlight on the conditions of the frontier 
districts at that time and their gradual transformation under 
the British. H.B.Edwardes, A year on the Punjab Frontier;
H.B.Sdwardes and Herman Merivale, Life of Sir Henry Lawrence;
H. Pearson, The Hero of Delhi. The Life of John Nicholson; 
G.R.Slsmie, Thirty five years in the Punjab; W.Lee-Warner,
The Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie: R.C.Temple, Men and Events
of My Time in India; Maud Diver. The Unsung; A.C.Taylor. General 
Sir Alex Taylor; R.Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence.
2 2
the rule of over half a centuiy by the Punjab Government over 
the Frontier districts, these areas had made slow progress 
and were less developed in various fields of administration 
than the cis-Indus areas of the Punjab. Their somewhat neg­
lected condition might be attributed to the Punjab Government's 
preoccupation more with the problem of security, law and order 
in the frontier districts than with other administrative matters. 
Added to this, indeed, was the strategic importance of this 
"outpost of the Indian Empire" where administrative developments 
were subordinated to strategic necessities.
One of the first concerns of the new rulers was the pre­
servation of law and order and the suppression of crime. The 
duties of civil police were invested in levies which were under 
the control of the Deputy Commissioner in each district. These 
levies were made up of local tribesmen who were chosen by their 
chiefs and paid by the Government. This police force was gradu­
ally changed into a regular police force. Village ifatchmen were
also appointed who helped the police in the prevention and de-
1tection of crime. Unlilce the other districts of the Punjab, 
the people in the trans-Indus districts were allowed to retain 
their arms for the protection of life and property from the raids
1
Imperial Gazetteer of India. N.W.F.P., pp. 69-71 *
2 3
l
of the trans-border tribesmen. This system remained in force
till 1899-1900 when partial disarmament of the districts was 
2
undertaken. Another special measure which the Punjab Govern­
ment undertook for the administration of justice was the en­
actment of the Punjab Frontier Crimes Regulation in 1872.
This regulation empowered the Deputy Commissioner of a frontier 
district to refer the question of guilt or innocence of an 
accused person to a j irga (Council of Elders) convened accord-
3
ing to Pathan customs.
The complex question of land revenue administration was
dealt with some vigour. The frontier districts wsre at
first put under summaiy settlements. The policy was to fix
the revenue at a low rate because the villagers were "refractory,
and if pressed betake themselves to the hills".^ Besides the in-
15
fluential classes were treated with special concessions. The
■j
General Report on the Administration of the Punjab, 1849-50* p.57.
2 .
Summary of Curzon's Administration. Foreign Department. Rorth-
West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, pp. 26-7, C.C., vol. 526;
I.F.P.P.V ifd. 6648. February 1905. Proc. Ros. 75-80.
3 .
Report on the Administration of the Punjab and its Dependencies 
1875-4* Chapter III, p. 21. This Regulation was superseded by the 
Punjab Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1887 and again by the Frontier 
Crimes Regulation of 1901, see pp, $1-5*
^General Report on the Administration of the Punjab. 1849-50* pp. 10-17.
5Sir James M, Douie, Punjab Settlement Manual (third edition), p.29.
period of the summary settlements of the frontier districts 
lasted rather a long time until in the eighteen sixties it 
was thought practicable to undertake the first regular settle­
ments, a time when revised settlements were being made in
1
most of the other Punjab districts.
Closely linked with the systematfeation of land revenue was 
the development of canal irrigation for agricultural improve­
ments. Tremendous progress had been made in this field in the 
Punjab but, by comparison with the enormous irrigation works 
constructed there, the irrigations! projects in the Frontier
p
districts were much less conspicuous.
The fostering of trade, commerce and agriculture by con­
structing roads had, too, been given some attention. On the 
Frontier, a further purpose of building roads and railways was 
strategic. No sooner was the Punjab annexed than the Govern­
ment of India directed the Board of Administration to take 
steps for laying out the military roads in the Frontier areas 
and linking them with the rest of the Punjab. But the progress 
made in the field was slow.
^Ibid., p.33.
2Imperial Gazetteer of India. N.W.F.P., pp. 43-4. Also see Im­
perial Gazetteer of India, Punjab, vol. I, pp. 65-6, 126-7, 202-19
3
General Report cn the Administration of the Punjab, pp. 21-3, 30-2
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As for education^ the Frontier districts made similarly 
little progress. The organisation of a Department of Public 
Instruction in the Punjab took place in 1854 when it was put 
Under.:;* a Director. The new educational system grew slowly 
and institutions of all kinds were established^ But edu­
cation in the Frontier Districts did not proceed beyond the 
Secondary stage. Amongst the thirty-one districts of the Punjab,
the Frontier districts were by far the least advanced in regard 
2
to education.
It may be concluded therefore that in 1901, at the time of the 
creation of the North-West Frontier Province under Guriaon, the 
Frontier districts were much less developed in all aspects of 
administration than the remaining districts of the Punjab. The 
object of the subsequent developments will be a subject of later 
chapters.
The numerous works on the North-West Frontier which exist 
are dominated by one theme: the political and strategic aspects
of the British frontier policy. Issues like the British reaction 
to the Russian approach to the Indian border, British relations
*1
Imperial Gazetteer of India. Punjab, vol. I, pp. 133-44.
2-Report on Popular Education in the Punjab and its Dependencies, 
1889-90. p.11.
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with the Amir of Afghanistan and the Pathan tribes have been 
extensively studied over manyjyears. Of the comparatively 
modern works, Dr, G. 0* Davies1 The Problem of the North-West 
Frontier, 1890-1908 (1932) is the most authoritative. Written 
more than thirty five years ago, it still holds the field as 
the most lucid exposition of the subject, although due mainly 
to the unavailability of some of the source materials the 
author has not been able to deal with the various issues with 
equal depth. For instance, while the Mahsud blockade of 1900- 
1902 has been given sufficient space, British relations with 
the Afridis and Mohmands have been treated rather briefly. Never­
theless over the years the book has provided the guide line for 
all succeeding works on the subject. Another useful older work 
is R.I.Bruce1 s The Forward Policy and its Results (1900) which 
gives a good account of Robert Sandeman’s policy in Baluchistan 
and its application by Bruce in Waziristan. Of recent works,
L. Harris's thesis on British Policy oa the North-West Frontier, 
1889-1901 is worth mentioning as a competent study of the 
Frontier policy in the nineties, the reaction it set off in the 
tribal territory and the revaluation of that policy by the 
British Government. Based on source materials to which Dr. Davies 
had little access, Dr. Harris's work has filled certain gaps 
which are found in Dr. Davies' book.
There are three other general works, al-ao- of comparatively 
recent date, the theme of which is the peoples of the Frontier 
rather than British frontier policy. The Pathans (350 B.C. - 
A.D. 1957 (1958) by Sir Olaf Caroe traces the history of the 
settlements of the Pathans and their ethnology from ancient 
times. The author* s intimate association with the Pathans among 
whom he lived and worked for about twenty years and his love 
and admiration for them is reflected in the book and makes it 
absorbing reading. Unlike the authors mentioned earlier, Sir 
Olaf has but briefly dealt with the administration developments 
under the British but the book contains an interesting account 
of some famous British officers who served on the Frontier. 
However, Sir Olaf has made but little use of archival materials. 
The Pathan Borderland (1963) by J. W. Spain, an American, is 
an account .of*cfc-he social and cultural life of the Pathans with 
a summary of British frontier policy, the political reforms 
in the Frontier Province, the problems faced by the Pakistan 
Gcvernment in the area and the progress achieved after 1947. 
Arthur Swinson's North-West Frontier, People and Events, 1839- 
1947 (1967) is primarily intended for general readers. It pro­
vides no more than an attractive narrative of a few interesting 
political and military events which took place ±n the region.
There is as yet no history of the administration of the
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Frontier Province which deals not only with the course of the 
British Governments relations with the trihes (which is but 
one aspect of the administration) but with the development 
of the civil administration of the settled districts of the 
Frontier Province as well. Nor is there any satisfactory account 
of British relations with the tribes after the first ■ decade of 
the present century. Such an account it has been my object 
to write, and the opening of the private papers of several 
Viceroys, Ghief Commissioners and others and of several series 
of secret and confidential Government documents has made this 
attempt possible. Since a comprehensive treatment of all aspects 
of the administration of the settled districts is not possible 
within the space allowed in a thesis I have concentrated only, on a 
few aspects of the administration.
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Chapter I
TEE FORMATION OF THE ITORTH-vIEST FRONTIER PROVINCE'
On as sinning office as Viceroy in January 1899 Cur son had to 
deal with the two-fold problem of the North-West frontier of India: 
the reorganisation of military defences, and the reform of the ad­
ministration of the trans-frontier districts. The frontier was 
Curzon's forte. By wide travel and study he had acquired an 
extensive knowledge of frontier problems and politics, particularly
of Central Asia, although he belonged to "neither school of Frontier 
2
theorists". Even before coming to India he had given indications
of not only his appreciation of India’s frontier problems, but his
3desire to deal with them as well.
Soon after his arrival, Curzon took up the question of military 
dispositions and the control of the tribes. Curzon's policy was, 
first, the "withdrawal of British forces from advanced positions"; 
second, "the concentration of British forces in British territory 
behind them as a safeguard and a support" and, finally, "the im­
provement of communications in the rear".^ " The regular garrison
*1
The subject of the formation of the North-West Frontier Province 
(l90l) is briefly described here since an extensive account of it 
is already given by C. C. Davies in the sixth chapter of his book, 
The Problem of the North-West Frontier Province 1890-1908, and by 
L. Harris in the eighth and ninth chapters of his thesis, British 
Policy on the Horth-h^st Frontier of India, 1889-1901? unpublished 
^Ph.D. thesis, University of London, I960.
M. Edwardes, Eighhoon of the Empire, p.64.
3Speech of Curzon in the House of Commons, 15 February 1898, P.P., 
vol. LIII, 1898, pp. 677-9. '
^T. Raleigh, Lord Curzon in India 1898-1905. p.429; L. Fraser, India
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in Chitral was reduced, the troops being concentrated at Kila
Drosh at the extreme southern end of the Chitral country.The
outlying posts were manned by the Chitrali levies themselves.
Further southwards, such posts were held by levies from Dir
and Swat for the security of the Dir-Chitral road. Regular troops
were stationed at Chakdara, Malakand aid Dargai to support the
levies. To strengthen the British position at Malakand a light
railway was constructed from Nowsher&to Dargai in 3901. In the
Khyber all regular troops were withdrawn from advanced positions
and replaced by two battalions - 1,250 strong - of the reorganised
1and enlarged IChyber Rifles with an increased number of British
officers and an improved scale of pay. For their reinforcement a
flying column was maintained in readiness at Peshawar, and for its
support Peshawar was linked with Jamrud - a distance of ten miles
- by an extension of the broad-gauge railway, and with Landi-ICotal
2
a road running through the Mullagori country. Between Peshawar 
and Kohat a cart road was built through the Kohat pass. South of 
Kohat a force of tribaymilitia - 450 strong - called the Samana Rifles
Under Curzon and After, pp. 39-55; Lord Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord 
Curzon, vol. II, pp. 39-42; C. C. Davies, The Problem of the North­
west Frontier 1890-1908, with a survey of Policy since 1849? pp. 102-3. 
On communications see chapter , \V .
1See chapter \\ , p. 99,
^See chapter \\i , pp. 7*
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was raised under British officers. It was largely recruited from 
the Oralczai tribesmen and formed a part of the Border Military 
Police; the Samana Rifles replaced the negular garrison of the 
Sain an a Range. In the Murrain valley the Murrain Militia was aug­
mented and reorganised in two battalions - 1,250 strong - on the 
model of the Khyber Rifles. Both the Samana and the Kurram positions 
were to be supported by a light railway to be constructed from Kohat 
to Thai.1
Further to the south, two battalions of the Waziristan Militia 
- 800 strong each - were raised, one being for the To chi valley or 
North Waziristan, and the other for the G-omal valley or South Waziri- 
stan. The militia replaced the large garrisons of regular troops 
which had beerfkept in these valleys since 1895, and were supported 
by mobile columns garrisoned at Bannu and I)era Ismail Khan. By 
1904 the new frontier defence policy was in operation along the 
entire line from Chitral to Baluchistan.
The new military structure, in the words of Curzon, had the
advantages of ”reduced outlay, of increased tactical mobility, and
2
of tribal contentment'1. It relieved the soldiers of the Indian army
of arduous trans-front i<= id left them, in the event of a war,
^See Chapter \V , p. £t>Lj.
^Curzon’s Minute, 27 August, 1900, C.C., vol. 319f p.2.
to be concentrated on the two main routes to Afghanistan, Bolan 
and Khyber. It was further hoped that the presence of local, garrisons 
would reduce the chance of "commotion and reproach attached to mili­
tary disaster", besides increasing the tribesmen's attachment to
the British Raj through a service which would at -the same time
1nurture their patriotism.
Thep ress in India and England commended Curzon's frontier 
policy on economic and political grounds. The Times of India hailed 
it as "the most important work" undertaken by the Viceroy "in the
p
domain of the Indian Statesmanship". The Spectator and The Times 
approved the new policy, although the latter was not "without 
doubts as to the confidence and loyalty of the tribal levies. Curzon' 
own mood was one of cautious optimism. He was fully aware that his 
frontier policy would not save the Government "from frontier war­
fare, or from occasional expeditions, or from chronic anxiety". His 
plan,ehe claimed, was essentially one of "military concentration as 
against diffusion, and of tribal conciliation in place of exasperation" 
Hot only the military defences were reorganised, but to improve 
the relations with the tribes some positive measures were also adopted.
G^ovt. of India to Secy, of State, 26 October 1899? P.S.L.I., vol. 117? 
Reg. Ho. 208.
T^lie Times of India, 8 August 1899.
The Spectator, 12 August 1899; The Tines, 8 August 1899.
4Extract from Curzon's Budget speech, 27 March 1901, Raleigh, 
op.c it., pp.416-7.
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The frontier officers were given increased freedom to act on their
own responsibility and initiative; they were asked to cultivate
friendly relations with the tribes and to acquire by slow degrees
control over them.; they were also required to deal with local
1offences expeditiously.
At the same time subsidies to the 'bribes were increased. It
was expected that the system of tribal militia and local levies
would make the tribesman responsible for the maintenance of peace
in his own land; make his service to the Government "a guarantee'1
for the "independence" of his land, and instil in him discipline
by close contact with British officers, which contact, in its
turn, would foster "mutual trust". It would mitigate to a certain
2extent the poverty and unemployment in the tribal area. The policy 
was an attempt at developing intimate knowledge of the tribesmen 
and their affairs, improving their economic condition and in this 
process gradually acquiring an influence over them.
1
L. Harris, op.cit., pp. 343-4.
2In October 3896, the amount of allowances given to the North-West 
Frontier tribes on the Punjab border, including payment to tribal 
levies was Rs. 5,65,864. In February 1908, the grand total of
es including payment to militia and tribal levies 
swell£dto Rs. -18,49,600 per annum. L. Harris, op.cit., Appendix E, 
pp. 427-30; Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 24 February 1908,
P.S.L.I., vol. 212, Reg. No. 458.
3
Curzon's speech at Peshawar, 26 April 1902, Raleigh, op.cit., pp. 424-5-
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The success of his frontier defence scheme, Curzon was cer­
tain, depended on the reform of the administration of the trans­
frontier districts. The existing system of administration, he 
saw, was full of "complexities... anomalies and... ineradicable 
flaws". The remedy, in his view, lay in the formation of a frontier 
province: the trans-Indus regions had to be brought under "more
prompt, more imperative and more direct" control and authority
of the Government of India by the removal of the intervening barrier
1
of the "elaborate organisation" of the Punjab government.
The idea was not Curzon’s own. Throughout the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century, schemes of different character had been 
mooted by officials, submitted to and debated by the Government cf 
India for the formation of a new administrative unit on the frontier. 
Host of the frontier experts of the time had agreed on the need for 
such a unit. Yet, the fact that this much-desired change had not 
been effected was a pointer to the complexity of the issue.
Prom the Mutiny until 1889, the frontier question centred on 
the various proposals to amalgamate Sind with the Punjab with a view 
to co-ordinating the frontier policies of the two administrations. 
Prom time to time schemes for the transfer of Sind from Bombay to 
the Punjab were submitted to the Government but ultimately dropped.
Curzon's minute, op.cit.» pt2.
p
The ex£>erts were Bartle Prere, Henry Durand, General Roberts, James 
Brown, Robert Warburton, Robert Sandeman, General Lockhart, Charles 
Aitchison and George Chesney. See Curzon's Minute, op.pit., p.2.
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In 1876, Lord Northbrook’s recommendations on the same issue were 
accepted in principle by the then Secretary of State, Lord Salis­
bury, However, "the plan foundered, partly on the question of cost, 
but more because of the opposition of the Bombay Presidency". The 
Bombay government was not prepared to lose Sind unless compensated 
by the transfer of other areas to its jurisdiction. During 
Lytton's viceroyalty the increased danger of Russian aggression
from Centi’al Asia necessitated a "vigilantly precautionary frontier 
2policy". Salisbury strongly urged unity of action on the part 
of the Government in the western and north-western frontier of 
India by bringing it under the direct control of the Government 
of India. Lytton in his well-known minute of April 1877 accepted 
the Secretary of State’s suggestion and sketched out a scheme for 
the formation of a separate trans-Indus province which went far 
beyond the original recommendations of the Secretary of State. The 
proposed province was to consist of the sis: frontier districts of 
the Punjab-Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu (excluding the cis-Indus 
tracts), Dera Ismail Khan (with the same exception) and Dera Ghazi 
Khan - and trans-Indus Sind (excluding Karachi). This large province 
was to be headed by a Chief-Commissioner and Agent to the Governor- 
General. Under him were to be two Commissioners, the one for the
Ibid., p.3. Also see Z.H.Zaidi, The Partition of Bengal and its 
Annulment - a Survey cf the Schemes of Territorial Redistribution 
of Bengal"!1902-1911?> Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 
1964, p.27.“ ......
2Lytton's Minute, ’Reorganisation of the frontier', 22 April 1877,
L.P., vol. 8.
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Pathan, the other for the Baluch, tribes.
Salisbury saw that Lytton’s proposals were "measures of 
defence and security, not of aggression", but since they in­
volved a huge expense and "too large a change", he rejected 
them. Alternatively, he proposed a compromise scheme: two Com­
missioners, the one for the trans-Indus Punjab, the other for 
Sind, to be appointed directly by the Viceroy. In regard to ex­
ternal affairs they would, correspond with the Viceroy direct,
while, in matters of internal administration, they would act
2under the Punjab government. Salisbury's proposal met with
severe criticism. Charles Aitchison, the Foreign Secretary of
the Government of India, aid Robert Egerton, the Lieutenant-Governor
of the Punjab, condemned it as "full of the seeds of future mis-
understanding, confusion... divided responsibility" and certain
to cause "the worst effect upon the internal administration of
3
the frontier districts". Despite this criticism, Lytton accepted 
Salisbury’s proposals. General Frederick Roberts was designated 
the first Commissioner of the trans-Indus districts. But,soon af­
terwards, the Second Afghan war broke out resulting in the termin­
ation of Lytton’s viceroyalty. Ripon, who succeeded Lytton, abandoned, 
the scheme altogether.
^Ibid.
2 £&.
Curzon * s Minute, p.3.
3Ibid.
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In 1889, when Lansdowne was the Viceroy, the Baluchistan 
Agency was created with Hobert Sandeman as its head; Sind 
ceased to be a frontier province. Before laying down his office, 
Lansdowne expressed the desirability of the creation of a single 
frontier charge which should be entrusted to the management of 
a single officer under the immediate direction of the Government 
of India.
1
The tribal uprising of 1897-8, as has already been seen, 
underscored the need for the detachment of the tribal -territory 
from the Punjab administration and its placement under the direct 
control of the Government of India to ensure its efficient manage­
ment. Hamilton, the Secretary of State, therefore suggested to 
Elgin, who load, taken over from Lansdowne in 1895? that
the present arrangements are not satisfactory, and 
that it is desirable that the conduct of external 
relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier 
should be more directly than heretofore under the 
control and supervision of the Government of India.
Accordingly he proposed a scheme which provided that the Commissioner
of Peshawar and his subordinate officers responsible for dealings
with frontier tribes should act directly under the Government cf
India, while in all matters of civil administr at inn, he and his
subordinates would continue to be under the Punjab government. It
■]
See Introduction, p^ .
^Secy. ot Stale to Govt, of India, 5 August 1898, 0.C., vol. 501.
was exactly the reproduction of Salisbury's scheme twenty-one
years before and met with an equally frosty reception from the
1
Punjab authorities. It fell to Curzon's lot to deal with the 
problem which had taxed the energies of the earlier Viceroys.
Curzon was not the man to let matters drift. Before Elgin 
left India Curzon had discussed the matter with him. In April 
1899 he held discussions with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Pun­
jab, Mackworth Young, and other frontier officers. Curzon suge 
gested four possible solutions: first, the status quo should be
maintained; second, a separate frontier province and commission 
should be created; third, Hamilton's compromise plan should be 
adopted; fourty, the trans-frontier districts should be divided 
into five or six separate charges each under a political officer. 
Curzon claimed that the opinion of the Punjab officers was in 
favour of the creation of a separate province, while the Lieutenant- 
Governor, though in favour of maintaining the status quo, did not 
seem either ‘'unreasonable or immoderate". Curzon, for himself, 
maintained that the status quo was unsatisfactory. The existing 
system was such that the Viceroy, though directly responsible for 
frontier administration, had to implement lhs policy through the 
medium of subordinate officials who might well have no special
1Govt, of India to Secy, of State, 10 November 1898, P.S.L.I., vol. 
Reg. No. 207, C.C., vol. 301.
^Curzon to Hamilton, 12 January, 5 April 1899, 0«C.. vol. 158.
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knowledge of frontier affairs and over whose appointment, inter­
change or removal, the Viceroy had no control. In norma], times 
the Supreme Government did not interfere with the Punjab govern­
ment's handling of frontier affairs. But emergencies could arise 
when they had to act and even assume entire control of the frontier. 
Such a control could hardly be effective as the Supreme Government 
had to act through
agents who are not its own; while the Punjab govern­
ment, dispossessed and sulky, stands on one side, 
criticising everything that is done.l
Naturally Curzon felt gratified to have received what he called
"a unanimous pronouncement cf the leading officials of the Punjab
2government against their own system’!.
In a series of private and official letters to Hamilton,
Curzon scathingly condemned the extremely unsatisfactory way the 
frontier was being administered by the Punjab government. The 
latter, he pointed out, had no idea of any frontier policy at all; 
the officers at Lahore had neither any knowledge of nor any interest 
in frontier affairs; the Punjab government showed "distrust" of 
their own officers in the frontier areas which bred mutual dis­
agreement, "perpetual friction... inevitable blunder and... scandalous 
■5
delay."
I^bid.
2
Curzon to Hamilton, 5 April 1899? C.C.» vol. 158.
3Curzon to Hamilton, 9 March, 27 September 3899? ibid.
In a minute dated 27tli August 1900, "perhaps the most 
elaborate written by a Viceroy",'*' Curzon sketched Out his scheme 
for taking over the administration of the frontier from the Punjab 
government and the constitution of a new province. In Curzon’s 
opinion the area between the Swat river and the Comal valley was 
the’host critical, most anxious and most explosive section of the 
entire frontier" of India, It was inhabited by the "most numerous, 
fanatical and turbulent of the Pathan tribes". .And in regard to 
such an area, the Viceroy, who was the "Foreign Minister" of India, 
could not issue orders or make an appointment except through the 
Punjab government. This, Curzon asserted, was a most reprehensible 
system:
I venture to affirm that there is not another country 
or Government In the world which adopts a system so 
irrational in theory, so bizarre in practice, as to 
interpose between its Foreign Minister and his most 
important sphere of activity, the barrier, not of a 
subordinate Official, but of a subordinate Government, 
on the mere geographical plea that the latter re­
sides In close proximity to the scene of action - a 
plea which itself breaks down when it is remembered 
that for five months in the year the Supreme and the 
Local governments are both located the same spot,
Simla. 2
Curzon felt that the officers posted to the frontier did not posses 
the necessary qualifications aid training. Nor could they gain
■I
Edwards, op.cit., p.111.
2
Curzon’s Minute, op.cit., p.8.
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enough experience and specialised knowledge for they did not
serve long enough on the frontier. He pointed out that the five
Lieutenant-Governors of the Punjab since 1877, who had to their
credit the total cumulative service of 145 years at the time of
their appointment as heads cf the Punjab government, had only
served in the frontier districts for the total cumulative period
of twenty months. Hone of the Chief Secretaries of the Punjab
government between 1878 and 1899 had, at the time of appoint-
1merits, any experience of political service in the frontier at all. 
Curzon, therefore, believed that the Punjab government's personnel 
was not specially equipped with the requisite knowledge and exper­
ience of the frontier. The officers of the Punjab Commission, the 
Viceroy went on, due to die wider scope of promotion In the Revenue 
and Finance Departments, did not like to serve on the frontier, 
for it was a tedious, risky and less remunerative job. There was 
much "departmental irresolution" in the administration, and the 
"dissipation instead of concentration of responsibility". V/liere 
"rapidity of action and swiftness of execution" were so essential, 
the long official chain and numerous links of references made prompt 
action impossible. It was wrong to suppose, said Curzon, that the 
interposition of tie Punjab government between the Supreme Government
*Curzon's Minute, op.cit.,p.9.
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and tlie Frontier involved ”a wise and necessary decentralisation,r.
On the contrary, it led to ”centralisation of the pettiest and most
exasperating description”. Three factors were responsible for
this: the indecision of the Punjab government, "the timidity” of
its junior local officers, and the restrictions on the initiative
and authority of these officers. Curzon concluded that the existing
system of frontier administration
attenuates without diminishing the ultimate re­
sponsibility of the Government of India. It 
protracts without strengthening their action. It 
interposes between the Foreign Minister of India 
and bis subordinate agents, not an Ambassador, or 
a Minister, or a Consul, but the elaborate mechan- 
ism of a Local Government, and the necessarily ex­
alted personality of a Lieutenant Governor... Worked 
as the system has been with unfailing loyalty and 
with profound devotion to duty, it has yet been the 
source of friction, of divided counsels, of vacil­
lation, of exaggerated centralisation, of inter­
minable delay.!
The remedy lay, Curzon was convinced, in the creation of a new 
province, consisting of the trans-Indus districts of Peshawar,
Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and the political agencies of Dir,
Swat and Chitral with headquarters at Malakand, Khyber, Kurram,
Tochi and Wana. The inhabitants would be as far as possible Pathan 
only.
The head of the new administration would be a Chief-Commissioner 
and Agent to the Governor-General, appointed by and directly subord-
Curzon1s Minute, op.cit., p.1p.
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inate to the Government ox India. He would reside at Peshawar, 
and would he assisted! by a Revenue Commissioner and a Judicial 
Commissioner. A small commission would he set up to deal with 
matters regarding the recruitment, replacement and promotion of 
officers in the new province. The frontier officers would cease 
to belong to the Punjab Commission, being brought within the 
graded list of the Political department of the Government of 
India. However, the Divisional and District Judges and Settlement 
Officers would be borrowed from the Punjab or from other provinces. 
For other departments, such as Police, Jail, Medical, Education, 
Irrigation and Public hoiks, and the subordinate establishments 
of all departments, Curzon would take over temporarily the whole 
or the bulk of the existing staff of the Punjab government serving 
in the area of the proposed province. The Viceroy expected that 
in return for the employment of the officers of the Punjab Commission 
in the new province, the Punjab government might be willing to 
employ educated Pathans of good family in the Punjab civil service.'*' 
The plan for the new province having been set out, Curzon 
proceeded with meeting some objections to the project and emphasising 
its compensating advantages. Hamilton, in his despatch of 5 August 
1898 had raised four possible objections to a new frontier province.
•\
Curzon's Minute, op.cit., p.20. Note by J. G. Lorimer on the diffi­
culties connected with the scheme of a New Frontier Agency, 3 Sept­
ember 1900, C.C., vol. 919.
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The first was that the scheme would have the effect of breaking 
up the established administrative units of the Punjab and dis­
turbing, in particular, the revenue system in the Peshawar, Kohat 
and Bannu districts. The proper functioning of the revenue system 
needed specially-trained officers such as were nchb ordinarily 
available in the Political Department. To overcome this difficulty, 
Curzon proposed that the new province would continue to get offi­
cials with experience in revenue matters from ‘the Punjab. In this
way the revenue administration of the frontier districts would be
1
left undisturbed.
Hamilton's second objection was that the creation of a new 
province would entail ua succession of territorial rectifications 
and comp©naations!i. Curzon did not regard it a valid objection for 
the change did not warrant any compensation to the Punjab. The 
new province, Curzon pointed out, would take away only one-fourteenth 
of the Punjab's total area, one-fifteenth of its total revenue,
2
and a little less than one-eighteenth of its entire population.
In the circumstances the question of any territorial compensation 
to the Punjab, he said, did not arise at all. Moreover the districts
Curzon's Minute, op.cit., pp. 20-21.
2
The area, population and revenue of the Punjab according to the 
1891 census were as follows:
Area Population Revenue
"(rupees)
148,9^6 sq. miles 25,130,127 27,532,972
Por the districts to be withdrawn from the Punjab:
Area Population Revenue
(rupees
10,691 sq. miles 1,365,575 1,875,847
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proposed to be detached did not belong to the Punjab either geo­
graphically, historically or ethnologically; they were in­
habited by entirely different peoples having different modes and 
standards of life. These essentially different conditions cbtaining 
In the area had, in fact, been recognised by the Government as in­
dicated by the operation of special rules and regulations in the 
frontier districts.'*' Besides, Curzon went on, the making of Baluchistan
into a separate administration, the inclusion of Chitral and Dir with-
2
in the British sphere of iifluence, the Durand Agreement and the 
consequent political protectorate over Waziristan had, "revolutionised 
the state of affair^bn the frontier". These developments had changed 
the nature of frontier work which had become mainly political so as 
to bring it within the sphere of the Supreme government. Considerations 
of compensating the Punjab government for the loss of its jurisdiction, 
Curzon contended, should no longer stand in the way of the long over­
due change. He dismissed these pleas as being superfluous and re­
inforced his arguments against any compensation by referring to the 
op inion of P. D. Cunningham, the Commissioner of Peshawar who in 1898 
had remarked?
the population, levenue, trade and wealth of the pro­
vince ZPunjab/^  have so increased since the question 
of a separate Frontier Commissioner ship was mooted
See
2See p. IT.
some 20 years ago under the Government of Lord 
Lytton, that what would be left to the Punjab 
after removing Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat and a strip 
of the Deraj at is still sufficient to constitute 
an administrative area of the first class.^
Hamilton!s third objection to a new province was that it 
would deprive the Punjab government of a ■valuable opportunity of 
training officers for the Frontier service and of acquiring know­
ledge of the tribesmen. Ourzon maintained the contrary view: the
creation of a Frontier province would offer greater opportunities 
for such training than had hitherto existed as the officials 
would belong to a separate Political Department of the Government 
of India. An officer displaying exceptional ability in tribal 
dealings would have no fear of being withdrawn, unless his services 
were required for a more responsible post of a similar nature in 
Baluchistan or in the Political Department of the Supreme Govern­
ment. On the other hand, an officer lacking in aptitude in dealing 
with the tribesmen could be easily transferred to another place 
in the Foreign Department. It could be expected that a ’’fresh 
goal of ambition" would lie in front of political officers; that, 
in fie near future, the new Province would attract the best men in 
the civil and military service and ,that it would be "the nursery of 
a new school of political officers who would revive the memories
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and credit of "bygone days'1.***
Finally, Hamilton had held that the change ■would lead to
a "forward and aggressive policy” on the part of the Government.
This Curzon rejected as an "entire illusion", contending that,
in the past, the intervention of the Punjab government had not
acted as a barrier against "a forward policy" or saved the
Supreme Government from punitive esq)editions ca? from Frontier
war. The fifty years control of the Punjab government over the
Frontier, he asserted, had neither prevented the forty military
expeditions against the tribes nor held back the rapid forward
p
move of the Government into the tr ibal territory.
Having dismissed the objections raised by the Secretary of 
State, Curzon proceeded to convince the members of his Council. 
Copies of his Minute were sent to each member of the Viceroy's 
Council at the end of August 1900. A special meeting of the Council 
was held on 10 September 1900 for final discussion and, three 
days later, Curzon’s Minute with a covering despatch was sent to 
the Home government "with an expression of our unanimous and hearty 
agreement with its main provisions".^ In a mood of relief Curzon
1
Curzon’s Minute, op.cit., p. 2 5 •
2
Curzon's Minute, op.cit., p.27.
■^ Note by Curzon, 27 August 1900, Q.C., vol. 319*
^Oovt. of India to Secy, of State, 13 September 1900, ibid.
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wrote to Arthur Godley, the Permanent Under Secretary of State
at the India Office:
My Frontier Scheme is finished and done at last.
I feel like an Eton hoy who lias got through trials.
Be kind to it and help it on. It would break my 
heart if it were now to fall through.^
Even though Curzon had claimed the "unanimous and hearty 
agreement" of his officers he, in fact, had not bothered to con- 
suit the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Mackworth Young, be­
fore he sent his j>roposals to the Secretary of State. The Vice­
roy’s explanation of why he kept the matter frcni the Lieutenant- 
Governor was that the latter being "slow, very sensitive" and 
"very disputatious" would have taken the measure as "a wilful 
diminution of his prestige"or even as a "personal affront". He 
would have "violently protested" against the scheme, incited
an agitation both in India and in England, and rendered its pass-
2
age through the Council difficult. But after sending off the 
despatch to the India Office, Curzon x>rivately informed Young about 
his scheme and assured him that if it received the approval of 
the Home government he would have with the Lieutenant-Governor 
"full and immediate" consultations concerning the details of the 
plan and show die most scrupulous regard for the traditions, inter­
ests and feeling^of the Punjab government and of Young himself.^
1 ~ _  * —  * '
Curzon to Godley, 12 September 1900, ibid., vol. 159.
^Curzon to Hamilton, 15 August 1900, C.C., vol. 159*
Curzon to Young, 15 September 190CA ibid., vol. 202.
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Haturally the Lieutenant-Governor1 s reaction m s  one of anger and 
surprise; he had expected that Curzon would give him a chance 
of expressing his opinion about the issue before any formal pro­
posals were made to the Secretary of State. Young blamed Curzon 
for having ignored him altogether and for showing want of confidence 
in him.***
In January 1901 the government of India, after having received
the sanction of the Home authorities to their scheme officially
informed the Punjab government and solicited their "hearty co*
2
operation" in its execution. The relations between the Viceroy 
and the Lieutenant-Governor had now become extremely straihed, the 
latter maintaining that from the constitutional point of view the 
Viceroy's not having consulted the Punjab government was an "un­
precedented" procedure and that it involved "a most dangerous 
%
doctrine". Young was indiscreet enough to give vent to his bitter­
ness and wrath in public, which embittered his relations with the 
Viceroy still further. Curzon heard from "several persons" that 
Lady Mackworth Young entertained "bitter feelings" and had said "bitter
1
Young to Curzon, 20 September, 1900, C.C., vol. 202; Lt. Governor, 
Punjab to Viceroy, Tel. 20 September 1900, ibid.
^Govt. of India to Govt, of Punjab, 23 January 1901, C.C., vol. 938. 
^Govt. of Punjab to Govt, of India, 13 February 1901, ibid.
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things'1 about him, aid. he believed that she had "vilified and 
abused" him all over Simla. These incidents wounded Curzon 
deeply, aid it was long before they were "effaced from his re- 
collection”. Not only the Lieutenant-Governor himself but his 
subordinate officers also took the decision of the Supreme Govern­
ment as a personal slight. When Curzon's Minute was published 
Herbert Panshawe, the Commissioner of Delhi and an ex-Ciiief Secret­
ary of the Punjab, resigned, feeling that " a great public indig­
nity had been thrust upon the ^Punjab/ administration as unmerited
2
as it was ungenerous". The appointment of Colonel H. Deane as 
the first Agent to the Governor-General in the new province gave 
further offence to the Punjab government. Deane was then Political 
Agent of the Hal ak and agency. Curson considered him , by his ex­
perience and qualifications, to be the best officer outside the Pun­
jab Commission to head the new province. Young objected to Curzon's 
choice, pointing out that the two Frontier Commissioners, P. Cunning­
ham aid W. H. Merk, were the most senior officers in the Punjab 
Commissioner, Deane was junior-to. both the officers by thirteen and 
ten years respectively and had served under them. Young recommended 
that either Cunningham or Merk be given the post. Curzon rejected
■j
E. Baring (military secretary to Viceroy) to Lady Y0ung, 23 Septem­
ber 1901; M. Young to Curzon, 30 September, 1901, C.C., vol. 230.
2Curzon to Hamilton, 11 June 1901, P.O., vol. 161; The Spectator,
15, 22 June 1901.
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the recommendation; Cunningham ms about to retire and Merk
did not appear to the Viceroy to be a suitable choice.i Deane
was ’’highly thought of" in the India Office aid his proposed
2appointment was received favourably there.
Deane was asked by the Viceroy to thrash out a plan to
male© the new province ”independent, self-contained and self-
3supporting". Accordingly Deane recommended the inclusion of 
the Mansahra, Abbottabad and Haripur tahsils of Hazara district 
in the new province not originally included in the scheme. The 
reasons given for this incorporation were that, leaving aside 
the Abbottabadtahsil, Hazara was a frontier district. It was a 
part of the Peshawar administrative division where the same 
Border Military Police System and the Frontier Grimes Regulations 
were in force. A considerable proportion of the inhabitants of 
Hazara was of Pathan extraction. Moreover Hazara would provide 
the base for the political control over the Cis-Indus Black Mountain 
tribes. In addition, Hazara would provide a good sanatorium in 
summer for the Agent to the Governor-General and his officers and
would bring thejwhole of the Punjab Frontier Force with its Head­
quarters at Abbottabad within the local limits of one single civil
q
Curzon to Hamilton, 15 August 1900, C.C., vol. 160.
^Curzon to Young, Tel.4 February 1901, P.O., vol. 203.
3Scheme for the Administrationof the H.W.F.Province, p.l, ibid., vol. 320.
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adminis tration.^
Young, ad- could “be expected, was critical of the scheme
contending that the severance of the districts of Peshawar,
Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail IChan and Hazara from the Punjab would
be unpopular with the people and the chiefs of the districts alike;
that the '’miniature administration” of the new province, apart
from involving considerable expense,would be far from efficient;
that the Chief Commissioner would not be able to give equal
attention to his political and administrative duties, and that
under the new scheme the border districts would be reduced to a
2
status of an "inconvenient appendage”.
Curzon dismissed Young's views as the "belated addition”
3of his protest against the formation of the new province. He 
also rejected Young's request that the severance of the frontier 
districts from his charge be put off until March 1902 when he 
would, retire. The Viceroy., was eager to inaugurate the new ad­
ministration without any delay because, as he said,
The unfortunate attitude of M. Young is known every­
where in the Province, the idea had been widely dis­
seminated that the Local and Supreme Governments are 
at loggerheads with each other; that the Lieutenant-
1
Ibid., p.4.
2
Young's Memorandum on the Scheme for Adrnini strati on of the rl.iv.P. 
Province, 15 July 1901, C.C., vols. 320, 321, 338; P.S,M>, A 154; 
P.S.L.I., vol. 135, Peg. Ho. 124.
■^ Curzon to Hamilton, 17 July 1901, C.C., vol. 161.
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Governor has successfully defied the Viceroy; and 
that it is possible that the new scheme may still 
fall to the ground.^
The only way to dispi*ove these apprehensions was to bring the new
administration into existence with as little delay as possible.
The North-West Frontier Province, therefore, came into being
p
on the King’s birthday, 9 November 1901. The formal inauguration
of the Province took place five and a half months later, on 26
/ipril 1902, when Our a on held a big durbar (reception) of three
thousand dignitaries of the area in the Shahi Bagh at Peshawar.
Curzon’s address to the assembly was a tUll statement of his frontier
policy. lie told his audience that the Viceroy’s presence in person
on the occasion was proof of Ms interest in the new province and
his sympathy with the new work. He hoped tbrb the creation of the
province w ould lead to "the peace and tranquillity and contentment
of the Frontier". Its control by the Government of India "instead
of somebody else", the Viceroy asserted, would be advantageous both
for the Government and the frontier people.
Business Mil be better done and more quickly done; 
and there will not be long aid vexatious delays. The 
system of rule will not be altered, tut it will be 
more efficiently worked. Fver;yjman in the Frontier 
districts ought to look upon it as a direct gain to
 ^Jbid.
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 29 October 1901, P. S. L. I., 
vol. 138, Keg. No. 1276.
himself that he has a local government on the spot, 
and that there is nobody above that local Govern­
ment but the Government of India... Merit will be 
better known under the new system, service will be 
more quickly rewarded, abuses will be more promptly 
checked, responsibility will be more strictly enforced 
and punishment, when punishment is needed, will be more 
swift
The Viceroy called upon the leading men of the Province to co-operate 
with the local administration especially in the d©te,Qtion and 
punishment of violent crimes to help the Government attain their 
object of establishing peace and order in the Province. Curzon 
assured the durbaris that he would watch the new administration 
"with a fond and parental eye", see to it that the "local pride 
and local patriotism" were "jealously guarded" and that the 
Province showed itself "ever more and more deserving of the inter­
est that has secured for it a separate existence and an independent 
name".
The head of the Borth-lTest Frontier Province was a Chief- 
Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General, appointed by and 
directly responsible to the Government of India. The Chief-Commissioner 
had a dual duty to perform which constituted a unique feature of 
the administraticnof the Province. In his capacity as the Agent to
Summary of Curzon's Administration,_ Fgreign__p_ejit.
Baluchistan, Part XX, p.21, 0.0., vol. 526; Palbi£h, op.clt., p.427.
2
Ibid., pp. 427-8.
5 5
the Governor-General, he controlled the political relations 
with the border tribes, wliile as the Chief Commissioner, he exer­
cised the same powers in the civil administration cf the l^ ro vince
1
as the heads of other provinces did in their charge.' The staff 
of the Chief Commissioner consisted, of members of the Indian Civil 
Service , Military officers of the Political Department of the Govern­
ment of India and the Punjab Commissiony.rmembers of the Provincial 
and Subordinate Civil Services, Police officers and officers speci­
ally recruited for the departments such as Medical, Education,
Public Works, Forest and Jails etc. The Chief Commissioner's 
principal advisers were the Judicial and Revenue Commissioners.
The Jtidicial Commissioner headed the judicial administration of 
the province, his court being the hig'hest Civil and Criminal appel­
late tribunal which replaced the Chief-Court of the Punjab. Sub­
ordinate to the Judicial Commissioner were the two Divisional and. 
Sessions Judges of Peshawar, and the Deraj at. As Divisional Judges, 
these officers decided most of the appeals in civil suits from 
the "Courts of first instance". As Sessions Judges, they tried 
Sessions cases, with fie aid of assessors, and heard criminal appeals. 
The Revenue Commissioner was the controlling and final appellate 
revenue authority in the province. lie bad also to act as the Re­
venue and Financial Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, besides
'imperial Gazetteer of India: Worth West Frontier liro vince, pp. 57-8;
Davies, op.cit. , p. 112; Scheme for the Administration of N.W.F.P.,
1901, op.cit., p.l.
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■being the Director of Land Records and Agriculture, Commissioner 
of Excise, Superintendent of Stamps, Registrar-General, Inspector- 
General of Registration and Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, 
ho change was reflected in the subordinate revenue agency. Each 
of the five districts remained, as "before, under a Deputy Com­
missioner. The Yusufzai, Mardan and howshera tahsils in Peshawar, 
and the tahsils of Thai in Kohat and Tank in Lera Ismail Khan 
formed subdivisions, each in charge of an Assistant or Extra- 
Assistant Commissioner. Each of the five political agencies had 
a Political Agent. In the ICurram, Northern and Southern Waziristan 
Agencies, the Political Agents exercised the powers cf District 
Magistrates and Court of Session in dealing with criminal cases.'*'
The administration of the Province had certain distinctive 
features which were indicative cf the special treatment which the 
Government thought the area deserved in view of its political and 
strategic importance. The first such feature ms that not only 
was the Province itself under the Foreign and Political Department 
of the Government of India but the higher posts of Chief Commissioners, 
Deputy Commissioners and Political Agents dn the Province were mainly
manned by officers in the Political Department and by men who had
2
political experience, and training. The first Chief Commissioner
ibid., pp, 9“16; Imperial Gazetteer of India: North-West Frontier 
Province, p.61.
^Between 1901 and 1921 the position of military officers who held 
the post of Deputy Commissioners in the five districts was as follows:
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was Colonel (later Sir) Harold Deane. From 1885 to 1895 He was 
Assistant Commissioner in charge of the Yusufzai subdivision of 
the Peshawar district and the Deputy Commissioner of the district. 
Between 1895 and 1900 he acted as the Political Agent of the Dir, 
Swat and Chitral agencies. Deane’s long record of service among 
the Patlians enabled him to know the people well, to speak their 
language and to command their respect and confidence. His poli­
tical experience, combined with M s  strong personality and fear­
less character, had influenced Curzon's decision to give him the
1charge of the Province in preference to his seniors in the service. 
Curzon regarded him as "an ideal ruler” of the new Province, who
was "modest, cool, alert, well-balanced, a master of his subjects
2
and his men” and who inspired "both affection and respect”. Deane 
remained in office for over six and a half years before being suc­
ceeded, in June 1908, by Lt. Col. G. Roos-Keppel, who since 1900
in Dera Ismail Khan there had been thirty-four changes between 
twenty-five persons and on fifteen occasions military o fficers 
held the post. In Bannu there had been thirty-three changes 
between twenty persons and on nineteen occasions military officials 
held the post. In Hazara there had been twenty changes between 
fifteen persons and on twelve occasions military officials held 
the i^ ost. In ICohat between 1909 and 1915 there had been eighteen 
changes and on nine occasions military officials held the post. In 
Peshawar since 1908 there had been eighteen changes between thirteen 
persons and on ten occasions military officials held the post.
H.W.P.P. Enquiry Committee Report, 1924, pp. 45-6.
"Who was Who, 1897-1916, p. 188; Olaf Caroe, The Pat bans, pp. 421-2. 
See also supra, p.5b'.
2Curzon to Hamilton, 30 April 1902, C.C.» vol. 161.
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had been Political Officer in Khyber.^ Lord Minto, the Governor-
General, selected him mainly because he was uan expert in tribal
administration1' who wielded remarkable personal influence with
the Afridi tribes. Though Minto liked Michael O'Dwyer, the Revenue
Commissioner of the Province, he did not give him the Chief-
Commissionership because, as the Governor-General himself put it,
the pressing need of the ... Province is tribal 
administration and not the furtherance of revenue 
questions - as yet at any rate. 2
There was an adverse reaction in the Political. Department on Roos- 
Keppel’s appointment "over the heads of 50 seniors or even over 
80". Besides, Roos-Keppel had no experience of civil administration. 
But John Morley, the Secretary of State, approved of Minto's choice 
because he said "Peshawar requires" a man like Roos-ICeppel.^ Roos- 
Keppel remained in office until 1919 when he retired.
Another striking feature of the administration of the Pro­
vince was that it had always a budget deficit. Prom 1901 to 1910 
the revenue and expenditure of the Province was wholly Imperial.
It was hoped at the time of the formation of the Province that its 
finances would, be provincialised by a "quasi-provincial contract"
1
History of Services Puntjab, 1919-20, pp. 148-9.
‘Rlinto to Morley, 4 dime 1908, M.P., vol. 16.
5Morley to Minto, 16 July 1908, Ibid., vol. 5*
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as soon as possible but, because there was no "sufficient data
to go upon",'** the hope remained unfulfilled. In 190Q the Do-
centralisation Commission took up the Issue and recommended a
quasi-provincial settlement for the Province on the lines of 
2Baluchistan, and the recommendation was accepted, by the Govern” 
meat in 1910-11. According to this settlement, the local ad- 
ministration was assigned revenues under major heads such as 
land revenue, stamps, excise, forest, registration, police, 
medical, jails, education etc. In the event of expenditure ex­
ceeding the assigned revenues, the difference was to be made up 
by a fixed recurring grant from Imperial revenues. 1'he Govern­
ment of India also took the responsibility for providing the 
expenditure under the "political subsidies", "refugees and state 
prisoners" and "salaries of officers borne on the cadre of the 
Political Department". In regard to the assigned revenue and
expenditure, the Chief Commissioner was empowered to exercise
3the same powers as the heads of other local governments. The 
1
Summary of Curson’s Administration, op.cit., p.24*
2
Report of the Decentrasliation Commissimi, para 147.
^Secy. to Govt, of India to Roos-Ifeppel, 5 November 1909, Merk to 
Secy., Govt, of India, 13 May 1910, Depy. Secy, to Govt, of India 
to Chief Commissioner, 24 November 1910, X.P.P.P. (Establishment), 
vol. 8515, March 1910, Proc. Nos. 60-63, December 1910, Proc.
Nos. 66-71. See also X.P.N.P. (Accountant-General)» vol. 8727, 
April 1911, Proc. No. 1, vol. 8728, August 1911, Proc. Nos. 1-6*
I.P.P., vo1. 8759, November 1911, Proc. Nos. 612-3.
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revenue increased steadily, but the expenditure of the admini­
stration rose rapidly, too, with the result that the budget 
always showed a deficit.^ - The large excess of expenditure over 
revenue was attributed to the
geographical position and political importance 
of the Province, considerations of imperial 
policy calling for special outlay under poli­
tical. .. police ,^public/ general administration 
and civil Hjo rks. 2
The government’s main expenditure lay in matters relating to
the tribal tracts and border defence, the largest increases in
this expenditure appearing, necessarily, under Political and
Police, which included the tribal allowances, maintenance of
tribal levies and the Border Military Police which was reorganised.
1
The llorth-V/est Frontier Province Revenue and Expenditure
Year
1902-03 
1910-11 
1919-20
The Administration Reports of the M.¥.1T.P.» 1901-03, p. 57, 1910-11, 
p.20, 1919-20, pp. 26-7-
2Imperial Gazetteer off India: North-West frontier Province, p. 62.
Revenue Expenditure Deficit
Rs. Its. Its
45,40,924 74,92,646 29,51,722
46,57,275 99,50,435 52,73,160
70,85,845 1,80,20,927 1,09,34,082
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1
in 1912-13 as the Frontier Constabulary. The figures below 
show that the "principal rise in expenditure", since the forma­
tion of the Province, had been due to the need for the "protection
2of India’s land frontier".
The peculiar feature of the judicial administration of
the Province was the Frontier Crimes Regulation, "an exceptional
and somewhat primitive" Regulation, as the India Office described 
3
it. it was enacted in 1872 by the Punjab government and was re­
vised in 1887 and 1901. The Regulation empowered the Deputy Com­
missioner to refer both civil and criminal cases to Council ' of 
Elders, called the Jirga. The Jirga was a traditional indigenous 
institution for administering justice recognised and resorted to 
by the tribesmen themselves. The government, in a modified form,
1 Selected Items of
Revenue
Item 1902-03 1910-11 1919-20
“Rs. Rs. Rs.
Land Revenue 17,26,302 20,32,731 20,28,510
Irrigation 1,53,755 7,63,302 13,58,273
Stamps and
Excise 5,81,876 8,80,210 17,29,717
"Political” 20,97,106 32,14,115 53,11,652
Law and
Justice 5?84,080 7,02,020 11,33,049
Police 10,67,104 15,59,316 41,03,262
Education 29,937 1,61,796 8,81,295
Civil Works 26,041 21,53,735 21,32,755
(roads and
The Administration Reports of the R.W.F.P., 190103s p. 57? 1910-11, 
p.20, 1919-20, pp.'26-7.
N^.¥.P.P. Enquiry Committee Report, op. cit., p.20.
31. , 1901, vol. 579? Reg. 110. 1815,~~India Office’s Comment on
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preserved, aid mad.e use of the institution in the settled districts 
as well as hi hie administered tracts of the political agencies.
Under the Regulation',: a Jirga consisted of three or more persons, 
nominated and appointed "by the Deputy-C.bmmissioner. The latter 
referred a civil case to the Jirga if he was convinced that the 
dispute would cause blood-feud, or murder, a breach of peace or 
some other mischief, especially if a frontier tribe were involved 
in the dispute. The J irga was required to make an on-the-spot in­
vestigation and to submit a report of its findings to the Deputy 
Commissioner. If the report were acceptable to the Deputy Commissioner 
he passed a decree which, however, had to be agreed upon by not 
less than tliree-fourths of the J irga members. If the Deputy 
Commissioner did not agree with the findings of the Jirga, he could 
remand the case again to the J irga for a further enquiry, or refer 
it to another Jirga. Disputes involving local customs^matrimonial 
infidelity and claims for debts etc. could be disposed of by the 
Jirga without recourse to the ordinary law courts, so that the 
vakils and pleaders were dispensed with. The system had the practi­
cal advantage of securing decisions with the assistance of those 
who had the best knowledge cf actual incidents and of local custom.
In regard to criminal cases the Deputy Commissioner's power of
the Frontier-Crimes Regulation, 1901.
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nomination of Jir^a members was limited in one respect: the
accused person had the right to object to any nominated member 
of the Jirga. The maximum penalty for a criminal offence was
1fourteen years rigorous imprisonment or transportion for life.
Ho appeal could be made to a higher court against the ultimate 
docision cf the Deputy Commissioner, but it was common to petition 
the Chief Commissioner requesting him to review the Deputy Com­
missioner' s decision." Section 21 of the Regulation provided 
for the blockade of hostile or unfriendly tribes. The usefulness 
of the Regulation ms emphasised by the Frontier Enquiry Committee. 
(1924) thus:
To repeal its civil sections would be to inflict 
grave hardship on the ^athans, who rely on them for 
a cheap and expeditious settlement of their dis­
putes by a Jirga... To repeal the criminal sections 
would be to undermine the forces of law and order 
and to deprive the Hindus, in particular, of one 
of their greatest safeguards, in a land where passions 
are hot, blood feuds are endemic, legal evidence is 
exceedingly difficult to obtain, and refuge from 
the arm of the law is close to hand across the border.
To repeal the trans-frontier sections would be to ~ 
paralyse our whole system of trans-frontier control.
1Ibid., the Regulation, sections 8-12. imp er ial G-aae11eer, op. cit. , p. 51;
Davies, op.cit., pp. 53-4; James, ¥.Spain, The Pathan Borderland, pp. 145-7.
II. J.F.P., Enquiry Committee Report, p. 27.
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Chapter II
THF RELATIONS ¥1TH TEE FRONTIER TRIBES^
1901-14
The main object of Curzon1s North West Frontier policy was 
to ensure law and order upon the borders of settled British, terri­
tory, He sought to achieve this end by securing the "pacification 
and contentment" of the frontier tribes. One great question was 
what .mixture of force, threat of force, diplomacy or material in­
ducement would best produce that pacification and contentment.
The other, of course, was how far the means chosen could be recon­
ciled with the maintenance of good relations with the Amir of Af­
ghanistan, with whose considerable influence over the tribesmen 
the British had always to leckon. Hot all areas of the frontier 
were of equal military sensitiveness, nor were all the tribes of 
such strength of strategic importance as to be able vitally to af­
fect the success of Gurzon*s policy. The evolution of that policy 
will therefore be considered in relation to Waziristan, and the 
country south and north of the Khyber and to the inhabitants of 
these regions, the Kahsuds, Afridis and Mohmauds,
The Mahsuds
The first area to be considered is haziristan, the southern 
portion of the area of mountains which forms part of the North-West 
Frontier. Waziristan is situated between the Kurram river on the
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north, the Gromal river on the south, the Durand line on the west, 
and the administrative border of the Bannu and Dera-Ismail Khan 
districts on the east* Its strategic importance lies in the fact 
that it dominates the Tochi and Gomal, two historic routes from 
Afghanistan to India, The southern half of the area is a tangled 
mass of mountains, cut and intersected by ravines, "There are 
well defined ranges which protect the interior of the country by 
double barriers, and make penetration into it a matter of extreme 
difficulty," North Wasiristan, 011 the other hand, is richer and 
more ojjen, consisting of large and fertile valleys separated by 
high barren hills,
Wasiristan is inhabited, by several tribes, the most important 
of which are called by the generic name Waziris, In origin the 
Mahsuds are Waziris, but by the British period they were for all 
practical purposes considered to be a separate tribe. The inaccessi­
bility of Wasiristan has always prevented any close contact with the
ruling power of either India or Afghanistan, and its inhabitants
1boast that "they never owned the sway of any sovereign'1,' The Mah­
suds occupying the central portion of Wasiristan are of particularly 
independent nature. And if the Isolation of Wasiristan has pro­
duced, in Denys Bray's words, the "economic stringency, the crass
■j
Gazetteer of the Tochi and Northern Wasiristan, 1898, p.91> C.O., 
vol. 909.
ignorance, and the wanton insolence and barbaric cruelty that
springs from a sense of security'1, the Mahsuds were considered
1to share these attitudes in full measure.
On their annexation of the Punjab in 1849 the main problem
of the British government regarding the border had been the defence
and security of the settled districts of the Punjab from trans-
2frontier marauders. It was not deemed politic to maintain direct 
relations with the Mahsuds nor was it held to be advantageous to 
interfere in their affairs. Instead thei Government decided to 
deal with them through intermediaries like the Nawab of lank, who 
were thought to have considerable influence over them. But this 
method of keeping the tribes quiet proved a short-lived and un­
successful expedient, for the Mahsuds, in March I860, attacked lank. 
The Government of India thereupon fell back on force aid launched 
an expedition. For some years hereafter order prevailed.^
But the campaign had another result. Having once entered 
the tribal lands the Punjab government became involved in Mahsud 
affairs. In 1865-66, therefore, the new experiment was tried of
1Denys Bray on British policy towards the Frontier tribes, 5 March 
1923? G. H. Philips, ed., The Evolution of India and Pakistan 
1858-1947) p.496,
2
See Introduction, pp. \3-4.
^Evelyn Howell, A Monograph on 'Government's Relations with the Mahsud 
tribe, 1931? u.l, P.S.P.P., B, 29 5 ? W. H. Paget and A. K. Mason, 
Record of Expeditions against the Hortlw/est Frontier since the 
Annexation of the Punjab, p.503.
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settling a number of Mahsuds on lands allotted to them in Tank
and in return of making then responsible for border defence. This
experiment, 'too, proved unsuccessful, whereupon the Punjab govern-
1
ment assumed "direct control of border affairs".
During the second Afghan War (1373-80), the frontier was 
greatly disturbed and the tribes once again became troublesome.
In January 1879 the Mahsuds burnt Tank. An expedition was then 
sent, and the Mahsuds were compelled to make the reparations de­
manded by the Government. By this tine a new factor had been intro­
duced into frontier politics: the British fear of Russian aggression.
Consequently, the non-interventionist policy hitherto followed gave 
way to 'Forward Policy'. In 1887-88, a survey expedition was sent 
up the Gonial pass to secure this strategic line of communication.
But, the attempt having failed, a new policy was tried. In 1889-90 
Robert Bruce, the Deputy Commissioner of Dera-Ismail Khan, and later 
the Commissioner of the Deraj at, proposed a plan to control the Mah­
suds through their own tribal organisation. A policy of control
through tribal leaders had been tried with success in Baluchistan
2
by Robert Sandeman. Now a similar scheme called the 'Maliki system' 
was introduced by Bruce for Wasiristan. The leading Maliks were 
selected by Bruce and graded according to their supposed power and
■j
Howell, op.cit., pp. 1-9.
2See pp.
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influence and paid allowances by the Government. In return they 
were required to supply a number of tribesmen for service as 
levies to guard the Gomal pass, to control the tribe as a body,
1
and to surrender individual criminals to the Government for trial.
But,according to Dr. Davies,Bruce committed three mistakes 
in introducing the ’Maliki system1 in Wasiristan. First, unlike 
S'audeman, Bruce did not occupy some central points in Wasiristan 
with troops so as to assist the Maliks in times of emergency.
Secondly, Baluchis and Brahuis had powerful tribal chiefs who 
could control them whereas among the Mahsuds no such powerful 
chiefs existed, And lastly, the Mahsuds were much more democratic 
compared with the Baluchis which made the former extremely difficult 
to control.^
These factors soon made the ’Maliki system’ face a hard test.
In 1893, a British officer was assassinated by the Mahsuds, The 
offenders were tried by the tj irga and sentenced, which infuriated 
a faction of Mahsuds with pronounced anti-British feelings. They, 
under their leader, Mulla Powindah, attacked the Maliks who had 
tried the murderers of the British officer. Three of the Maliks were 
killed and others were forced to flee the country. The Punjab Govern-
1WC P. Merk to Govt, of the Punjab, 24 July 1900, P.S.L.I., vol. 127, 
Reg. Mo. 1169; C. Aitchison, A Gollecticnof Treaties, Engagements 
and Sanads, vol. XI, p. 160.
2Davies, op.cit., pp, 34, 124-5.
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rnent urged, that a punitive expedition he undertaken but, as the
Supreme Government were busy with frontier 'demarcation under the
Durand Agreement concluded in 1893? this course of action was not
adopted. However, soon after, in 1894-95? the Government of India
were obliged to mount their third expedition against the Mahsuds
following an attack on VTana, which had come under permanent British
occupation in 1894* The expedition was a success and in 1895 the
whole of t/aziristan was brought under British political control.
Political agents were posted at Wana and Tochi with garrisons at
1
Vi ana and Miranshah, The Government also continued their policy
2of giving allowancesj these were now increased on the undertaking 
by the Maliks of general good behaviour of the tribesmen, their 
desistance from attack on British territory or protected areas such 
as Gomal, YJana, Spin and harm el an, surrender of criminals to the 
Government, and readiness to serve under the British in any part 
of the country. 3?or three years after this, the Mahsuds remained 
generally quiet* they did not even participate in the great tribal 
uprising of 1897-93•^
But the turn of the century saw a resumption of Mahsud out­
rages in British territory. Government troops were ambushed and
1I,» Ilarris, The British Policy on the North-Uest Frontier of India, 
1889-1901, pp. 138-190? unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of
London, I960.
^From Rs. 51?228 to a total of Rs. 61,548 
S^ee pp-iQ-fto.
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attempts made on the lives of British political officers. The
man behind all these troubles was believed to be Hulla Powindah.
However, in the absence of any positive evidence,no punishment
could be inflicted except the enforcement of tribal responsibility
1by the imposition of a fine. Apart from the Mulla’s complicity, 
the Mahsud outrages were attributed to their receiving the allow­
ances from the Government which enabled them to buy rifles and
2to the activities of the Mahsud colony in Bera Ismail Khan, This 
colony, as one of the border chiefs described, was a 1 school of 
badmashi opened by the Government for the instruction of our young
•• 3men”.
This was the situation in Wasiristan when Cur son took over as 
Viceroy. The Government had not yet evolved a sound policy, and the 
best method of dealing with the local tribesmen was nstill a matter 
of experiment”.^  Curson’s Viceroyalty witnessed a change in the 
Government’s policy towards Hull a. Powindah and. the Mahsud tribe in
-j
Howell, op.cit., pp. 7-13*
2
In 1896, R. I. Bruce, the Commissioner of Derajat, allotted 5,500 
acres of land in the Tank tahsil of the Dera-Ismail Khan district 
to Mahsud Maliks for the settlement of Mahsuds as tenants on this 
land.
^Hote by Watson, Political Officer, ¥ana, 14 May 1900, P.S.h.I., 
vol. 127, Reg. Mo. 1169; Mote on the Mahsuds by Pipon, Asst. 
’Commr., Tank, 1 February 1902, P.S.L.I., vol. 143? Reg. Mo. 473.
^Govt. of India to Govt, of the Punjab, 16 May 1900, P.S.h.I., 
vol. 127, Meg. Ho. 1169.
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general. In the middle of 1900 the Government of India bestowed 
a monthly allowance of one hundred rupees on the Hulla to "destroy
,( c, s
wes ; or a*k any rate greatly reduce" his influence and prestige among the
She,vcHv.j tribesmen, who were expected to look down upon a religious man
seeking to advance his own material interests by accepting the 
ignoble position of a British stipendiary. Though the Government 
was thus ready to buy peace with the Mulla, whom Curson nevertheless 
labelled "a first rate scoundrel", M. R. Merk, the Commissioner of
the Derajat was dissatisfied with the Maliki system as a whole,
w  tv I. m . m i*'*i ■ ■ ■ 1.1. v
In July 1900 he pointed out to the Punjab government;
There is something radically wrong... in the present 
system, he move in a vicious circle. V/e look to 
the Maliks and they look to us. Between the two the 
management of the Mahsuds falls to the ground.
Merk proposed that allowances be paid, to the tribe and. not to some
selected Maliks, and that the Government should deal with the tribe
as a whole and enforce tribal, instead of individual, responsibility
in case of offences. The practical advantage of the method, he argued,
was that every member of the tribe would become interested in con-
2
trolling the bad characters.
'j
Frontier and. Overseas Expeditions from India, II, p.437, Note by 
Curzon, 20 June 1900, C.C., vol. 308, Govt, of India to Secy, of 
State, 18 October 1900, P.S.L.I., vol. 127, Peg. No. 1169.
‘“Merk to Govt, of the Punjab, 24 July 1900, P.S.h.I., vol. 127, 
Reg. No. 1169. For tribal responsibility system, see Davies, 
op.cit., p.125.
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The argument about a change in the Haliki system was given 
further urgency by the continuation of Mahsud raids. Early in 
September 1900* therefore, two conferences were held at Simla 
attended by Curson, Young, General Egerton, the Commander of the 
Punjab frontier Force, and Merk to discuss the Mahsud problem. It 
was decided that the Mahsuds should be given a period of grace 
within which to make a settlement with the Government, and that 
failing compliance a blockade of the whole tribe should be imposed 
at the beginning of December 1900, Merk1s recommendation to dis­
continue the Haliki system was also accepted; in future the Gov­
ernment would deal, with the tribal or sectional Jirga to whom the 
subsidy would be paid; a portion of the subsidy, however, might
be reserved for certain individuals whose interests were impossible
, . 1 to ignore.
In October 1900 the Government imposed a fine of one lakh of
2
rupees on the Mahsuds for the offences committed by them. On 8 
November 1900, Merk summoned a great Jirga of the Mahsuds at Tank.
The Maliks declared themselves helpless and requested that their 
country be taken over by the Government; this, however, was not in
■i
Note by Curzon in the Military Dept., 9 August 1900, Nore by Curzon,
10 September 1900, C.C., vol. 308; Govt, of India to Govt, of the
Punjab, 18 October 1900\ P.S.L.l/, vol. 127, Reg. No. 1169,
^Govt. of the Punjab to Govt, of India, 23 October 1900, P.S.h.I.,
vol. 141, Peg. No. 293; Govfc. of India to Govt, of the Punjab,
Tel. 25 October 1900, ibid.
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accordance with the wishes of the tribesmen, Merk then announced
the terms of the Government to the assembly, and the tribe was
1
given fifteen days to discuss them. The Maliks consulted the
tribe but with no result. The time of grace was over and the
blockade duly began on 1 December 1900 with the avowed object of
2starving the tribe into submission. The blockade lasted until 
March 1902. In the initial stages it failed in its purpose; the 
Mahsuds continued both to raid and trade. Eventually in November 
1901, active operations were mounted against the tribe - and suc­
cessfully. The Mahsuds came 1d their senses. On 16 January 1902, 
they sent in a deputation to tender submission. The terms offered 
by the Government were the payment of the fine of one lakh of
rupees hi full, the return of all rifles looted and all cattle taken
3during the blockade, and the surrender of certain outlaws.
On 5 March 1902 Merk met the Mahsud j irga at Tank. The j irga 
appointed and despatched two hundred chalweshtis (Mahsud tribal 
police) for the arrest of the outlaws demanded by the Government,
On the promise of future good behaviour and the acceptance of tribal 
responsibility, the j irga was permitted to disperse with orders to
•l
Commissioner, Derajat Division,to Govt, of the Punjab, Tel. 8 Nov­
ember 1900, ibid,
2
Commissioner, Derejat Division, to Govt, of Punjab, Tel. 1 December 
1900, Ibid.
G. B. Unwin, History of the Mahsud Blockade, 1901-02; Davies, op, 
cit., pp. 128-32/ P.P^? 1902$ D m ,  cd. 1177.
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reassemble at Tank on 24 March 1902. On 10 March, the blockade
was raised and on 24 March Deane, the Chief Commissioner, sccexDted
the formal submission of the Mahsuds and announced the restoration
2
of their allowances.
In Deanes view blockade was not a very effective method for 
dealing with hostile tribes, and he certainly did not feel that 
the Mahsud blockade had been a success. He argued rather, that
"the punitive expedition remains and will remain as the best/source
for enforcing peace on the frontiern. Deane was not sure that 
even this extreme measure would be a guarantee for the future be­
haviour of the tribe
whose record for all time has been one of thieving 
and raiding and who for years past have terrorised 
their neighbours, and it may be that restless and 
turbulent spirit in the tribe may again prevail,3
This was Curzon1s feeling, too, for he commented that the Mahsud
problem had not been solved either permanently or temporarily, that
before long the Government might be compelled to take coercive
measures against the tribe.^
Merk, however, still hoped to conciliate the tribe through
allowances. Accordingly, on 5 April 1902, he distributed the tribal
Hlerk to Deane, Tels. 5, 6 March 1902, P.S.L.I._, vol.143? Meg. ITos.
473, 543-4.
2llcrk to Govt, of India., Tel. 10 March 1002, ibid, roue oy Curzon,
8 March 1902, C.C., vol. 303.
'’Deane to Govt, of India, 27 March 1902, P.S.L.I.» vol. 144? Heg. Ho. 618. 
^Hote by Curzon, 8 April 1902, G>C., vol. 303.
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payments. Out of the total sum of Rs. 61,000, Rs. 54,000 were
equally apportioned among the three sections of the Mahsuds - the
Alizai, Bahlolsai and Shaman IChel. The balance was resex’ved for
distribution among the dLd Haliks as rewards for fieir services
to the Government. Merle regarded the arrangement as satisfactory
and reported to the Government:
So far as 1 am able to judge the Mahsuds have not 
the slightest intention of permitting any one to 
do what may lead to the forfeiture of the tribal 
allowances and to the rescission of the present 
settlement... If nothing unforeseen occurs, I 
see no reason why the settlement should not work.
There will be difficulties of course... but one 
may reasonably hope that they will be overcome 
and that affairs will go smoothly till they become 
matters of routine.^
This proved, however, to be too optimistic a view. Within 
three months of Merle’s settlement, Johnston, the Political Agent 
of Wana, was pointing out the inadequacies of the arrangement 
and forecast its failure, Merk had laid down that the payment 
of fines by the three sections of the tribe was to be made in ex­
actly the same proportion as the distribution of allowances among 
them. 1-Ie had thus stretched tribal responsibility for offences 
to a point where even the innocent had to share the punishment 
with the guilty. He also argued that the sum reserved for the
Hlerk to Deane, 12 April 1902, P.S.L.I.„ vol. 147, Reg. Ho. 1073; 
Aitchison, op.cit., pp. 160-1,
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deserving Maliks was inadequate; most of the old Maliks and 
the large class whom Johnston called Hutabars had held aloof from 
the settlement. Without their cooperation it was impossible to 
conduct relations with the tribe. In Johnston*s view, the arrange­
ment was unworkable. He therefore proposed a compromise scheme 
between the Maliki system and Merle's tribal responsibility arrange­
ment ; the old Maliks were to receive better recognition than 
hitherto while the distribution of allowances was not to be on a 
sectional basis as was proposed under Merk*s arrangement. John­
ston recommended that an additional sum of Rs. 9,000 be sanctioned,
thus raising the total allowances to Rs. 70,000 per annum. Of
1this Rs. 54,000 as arranged by Merk were to be Turnani for the tribe as a
whole, rand the balance was to be distributed among the old Maliks and 
2Mut abacs.
Deane supported Johnston. He pointed out the risks involved 
in conducting relations with "the great ;jirga of the Mahsuds” which 
was "an armed rabble of several thousand strong”. It was, besides, 
expensive to entertain such a large gathering. Curson had become 
exasperated with the frontier officers' "constant oscillations” of
j
Iurn an = the whole body of the tribe; Iurn an i - payment of allow­
ances to the whole tribe.
^Johnston to Deane, July 1902, P. S. L. I., vol. 149, Reg- Ho. 144S-A.
^Deane to Govt, of India, 7 August 19^2, ibid. Deane to Govt, 
of India, 9 November 1902, I.P.P.P., vol. 6648, February 1903,
Proc. Nos. 58-64-
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policy and the lack of a fixed plan. He now reluctantly accepted. 
"Johnston's conglomerate scheme on the express responsibility of 
those Tjho proposed it". He urged the officers to make earnest 
efforts to secure continuity in the Government's dealings with
’.Jaziristan and to briny the era of divided counsels and fluctuating;
 ^ 1ac■cions to an end..
in February 1903, Johnson proceeded to put the scheme into 
effect. He held a fully representative ,jirga of ' 3,500 men at 
Jandolaj Mull a Powindak and every other man of importance attended 
the dj-rna. The fj irga unanimously agreed to do away with all the 
tribal representatives selected in the preceding year as they were 
men of no account. For these were substituted all the old Kalihps 
and other leading men who at the last distribution of allowances 
had stood aloof in the hope of obtaining separate recognition.
It was proposed that the old. Maliks and Mutabars should enter the 
'human as Vakils (representatives), that Rs. IS,000 assigned for 
Maliks should not be divided in any arbitrary way but should follow 
the tribal distribution aid be given solely to the Maliks. The 
Mull a, who had been receiving a secret allowance from the Govern­
ment and who was attending the jirga for the first time, stood up 
to defend the new arrangement as a "fair, just and generous" scheme
Siofe by Curzon, 9 December 1902, G.G., vol. 333,
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which would usher in a new era in Hahsud re 1 at inns with the Brit­
ish Government. For ten years past he had constantly opposed the 
Government, but now he promised to cooperate with them for the 
good of the tribe.1
Beane was happy that in place of the unwieldy, expensive 
and irresponsible Turn an the new scheme had set up a comprehensive 
system of representation. He hoped that the arrangement of sub­
sidising the Mahsuds would secure both their goodwill and the co-
2operation of their leaders and thus ensure peace. The hope was 
strengthened when the Mahsuds willingly enlisted in the militias. 
Three companies, each about one hundred strong, were recruited 
in the South ¥aziristan Militia, each company being formed from a 
different clan of the tribe. One such company was recruited in 
the North viaziristan Militia. Gradually the militias took over 
all the posts in iris tan which were formerly held by regulars,
with the exception of Jandola. ^
These were evidently encouraging signs, but there were others 
which clearly suggested that the conduct of the tribe was, indeed, 
unpredictable. Thus, within about eighteen months of Johnston*s
^Johnston to Beane, 14 March 1903, I.F.P.P., vol. 6648, Proc. Kos. 
68-71 *
^Deane to Govt, of India, 25 March 1903? ibid.
3 _
Howell, op.clt., p,20.
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arrangement a sepoy of the South Waziristan Militia murdered
Captain Bowring, Political Agent, ¥ana. In February 1905
Captain Harman, Commandant of the South Waziristan Militia,
was murdered by another. Mahsud sepoy. At first fanaticism was
suspected to be the cause of these incidents. Then they were
attributed to a !,plot among certain Mahsuds in the militia’'.
Inconsequence, four hundred Mahsuds in the Militia were disbanded
and sent back tofbeir homes, while twenty, who were suspected
of being the perpetrators of the crimes, were sent to Dera Ismail
Khan for trial. In November 1905, a third British Officer,
Captain Donaldson, Brigade Major at Bannu, fell victim to an
ex-militia man. It now came to the surface that Mulla Powindah
1
had actually instigated these murders.
This was the position on the frontier when Curzon in November 
1905 handed over charge to Minto. Before his departure from India, 
in a speech at the Simla United Services Club, Curzon claimed that 
the frontier was quiet and that during seven years of his Vice­
royalty no frontier expedition had been undertaken, and that the
Government had spent only £248,000 on what he called the "semi-
1pacific operation of the Mahsud blockade" as compared to £4 /2 ■
2million in the five years preceding his rule.
Minto, the incoming Viceroy, refused to accept Curzon1s
^Deane to Govt, of India, 14 March, 1905. F.S.L.I., vol. 176, Reg.
No, 690/ Crump to Deane, 11 June 1906, ibid., vol. 190, Reg.No.1382.
p
Raleigh, ou.cit., p.567.
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clalas. He felt, indeed, that hehad
inherited a difficult position on the frontier.
Our relations with the Amir, with the tribes, 
the position of the militia levies, and the view 
our officers take generally of frontier questions 
all seem to me to have been influenced by a spirit 
which I 6.0 not profess quite to understand, but 
which I thin!: has not indicated- a sense of the nec­
essity of avoiding friction on the frontier as much 
as possible,™
He could point to the evidence of unrest in the series of murders 
of British officers by Mahsud militiamen. It became increasingly 
obvious that the Border Military Police were not strong enough to 
safeguard, the border from tribal raidrs, which grew in intensity 
and frequency. Moreover Kinto soon discovered that the official 
reports submitted during Curzon' s time had. been deliberately slanted 
to throw a favourable light on the frontier situation. Several 
daring raids had been suppressed by the local authorities but not 
brought to the notice of the foreign Department, "for the sake of 
giving a good impression of Curzon1s frontier policy". Minto de­
clared himself unable to understand the line adopted by the pre­
vious administration, and in a strong letter he warned Deane that
the suppression of information respecting raids and 
the tendency to ascribe as many evil acts as possible 
to Afghan influence cannot be tolerated.2
Hi into to Horley, 8 March 1906, Minto Papers, vol. M 1005- 
2Minto to Morley, March 19^6, ibid.
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The immediate problem Minto had to deal with was the punish­
ment of the Mahsud murderers. Deane’s proposal was that the five 
relatives of Captain Donaldson's assassin should be surrendered hj 
the tribe to the Government, that all lands in the British terri­
tory belonging to the Sultani sectionfof the Alizai clan of the 
Mahsuds be confiscated, that the Mahsud allowances be stopped for 
two years and, that a fine of 25?000 rupees be imposed on the tribe.
Mailing compliance within a month, Deane recommended that an ex-
"I
pedition be sent and the Mahsud country occupied.
In December, 3905 and January 1906 Minto discussed the issue 
in his Council. There were two questions; first, the need for 
immediate action to secure the safety of British officers serving 
with the militia levies on the frontier; second, how best to pun­
ish the tribe. As for the first, two alternatives were suggested; 
either the militia posts in tfaziristan should be strengthened by 
the addition of separate contingents of troops from India, or the 
militia levies should be reorganised by the incorporation of a pro­
portion of Sikhs and Dogras who would act as a counter to the Mah­
suds. The former was a difficult course to adopt, for to send small 
bodies of troops to reinforce the militia posts was risky in the
existing state of feelings in Jasiristan, while the reorganisation
2of the militia levies would take some time.
•j
Memorandum of information for December 1905, regarding affairs on 
and beyond the H.W.M. of India, p. 15, R.S.L.I., vol. 184, Reg.Ho. 288.
Slinto to Morley, 28 December 1905, 1 February 1906, Minto Papers, 
vol. M 1005.
As for punishing the Mahsuds by an expedition, neither 
Minto nor Kitchener was favourably disposed. The members of 
the Council, though generally desirous of adopting the course, 
could not ignore the risk of the expedition escalating into a 
frontier war,’*' Minto, therefore, accepted Beane1 s proposal to 
impose a fine of Rs. 25,000 to be recovered from the tribal 
allowances, and to withhold all allowances for one year, unless 
the tribe cleared itself of suspicion or handed over to the 
Government the five men suspected of the murder of British officers.' 
The plan seemed to have worked when Mulla Powindah surrendered three 
of the men demanded. The fourth was also soon brought in. But the 
fifth, a relative of the Mulla, fled to Birmal, within the Afghan 
boundary. In spite of the suspected complicity of the Mulla in 
the recent crimes, the Government hesitated to take action against 
him, L. Crump, the Political Agent of Wana, for instance, thought 
that the Mulla was implicated in the crimes but commented that to 
"punish him means war and war means annexation". Crump, therefore, 
proposed that the Government purchase the Mulla’s loyalty by pub- 
licly granting him a plot of land in British territory; this would 
bind him "by ties of personal interest to Government" acid "incident­
al
Minto to Morley, 10 January, 1906, ibid.
ultaneoucly, 0rumx> asked the Government to rearrange the lialikl 
allowances of Rs. 16,000, for lie thought that Johnstoh' Vakils 
were merely ordinary householders of the tribe who did not exer­
cise any real influence but had undeservedly got a share in the 
Tunianl and in the Maliki allowances. Grump wanted to introduce 
the old Ualike into the settlement to give the tribe alternative
leaders and "to strengthen the oligarchy of really efficient
1
Maliksto counterbalance the influence of the Mullah. Deane was
not in favour of Crump's "revolutionary" proposal regarding the
2 3Mulla, but Minto believed that it was worth buying the Mulla off.
Unlike Curzon's secret allowance to the Mulla, the grant of land 
to him was therefore publicly announced, the Government's intention 
being to "cut away from him all his pretensions to religious piety” 
and "to set the Turnan strongly against him". Johnston's "Conglo­
merate" scheme was also changed; the number of recipients of Haliki
4
allowances was reduced from 1,500 to 300.
 ^Crump to Deane, 11 June,1906, P.S.L.I., vol.190, Reg. Ho. 1382.
2Deane to Govt, of India, 11 July 1906, ibid.
%into to Morley, 29 August 1906, Minto Papers, vol. M 1006.
^Govt. of India to Deane, 22 August 1906, P.S.L.I., vol. 191,
Reg. no. 1530, Memorandum of Information for the month of January 
1907 regarding... N„¥.P. of India, p.12, P.S.L.I., vol. 198, Reg.
Ho. 385? H0wel1, op.cit,, p.23.
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For a while the officials claimed that the Government's 
object of curbing the Mulla’s influence had been realised. Sev­
eral attempts were reported to have been made on the Mulla’s life, 
possibly by those 1,200 men who attributed the loss of their Haliki 
allowance to him. This led the officials to believe that the Mulla's 
prestige was at a low ebb which was indeed - wishful thinking, for
the Mulla continued his struggle with the discontented Maliks,
1
ua struggle fraught with menace to the peace of the border”.
There was a recrudescence of raids by the Mahsuds with an
organised system of assassinations. British subjects inside the
administered area ran great risks while the British officers in
Waziristan were practically prisoners in the militia forts.
The Government were convinced that Mulla Powindah was the
2
brain behind the Mahsud outrages, The situation which seemed to
be getting out of hand was described by Minto thus;
he sent what practically amounted to an ultimatum 
to the Mahsuds in July, warning them that if they 
did not behave themselves the consequences would be 
more serious. Their reply to this has been a raid by 
a force of an unusual strength, composed of all sections 
of the tribe into British territory and an insolent 
letter to Grump ,.. much of it :!n a tone of contempt 
and defiance, whilst a man has been arrested near the 
tennis groimd at ¥ana, who has confessed that he was 
employed by the Mulla Powinda to assassinate Crump.P
^Ibid.
"Jimto to Morley, 29 August 1907, Minto Papers, vol. H 1007.
'%into to Morley, IS October 1907, ibid.
The Government had therefore no choice but to withdraw the
grant of land from the Mullas as well as the special secret 
1allowance. But this was not enough.
Beane, who was ’’rather pessimistic” about the frontier 
affairs, once again urged upon Minto the launching’ of an expedition 
against the Mahsuds, Minto was in a predicament; he held that 
for the vindication of the Government’s authority and prestige an 
expedition was justified but ho was handicapped by the fact that 
it might have unfavourable repercussions on British relations with 
Afghanistan as well as with Russia. ”It is all-important” Minto 
explained to horley, "that nothing should arise to jeopardise tho 
Treatjr with Russia,“ and violent anti-British feeling on the front­
ier might for the moment react on Afghan politics, and handicap 
the Amir in any wish he may have to meet us half way. Besides, 
any expedition was an expensive undertaking. Minto was supported 
in his views by Kitchener who absolutely agreed that to enter the 
llahsud couiitig' simply to punish the tribe and then to withdraw 
would be "full of the most unfortunate results”. Minto had an in­
tense dislike for what was known as the "steam roller policy”, that 
is,
^Howell, on.cit., p.2p.
2
'The Anglo-Hussian Convention concluded in August 1907- 
^Minto to Korlejr 10 October 1907, M.P., vol. 13.
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20ins* into a country simply to ' burn and destroy 
all we can lay our hands on aid then going away 
again, leaving a starving population with their 
hatred for us increased a hundred fold.
The withdrawal of the British troops after inflicting punishment
on the Mahsuds, Minto explained,
would he credited to no feelings of generosity on 
our side, hut simply to fear of the tribes... 
whilst our own soldiers would say, with truth, that 
their comrades who were killed had sacrificed their 
lives for nothing.
However, should an expedition he forced on the Government
hy the continued misbehaviour of the tribe, then Minto preferred
to occupy the Mahsud country by establishing military posts and.
improving the means of communication rather than to devastate it
and. then withdraw. It was not necessary in his view to force upon
it a "British administration, collection of revenues" etc. It
would be sufficient to hold the area
by the creation of one or two roads, or rather by 
the improvement of existing roads by means of tribal 
labour, for which we should not pay, and the establish­
ment of a few armed posts, leaving the tribe as here­
tofore to carry on its own tribal administration.
It was a safe policy to adopt, Minto asserted, as well as one likely 
to bring "happiness and prosperity to the districts we have paci­
fied". Moreover the "pacification of Waziristan" by this means
would, Minto hoped, "in the long run, be far less expensive than
1
a succession of expeditions".
Minto to Morley, 16 October 1907, M.P., vol. 13- Also see Mary, 
Countess of Minto, India, Minto and Morley,1905-1910. pp. 185-6; 
J. Buchan, Lord Minto. A Memoir, pp.’268-9-
'The Home Government’s reaction was cautious. Morley was not 
only against any expedition, "but lie was opposed to any form of 
occupation of the tribal territory. On 5 December 1907 he wrote 
to Minto:
Things may be tiresome; they always are tiresome in 
that delectable region, but who thinks they would 
have been less so, if we had listened to frontier 
counsels. Whatever the Amir may say about the Russian- 
Convention, for us to have gone into the field against 
his friends on the border while he is deciding his 
tactics, would beyond all doubt have prejudiced our 
chances of his assent ^ o  the Convention^. Much there­
fore do I applaud your cautious refusal to go in for 
punitive expeditions.,, as at present advised, or as 
likely to be advised, H.M.'s Government will certainly 
refuse to set up permanent posts, or anything else that 
is of the nature of annexation.-®-
Meanwhile, the Mahsud attempts to kill British officers went on
unabated. On 13 March 1908 matters came to a head. The Mahsud
assassins killed the Political Agent’s bearer and the Political
Tahsil dar ’ s Mimshl. Thereupon Crump effected an immediate b ar am at a
(seizure of person and property) ox all the Mahsuds in the protected
and administered areas and secured the c apture of four hundred Mali- 
2
suds. Deane and Minto fully approved of this step but Morley 
felt ’’rather quaking". He wrote to Minto that the "doings of Crump 
and Deane" struck him "as savouring unpleasantly of the forward 
frontier school". Morley feared that Crump’s action without orders
8 8
was just the kind ©f thing to commit his Government to an 
expedition.^
While the Yiceroy and the Secretary of State were busy
in debating the wisdom of Crump's action, Deane was directed
to get in touch with the Mahsud ,j irga. In April 1908, Deane
interviewed the ,iirga at ‘lank, announced the definite forfeit­
ure of the previous year's allowances and reiterated the warning 
of July 1907 regarding tribal responsibility for the prevention 
of outrages on British territory and attempts at the murder of 
British officers and British subjects. Unless the tribe stopped 
these practices, its allowances would be withheld. Ihe Maliks 
as before pleaded their inability to control the outlaws and Mulla 
Powindah, whereupon Deane recommended to the Government the launch­
ing of an expedition as the only solution of the long festering 
problem.^
Minto by now was very anxious; he realised the extreme 
strain under which the British o ff ice rs were living ii the troubled 
region "with their lives an their hands from, day to day with a 
constant threat of assassination". An expedition, as repeatedly
^Morley to Minto, 15 April 1908, Minto Papers, vol. M 1008.
2
frans-Prontier Journal for March.April. June 1908, P.8.L.I., 
vol. 215, Reg. Mo. 848; vol. 216, Reg. Mo. 1095; vol. 218,
Reg. No. 1454*
"^ Minto to Morley, 15 April 1908, Minto Papers, vol. M 1008.
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urged by Deane, seemed to the Viceroy the only course left.
However, since Minto found it uimcommonly hardM to persuade
*1
Morley to sanction the course, he had to drop the idea.
Matters kept on drifting and no satisfactory solution
of the intricate Mahsud problem was forthcoming. In June 1908,
Roos-ICeppel replaced Deane whose health under the heavy strain 
2gave way. Deane went home, a physical wreck, and died soon 
3after. One of the first steps taken by Roos-Heppel was to 
place Waziristan under D. S. Donald, the Deputy Commissioner 
of Hazara, a senior and experienced officer, to coordinate and 
control all political work in the region.^
During this time an unofficial correspondence took place 
between Crump and Roos-Keppel. Crump recommended the occupation 
and direct administration of Waziristan, He proposed the con­
struction of a road from Thai in Kurram via I dak in To chi through 
the heart of the Mahsud country to Nana in the Gomel. There would 
be a garrison of some 2,500 regular troops at Razmak, and the 
road would be held by a series of militia posts. The entire tribal
^Minto to Morley, 23 June 1908, Morley to Minto, 16 July 1908, ibid.
*TIinto to Morley, 4 June 1908, H.P., vol. 16.
^Olaf Caroe, on.cit., p.422.
^Roos-Keppel to Govt, of India, 18 June 1909, Govt, of India to 
Secy, of State, 3 November 1910, P.S.L.I., vol. 244, Reg.No. 1670.
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territory would be administered on the system in force in
the protected areas of the ¥ana and Tochi agencies. A light
revenue in the form of a house tax would be levied. Grump
also laid stress on adopting such measures lay the Government
as would promote the economic development of the Mahsud country.
The mineral wealth and forests of Waairistan, if developed, wohld
not only bring prosperity to the country but transform the peopled
habits as well. Urging a change of outlook on the part of the
Government, ^rump wrote:
At present the Mahsud is treated as an outcaste, 
with suspicion and hatred. He is a byword for 
treachery. ... There is splendid material of humanity 
in the people, and it is time that Government ceased 
to treat the Mahsud as a brute, and began to treat 
him as a man. Let Government enter and administer 
the country,' it will not only be blessed by its own 
subjects, but afford a chance of civilisation to one 
of the finest of the Pathan tribes. i
Crump's scheme was a departure from the Government's policy
of non-interference in the internal administration of the tribal
people. Hoos-ICeppel, considering it as "a war policy", did not
attach much importance to it, while Minto, regarding it as the
"irresponsible utterance of a suboi’dinate official" asked Morley 
3to ignore it.
Grump's Note cn the Settlement of ¥aziristan, 22 December 1908, 
P.S.L.I.♦ vol. 227, Keg. No. 633.
2Roos-ICeppel to Govt, of India, 11 January 1909, ibid.
^Govt. of India to Secy, of State, 8 April 1909, ibid.
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The year 1909 "began with the Mahsud problem becoming a
trifle easier. In January sixty rifles were surrendered to
the Government as a token of the Mahsud submission and as an
1assurance of the tribe* s future good behaviour. The Government 
also made certain gestures. In May sectional instead of tribal 
responsibility was once again enforced. Several sections of the 
tribe paid fines to the Government, and to allay the dissatisfaction 
regarding the existing system of distribution of Maliki allowances, 
the Government made a re arrangement of the system. Lists of 
sectional Maliks were drawn up by each s ection and allowances were 
paid out by the Government in accordance with thelists. Simultan-
2eously the recruitment of Mahsuds in the army was also undertaken.
Mulla PoWihdah's influence, too, seemed to be on the wane. He failed 
to convene a ,j irga at Kaniguram in November 1909 and to prevent the 
Mahsuds attending a fiirga called by the Government at Tank in January 
19X0.3
In late 1910 Minto was succeeded by Lord Hardinge, who, in 
the words of Morley, was 1 an enemy of the Poniard Policy11,^  Under
1
Trans-Prontier Journal. January, 1909# p.12, P.S.L.I.. vol. 225,
Reg. No. 520.
^Memorandum of Information for September 1910 regarding ... N.W.P. 
of India, p.18, P.8.L.I.» vol. 244, Reg. No. 1557; ibid., November 1910, 
P*14, P.S.L.I., vol. 245, Peg. Nos. 1847-8. - N.vf.P. Province Diary for 
the week ending 51 December 1910, p. 16, P.S.L.I., vol. 246, Reg.No. 218.
^Merk to Govt, of India, 28 March 1910. P.S.L.I., vol. 240, Reg.No.852.
^Morley to Minto, 15 June 1910.',: M.P., vol. 5.
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Minto, whatever the Viceroy*s personal beliefs and convictions
might have been, the Mahsud situation had been handled by makeshift
arrangements with the predominant object of avoiding a punitive
expedition. As a result, the situation ms by no means easy, and
the new Viceroy had plenty of anxiety and worry in store for him.
The year 1911 was very hard for the Mahsuds, the country suffered
from a bad drought and famine. The Government feared that the failure
of crops would intensify the Mahsuds* propensity for raiding. They,
therefore, thought it "very desirable from the political point of
view** to give some sort of employment to the Mahsuds to ease their
economic distress and thereby to minimise the risk of Mahsud attacks
on British territory. The railway department had at that time a
scheme for the extension of the Kalabagh-Bannu line from Lakki to
Tank. Eardinge saw that the section from Lakki to Pezu - a distance
of about twenty five miles - could offer employment to a large number
of Mahsuds for a few months. Accordingly, in February 1912, nearly
2,000 Mahsuds were employed and many more were engaged on the Khu^ma
2road in the Gomal and the Mughal Kot road in the Zhob valley. The 
development of communications on the Waziristan border ty the Govern­
ment was distasteful to Mulla Powindah who unsuccessfully tried to
3damage the iCbuKma road.
Viceroy to Secy, of State, 24 October 19H> P.S.L.I., vol. 252, Beg.No.1744. 
2
Roos-ICeppell to Eardinge, 2 February 1912, E.P., vol. 85: III, Roos- 
ICeppell to Eardinge, 6 March 1915» ibid.. vol. 85: V,
5
Roos-Keppel to Govt, of India, Tels. 1, 4, 6 March 1912, P.S.F.,
9 3
In November 1915 the Hull a died. For nearly two decades he 
had dominated the politics of South ^aziristan. He saw in the 
advance of the British government jnto Waziristan, with its out­
ward manifestations of the Militia, military posts and roads, a 
menace to the cherished independence of his country. To safe­
guard this independence he set himself to wreck the British plans, 
and his methods - raids on the British territory, assassination 
of British officers and intrigues with the anti-British party 
at Kabul - had proved a constant source of anxiety for the British 
government. The latter1s polipy towards the Mulla lacked consist­
ency. At first he was ignored; then he was favoured with a 
liberal gratuity and friendly relations with British officers; 
later he was deprived of both. This "mixture of cajolery and snubs" 
had turned the Mulla into a bitter opponent of the British in his 
later years. Curzon, Minto and Kitchener, to whom the Mulla had 
given many anxious moments, despised him as a "first class scoundrel", 
"a great rascal" and "a pestilent priest", but to a later competent 
British observer, Evelyn Howell, the Mulla was a remarkable man.
In Howell's view, the Mulla
cannot be judged by any standard current among English­
men... By those who had made allowances for the en­
vironment in which he lived., he cannot be denied some
vol. 15, 1912, File No. 1088, Covt. of India to Roos-Keppel, 
Tel. 15 March 1912, Ibid.. File no. 3291.
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tribute of admiration as a determined and astute, 
though, not altogether single-minded, patriot and 
champion of his tribe1s independence.,*, his force­
ful character, striking appearance and persuasive 
eloquence made a deep impression on those with whom 
he came mto personal contact, A man,who without 
any inherited advantages and without education, 
could make so large an instalment of frontier 
history in effect, but a series of chapters in his
own biography, can have been no little man, and
given more malleable material to work upon than 
Mahsuds have ever afforded and a more fortunate 
setting in time and space, he might well have ranked 
with many who are accounted great men.^ *
The Mulla1 s second surviving son, Pazl-Din, a stripling of fourteen 
or fifteen years of age, was destined to carry on his fathers
policy as a "centre of opposjfc ion1 to any friendly relations of
the Mahsuds with the Government.
This was soon apparent for in January 1914, Captain Butler, 
Second-in-Command, South Waziristan Militia, was killed by a sepoy. 
Two months later ftlajor Dodd, Political Agent, Wana, Captain Brown, 
Second-in-Command, South Waairistan Militia and Lieutenant Hiekie 
of the Royal Artillery, along with three sepoys, lost their lives 
at the hands of a Bahlolzai Mahsud, Sarfraz by name, who was the 
personal orderly of Major Dodd, An enquiry into the incident re­
vealed that the murders had been previously planned and were the 
result not of any private grievance but of a "tribal movement".
Mulla Abdul Hakim, an intimate friend and for years the "confidential
^Howell, op.pit.t p.30.
munshi,( of the late Mulla Powindah, was strongly suspected of 
complicity in the crime.
Donald, who was officiating as the Chief Commissioner, 
interviewed the Mahsud .1 irga in May 1914, enforced tribal re­
sponsibility and suspended the tribal allowances* The Mahsuds were 
asked to surrender three relatives of Sarafraz and three other men,
the accomplices ha the murder of British officers. The Mahsuds re-
2
fused compliance. Shortly thereafter the Great Wax started; ac­
centuating the hostile attitude of the Mahsuds towards the British 
3
government.
The Afridis
The Comal and IChyber passes have a local strategic and commer-
cial|importan.ee, but there is no doubt that of all the routes from 
Central Asia and Afghanistan, none rival the IChyber. The Ehyber has 
been rightly described as ”the most historic ... of all the passes 
of the world”.^  It begins near Jamrud, ten and a half miles west 
of Peshawar, and runs through the Khyber hills for about thirty- 
three miles, in a north-westerly direction till it reaches hoi Dakka
^Donald to Govt, of India, 6 June 1914, P.S.P., vol. 46, 1914, Pile 
Mo. 2627^ Mote by P. A. Hirtzel, undated, ibid., Pile Mo. 1469.
2
Summary of the Administration of Lord Eardinge. 1910-16. p. 100, H.P. 
vol. 131, Donald to Eardinge, 19 July 1914, enclosed in Eardinge to 
Crewe, 30 July 1914, ibid., vol. 120; IV.
Summary of the Administration of Lord Eardinge. p.lOQ H.P., vol. 131
in Afghan territory. The Khyber has always been the high-road from 
Central Asia to India; hence, its strategic and commercial im­
portance.
■j
The guardians of the Khyber pass are the Afridis, who like 
the ¥aairis, are "warlike and predatory" tribesmen. The Khyber 
Afridis are divided into six distinct clans; The Kambar Khel,
Kamarai Khel, Kuki Khel, Malikdin Khel* Sipah Khel and Zakka Khel. 
Their common homeland is the Tirah to the south of the Khyber pass; 
each clan has its own habitat. Of these clans, the Zakka Khel are 
the most important, most powerful and the most turbulent, being re­
garded as the "archetype" of Afridis. They were less amenable to 
British control than other clans partly because their settlements 
were a long way from the settled border, and also because their 
trade with the British territory was small.
The British government first came in contact with the Afridis 
during the first Afghan war. Then when Peshawar as a part of the 
State of Lahore became a British possession in 1849, Afridis took 
service in the British Indian army and served well during the Mutiny
^avies, op. cit., p. 135*
esides the Khyber Afridis, there aie two other Afridi clans: 
the Adam Khel, who live in the Kohat pass between Peshawar and 
Kohat, and the Aka Khel, who live in the hills south of Jamrud.
Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, vol. II, pp. 13-4, 19
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In the beginning, British relations with the Afridis, as with 
the Mahsuds, were maintained through influential men of the 
Peshawar border, called the Arbabs. These intermediaries, 
however, proved unreliable, being prone to intrigues against 
the British. To enhance their own importance, they fomented 
unrest among the Afridis and prevented friendly relations de­
veloping between the tribe and the British Government. During 
the second Afghan war, the Afridis, particularly the Zakkar Khel, 
harassed the British troops passing through the Khyber. In 1878, 
the Government were forced to send a punitive expedition against 
the tribe.^
In 1879, by the Treaty of Gandamak concluded with the Amir 
of Afghanistan, the British Government secured the control of the 
Khyber pass. The Khyber Political Agency, the first of its kind 
on the frontier, was then created by the Government. It included 
the Mullagori country north of the Khyber, the Tirah to the south 
and the country on both sides of the Khyber pass. An agreement was 
also made on 17 February 1881 between the British government and the 
Afridis, bjr which the latter, together with the Loargai Shinwaris 
of Landi Kotal accepted entire and exclusive responsibility for ihe 
safety of the Khyber, and, on condition of British recognition of
Imperial Gazetteer of India. North st Frontier Province. 1908, 
pp. 231-2; R. Warburton, Eighteen years in the Khyber (1879-1898), 
pp. 35-0, 328-9.
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their independence, undertook to have no relations with any 
foreign power. In pursuance of this agreement allowances were 
fixed for the Afridis, including the Shin war is of Loargai, amount­
ing to Hs. 87,540 per annum, which was liable to forfeiture if 
the Afridis committed dacoity, highway robbery or murder in 
British territory. The management of the Khyber pass was en­
trusted to the tribesmen themselves. Some local levies called 
Jezailchis numbering about four hundred, were also raised for es­
corting caravans through the Khyber twice a week. They were paid 
by the Government, but their appointment and dismissal lay with 
the chiefs of the clans concerned, who were solely responsible for 
the management of the levies. The Political Agent of the Khyber 
dealt with Matters relating to the Afridis. The British government 
exercised the right of levying tolls on traffic carried through
i
the Khyber pass.
During the tribal disturbances of 1897-8 the Afridis were
severely dealt with by the Tirah Expeditionary force under General 
2
William Lockhart. In 1898 a fresh settlement was made with the 
Afridis requiring them to h ave no intercourse with any power ex­
cept the British and to raise no objections to the construction of 
railways or roads by the Government through the Khyber pass. On 
these conditions their allowances were restored with a small increase
^Aitchison, op.cit., pp. 27-8, 97-9.
2 See Biographical iNlotes , pp. 469-70
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of two hundred and fifty rupees per mensem for the Kambar Khel.^
Under Curzon1 s scheme of frontier defence the Jezailchis were 
renamed the Khyber Rifles and augmented to two battalions of 
six hundred men. each. They were placed under British officers 
and supported by a mobile column at Peshawar. The government 
of India took responsibility for the safety of the IChyber road
p
and the Khyber Rifles.
Before the Agreement of 1881 had brought the Afridis under 
British control, the Amir of Afghanistan had been accustomed to 
exercise wsome measure of controlover them. He had, for ex­
ample, paid allowances to the tribe to keep the Khyber pass open
for trade. Under the 1881 Agreement, the Amir was obliged to re-
3frain from interfering with the Afridis. However, Afghan influence 
over the tribe did not suddenly cease, and neither did he^&ntrigues 
with them. These intrigues and continual raids by the tribe on 
frontier districts constituted the main problem of the British gov­
ernment in the period under review.
In 1902-03 Afghan intrigues not only with the Afridis but 
the Orakzais and Kohmands also took what was considered by the Govem-
 ^Ibid., pp. 99-100. Imperial Gazetteer of India, 3)1.¥.P.P., 1908, p.232. 
2See Chapter l, p,2>o.
'’imperial Gazetteer of India. U.W.ff.B., 1908, pp. 232-2.
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ment to be an 1 extremely undesirable" turn. The tribesmen visited 
Kabul in large numbers in response to invitations from persons 
who represented themselves as the Amir's agents. Khwas Khan, 
an ex-Malik of 2akka Khel, who had fled to Kabul after the 1897 
disturbances, was the Amir's "principal agent" in dealing with 
the tribes. In Kabul the tribesmen were liberally treated; sub­
stantial sums of money were distributed among them; jpensinns and 
allowances were fixed for some of the headmen; facilities were 
provided for extensive purchase of arms and ammunition; . and they 
were even enlisted in the Afghan army. It was also reported that 
the Amir had conferred the title of Khan Bahadur on five Afridi 
leaders including Charnan, a notorious Bakka Khel raider and rifle 
thief, thus making a mockery of Curzon's bestowal of that title 
on the pro-British Malik, Yar Muhammad Khan of the Malikdin Khel. 
The Amir declared that the man honoured by Gurzon was "disloyal
to his tribe and his King", and that his own nominees were "faith-
1
ful to their religion".
Afghan intrigues resulted hi what looked to the British to 
be the splitting up of the Afridis into two factions, the Kabul 
party and the Sarkar (Government) party. The former was numerically 
weak but its members, out of gratitude for past and hope of future 
favours at the hands of the Auir, were his active and enthusiastic
^Govt. of India to Secy, of State, 22 September 1904? P.S.S.K., 
vol. 33*1904, Kile No. 1776, Keg. No. 1776^  Ampthill to Brodrick, 
24 August 1904* Ampthill Papers, vol. 37.
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supporters. They openly boasted that their object was to embroil
the Afridis with the government of India and to bring the tribe
closer to the Amir. The Sarkar party, on the other hand, was
headed by the Maliks and elders who were well-disposed to the
1
Government but powerless against the "malcontent minority".
The Government took a serious view of the Amir's activities 
but were not very sure of their motivation. The British Govern­
ment* s agent in Kabul reported in September 1904 that the Amir 
had doubts about the British friendship and so had deemed it 
exiDedient to increase his influence with the Afridis. It was 
also possible that by intriguing with the tribes on the undemar- 
cated section of the Indo-Afghan boundary, Habibullah was seek­
ing to "force us at demarcation to accept his views’*, or perhaps
"trying to coerce us on the subject of our general arrangements 
2
with him".
In September 1904, in a despatch to the Secretary of State, 
they elaborated their views on the Afghan intrigues and the meas­
ures they deemed necessary to deal with the situation. The 
Government of India proposed that they should ask the Amir to 
abide by his treaty engagement and to press the xlfridis to ob­
serve their agreements. If the Amir desisted from intrigues, it
IChyber Political Diary week ending 24 September 1904, P.S.L.I., 
vol. 170, Reg. Ho, 1927A.
2Govt. of India to Secy, of State, 22 September 1904, P.S.S.F., 
vol. 33, 1904, Pile No. 1776, Reg. No. 1776.
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would not be difficult for the Government to deal with the
Afridis, especially if the demarcation of the Indo-Afghan boundary
was carried out.'*' The Government were ready to establish a post
at Sassobi on the border to close this "back-door1 to Afghanistan
2
used by the Bar hang of Dakka for his communication with the Af­
ridis. In the event of the Orakzais and Afridis refusing to obey 
Government orders and of their continuing to ignore the 1898 settle­
ment, the Government would stop their allowances and accept the
■3
request of the Shia Qrakzais to take over their country.
This request had been made in the beginning of 1904 by cert­
ain clans of the Shia Orakzais across the Kohat border who were 
seeking protection against rival Sunni clans who oppressed, them.
Deane strongly urged the Government to annex the country of the Shia 
Orakzais because of its many advantages. The Government -rould se­
cure a firmer political control over the adjacent Afridis, especialljr 
the Zakka Khel and Aka Khel sections, by occupying a strategic base 
in the rear of the Afridi country. Deane recommended that after
See pfc. n - g ,
2Dakka was a village in the Jalalabad district of Afghanistan and was 
twelve and a half miles from Landi Kotal on ‘the road to Kabul. A 
force of two hundred Khassadars armed with Lee-Metford rifles was 
stationed here, under a Bar hang or Sart ip.
^Govt. of India to Secy, of State, 22 September 1904? P.S.S.’F., 
vol. 33? 1904, Pile No. 1776, Reg. No. 1776.
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taking the Shia Orakzais under their protection, the Government
should administer the tract on the lines of the Kurram agency.
A native Assistant working under the Deputy Commissioner of
Kohat should be appointed, a cess of four rupees per house should
be cellected and a corps of two hundred local levies should be
raised for the protection of the border and affiliated to the 
1
Samana Rifles.
Curzon, so it seemed to Ampthill, the Acting Viceroy, was
"a little dubious" about the matter. Kitchener and Edmund Elies,
the Military Member of the Council, were willing to accept Deane’s
recommendations. But in Ampthill’s view this course involved a
distinct departure from the existing frontier policy as laid down
by the Home government in 1898, prohibiting the undertaking of any
new responsibility unless absolutely required by actual strategical
2
necessities, and any unnecessary interference with the tribes.
At the end ofl904 the issue was discussed in tlie Council. Kitchener 
stuck to his views, maintaining that the Kabul-Kandahar line was 
the strategical boundary for the defence of India agaiist an enemy 
advance through Afghanistan. That being so, it was absolutely 
essential that the Government should assert themselves and control
^Deane to Govt, of India, 14 May 1904, P. S. L. 1.» vol. 168, Reg.No.1558. 
^Ampthill to Brodrick, 13 July 1904, Ampthill Papers, vol. 37.
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the tribes up to the Durand line, for these tribes were both
a
able and ready to endanger the approaches to the ICabul--Kandjhar
position. Kitchener strongly urged that such control required
the gradual incorporation and absorption of the frontier tribes.
To leave them in a "state of semi-independence as a sort of buffer
state" would, in his view, be "fatal to any scheme for the defence 
1
of India". Edmond Biles, the Military Member, supported Kitchener, 
but other members of the Council opposed the idea, being unwilling 
to reverse the existing frontier policy, to incur the expense in­
volved in the project and to rim the risk of stirring up hosti-
2
lities with the Afridis.
The news of the Orakzai approach to the Government of India
by July 1904 had already reached the Afridis, and according to one
informer, "there is not a tree in Maidan under which you will not
find three or four men discussing the Shia affair". The Amir, too,
3was aware of the matter. Ampthill, hesitating to take a definite 
decision, sent a "non-committal" despatch to the Secretary of State, 
stating that
1
Ampthill to Brodrick, 27 July 1904, ibid. See also A Note on the
Military Policy of India by Kitchener, 19 July 1905, K.P., vol. 30.
^Ampthill to Brodrick, 27 July 1904? Ampthill Papers, vol. 37.
^Govt. of India to Secy of State, 18 August 1904? P.S.L.I., vol. 168,
Reg. No. 1558.
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if the policy of peaceful penetration is activ&lSry 
pursued all along the border, we shall add seriously 
to our responsibilities, while our relations with 
the Amir will become closer and more delicate.'*'
In October of the same year the Cabinet discussed the issue
and decided ..against any departure from the policy as laid down 
2in 1898, Curzon, then in England, wrote a minute supporting
the Cabinet’s decision.
Meanwhile, the Indian government, while preparing for the
despatch of a mission to Kabul, to conclude a fresh treaty with
Afghanistan, suggested to the Home government that the Amir be
addressed on the subject of intrigues and raids on the border.
Ampthill explained?
Our attitude should 1 be firm and uncompromising, and 
the Amir should be told in an unmistakable language 
that he will be held to the engagement of 1893? and 
that any interference or intrigping with the tribes 
on our side of the boundary that may be fixed under 
the Durand Agreement will be regarded as an unfriendly 
act and a most serious violation of that Agreement, 
which may necessitate our talcing measures to prevent 
the possibility of such action on his part in the future.
3Louis Dane, the leader of the Mission, was instructed accordingly.
^Ibid.
^Secy. of State to Govt, of India, 28 October 1904? ibid.
^Morley to Kinto, 8 January, 1908, H.F., vol. 3*
^Govt, of India to Secy, of State, 22 September 1304? P. S.S.3T., 
vol. 33? 1904? Pile No. 1776, Reg. No. 1776.
^Aide Memoire for Dane, enclosed in Brodrick to Ampthill, 20 
October 1904? Ampthill Papers, vol. 37.
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In December Dane raised the issue with the Amir. In March 1905 
after signing his treaty with the Government of India the Amir 
informed Dane that he had appointed a committee of seven persons 
to deal with the general question of frontier crimes and control 
of the outlaws. Dane hoped that the Amir’s "Septemvirate" would 
cooperate with the British officers on the frontier, but later 
it was found that no such committee was ever formed. However, 
after the treaty, there was a temporary cessation of raids, creat­
ing in the Government some hope that the tribe had changedits 
hostile attitude; this hope soon proved illusory.
From the middle of 1905 until the beginning of 1 908 the 
Zakka Khel, with the assistance of the Orakzais and the Eazarnao 
gang, a band of Afghan outlaws, perpetrated a series of daring 
raids into British territory. Five raiding gangs were organised 
under the most notorious elders of the Kabul party, Dadai, Usman, 
Multan, Gulbaz and Muhammad Afzal. Peaceful villages well within 
the administered districts were raided, border military posts 
were attacked, Government property robbed, British Military Police 
constables and British subjects abducted. The efforts of the Afridi 
jirgas and Maliks to bring the raid.ers to their senses did not
if ■_ M iniifc ' ■ ■■ —  ii. iiIiih
succeed. In July 1906 the Zakka Khel wreaked vengeance on an 
elder of their own section for assisting the Government in the 
capture of a few Afghan outlaws; they thus meted out what they 
claimed to be an
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exemplary punishment to those t raitors to the 
national cause who had dared to ... aid the 
British authorities.'*-
The activities of the Zakka Khel were creating a had moral effect
on other clans. Roos-Keppel, then Political Agent, Khyber, reported
Every man, woman and child looks upon those who commit 
raids, murders and robberies in Peshawar or Kohat as 
heroes and champions. They are the crusaders of the 
nation; they depart with the good wishes and prayers 
of all, and are received on their return after a suc­
cessful raid with universal rejoicings and congratu­
lations. Should a raider be killed during a raid... 
he is pronounced to be a marts^ r, and is mourned as 
such. On the other hand his victims die as ’Kafirs1 
and are condemned to eternal damnation for no crime 
but that of being British subjects.2
In February 1907, Roos-Keppel again informed the Government that
Men of other tribes - Aka Khel, Orakzai, Sturi Khel, 
are joining the raiders and the temptation to the 
Afridis of all sections to do so is becoming over­
powering as they see that, week after week, villages, 
police posts, cattle, camels, horses, women, and men, 
even Government servants, can be carried off and sold 
or held to ransom, while the authorities appear to re­
gard the matter with indifference.3
Deane estimated that during the previous seven years thirty-txfo
British subjects had been mux*dered, twenty nine wounded, thirty
Roos-Keppel to Deane.,' 18 November 1906, ibid. 9 Reg. No. 2134; 
Roos-ICeppel to Deane, 3 December 1906, ibid. 9 Reg. No. 2179;
Roos-Keppel to Deane, 7 February 1907, ibid., Reg. No. 491;
Govt, of India to Secy, of State, 7 March 1907, ibid., Reg. No. 359;
Roos-Keppel to Deane, 1 November 1907, ibid., Rqg. No. 2149^.
2Roos-Keppel to Deane, 18 November 19Q-6, - ibid.-, .Keg. No. 2134;
Davies, op.cit., p.146.
■^Roos-Keppel to Deane, 7 February 1907, P.S.S.F. , vol. 32, 1904,
Reg. No. 491.
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seven kidnapped and held up to ransom by the Zakka Khel either
alone or in conjunction with the Hazarnao gang, while the property
1looted was worth over one lakh of rupees.
The Zakka Khel kept visiting Kabul where they were encouraged 
by Kasrullah Khan, the Amir's brother and the leader of the anti- 
British party in the Afghan court. The Zakka Khel praised Kasrullah 
for his "generosity and Pan-Islamic sympathy" and for having gone 
"further hi encouragement to Afridis than ever did his father or 
brother".^
The Frontier Province government adopted several measures 
to check the Afridi raids. An elaborate system of picquetting the 
Peshawar and ICohat roads by troops was established and detachments 
of regulars and cavalry were engaged to cut off raiders. Special 
patrols of the Border Military Police were organised and Border 
Military Police posts near the Peshawar and Kohat frontier were 
strengthened. Border villages were given arms and village chighas 
(pursuit parties) were organised to cooperate with the local author­
ities to defend themselves against raiders. But all these defen­
sive measures proved inadequate to deal with the situation. The 
tribesmen set up an elaborate system of espionage, the wide stretch
Deane to Govt, of India, 13 February 1907, ibid.; Davies, op.cit., 
p.146.
p
Govt, of India to Secy, of State, 9 January 1908, P.S.S.g.. 
vol. 33, 1904, File No. 1776, Reg. Io.l92.
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of the covmtry and its terrain, with which the sure-footed hill
men were thoroughly familiar enabled them to avoid Government
posts, patrols and armed villages; the Border Military Police
was inadequate in strength, far from efficient and lacked dis-
cipline. Their arms were inferior to those of the tribesmen
2
who obtained better rifles from the Persian gulf.
The situation was ‘evidently gloomy but the Government's 
policy towards the Afridis was as cautious as it was towards the 
Mahsuds. In consequence, the Zakka Khelj^  long remained unpunished. 
Since 1906, Roos-Keppel had been urging the Government to occupy 
the Bazar valley and to hold it with Militia Posts at important 
points like China, Mangal Bagh and Sassobi to be garrisoned by 
the Khyber Rifles; this in his view was the"only completely satis­
factory" solution of the Zakka IChel problem. The occupation of 
the Bazar valley, Roos-Keppel pointed out, would give the Govern­
ment command of the passes leading to Tirah and Afghanistan which 
were used by the Zakka Khel as their escape route. Should the 
Government decline to take this step, Roos-Kepipel recommended the 
stoppage of the Zakka IChel allowances. Deane had agreed with Roos- 
Keppel, urging the Government that they must decide whether to let
Rote by 0. Rawlinson, Depy. Oommr., Peshawar,17 February 1908,
Note by W. P. Barton, Depy. Conunr4 IC&hat, 21 February 1908, Deane 
to Govt, of India, 5 March 1908, ibid., Reg. No. 687.
2See pp. 1
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things go 021 as heretofore or to take "definite action" against
the Zakka Khel.~ The Indian government were at this time anxious
to avoid any disturbance in the IChyber region as the %air was
about to visit India; they were naturally unwilling to take any
step which might lead to an open rupture with the Zakka Khel until
the Amir returned home. Therefore, the Government, instead of
stopping the Afridi allowances altogether, instructed Deane to
defer their payment until March 1907 when the Amir was expected
2
to have left India.
p
Minto, as seen earlier,' was in favour of peaceful penetration 
into the tribal area and against the policsr of punitive expeditions. 
He explained to Morley that he did not have "any land hunger" so 
far as the tribal territory was concerned. Rather his policy was 
actuated by a strong belief that the extension of British admini­
stration on the frontier would bring uan increase in prosperity 
and happiness and a greater security for life" as he claimed had 
been the case in the ICurram, To chi, Sam Ranizai and Baluchistan 
areas. The Viceroy agreed with the frontier officers regarding the
1Roos-Keppel to Deane, 18 November 1906, Deane to Govt, of India,
9 December 1906, P.S.S.ff., vol. 32, 1904, File Ho. 1776, Reg.
Ho. 2134.
2Govt, of India to Deane, Tel. 13 December 1906, .ibid.., Reg. Ho. 
2174.
^See pp. SS’-6.
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occupation of the Bazar valley and the construction of military
posts there because
certain posts on our political frontier would 
deprive the raiders of their lines of retreat 
into Afghanistan, and would give us such a general 
control over the Bazar valley (without ourselves 
attempting to administer it) as would do much to 
constitute to the safety of the frontier.1
Mori057*, however, had two objections to Minto1 s policy;
it was expensive and it was riskys ”though an individual post
cosh 110 mountains or marvel of money, yet the policy is not
cheap”. Morley asked Minto if frontier officers like Beane
and Roos-Keppel, advocating the policy, were 1 alive to the risks
... of the posts kindling the wrath of neighbouring tribes”.
The Home government, Morley added, could never forget the Tirah
campaign, a result of the sort of policy in question. At any
rate Morley needed a tremendous weight of argument to induce him
2to sanction the policy of establishing posts ±1 the tribal tracts. 
Realising that Morley remained absolutely unimpressed by his argu­
ments, Minto left the issue for the moment.
In the circumstances there was no diance left to Minto except 
to address the Amir regarding the sanctuary given to 2aklca Khel 
and other raiders at Ningrahar in Afghan territory requesting him
^Minto to Morley, 28 October 1906, Minto Papers, vol. M 1006;
Minto to Morley, 18 February 1907? ibid., vol. M. 1007.
^Morley to Minto, 14 March 1907? ibid.
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to release the kidnapped British subjects, to restore the looted 
British property and prevent the Afghan territory being used as 
a base by the Zakka Khel. The Amir promised to make enquiries 
into the matter.
Towards the end of 1907 an Interesting development took 
place. The Gaduns on the Tusufzai border and the Darwesh IChel 
Haziris of the Tochi valley asked for the Government’s protection 
saying they wanted “peace and quiet'*. Deane welcomed this over­
ture, believing that the taking over of the frontier tribes gener­
ally was the '*eventual solution of a lot of difficulty on the 
2
frontier". Minto agreed with Deane and took the opportunity of
writing a long private letter to Morley, elaborating his general
frontier policy. Minto said that he
had always considered the gradual absorption of 
tribal districts as the proper solution of our 
front ier difficul t ies.
He once again "really earnestly" asked Morley "not to think that
we are afflicted with incurable land-hunger, but that we only wish
to do what is best in ihe cause of peace and civilisation". It
seemed clear to Minto,
that when these unfortunate people, sick of fighting, 
come to us and ask us to take them over, we should 
not lose the opportunity of doing so. It would not
^Viceroy to Amir, 10 May 1907, Amir to Viceroy, 29 May 1907, 
P.S.S.F., vol. 52, 1904, Mile Ho. 1776, Keg. Hos. 958, 1140.
2
Deane to Viceroy, 18 Hovember 1907, enclosed in Minto to Morley, 
12 December 1907, M.P., vol. 15.
113
mean that we assume the government of their country 
with the idea of administering it and collecting 
revenue, hut that we guarantee the peace of their 
homes leaving their territory to their own tribal 
administration, whilst the fact that we have taken 
over a district does not only affect the district 
itself, hut contiguous districts throughout the 
border. It is a choice between a continuance of 
perpetual raids into British territory and murders 
of British subjects followed by useless punitive 
expeditions and possibly the necessity for ultimate 
conquest, or meeting the wishes of the tribes them­
selves, and taking them under our wing,
Minto supposed that "it was the suspicion of a policy of advance 
and grab" which stood in the way of what promised to lead gradu­
ally to a peaceful solution. Minto regretted that the Government 
had made a great mistake in refusing to take over the Shia Orak- 
zais at their own request. "If we had dune so", he pointed out 
to Morley, "we should have been far better able to deal with re­
cent raids, some of which indeed very probably would not have 
occurred". Minto's conclusion was;
now If we are forced to enter the Bazar valley, I 
cannot but think it will be unfortunate if we do not 
leave behind us a sufficient number of small posts 
to guarantee future quiet.
Morley was unmoved, and refused to act, for apart from the 
expense and the risks of a tribal conflagination there was the fear 
of estrangement from the Amir. Morley was totally against any
 ^ibid.
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absorption, incorporation, or by whatever other 
names the Deanes and Crumps choose to call a pro­
cess that would inevitably mean fresh responsibility 
and increased expenditure.!
Any lingering hope in Minto's mind of eventually succeeding in 
bringing Morley round to the Indian government's views was re­
moved by the latter's private letter to the Viceroy, dated 
19 February 1908. Morley wrote;
you speak of frontier policy and suspect that 1 
only half understand your view. I do believe I 
understand it wholly, though I read the lessons 
of the Tirah campaign2 in a different sense from 
yours. Now I dislike a ragged edge as much as 
you do, and in many painful ways the state of 
the borderland is what you bluntly call it 'dis­
reputable' - and if wejhad a quarrel with the Amir, 
or with the Czar, these 300,000 catamounts, or 
caterans, or whatever the name for border ruffian 
may be, would be not only disreputable but danger­
ous. Only I cannot but think that any policy 
tending towards a repetition of Tirah ... would 
be, or might be a great deal more dangerous still.
Morley felt "as strongly as I can feel about anything relating 
to frontier policy" that Lord Salisbury's government "were as 
right as right could be" in asking the Indian government under 
Curson to forbear from a forceful frontier policy, and pointing 
out to them that the Home government, in consideration of inter­
national implications, would not allow any deviation from their 
instruction. Morley asked Minto to convince the Home government
-1
Morley to Minto, 8 January 1908, ibid., vol. 3■
2
See p.q8.
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of three things aid then "we would throw the reins on your neck, 
and let you stay in the Bazar valley etc., as long as ever you 
like." The three things were
(1) Would it not be likely to alarm and irritate 
their /Zakka IChel/ neighbours against us? ...
(2) Would it not put a good card into the hands 
of the anti-British party at Gabul - just at the 
moment when we are (with rather uncomfortable 
minds) waiting for the Amir to show himself our 
friend? (3) Would it not involve exposure to 
fresh liabilities, risks and, above all, expenditure?
And then Morley put his foot firmly down: "we won't prolong the
1controversy, unless ;you like, but that's my sort of case".
Meanwhile, the Zakka IChel made the situation very intolerable
for the Government. Visits to ICabul went on; increased allowances
were received from Nasrullah IChan and his men; the Zakka IChel
bought large quantities of arms and ammunition and carried out
raids of greater daring on. the Peshawar and ICohat border. Deane
and Roos-ICeppel once more urged a punitive expedition and the occu-
2
pation of the Zakka territory. On 28 January 1908 a gang of sixty 
to eighty Zakka IChel raided the house of a Hindu banker and de­
camped with property worth one lakh of rupees. British troops and 
the Kliyber Rifles chased the gang but in vain. nThe boldness of the
i
Morley to Minto, 19 February 1908, ibid.; J. Morley, Recollections, 
II, p.246.
^Roos-Keppel to Beane, 9 October 1907, P.S.S.F., vol. 32, 1904? File No 
1776, Reg. No. 644; Roos-Keppel to Beane, 1 November 1907, Viceroy 
to Secy, of State, Tel. 25 November 1907? ibid.? Reg. No. 2049B;
Govt. of India to Secy, of State, 9 January 1908, ibid., vol. 33? 1904 
File No. 1776, Reg. No. 192.
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exploit'*, so ran the Khyber Political Diary, uand the enormous
booty carried, off fired the minds of Zakka Khel and indeed of
all the Afridis, who openly expressed their regret that they
1were not among the raiders'*. It was the proverbial last straw.
The Indian government had now reached the end of their 
patience. They were determined to take decisive action against 
the Zakka Khel. The Secretary of State was informed that the 
Government would summon an Afridi fjirga and demand that the tribe 
ensure that the Zakka Khel should make reparation for their 
offences and should not misbehave, otherwise, the Afridis would be 
warned, the Government would take punitive measures against them.
The government would not only punish the offenders but would re- 
cover the fine and disarm the Zakka Khel, capture and bring their 
leaders to trial and finally construct a road in the Zakka terri­
tory to be maintained on the lines of the IChyber road. This would
enable the Government to control the Zakka Khel by holding the
2
exits to Tirah and Afghanistan. Morley, while maintaining his 
opposition to any occupation or annexation of tribal territory 
agreed to "consider proposals limited, to blockade and punitive meas­
ures or combining blockade with punitive action" as in the Mahsud 
blockade of 1901. He asked the Indian government to ensure the
•j
Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 1 February 1908, p.31> 
ibid., Reg. No. 496.
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 31 January 1908, 1 Februarj?" 1908, 
ibid., Reg. Nos. 259-60.
117
neutrality, if not the active cooperation of other sections
1of the Afridis in punishing the Zakka Khel#. On 31 January 
1908 Minto discussed the situation in the Council where it was 
decided that it was absolutely necessary to vindicate authority 
without delay. It was also decided to summon the Mai lies of differ­
ent sections of the Afridis, to point out to them the gravity of 
the situation and to reassure them that in talcing action against 
tie Zakka Khel, the Government in no way intended to injure other
sections of the Afridis or interrupt the Government’s friendly
2
relations with them. This assurance would immediately be fol­
lowed by the entry of troops into the Bazar valley. Morley approved 
of the course but at the same time reminded the Indian government 
that the expedition should be
strictly limited to punishment cf Zakka Khel and not 
either immediately or ultimately, directly or in­
directly, to occupation or annexation of tribal 
territory.3
On 5 February the Amir was informed of the Government’s determination 
to punish the Zakka IChel and he was requested to ask his frontier 
officials to prevent the Zakka Khel fleeing to Afghan territory or
^Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tels. 2. 6 ikbruary, .,1908‘ibid.., 
ibid., Reg. No. 204.
2Viceroy to Secjr. of State, Tel. 31 January 1908, ibid. , Reg. ho. 259« 
Morley to Minto, Tels. 2, 6 February 1908, ibid. , Reg. No. 204-
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securing assistance from Afghan subjects. A week later, Deane 
met a jirga of Afrida Maliks and sought their cooperation to
2
make the Zakka Khel come to a settlement with the Government.
On the next day the Bazar Field Force, under the oommand of 
Major General James Nillcocks left for the Zakka territory, 
and then fon/jTour days from 18 to 21 February battered the clan.
No frontier tribe had ever been so "sharply, quickly and effective- 
lyu punished as the Zakka Khel on this occasion.
The success of the expedition was due to several factors: 
the military skill of the British troops; the loyal co-operation
i » .
of the Af ridx- Maliks; the exemplary behaviour of the Khyber 
Rifles; the remarkable influence of Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum, the 
Assistant Political Agent, Khyber,^ * on the Afridis and, above all, 
the tact of Roos-Keppel." On 28 February a settlement was effected 
with the Zakka Khel. Other Afridi clans held themselves responsible 
jointly and separately for the future good behaviour of the Zakka 
IChel and promised, when called upon by the Government, to assist each,
1
Viceroy to Amir, 5 February 1908, ibid., Reg. No. 445-
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 14 February 1908, ibid., Reg. No. 260.
^Viceroy to Secy., of State, Tel. 20 February 1908, enclosing Reports 
from NiRcocks, ibid., Reg. No. 416; Nillcocks to Govt, of India, Tel.
25 February 1908, ibid., Reg. No, 584.
4  ^ .For A. Qaiyum see Biogr’apliical Notes, p. 468
^Roos-Keppel to General Mullaly (Chief Staff Officer, Bazar Field 
Force), 3 March 1908, P.S.S.F., vol. 33? 1904, File No, 1776, Reg.
No, 775B; Davies, op.cit., pp. 148-9.
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other in punishing Zakka raiders; the Afridi elans also agreed 
to the Government's right to punish them by fine or by exclusion 
from British territory for the misdeeds of the Zakka IChel, for 
whom they had stood security. The clans d_eposited fifty-three 
rifles with the Government as a guarantee to honour their commit­
ments, The next day, British troops pulled out of the Basar 
valley. ^
Morley was very happy with the result of the eqpedition. He
informed Minto:
we Indians are all in great spirits here just now 
at the end of the Zakkas, aid at its being a good 
end, aid our gratification is shared to the full 
by all the rest of the world. I think the Policy 
of His Majesty's Government has amply justified 
itself in the result.^
The Afridi Maliks and elders kept their word; they succeeded in
punishing most of the notorious Zakka raiders except Multan and
in restoring to the Government looted property worth about
'5
Rs. 33,489 in two months. Multan, who fled to Jalalabad, met
his end eleven months later in an encounter with the Border Mili-
4tary Police at Peshawar. Hereafter the relations between the 
1Roos-Keppel to General Mullaly, 3 March 1908, on.clt.
^Morley to Minto, 4 March 1908, Minto Papers, vol. M 1008.
■^Roos-Keppel to WiHcoclcs, 25 April 1908, P.S.S.P.» vol. 33, 1904, 
Pile No"." 1776, Reg. No. 1092.
^Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 23 January 1909, P.S.L.I., 'vol. 
225, Reg. No. 168; The Pioneer Mail, 8 January 1909.
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Zakka IChel mid the Afridis with the British government in general 
remained free from strain and trouble. One result of the Zakka 
IChel expedition, however, ms to unsettle another tribe, the 
Mohmands, against whom the Government had to send an expedition 
in May 1908.1
The construction of strategic roads through the IChyber 
2
pass in 1913-14 raised an important political issue. It provided 
the Afridis with an opportunity to demand an increase in their 
allowances on the ground that these roads had "lessened permanently 
the strategical mlue” of the IChyber pass, a development which its 
owners naturally resented. In 1914 the Afridis submitted a peti­
tion to the Government further pointing out that the rise in prices 
and in population had considerably reduced the value of the Afridi 
allowances. On the other hand, the value of tolls in the IChyber 
realised by the Government had risen considerably and the responsi­
bilities of the Afridis in the IChyber area had thus increased.
S. E. Pears, the Political Agent of IChyber, strongly supported the 
Afridi petition and pointed out the inadequacy of the allowances 
the tribe received from the Government. Pears pointed out that 
the net increase in the allowances between 1879 aud 1914 - thirty-
*See p; . lljO,
2See pp. £’33-6.
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five years - had been only Rs. 6,500,^ " while the rise in the
total income of hie Government fr&n the tolls in the IChyber pass
2
for the same p eriod had been more than '-.Rs. -.27,000. Moreover, 
with the years the Afridi responsibilities had increased both within 
and outside the pass limits. Originally the tribe’s responsibility 
was limited to the provision of security for the movement of cara­
vans on fixed days and during the rare movement of local officers 
through the pass. With the construction of roads had occurred an 
increase in traffic which threw an extra burden an hie Afridis 
for their security. Moreover, the Government’s policy of direct 
contact with the Maliks and "the grey beards’’ of the tribe, 
making them responsible for good behaviour of different tribal 
sections, had increased the burden of responsibility an these 
elders and through them on the tribe itself. When, for example, 
a crime was committed at Peshawar or ICohat by the Afridis, "a long 
and troublesome pressure” was exerted by the Political Agent, IChyber, 
on the tribal leaders to bring the offenders to their senses. Pears 
pointed out that this system of control through sureties had gradu­
ally spread from IChyber to the Tirah and the Bazar valley when in
1908 each subsection of the Zakka IChel was subjected to the guaran-
3
tees and control of other powerful sections of the Afridis. For
In 1879 the tribal allowances were Rs. 72,600 per annum; in 1914 
they were Rs. 79,200 per annum. Note on the Petition of Afridi 
Maliks by S.E.Pears, 15 January 1915, P.S.P., vol. 26, 1912, Reg. 
No. 974.
2
In 1882-3, the income from these tolls amounted to Rs. 55,882; 
in 1913-14, it was Rs. 83, 161. Ibid.
■'’See pp. ||8-q.
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their services and heavy responsibilities the Maliks and elders 
received from the Government rewards by no means adequate - 
only six to seven thousand rupees a year distributed among seven 
hundred men - rewards which were accepted? Pears said? "only for 
their sentimental value attached to the recognised status of 
’grey beards' in tribal society". The construction of the IChyber 
road in 1913-14 had converted the IChyber pass "from a doorway into 
a gateway", formerly the political and strategical mlue of the 
IChyber pass had lain not only in its being the main artery of 
communication through the mountain barrier between Afghanistan 
and India? but in its providing a gap which could be easily closed 
and held by the Afridis against a force far superior in number.
But with the construction of strategic roads in the IChyber the 
Government could now easily send the IChyber mobile column up to 
Landi-ICotal to prevent the closure of the pass by the Afridis.
The latter had well realised the diminution of their power; one 
Afridi Malik remarked in a ,jirga>
The Mullagori road and the new IChyber road have
emasculated the Afridis.
In such circumstances Pears strongly felt that the Afridi grievances 
set forth in their petition to the Government were genuine and 
therefore that their allowances should be increased.^ * The \iorld
■\
Note on the Petition of Afridi Maliks by Pears? op.cit.
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¥ar had by now broken out,making the maintenance of peace 
and order on the frontier the first care of the Government,
Donald, the Officiating Chief Commissioner, fully agreed with 
Pears, thinking it politically expedient to accept the Afridi
petition, and ±njl915 action was taken 011 it by the Indian
government. ^
The Bio Man ds
North of the IChyber and in the great angle formed by the 
Kabul and ICunar rivers is to be found the country of the Mohmands. 
They live partly in the Afghan province of Ningrahar, partly in 
the hills between the ICunar valley and the ^eshawar plain, and 
partly In the Peshawar district. The Mohmands who live between the 
ICunar valley and the Peshawar plain were known to the British as 
the " indepen dent" or "hill Mohmands". They were divided into 
eight clans - the Khwezai, Baizai, Halimzai, Tarakzai, Xsa Khel, 
Burhan IChel, Dawezai and Utmanzai,
Since the days of Ahmad Shall Abdali the rulers of Kabul had
exercised "some sort of vague suzerainty" over the Mohmands as they
V. S. Donald to Govt, of India, 19 Januaryl915? P. S. F., vol. 26, 
1912, Reg. No. 974.
^See Chapter IE.
^Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, vol. X, p.419; 
Imperial Gazetteer of India, N.M.P.P., 1908, p.225.
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had over the Afridis. The Mohmands were ruled by hereditary
chiefs, selected by the Amirs of Kabul who paid allowances to
1
different sections of the tribe through their chiefs. In addition 
the Halimzai and Tarakzai, the two clans of the eastern Mohmands, 
held large j agirs on the Peshawar border, of which they were dis­
possessed by the British after the latter had annexed Peshawar 
in 1849. The clans naturally took a hostile attitude towards the 
British; with a view to recovering their lost fiefs, they made 
inroads into Peshawar and brought upon themselves punitive expeditions 
in 1851, 1852 and 1854.
During the Mutiny, the Mohmands were widely excited, looking 
upon the event as an opportunity to strike a blow against the 
British government and to recover their lost territories. The 
Government had no troops to move against thetribe, and Colonel 
Herbert Edwardes, the Commissioner of Peshawar, had to promise 
that their territories would be restored. This quietened the 
tribe. In 1859 the jagirs of the Tarakzai Mohmands were restored, 
subject to good conduct and the payment of a light revenue to the 
Government. In 1864, following a Mohmand attack on Shabkadar fort, 
the Government sent their fourth expedition against the tribe.
Prom 1864 to 1897 there was comparative peace on the Mohmand border,
1Roos-Keppel to A. Ii. Grant, Foreign Secy., 14 June 1917, P. S. S. F., 
vol. 48, 1913, Pile Ho. 1364, Ho. 3775; Aitchison, op.cit., p.21.
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disturbed only on two occasions. In 1873» Major Macdonald,
Commandant of Fort Michni, was murdered in an assault in which
the third brother of the Khan of Lalpura, a Mohmand chief, was
implicated. During the second Afghan ¥ar the Mohmands, many of
whom were Afghan subjects, constantly attacked the British line
1of communications and were punished in 1880.
The Durand Agreement of 1893 divided the Mohmand country 
between the British and Afghan governments. The boundary drawn 
on the map according to the agreement ran through the centre of 
the Mohmand hills. This boundary had, however, never been de­
marcated, and later, on variaus occasions, it was disputed. After 
signing the agreement, Durand had an interview with the Amir who 
told him:
X won't interfere with Bajaur but, of course, 
all the Mohmand country is m i n e .2
The government of India thought that the Amir either did not under­
stand or pretended that he did not understand the map attached to 
the Agreement lieu' had signed. Later, in 1895, when the Delimitation 
Commission reached Nawa Kotal, the Afghan Commissioner contended 
that the line would so run as to include all the Mohmands within 
the Afghan territory. The government of India having disputed this
^Roos-Keppel to Grant, 14 June 1917? P.8.S.F., vol. 48, 1913?
File Bo. 13^4? Reg. Bo. 3775? Davies, op.cit., pp. 149-52.
^Mohmand Delimitation: A Memorandum by L. B. Lindsey, 22 June
19^8, B.S.M., A 171.
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claim, a deadlock was reached.
According to the Durand Agreement, the eastern Mohmand
clans fell to the British side of the border. In 1896 the
jirgas of the eastern Mohmands - Halimzai, ICamali, Dawezai,
Utmanzai and Tarkakzai - were received by Dennis Fitzpatrick,
the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and on condition that
they would remain faithful to the British^allowances were
granted to them to replace those which they had hitherto been
receiving from Kabul. Henceforth, these Mohmands were called
the "assured" clans to distinguish them from those who were
2not under the control of the British government.
In August 1897j Hiring the tribal uprising, the Mohmands, 
led by liadda Mull a, attacked Shabkadar and burnt the tom where- 
uj)on the Government despatched a punitive expedition. However, 
on payment of a fine of fifteen thousand rupees and a few rifles, 
the Mohmand allowances, stopped during the expedition, were re- 
stored.
In November 1902 the Baizai Musa IQiel of Mitai became an 
"assured" clan and received allowances on conditions snailar to 
those imposed on other clans by the agreement of 1896, Amir
1For details on the Durand. Agreement see L. Harris, op,cix., 
pp. 108-37? Davies, op.cit., pp. 161-2? W.K.Fraser-Tytler, 
Afghanistan; A stiidy of Political Developments in Central and 
Southern Asia, pp. 188-9.
2
Aitchison, op,cit., p.24? P .P., 1908, vol. LXXlV, Gd. 4201, p.129. 
^Roos-Keppel to Grant, 14 June 1917, P.S.S.F., vol. 48, 1913.
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1
Habxbullah and the Afghan Hullas resented this.
At this time the Government of India had under consideration
the construction of the strategic railway from Peshawar to the
2
Afghan frontier through the Khyber, and British, engineers were
sent out to Khyber and Mullagori to make preliminary Inspections
while in March 1903 kitchener visited Loi-Shilman in the Mohmand
country. The Afghans disliked these visits.''’ At the instigation
of the Sartip^ of I) aide a the Afghan Khassadars destroyed wells
and c rops in the border villages of Shinpokh and Smatzai whose
5Maliks had friendly relations with the Government ox India.
Early in 1903? on Curzon’s instruction, Captain W. E. Venour, the 
Political Agent of Khyber, inarched with the Khyber Rifles into 
Smatzai and Shinpokh and occupied the two places without facing 
any opposition. The risk of further trouble being over, the 
IChyber Rifles withdrew and some thirty Shilman Khassaclars were en-
6
gaged by the Government for the protection of Smatzai and Shinpokh.
Aitchison, op.cit., p.90; frontier and Overseas Expeditions from 
India, vol. I, p.4-91; Trans-Frontier Journal December 1902, P.S.h.I., 
vol. "151, Reg. Ho. 178.
^See Chapter \\f.
^Curzon to Hamilton, 13 April 1903? P.O., vol. 162.
artip was the leader of six or more bairaks (companies) of Khassadars, 
who were irregular foot soldiers.
^Deane to Govt, of India, Tel. 22 April 1903? P.S.h.I. , vol. 153?
Reg. Ho. 658.
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tels. 6, 10 May 1903? P.S.h.I., vol. 153? 
Reg. Hos. 596, 605; Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, 
vol. I, p.493.
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These incidents indicated to the Indian government the
desirability of demarcating the section of the frontier between
the Kabul river and the Sassobi pass, south of Landi Khana, so
that uncertainty about the boundaryoould not spark off such
friction in future. Also, a suitable demarcation of this sector
of the frontier might, in Kitchener's view, give a terminus for
the broad-gauge railway which the Government were contemplating
constructing from Peshawar to Kam DakkaV
A lengthy cori’espondence then began between the Government
of India and the Afghan government. Mentioning the incidents at
Smatzai and Shinpokh and pointing out the objectionable conduct
of the Sartip of D aide a, and claiming that the two places lay on
the British side of the Durand Line, Curzon proposed to the Amir
in April 1903 that the boundary between the Kabul river and the
2
Sassobi pass be demarcated. The Amir agreed about the need for 
the demarcation of the boundary but he made a counter proposal 
that the entire border from Nawa Kotal (on the dividing range be­
tween Kunar and Bajaur) to the Sikaram Sar (at the Western end of 
the Safed Koh overhanging the Peiwar Kotal) be delimited. This 
section passed through (and bisected) the Mohmand country and in- 
eluded the Khyber and Afridi boundaries towards Afghanistan.^ The
Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 28 April 1903? P.S.L.I., vol.
153? Keg- No, 558.
2 -"Viceroy to Amir, 29 April 1903? ibid., Reg. No. 658.
Vmir to Viceroy, 8 May 1903? ibid.» vol. 154, No. 796.
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demarcation of this section had. been left undone in 1897-8.
The Viceroy did not accept the Amir's proposal for the delimitation 
of the entire un demarcated boundary from haw a Kotal to Sikaram Sar.
He held that there was no necessity for delimitation of the Mohmand 
section of the boundary because all was quiet in the region, but the 
position was different in the southern section of the boundary be­
tween Palossi 011 the Kabul river and the Sassobi pass; it was in 
this section, Curzon pointed out, that the recent "acts of aggression” 
on British territory had taken place with the connivance of the 
Amir’s officers. Curzon was ready to name the British representa­
tive for the joint d.emarcation as soon as the Amir should agree to 
the proposed demarcation from the boundary from the Kabul river near 
Palossi to the Sassobi pass.^ It is interesting to note that Curzon 
in his private letter to Hamilton admitted that although in regard
to Shinpokh the Amir had 1 no case”, his claim to Smatzai was "a 
2
very fair one”. The India Office, too, agreed that Smatzai was,
3indeed, prima-facie Afghan. Habibullah did not dispute Curzon’s
claim on Shinpokh and Shilman as British but as for Smatzai he contended
that pending demarcation of the boundary, it was difficult to say
whether the place was British or Afghan. As for the boundary demarcation,
i
Viceroy to Amir, 26 May 1903? ibid.
^Curzon to Hamilton, 21 May 1903? C.C., vol. 162.
D^ept. Note, May, 1903? P.SVL.I., vol. 153? Reg. No. 559.
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Habibullah reiterated his earlier proposal, adding that over
the Bohai Bag lands in the Mohmand country, he had "full rights".^
2
Beane when consulted by the Government of India about the
Amir's claim on Bohai Bag pointed out that the value of the area
in question lay in the fact that the Government by paying allowances
to the local Mohmands could strengthen their relations with a view
to ensuring their cooperation in the protection of the projected
*5Kabul River Railway. But then, if the Government could get ICam
Balcka from the Amir in exchange for Bohai Bag, it would be a good 
a.
barg/in because the possession of ICam Bakka would provide the ter™ 
minus for the projected railway, and the boundary along the Kabul 
river and then to Sassobi pass would "effectually round up the
4
Khyber territory".
Curzon, while avoiding any formal offer of Bohai Bag to 
the Mir, again tried to s ettle the boundary demarcation issue 
with him. He informed Kabibullah that the British government agreed 
with the Amir that the entire undemarcated frontier should be de­
marcated and necessary arrangements would follow7 soon, but urged 
that in the meanwhile the delimitation of the line between Palossi
1 ■Ainir to Viceroy, 8 July 1903, P.S.S.F.. vol. 4,1903, Pile Ho. 1552, 
Reg. Ho. 1074*
^Govt. of India to Beane, 27 July 1903, ibid., Reg. Ho. 1552.
^See Chapter \V.
’^Beane to Govt, of India, 19 August 1903, P.3.S.P.» vol. 4, 1903, 
File Ho. 1552, Reg. Ho. 1552.
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and the Sassobi pass should be undertaken. Curzon proposed Roos-
Keppel as the British representative for the joint demarcation 
X
of this sector. The Amir did not budge from his stand; he
insisted that the entire line should be demarcated and not only 
2
a section. The government of India thought that the Amir was in­
transigent because he hoped to get from the British government the 
Mohmand country before conceding any territory to them on the Kabul 
river and, once he had what he wanted, he would refuse any con­
cession to them, thus emerging "doubly victorious". Curzon be­
lieved that he had seen through the Amir’s game,and therefore he 
would take a firm attitude; he would concede "nothing... in the
Mohmand country except in return for a corresponding concession
3
by the Amir cn the Kabul river". Deane when consulted again ex­
pressed his readiness to cede Bohai Dag with the definite stipu­
lation that the Amir must give a "substantial quid pro quo" on the
Kabul river - a suitable boundary including, or in the neighbourhood
of, Loi Dahka.^ The militaiy authorities toot a stiffen attitude; 
no cession of Bohai Dag -to the Amir before the British had actually
1
Viceroy to Amir, 29 August 1903, ibid.9 Reg. ho. 1334.
2Amir to Viceroy, 19 September 1903, ibid-.
^Govt. of India to Deane, 6 November 1903, ibid.., Reg. ho. 296.
^beane to Govt, of India, 10 November 1905, ibid.
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secured the quid pro quo from him.
Curzon then proposed to the Amir that a survey for the de­
limitation of the boundary should start, pending the settlement
of any points over which the Commissioners of the two governments
2
might fail to agree. The Indian government's line of thinking 
was: demarcation should begin in the north from Nawa Kotal as
the Amir had desired; on coming do mi to the Bohai Dag section, 
if the Afghan Commissioner claimed the area, its delimitation 
would be put off and the matter referred to the Amir; the Commission­
ers would then proceed further south to demarcate the section the 
British wanted. This proposal, so Curzon calculated, would provide 
the test whether the Amir was at all serious about demarcation 
and whether he wanted really to effect a bargain. The Amir in 
his reply stated that the delimitation must follow the original
Durand line aid repeated with greater firmness his claim over Bohai 
4Dag.
The Amir's attitude now convinced the British that they would 
not get what they wanted. While Curzon, therefore, thought of
5
"dropping the project" altogether, Deane recommended its postpone- 
1
The Mohmand Delimitation by A.B.Lindsay, B.8.M., Alo7 ..
^Viceroy to Amir, 8 December 1903? B.S.S.F., vol. 4, 1903? Bile ho. 
1552, Beg. ho. 1655.
^Viceroy to ^ecy. of State, Tel. 9 December 1903? ibid.
^Amir to Viceroy, 26 January 1904? ibid. , Reg. ho. 447.
5Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 28 February 1904? ibid.
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ment until circumstances became favourable. Habibullah in his 
reply to Curzon*s letter took the opportunity of using the de~ 
limitation issue as a peg on which to hang ©11 his grievances
2
against the Viceroy regarding the subsidy and arms and ammunition.
As the answer to this letter involved the wider question of the
general relations between the British and Afghan governments
and consequently required the Home government’s decision, the
government of India decided not to reply to it.^
fhe Anglo~Afgiian boundary issue was again taken up in 1905
when the Dane Hiss ion went to Kabul to negotiate a treaty with 
A
the Amir. 1 Dane was instructed by the Government to press the 
Amir to agree to a railway te minus at Loi-Dakka non the ground 
that the military cooperation and support for Kabul? for which 
the Amir had pleaded” were out of the question unless the govern­
ment of India had a railway reaching the Kabul river plain. If 
the Amir did not concede this, Dane was to press for Kam Dakka 
and ascertain whether the Amir wanted any territorial compensation 
elsewhere. Dane was further instructed not to mention any other 
place as the terminus for the Kabul River Railway because the 
Indian government were ...not prepared to let the Amir lay a claim to
^Deane to Govt, of India, 17 March 1904, ibid., Reg. No.918.
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 25, March 1904? Viceroy to Amir,
1 April 1904, ibid.
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel, 7 May 1904, Secy, of State to 
Viceroy, Tel. 16 May 1904? P.S.S.F., vol. 4, 1905? File No. 1552, 
Reg. No. 1697.
^For Dane Mission to Kabul see L. ¥. Adamec, Afghaiiis;K^ i-IS.Q0r.IS^ R2-
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Smatzai. However, Dane found the -^ mir in no mood to discuss
any question of territorial concession on the frontier, let alone
to deal specifically with the ICahul River .Railway issue which
e
he regarded with extr^ tie suspicion and resentment. The Mission's
long stay had raised suspicion in Kabul that great concessions
were being made to the British, and this also bad some influence
1on Habibullah’s attitude.
Shortly after Dane's return from Kabul, the government of 
India again considered raising the demarcation issue with the 
Amir. But Deane was unenthusiastic, he saw no reason why the 
Government should be eager to reopen the issue. The Government, 
he pointed out, suffered no inconvenience from the frontier being 
undefined, except as regards the difficulty of acquiring a suit­
able rail-head for the Kabul River Railway. Deane was not in the 
least optimistic that delimitation of the boundary would enable 
the Government to obtain as the rail-head either Karn Dakka or Loi- 
Dakka; it was, moreover, doubtful whether Smatzai would be theirs, 
even though it was now under British control. In such circum­
stances, instead of asking the Amir for co-operation in demarcating 
the boundary, the Government should confine their efforts to secure 
a suitable rail-head by direct negotiations with him. It would be
1Dane to Govt, of India, 27 March 1905, P.S.S.ff.. vol. 4, 1903,
File Ho. 1552; Reg. Ho. 1095,' Summary of Curzon1 s Administration, 
Foreign Dept., p.66, 0.0., vol. 526.
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preferable, in Deane's view, to request the Amir to grant the 
Government a lease of the necessary ground on payment of rent 
or in return for a gift of rifles rather than to try to obtain 
from him a cession of territory. The Amir should himself state 
the amount he wanted as rent, for if the British suggested any 
sum, he would use it as a "basis for argument and obstruction".^
The time, too, was not suitable for delimiting the boundary. 
Strong religious feelings were then being fanned by Afghan Mullas 
among the Mohmands. Two Mull as, Sufi Sahib and Kama Mull a, had, 
in fact, “produced a state of terror, both spiritual and material" 
on the Mohmand border. Consequently, the Dawezai, Utmanzai and 
Mitai Musa Khel clans of the Mohmands hesitated to come to receive 
their allowances. Even the Ealimzai clan, with whom the Government's 
relations were closest, only received their subsidy after consider­
able reluctance. They also appealed to the Deputy Commissioner of
2
Peshawar for the Government's protection against the Afghan Mull as. 
Then followed an abortive Afghan attack on Smatzai at the instigation 
of the Sartip of Dakka. To the Viceroy's request to call the Sartip 
to account, the Amir sent a letter from the Sartip claiming Smatzai 
"to be in my charge and... belonging to my Government". The Amir
'Deane to Govt; of India, 9 May 1905, P.S.S.F., vol. 4, 1903, Pile 
No. 1552, Reg. No. 1095.
Ibid.
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supported this assertion* pointing out to the Viceroy that the 
revenue payment of Smatzai had "been "entered in my record here", 
and that no evidence pointing to the cession of the place to
1
the British could be found recorded - Smatzai was Afghan property.
Curzon intended to make a spirited reply to the Amirfs assertion
and his refusal to admonish the Sartip and to raise once again
2
the delimitation and rail-head issue. But the Secretary of
State* St. John Brodrick, advised caution in view of the temper
of the Mohmands and the feelings of the Amir. He instructed Curzon
to mention to the Amir only the Smatzai incident and affirm its
being in British territory and not to raise matters like the rail-
3
head and boundary demarcation. Habibullah did not hereafter 
er
both/ to continue any discussion on the Smatzai issue and disposed
4of it with the claim; "Smatzai is and always will be ours". The 
British government also did not see any point in continuing dis­
cussion with the Amir about the delimitation issue. The India. Of­
fice* some time later, summed up the situation thus;
Viceroy to Amir* 2b May 1905? Amir to Viceroy, 12 July 1905?
Ibid., Reg. Ho. Ip06.
Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 2 August 1905? ibid.
Secy, of State to Viceroy, Tels. 12, 24 August 1909? abid., Beg. 
Mos. 1240, 1322$ Viceroy to Amir, 30 August 1905? ibid., Reg.
Ho. 1456.
^Mohmand Delimitation; A Memorandum by L. B. Lindsay, 22 June 1908, 
P.S.M., i m .
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it would be unwise again to suggest demarcation 
of the debatable portion /of the boundary/. From 
past experience it is certain that we shall issue 
from any negotiations badly discomfited or minus 
considerable concessions. It is apparent that 
demarcation is for some reason or other distaste­
ful to the Amir.l
he an while the Government went ahead with the Kabul River 
Railway project. Although no part cf the railway actually ci’ossed 
through the Mohmand country, nevertheless since an attack on it 
by the iribe from the left bank of the Kabul river was not unlikely, 
it was decided to grant additional allowances of Rs. 5?000 to the 
Taraksai Mohmands at the end of 1905. A. few Mohmands were also 
recruited in the Peshawar1 Border Military Police.
The Mohmands generally remained quiet until the beginning of 
1908 when the Bazar valley expedition gave them a chance to rise 
against the British. For the Afghan Mullas» too, the expedition 
and the unrest among the Mohmands was grist to their mill. The 
Mohmands collected a lashkar but it was too late to prove of any 
real assistance to the Aakka Khel. Jihad. was preached by the Afghan
1X M d.
2
Govt, of India to Secy. of State, 4 January 1900, P.S.S.F., vol.
9, 1905j File ho. 582, Reg. No. 264; Aitchison, op.cit., p.91.
5' See p. \\% ,
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MulXas; supplies of grain, arras and ammunition from Ningrahar
flowed in. Overtures were made to the tribes of Dir, Swat and
Bajaur; the Afridis, Loargai Sliinwaris and Zakka Kliel were
also approached but without success.^
The Government were not quite certain about the causes
leading to the Mohmand rising. Deane believed that the rising was
due to a rumour that the Indian government intended to invade the 
2
Mohmand country. To Minto the origin of the tribal excitement 
was "a mystery". It might have been the aftermath of the Zakka 
expedition. Minto believed that the withdrawal of the British 
troops from the Basar valley had been well-timed.. A delay in the 
withdrawal, he feared, would lave unsettled the whole frontier.
But the withdrawal had also another effect. It was "talked of 
in Afghanistan as a retreat, and there was a general determination 
amongst mans'* who were too late for the fray not to be despoiled 
of the fun of a fight". The Mull as had taken advantage of this 
feeling and it seemed to Minto more than probable that Nasrullah 
was trying his utmost to set the tribesmen against the British,
"very possibly in hopes of rendering the Amir* s agreement to the 
Anglo-Russian Convention more difficult for him",' Reports of great
Frontier Disturbances, Mohmands, Diary of Events, April-May 1908, P.S.M., 
A 167.
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 17 April 1908, P.S.S.F., vol. 3,
1903, File No. 1552, Reg. No. 796.
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military activity in Kabul came thick and fast, making even 
Kitchener, usually cool and confident, feel "extremely anxious 
and apprehensive1 that the British were face to face with possible 
hostilities with Afghanistan.^*
The Government chose to pick their way; they took defensive
measures until the situation reached such a pass that punitive
measures against the Mohmands became absolutely unavoidable. Then
the British troops were alerted, and on 24 April 1908, General
Willcocks dispensed a mixed Afghan-Mohmand 1 aside ar near Matt a and
Sardar Ghari. Ten days later, another Afghan lasbkar under Sufi
2Sahib was driven back near Landi Khan a on the border.
Minto, in the meanwhile, apprised the Amir of the situation, 
requesting him forthwith to recall the armed bodies of his subjects 
taking part ii the fighting and to prevent them from violating British 
territory. The Amir'responded. He issued strict orders against 
any Afghan crossing into British territory, recalled those who had 
joined the Mohmands and took steps against the Afghan ringleaders."' 
This relieved the Government of their fear of Afghan involvement 
in the Mohmand trouble.
i
Mingto to Morley, 25, 50 April 1908, IMP., vol. 15.
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, 2 May 1908, P.S.S.P., vol. 3? 1903, 
File Ho. 1552, Keg. Ho. 890.
viceroy to Secy, of State, 24 April 1908, Amir to Viceroy, 5 Ma; 
1908, Ibid., Keg. Hos. 836, 984.
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In May 1908, the Government decided to summon a Mohmand 
,j dry a to meet Willcocks, hoping to reach a settlement with the 
tribe without resorting to an expedition. But the Mohmand Maliks 
refused to come and sent "insulting” replies. Minto then in­
structed Willcocksto march against the Mohmands, reminding him 
that the object of the expedition was purely punitive, to bring 
the-tribe as soon as possible to submission, trill cocks was asked 
to make it widely known that the Government had no intention of 
annexing territory or of interfering with the status quo as re­
gards general zel at ions between the tribe and the Government.
Willcocks was further asked to spare no opportunity of securing 
the assistance of other sections of the tribe in bringing the offend­
ing sections to submission. The Government's policy regarding the 
Mohmand expedition was thus , in Minto's own words, "the same as
that ... in the case of the Zakka expedition".’* The Mir was in­
formed of the expedition and requested to see to it that his sub-
2jects did not join the Mohmands. On 11 May the Mohmand Field Force 
under Willcocks advanced, into the Mohmand territory, fighting their 
way through valleys and villages. On 30 May it withdrew. Next day 
the Mohmands paid fines; they had submitted.^ The expedition was
Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tels. 10, 13 May 1908, ibid., xleg.
No. 984.
Vicery to Amir, 13 May 1908, ibid.
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 2 June 1903, ibid., keg. No. 1119.
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short and successful because of the cooperation of the Tarakzai 
and Hallmsai Mohmands and the friendly attitude cf the Khans of 
Dir, Swat and Bajaur. The Amir, too, kept his subjects on the 
leash. ^
After the expedition, the Mohmands were left in suspense
for a time; they were not told, definitely whether or not peace
had been made with them. In this state of uncertainty jirgas
of various Mo lam and sections visited Afghanistan. Though well
treated and given suns of money, they seem to have received only
evasive promises from the Amir regarding his active assistance
against the British or his talcing the tribe under his protection.
In September 1908 Roos-Keppel interviewed a representative Mohmand
,j irga at Peshawar which presented to him a number of petitions
for arrears and increase of allowances, for the release&f Mo liman d
prisoners and for the appointment of a special Political Officer,
Thereupon the Government restored the Mohmand allowances withheld 
2so long. Hereafter followed a long period of comparative quiet 
broken only by occasional demonstrations of those sections of the
tribe who thought their allowances to be inadequate, or by the de~
3predations of outlaws from the Afghan side of the border. It was 
1
Trans-Frontier Journal, May 1908, P.S.h.I., vol. 217, Reg. ho. 1225; 
Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 26 May 1908, P.S.S.F .» vol. 3? 1903? 
File ho. 1552, Reg. Ho. 1072.
^Minto^ Administration of India; Afghanistan and Morth-Jest Frontier, 
1908-09, pp. 11“2, Minto Papers, vol. M 959*
•^Roos-Keppel to Grant, 14 June 1917? P.S.S.F., vol. 48, 1913? File ho, 
1364? Reg. Ho. 3775.
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only with the outbreak of the World War that fresh turbulence in
1the Mohmand country occuxssd.
In dealing' with the tribal disturbances the Government to oh 
two important measures during* the p eriod under review; the sup - 
pressioa of the arms traffic from the Persian Gulf to the tribal 
territory, and the improvement of the Border Military Police. The 
first decade of the present century saw a flourishing arms trade 
in the Persian Gulf. European firms poured arms and ammunition 
into Maskat which were then smuggled across to the Persian coast 
and which ultimately found tlieir way in large quantities into Af­
ghanistan and the adjacent tribal territory. The growth of this 
trade led to the tribesmen’s possessing arms of precision which 
increased their military power and intensified their raiding pro- 
pensities and lawlessness. The Afridis and the Ghilsais were the
main dealers jn the arms trade which also received the active assist-
2ance of the Afghan government.
The situation caused considerable concern to the Government 
of India, In August 1906 Kitchener reported that the military 
strength of the tribes had been increasing by leaps and bounds; he
^See Chapter III, pp.
‘Tor Arms Traffic see P.SMI., B 182, 196, 1963, D 171, 181, 132. 
223-4, P.S.ST., vols. 2-8, 14, 1907; vols. 4-7, 82, 1912.
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estimated the fighting population in the tribal territory as
270,000 men who had some 94,000 breech-loading rifles; in a
few years, Kitchener had no doubt, every fighting man ii the area
1would, possess a modern rifle. In 1907, 15,000 rifles were re­
ported to have been smuggled into Afghanistan from the Persian
2
Gulf, a figure which increased to 40,000 in 1909. l-n 1909 the
Indian government reported to the Home government that the arms
traffic had "upset the balance of power'1, constituting a serious
3menace to the maintenance of peace on the frontier. Efext year, 
when Minto visited the frontier and went to the ICohat pass, the 
thing which impressed him most was "the complete change in the 
personal armament of the tribesmen". In olden days the tribesmen 
had only flintlocks, matchlocks, shields and long knives, but now 
breech-loading rifles were "universal11, the Martini-Iienry being 
by far the most numerous, besides there were plenty of *303’s and 
a sprinkling of the old snider. At a nirga in the ICohat pass Hinto 
saw several hundred rifles - "every rifle loaded and full-cock, and 
their owners heavily laden with ammunition". The whole atmosphere, 
the Viceroy said, was "full of stories of raids, counter-raids, blood-
■\
Hinto's Administration of India, Afghanistan aid North~yjest Frontier, 
1907-08, P*17, Minto Papers, vol. M 958.
2Davies, op.cit., p.177*
Arms Traffic, by J. E. Shuclcburgh, 15 January 1917, P.S.M., D.224.
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feuds". He warned Morley;
One cannot but shut one’s eyes to the seriousness 
of the position. The conditions we should have to
face now in a frontier war on a big scale would be
entirely different to those of past years.-
The Home government then stirred themselves to a vigorous action 
to suppress the arms trade. In 1910 they instituted a strong 
naval blockade in the Persian Gulf to intercept the arms-laden
boats on their way from Maskat to the Persian coast. The blockade
continued until the outbreak of the war in August 1914 when the 
vessels employed for the blockade had to be diverted for war ser­
vices. Prom thdjvery outset the blockade ms successful, and besides 
the capture of large quantities of arms and ammunition, it reduced 
the dealers’ profit to such an extent that all the European firms,
except one - the Goguyers - at Ilaskat were forced to wind up their 
2busin ess.
The second measure for effectively dealing with 'die tribal 
problem was the improvement of the Border Military Police. Since 
the 1880’s this force had been the Government’s main instrument 
for securing life and property on the frontier against tribal raids. 
The Border Military Police in each of the frontier districts formed 
an important link between the district officers and the iribes across
^Minto to Morley, 14 April 1910, M.P., vol. 24.
^Arms Traffic by J. S. Shuckburgh, 15 January 1917? P.S.H., D 224; 
The Cambridge History of India, vol. VI, pp. 473-4.
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the border, supplied intelligence of the movements of raiding
gangs and bad characters, and repelled raids, The corps received
1frequent support from regular troops and armed villagers. But 
Curzon's tribal policy brought considerable changes in\fche state 
of tilings. He withdrew the regular troops from the tribal areas 
and disarmed the border villages and so deprived the Border Military 
Police of assistance when threatened by tribal raiders. Besides, 
while the tribesmen had improved arms, the Border Military Police 
used weapons poor in quality. There had been no improvement in its 
personnel either. It was reported that service in the corps had 
become with the years unpopular, aid men from good families could 
not be obtained as recruits; the pay of the sepoys had also long 
"ceased to be a living wage". Ho wonder, the corps appeared to 
the Government in 1912 to be useless as a defence against organised 
lawlessness in the frontier. Por several years much disuussion and 
voluminous correspondence had taken place about improving the corps, 
but nothing positive was achieved until 1911 when Hardinge appointed 
a very strong committee to go Into the question of the Border Mili­
tary Police and the suppression of crime on the border." The Com™
2
mittee made several recommendations that first, the garrison at Thai 
be increased to one battalion with two cavalry squadrons and that
Govt, of India to Secy, of State, 5 September 1912, , vol.
10, 1912, Reg. Ho. 9676.
2
The Committee consisted of Earcourt Butler, the Education Member, Henry 
McMahon, the 3? 0 reign Secretary, Roos-Keppel, the Chief Commissioner of 
the frontier Province, A. Hamilton Gordon, the Director of Military Oper­
ations, and E.G.Stokes, Deputy Secretary in the Finance Department.
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at Tank to one battalion and cne regiment of cavalry; regulars
should be retained at Shabkadr, Aba sax, Han&u, Kohat, Fort Loci: hart
and BaiinUj and the San an a Range be held entirely by regular troops
and not, as hitherto, jointly by the Samana Rifles and regular troops;
second, the lower Tochi posts be entirely handed over to the Hilitia
or the Border Military Police; third, the Thai-Idah line of posts
be held permanently by the Northern Vlas iris tan Militia and the Samana 
1rifles; fourth, all posts in the Lana agency be abandoned beyond 
SarwakaJ and Sarwakai be made the headquarters of the South Waziri- 
stan Militia aid of the Agency; similarly, all posts in the Tochi 
valley beyond Idak be abandoned, and I dak be made the headquarters 
of the North ¥aziristan Militia and the Agency, Fifth, the pay of 
the ICurram-Waziristan Militia be increased. Finally, the entire 
Border Military Police Corps was to be reorganised under the name 
of "Frontier Constabulary" and would be a purely civil force under 
whole-time police officers and at the disposal of the Deputy Com­
missioners. "The interior economy and discipline" of the corps 
would be the responsibility6f the commandants who would be directly 
responsible to the Chief-Commissioner. The force would be entirely 
local, recruited within the frontier districts. The duties of the 
force would be to "watch and ward" the district borders, "to collect
-j
Since the beginning of 1911 the posts had been held temporarily
by these Militias.
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information and to serve as the medium of communication with
the tribes under the control of the Deputy Commissioners". The
Committee’s proposals involved an initial expenditure of Rs. 750,000,
1and an additional annual expenditure of about Rs. 100,000.
The Government of India did not accept aLl these proposals 
partly because they involved '‘considerable departure from estab­
lished policy" and partly on grounds of "prohibitive expenses".
They accepted only a part of the first proposal that all the Samana 
posts be made over to the regular troops; the Committee's third,
fifth and sixth proposals were also accepted. In December 1912,
2the Home Government approved of the proposals.
The relations of the Government of India with the frontier 
tribes were of such an intricate nature that they almost defied 
solution. Cursor's frontier policy alone stood the test of the 
tribal unrest. The Mahsud blockade, the short and swift Zakka IGiel 
and Mohmand expeditions were comparatively easily dealt with. The 
Militia experiment seemed to be successful except for its temporary 
blow in South hasiristan where the British officers fell victims 
to the Mahsud Militiamen. Cur son, however, set his face against any 
direct, interference or involvement in tribal affairs. This was
1
Secy, to the Border Military Police Reorganisation Committee to 
Govt, of India, 19 -August 1911, enclosed in Govt, of India to Secy, 
of State, 5 September 1912, P.S ,3T., vol. 10, 1912, Reg. No. 3&7S.
2 -oecy. of State to Govt, of India, Tel. 3 December 1912, ibid.
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clear from his inconsistent policy in regard to the Malisuds which
he was forced, to follow while admitting its unsatisfactory character.
A military occupation of the Mahsud country, in Curzon's opinion,
was the final solution of the problem, as he put it:
No patchwork scheme - and all our present recent schemes, 
blockade, allowances, etc., are mere patchwork - will 
settle the Waziristan problem. Not until the military 
steam-roller has passed over the country from end. to end, 
will there be peace. But I do not want to be the person 
to start that machine.!
Minto advocated, a change in the policy towards the frontier 
tribes. A gradual occupation and- absorption of the tribal areas 
by the Government of India would, in his view, tend to the prosperity 
and happiness of the tribes concerned and lead to ultimate peace 
on the bar der. This was a forward policy and did not find favour 
with Morley, the extremely cautious Secretary of State. Minto's 
policy, Morley said, would involve fresh responsibilities and in­
creased expenditure. It would be dangerous, too, because it would 
stir up the tribes and adversely affect the Anglo-Afghan relations. 
Nardinge carried 011 the policy which he found in operation but at­
tempted one essential reform in the system of border defence - the 
reorganisation'o f the Border Military Police into the Prontier Con­
stabulary.
1Note by Curson, 9 December 1902, c.C., vol. 338.
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Chapter 111 
WOULD WAR I AWD THE TRIBAL TERRITORY
During the first World War, the situation on the Worth-
West Frontier, which had been a "perennial source of danger"
for the Government of India, gave them many anxious moments.
They expressed the fear that the attitude of the Amir of Afghani-
2
stan, which had hitherto been far from cordial, would take a 
turn for the worse, events in Europe providing him with an oppor­
tunity to declare a "preventive war" against the British. An Anglo- 
Afghan war would be certain to rouse the frontier tribes and in­
volve them in a tribal conflagration. Should large scale t ribal 
raids on British territory be made an the hope of finding the 
frontier denuded ty the despatch of troops overseas, then the 
Government might be forced to launch a campaign into tribal terri­
tory, and the consequences of that would be unforeseeable. The 
situation was all the more dangerous for the Government because
of serious Internal troubles caused by increasing terrorist acti-
3
vities In Bengal, Western India and the Punjab. There was the
i
External Situation of India consequent on the War by A. Hirtzel,
15 June 1915, Cabinet Papers. Cab. 37/130, no. 4*
The conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention in August 1907
without consultation with the Amir had enraged him and increased
his suspicion of the British, Afghanistan. Anglo-Russian Convention,
P.S.S.F.. vols. 17-18, 1907, File No, 3082; Davies, op.cit..
pp. 172-3; Sykes, op.cit.. pp. 235-6.
^Internal Situation of India consequent on the War, 15 June: 1915, 
Cabinet Papers. Cab. 37/130, no. 7; Hardinge to Crewe, 17 February
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further fear that Indian Muslims might he stirred up by Pan-
Islamic propaganda emanating from Turkey,which had joined the
War against the British, and by frontier uprisings,'*'
Hardinge*s policy was to keep on good terms with Amir
Habibullah, who was promptly informed of the outbreak of the
War, advised to maintain neutrality and requested to take special
steps for the preservation of order on the Indo-Afghan boundary.
To the lelief of the Government of India, the Amir assured them
of his neutrality, an assurance which he repeated in November 1914
2
when Turkey entered the War. Throughout the War the Amir remained 
true to his pledged word, although this was by no means an easy 
task for him. The anti-British and pro-Turkish faction at Kabul 
headed by Nasrullah and supported by priests and "fanatical1* ele­
ments made no secret of their opposition to the Amir*s neutral
policy. Nasrullah and his men exerted strong pressure nn “Hhbibullah
3to eschew his policy and join the War in favour of Turkey. The
10, 26 March, 22 April, 9 December 1914, H.P., vol. 120, Lord 
Hardinge, My Indian Years. 1910-1916. pp. 116-7. Por terrorist 
activities see Sedition Committee Report. 1918; J. C. Ker,
Political Trouble in India 1907-1917. C.C., vol. 441; V. Lovett,
A History .of Indian Nationalist Movement, pp. 70-124, P.P.. 1920,
KKKIV; Cd. 920, Bast India: Progress and Condition, pp. 6-12,
21-4, 30-48.
External Situation of India consequent on the War, by A. Hirtzel, 15 
June 1915, F.S.M., D.210; IC, IC. Aziz, Britain and Muslim India, pp.34-6.
Viceroy to Amir, 8 August 1914, P.S.S.P.. vol. 21, 1914, Pile No. 3092, 
Reg. No, 3485; Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel, 29 August 1914, ibid.; 
Reg. No. 3364; Viceroy to Amir,'5 November 1914, ibid.. Reg. No. 4741; 
Amir to Viceroy, 18 November 1914. abid.. Rgg. No. 5025.
r z
Summary of the Administration of Lord Hardinge, 1910-16, pp. 98-9,
H.P., vol. 131; L. W. Adamec, on.cit., pp. 83-107.
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arrival at Kabul- in August 1915 of a Turco-German Mission, 
allegedly bearing messages from the Sultan of Turkey and the 
Kaiser of Germany, ^ and the intrigues of Indian "seditionists" 
with the anti-British elements at Kabul made the situation all 
the more difficult for the Amir: there were rumours of rebellion
3
against him, and even of his assassination. Habibullah handled 
the situation with consummate tact; he listened to the advice of 
the pro-Turkish elements in his court but never acted on It; he 
welcomed the Turko-German Mission but kept it guessing whether or 
not he would definitely join the Germans and Turks against the 
British; he also kept an effective control over the frontier 
tribes. He restrained his subjects from committing offences In 
British territory, sent troops to recall those assisting in raids, 
reproved the most influential Afghan mullas for directing those 
operations, and discouraged the tribes on the Indian side of the 
Durand line from hostility towards the British Government. The Amir's 
influence was of vital political importance, for it helped in steady-
■j
German War, German Emissaries to Afghanistan, P.S.S.ff.. vol. 35, 
1914, Kile Wo, 3443; I* A. Shah, "Afghanistan and the German 
^Threat", Edinburgh Review, vol. 22, 1918, pp* 59-72.
2German War, German Emissaries to Afghanistan, P.S.S.E., vol. 35, 
1914, Pile Wo. 3443; Sykes, op.cit., pp. 246-63. See below, p.
3
Summary of the Administration of lord Hardinge, pp. 98-9, H.P.. 
vol. 131.
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ing the situation on the frontier* Hardinge had the "firmest 
confidence" in Habibullah's good faith, and so had the Home Govern­
ment* In recognition of his attitude, King George V sent the
Amir a letter of thanks in September 1915 and the Government of
2
India increased his subsidy by two lakhs of rupees*
Towards the tribes Hardinge had meanwhile, with the concur­
rence of Crewe, maintained a "watchful policy"* In August 1914 
three divisions of infantry and a cavalry brigade were maintained
on the frontier on a "mobilised footing", with three other frontier
3brigades at ICohat, Bannu and Deraj at. Their particular task at
the commencement of the War was to watch the MoImands and the
Mahsuds, both of whom were restless. Prom the adjacent Afghan
district of Khost, over which due to maladministration the Amir's
authority had slackened, incursions on the Kurram and Tochi Valleys
4were apprehended. However, there were some important loyal elements 
in the tribal territory like the Mehtar of Chitral, the Nawab of
External Situation... War* op.cit.
Memorandum on the situation at Kabul, 17 May 1916, P.S.S.P., vol.
15, 1916, Pile Ho* 1287, Reg* Ho. 2447* Por German intrigues with 
Afghanistan, see P.S.S.P.* vols. 21-3, 34-6, 1914; vol. 15, 1916. 
P.S.M.. A-173, 1915-6; A-174, 1916. The Times. 22 May 1916, King 
George to the Amir, 24 September 1915, P.S.P., vol. 1, 1914, Reg*
Ho. 45.
3
Memorandum on events in India, 1917-8, circulated by the Secretary 
of State for India. Imperial War Committee, 1918. P.S.M*. D.235,
Memorandum by E. Barrow on the military situation of India,
6 June 1915, Cabinet Papers. Cab. 37/129, No. 16.
Summary of the Administration of Lord Hardinge. 1910-16. pp. 300-01, 
H.P.. vol. 131, P.P.. vol. 21, 1916, Cd. 36, p,56.
153
Mb, the tribes of Swat and the Khyber agency, all of whom
offered their services and cooperation to the British. So did
the Bhittanis of Jandola and the Waziris of Tochi; the Khyber
Rifles and the North-Waziristan Militia volunteered contingents
for active service.
The uneasy balance of forces on the frontier was threatened
in November 1914 by Turkey's entry into the war. Increased vigilance
over Indian Muslims, who were reported to be in a state of "con-
2siderable bitterness and some unrest" was called for. Yet at the 
same time more and more Indian Army units had to be despatched to 
Mesopotamia and other theatres of war in the Middle East. As a 
result, for several weeks in 1915 the number of troops for the 
maintenance of internal security fell udangerously below the safety 
level", the total British garrison in India being 1 ess than fifteen 
thousand men. The mutiny of the 130th Baluch Regiment and the 
suspected disaffection of other Indian troops added to the Govern­
ment's worries.^
War with Turkey also furnished the mull as in the tribal 
territory with an admirable opportunity to incite the local population
■i
J. S. Donald, Officiating Chief Commissioner, to Secretary to 
Foreign and Political Dept., 11 November 1914, P.S.S.P.» vol. 80,
1914, Pile No. 4265, Reg. No. 4965-6.
Miceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 7 December 1915, P.S.S.P., vol. 22,
1915, Pile No. 622, Reg. No. 4507-
^Lord Hardinge, My Indian Years. 1910-16. pp. 102, 117-8.
^Ibid., H. Butler to Kitchener, 20 October 1915, K.P., vol. 30.
15 4
*fc° jihad. "Hopes of a great Islamic renaissance were at once
aroused.1 It was fondly expected '’ that Persiawmld join the
the War on the side of Turkey and that the Mir, notwithstanding
his present neutrality, would ultimately join Persia. The tribal
mull as were reinforced by the mull as of Southern Afghanistan in
urging the tribesmen to rise in the name of the Sultan of Turkey
and to take advantage of the drain of Government troops caused
by the War. The return of invalid soldiers from Prance gave rise
to stories of German invincibility and many trans-border tribesmen
1
serving in the Indian army deserted their ranks, and joined the 
2
mullas. To this situation among the frontier tribes the Govern­
ment of India, with depleted and in some cases wavering forces, 
was compelled to respond as much by political as by military measures.
Prom the Governments point of view, the attitude of the 
Afridis, "the keystone of the frontier arch", was of paramount 
importance. Roos-ICeppel in emphasising this stated:
in the Muhammadan crisis, which there is reason to 
believe is approaching rapidly, their /Sfridi/
In 1914 there were nearly five thousand trans-border Pathans in the 
Indian army, of whom about half were Afridis. By June 1915, over six 
. hundred Afridis had deserted; there were many dismissals and dis­
charges for misconduct. In November 1915 recruitment of all trans- 
border Pathans was stopped* By the end of 1918 there were less 
then eighteen hundred trans-border Pathans in the Indian army.
Report of the Tribal Control and Defence Gommittee.1931. F.S.L.* 
B-293, p.54*
2
Administration Report of the N.W.F. Province* 1915-16* General 
Summary. Ft. I. w-\, P.P., vol. 24, 1917-18, Gd. 156, PP* 57-8.
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friendship will be of incalculable value. So 
long as we hold -Afridis, wholean-I\v - 
form a fireproof curtain between northern and 
southern Islam on this frontier, no Jehad or 
rising can be general.^
The Mohinands, Oraksais and other neighbouring tribes, he pointed
out, were eagerly awaiting a lead from the Afridis. Roos~3Ceppel
therefore urged upon the Government that as the general situation
was grave and as the Afridis were key to it their allowances
should be forthwith increased. This was the easier to allow since
ailiAfridi petition for an increase was already before the local 
2
government. The Government of India being anxious to secure the
3
goodwill of the Afridis doubled their allowances. The Home
government endorsed this decision, agreeing that the "Wisdom of
4this concession at the present time can hardly be disputed".
On 15 February 1915 Roos-Keppel held a representative .iirga of 
three thousand men in the Victoria Memorial Hall, Peshawar, where 
he announced the grant of increased allowances on conditions of 
"loyalty, good conduct, ratification of past agreements and equit­
able distribution of whole subsidy" by the tribe. The announcement
^Roos-ICeppel to Secy. Govt, of India, Tel. 29 January 1915, P.S.F. * 
vol. 26, 1912, Reg. No. 974.
2Ibid.: see Chapter II ? pp.
5Formerly the allowances were Rs. 84,040.
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 2 February 1915, P.S.F., vol. 26, 
1912, Reg. No. 974? Secy, of State to Viceroy, Tel. 4 June 1915, 
Note by Thomas Holderness, Under Secy., ibid.. &eg. 1402A.
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was recei'ved with a satisfaction which led Roos-Keppel to 
hope that
the maliks. the elders and the tribe as a whole 
will be with us and that nothing but a general 
upheaval of the Islamic World, including Afghani­
stan, will shake the Afridis.**'
Further, as a measure of support and encouragement to the loyal
trans-border chiefs, Roos-Keppel recommended a gift cf rifles
and ammunition to the Mehtar of Chitral aid the Nawabs of Amb
and Dir.^
Simultaneously military arrangements were also effected, 
the main feature of which was the modifications in the distribution 
of troops among the key points of the frontier. A detachment 
of Gurkhas was stationed at Oghi at the foot of the Black Mountains 
to defend the border against the Black Mountain tribes and "Hindu- 
stani fanatics". Parachinar in ICurram was also strengthened with 
the addition of two companies of Gurkhas and a squadron of cavalry 
to repel any attack from Khost. A strong column was located at 
Miranshah to defend the upper Tochi from Afghan incursions from 
Khost. The Dera Ismail Khan brigade was moved to Tank to keep an 
eye on the Mahsuds. Further, mobile wireless stations were installed
1
Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 14 February 1915, ibid.
^Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 13 February 1915, enclosed in Hardinge 
to Crewe, 17 February 1915, H.P.. vol. 121.
3
For Hindustani fanatics, see pp. 1G8-73.
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at Wana, Tank, Miranshah, Bannu, Kohat and Landi-Kotal. These
military measures, though they strengthened forward positions,
were intended to be "purely defensive". Preoccupied with the war in
Europe and the Middle East, the Government had to be content with
what Hardinge described as "necessarily a hand to mouth policy" on
the frontier. This policy, as Roos-Keppel later elaborated it was
to keep on as good terms as possible with the 
tribes who are behaving well, freely to use 
force in crushing any incipient outbreak, to 
encourage and support the people of the Districts 
in resisting trans-frontier raids and, generally, 
to c arryai as well as possible until the cessation 
of other preoccupations enables us to initiate 
a definite policy of setting our house in order.
The development of the War made the maintenance of this policy 
increasingly difficult. In 1915 a number of raids on British terri­
tory took place, and incitement to Jihad by the mullas continued 
unabated. There were attacks on Miranshah and Spina Khaisora in 
the Tochi Valley by the Afghans of Khost, but they were effectively 
repulsed by the North-Waziristan Militia and the Bannu Brigade.
The instigation of the mull as led to five attacks on the Peshawar 
border by the Mo liman ds and Bunerwals, but the first Division, part 
of the second Division and the Frontier Constabulary' successfully 
repulsed these attacks. Though outside India little m s  known about
1Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 10 March 1915, R.P.
^Hardinge: to Roos-Keppel, 28 March 1915* 10 May 1915, Roos-Keppel 
to Chelmsford, 13 April 1916, ibid.
3
Summary of $he Administration of Lord Hardinge, pp. 92, 101-03, H.p..
vol. 131. For lawlessness and tribal raids see F.S.S.F.. vols. 4-7, 1912, 
File No. 46; Vols. 45-50, 1913, File.No. 13464; vol. 22, 1915, File No.
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these frontier incidents, Hardinge claimed to have quietly and 
successfully carried out "the greatest military operations on 
the frontier since the frontier campaign of 1897”•
That these Jihad campaigns and disturbances did not 
escalate into a general uprising in the tribal territory might
be ascribed to three causes. First, the Amir's attitude had a
generally restraining influence on the tribes. Hardinge kept 
Habibullah informed about the movements of his Afghan subjects 
and urged him to hold them in leash. Habibullah made genuine 
though not uniformly successful efforts to check his subjects
2from talcing part in the Jihad or creating trouble for the British.
Roos-Keppel was sure that
but for the Amir's prompt action, the flame of 
Jehad would have spread and that there would have 
been a whole rising of Ningrahar and of the Hoh-
mand and Bajaur countries. His Majesty has dis­
played unprecedented boldness in his attitude to­
wards the Mullas and the Jehad party and has in­
curred much unpopularity, but his attitude and 
action have been of incalculable value to us.5
It was, indeed, a most striking admission on the part of the Chief
622. See also Gazette of India. Extraordinary, 4 July 1916, 
Despatch of Commander-in-Chief in India on Operations on the North- 
West Frontier up to 9 March 1916.
^Lord Hardinge, op.cit., p.131*
. D-210, 15 June 1915, op.cit.
^Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 30 April 1915, F.S.S.F., 
vol. 47, 1915, File No. 1364, Beg. No. 2095*
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Commissioner who, as the India Office noted, had "seldom ... a
good word to say for the Anir",^ and who appeared to Lord Chelms-
ford, Hardinge1 s successor, as "confessedly an Afghanphobe".
The second favourable factor for the Government was the
continued loyal behaviour of the Afridis, which, true to Roos-
Keppel* s anticipation, drove "an effective wedge" between the
tribes of the northern and the southern borders of the province.
Apart from the increased allowances, one factor which contributed
notably to the quiet in the Afridi country was the remarkable
influence of Abdul Qaiyum, the Assistant Political Agent of Khyber,
who, in Roos-Keppel's words, was "the anchor to which Tirah is
moored". "If we get through this critical year ^91^7", the Chief
Commissioner informed Hardinge, "this will be more due to Abdul
3Qayyum than to any other individual, I include myself."
The third factor in the Government's favour was the loyalty 
and co-operation of the Khans and Nawabs of the settled districts 
who volunteered their services to the local government to put 
down tribal disorders.^ It was fortunate that the Amir and the 
Afridis did hold firm, for,from the military point of view, 1915
^Ibid., Dept. Note.
^Chelmsford to Montagu, 4 June 1919, P.P., vol. IV.
’Z
Roos-ICeppel to Hardinge, 19 July 1915. R.F.
^Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 21 April 1915, ibid.
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was a very trying year for the Government of India, Their mili­
tary strength was waning as a result of Kitchener's unceasing 
demands for troops from India to which Hardinge*s government 
responded with increasing reluctance. The efficiency of the three 
frontier divisions was greatly affected when good Indian battalions 
from these divisions were sent overseas and inferior Indian batta­
lions replaced them^for the replacements were "under-officered, 
under-gunned" and composed chiefly of new recruits and reservists.
This the tribesmen soon came to know about. They had the "utmost 
contempt' for Indian battalions, especially those having Brahmin 
elements; it was only British battalions, so Hardinge believed,
'j
whom the tribesmen fearedI
The Government of India's anxiety over the draining away 
of their troops was reinforced by the War situation in Mesopotamia 
and Persia and its reaction on Afghanistan and the Frontier. In 
July 1915, when Kitchener asked for more British regular battalions 
from India, both Hardinge and Beauchamp Buff, the Commander-in- 
Chief, flatly refused to send any. There were then only eight 
British, battalions in India, all beingstationed on the frontier.
It was impossible in Hardinge's opinion "to play with the situation
^Hardinge to ChamberMn, 2 July 1915, H.P. ♦ vol. 121. On 10 September 
Hardinge complained bitterly of the "melting away" of the 4th Quetta 
Division, and on 5 November 1915 pointed out that only two British 
cavalry regiments remained in India - of which one was already on 
the frontier. See Hardinge to Chamberlain, 10 September, 5 November 
1915, H.P,, vol. 121.
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on the frontier", where peace hung on a delicate balance. If
Persia were involved in the War that balance, Hardinge feared,
could no longer be maintained, and this the Viceroy clearly
1pointed out to the Secretary of State, Austen Chamberlain.
The Home Government saw Hardinge*s point. In December 
1915 Chamberlain apprised the War Committee of the Cabinet of 
the Viceroy's anxiety about the military situation on the frontier. 
The War Committee decided to send "without delay" drafts for the 
British regiments in Mesopotamia and on the Indian frontier.
2
Accordingly, four garrison battalions forthwith sailed for India.
Meanwhile Roos-Keppel was becoming concerned over the situ­
ation at Kabul. Reports of the German intriguers consolidating 
their influence came thick and fast; Nasrullah's influence, too,: 
was on the increase: he was now being addressed as "Amir Nas­
rullah Khan". In January 1916 an apparently forged letter pur­
portedly signed by the Amir, by Nasrullah and by the pro-Turkish 
elements in the Afghan Court was circulated in the frontier asking 
the "mullahs, maliks and kazis of the Tirah ilaka" to prepare for 
a .i ihad in the spring of 1916. Stories of German plans for the 
invasion of Egypt, Persia and Afghanistan gained wide currency and 
ready credence in the frontier province. Roos-Keppel apprehended 
that under the pressure of Nasrullah and his men the Amir was
^Hardinge to Chamberlain, 2 July, ID September 1915, H.P., vol. 121* 
2Chamberlain to Hardinge, 9 September 1915, ibid.
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“showing signs of wavering" from his neutral policy.^
Hardinge reporting Roos-Keppel1 s anxiety to Chamberlain in
January 1916 made it clear that he still regarded the Chief Com-
2missioner's views as rather too pessimistic. Nevertheless the 
Viceroy himself was uneasy, and he waited impatiently for the 
Amir's reply to the letter from King George sent three months 
back, speculating whether the recent British set back in Meso­
potamia had compromised the British prestige so much as to force 
Habibullah to abandon his erstwhile neutrality underpressure of
3
Nasrullah and his men. As the Amir was the only man who stood 
"between a .jehad and a ¥ar",^ Hardinge had reason to speculate 
.’anxiously on what would happen if Habibullah, because of his 
resistance to the anti-British line, urged by the pro-Turkish 
party, were assassinated. This element of uncertainty regarding 
the Amir and his future conduct troubled Hardinge's mind and he, 
therefore, thought it prudent to be "both watchful and prepared" 
for any emergency from the Afghan quarter. In order to strengthen 
the Amir's hand the Viceroy intended to write a farewell letter
^Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 28 December 1915, 13, 31 January, 26 
February 1916, R.P.
^Hardinge to Chamberlain, 14 January 1916, H.P., vol. 122*
Adamec, ou.cit., p.97.
^Hardinge to Chamberlain, 7 January 1916. H.P., vol. 122;
Hardinge to Roos-Keppel, 25 December 1915, H.P.V, vol. 99*
4Ibid.
^Hardinge to O'Dwyer, 20 January 1916, H.p., vol. 91.
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to him, using the announcement of his impending retirement 
to cover a veiled warning that any hostile attitude towards the 
British would be dangerous for Afghanistan. However, in Feb­
ruary 1916, the tension relaxed. The long-awaited reply of the 
Amir to the King's and the Viceroy's letters reached Delhi. 
Habibullah saw the British agent at Kabul as well. These were 
encouraging signs. Harding could now
feel confident that he /Amir/ means to maintain 
his neutrality, provided that he can do so, and 
X think he can.1
Meanwhile, the Russian successes in Persia and the Caucasus 
had restored the Allied Powers' prestige in Afghanistan and 
proportionately strengthened Habibullah*s position. The govern­
ment of India's military position had also improved by the beginning 
of 1916. In January the four garrison battalions from England 
arrived in India. The Government of India had also steadily but 
quietly moved up territorial battalions to the frontier. Two 
flights of aircraft were also sent to the frontier which could
2
not but profoundly impress the tribes, the mullas and Afghans.
On 17 February 1916, at a gardeufcartjr at Peshawar, twenty-five 
thousand tribesmen with many Afridi maliks and chiefs among 
them saw an aeroplane flight organised by Roos-Keppel. The effect
-1
Hardinge to Chamberlain, 14 Januaiy, 11 February 1916, H.P.» 
vol. 122.
^Hardinge to Chamberlain, 25 Narch 1916, H.P.. ■vol. 122.
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was tremendous. One Afridi elder asked Roos-Keppel:
What do those things cost? The two that 
you have there are worth twenty thousand men 
to you.
A good number of Afghans were also present who sent off a 
special report of the flight to ICabul on tie same day. That 
the anti-British elements in the tribal territory were impressed 
by the aerial display was evident from one of their intercepted 
letters. The writer, one Mulla Doda Jan, informed Babra Mulla 
thus •
1 have heard wonderful things from the Mulla 
of Khema who says that the wicked British have
got aeroplanes in Peshawar district where they
fly in the sky. God knows whether we oan fight 
against them or not. The Mulla of Khema is 
sent on to you in order to relate the account 
to you personally. But the grace of God is 
greater than such deeds of devils.1
As a further demonstration cf British military might armoured cars
2
and mechanical transport were also kept on the frontier.
But what was most heartening for the Government of India 
was what they regarded as a "wonderful change" in the attitude of 
the War Office in London to the military situation on the frontier. 
Both Hardinge and Beauchamp-Buff had long complained that Kitchener
treated India simply as "a milch cow". This attitude, so it
seemed to the Government of India, changed after William Robertson
^Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 26 February, 15 March 1916, R.P.
^Hardinge to Chamberlain, 25 March 1916, H.P.. vol. 122.
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came to the War Office as Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
He was far more considerate regarding India's military require­
ments than Kitchener ever was. In the middle of March 1916, 
Robertson provisionally earmarked two divisions m  Egypt as a 
reserve for meeting possible contingencies on the Indian frontier. 
Hitherto the Government of India had adopted a purely defensive 
frontier policy; now their position was much stronger. Indeed,
if need be, Hardinge told Chamberlain, the Government could even
2take an offensive policy on the frontier. Hardinge assur^ed 
Roos-Keppel that he could now look with "equanimity upon the 
frontier situation, no matter what the Afghans tried to do".
The War Committee in London, however, were against any offensive 
policy, and the Government of India was warned accordingly. 
Chamberlain laid down that if active operations became absolutely
A
unavoidable, they should be strictly "local and limited". The 
same restrictions were also placed on Lord Chelmsford who took 
over from Hardinge at the end of March 1916. The new Viceroy 
had committed himself, before he set sail for India, to follow
5
"a strictly defensive policy on the frontier".
^Hardinge to Chamberlain, 17, 25 March 196, H.P.. vol. 122. 
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 18 March 1916, C.P.. vol. VII. 
Hardinge to Roos-Keppel, 18 March 1916, H.P.» vol. 81.
^Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel, 7 April 1916, C.P.. vol. VII, 
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 28 April 1916, ibid.. vol. II.
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In April 1916, the probability of the fall of Kut in Meso­
potamia led to the adoption of further defensive measures on 
the frontier. Under these, one infantry division and cne cavalry 
brigade, together with internal security troops, wjsre stationed 
in the Peshawar plain; brigades of infantry, with attached units, 
were allotted to the Mahsud area at Kohat, Bannu and Derajat; a 
further infantry brigade with divisional troops attached was 
posted to the Quetta area. Behind these forward troops, a central 
reserve was created at Rawalpindi, consisting of six infantry 
brigades and cne of cavalry, together with the remainder of the
divisional troops, and the troops on internal security duty.
2
The Secretary of State approved of these measures, but his
3military advisers, Charles Egerton and Edmund Barrow, supported 
by Gurson had little confidence in Duff's distribution of the 
troops. Chamberlain had earlier urged that the territorial battalions 
held at Bangalore as part of the central reserve should be moved 
within "striking distance" of the frontier, but had been told 
that this was not immediately possible because every military 
station and barrack was already full.^ Now his advisers strongly
^Secy, of State to Viceroy, Tel. 20 April 1916, Viceroy to Secy, 
of State, Tel., 22 April 1916, ibid., vol. VII.
^Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 24 April 1916, ibid.
%e:e Biographical Notes pp.
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 22 April 1916, C.P.. vol. VII.
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pressed Chamberlain to issue definite instructions to the
Government of India for the reinforcement of the Kurrain and
Khyber positions at the ‘'shortest notice". Chamberlain could
neither reject the views of his military advisers nor over
rule the Indian Commander-in-Chief; he therefore brought the
matter before the War Committee. The War Gommittee supported
the military advisers of the Secretary of State whereupon the
latter aslced the Government of India to make certain that they
would be able to take prompt and effective action in Khyber
and Kurram; that their proposed distribution of troops was
suitable and adequate; and that the forces detailed for Quetta
and Zhob were sufficient. On receiving satisfactory assurance
from the Government of India on these points, Chamberlain reported
it to the War Committee and the Cabinet and they accepted this 
2assurance.
The maintenance of peaceful relations with the frontier 
tribes during the War was made still mere difficult by the presence 
within tribal territory of anti-British elements both from India 
and abroad. These elements were the Mu.iahidin (holy warriors) 
called by the British the "Hindustani fanatics", the Indian "sedi-
^Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 26 April, 11 May 1916, C.P., vol. II.
Secy, of State to Viceroy, Tel. 28 April, 1916, Viceroy to Secy, 
of State, Tel. 29 %ril 1916, C.P., vol. VII. Telegrams regarding 
action to be taken in connection with the Defence of the N.W.p. f 
Cabinet Papers, Cab. 57/146, no. 48.
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tionists" and agents from Turkey. The Haji Sahib of Turangzai, 
a religious leader, also figured prominently in the troubled 
polities of the frontier an the War years. For all these intrigues 
tie tribal territories formed both a rendezvous and a base of 
operations.
^he Mu.i ahidin colony at Sit tana in Buner had long been a 
centre of unrest in the tribal territory. The Mu.i ahidin were 
followers of Syed Ahmad Shahid (1786-1831), a native of Rai Bareilly 
in Oudh and a spiritual disciple of Shah Abdul Aziz of Delhi.
Their aim was the reestablishment of a Muslim state as conceived 
by Shah Wali-ullah (1703-62), a renowned Muslim scholar and re­
formist, and to deliver the Muslims from the bondage of the "infidels".
"They faced formidable opponents; the Marat has in the south, Sikhs
o
in the Punjab and the British who were to overthrow all." In 1842,
i
Por the life^and activities of Syed Ahmad Shahid, see Sayyid 
Muhammad Miyan, Ulama-i-Hind ka Shandar Hazi. vol. II, Ghulam 
Rasul Mihr, Sayyid Ahmad Shadid & Jama ~at-e-Mu.i ahidin. 2iya- 
ul-Hasan Paruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan. 
pp. 1-21, Azizur Rahman Mallibk, British Policy and the Muslims 
in Bengal, 1757-1856, pp. 92-145f Mahmud HussainT^Sayiid Ahmad 
Shadid", A History of the Freedom Movement, vol. I, pp. 556-600, 
Aziz Alim ad, Studies in Islamic Culture an the Indian Environment, 
pp. 209-17, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964. 
pp. 19-21, W. W. Hunter, The Indian Musalmans, Q. Ahmad, The Wahabi 
Movement In India, pp. 25-87, Hafeez Malik, Moslem Rationalism in 
India and Pakistan, pp. 123-196.
2
Hafeez Maiik. op.cit., p.141.
169
Syed Ahmad appeared.;, on the Yusufzai border and soon stirred up 
the local population to holy war against the Sikh rulers of
■j
Peshawar. The conflict with the Sikhs met with varying fortunes
but thenceforward the Mu.i ahidin on the frontier were regularly
associated with deeds of blind fanaticism against 
the non-Islamic rulers of India, and no period of 
political stress... ,/had7 passed without attempt- 
on their part, attended with varying success, to 
engender religious excitement among the border tribes.
In the nineteenth century the Mini ahidin had several armed
conflicts with British troops; they created great disturbance
during the Mutiny and were the prime cause of the Ambeyla campaign
of 1863, "the most important and powerful single campaign led by
3the English" against them. However, during the last quarter of 
the century the fighting spirit of these "professional fanatics"
- as the British c ailed them - deteriorated and thereafter their 
activity was confined to "occasionally making a noise" in the 
tribal region with the object of keeping up "the supply of presents 
from the Amir /of Afghanistan^ and of offerings from the dupes in 
India". ^
•i
Olaf Caroe, op.cit., pp. 301-05; Sedition Gommittee Report, 1918, 
pp. 123-5; George MacNunn, Turmoil and Tragedy in India 1914 and 
After, pp. 63-5.
^The Mu.j ahidin had always maintained a secret communication with 
their sympathisers in India idao s ent men and money to the oolony. 
See Brief History of Hindustani Fanatics, June 1915, F.S.M.. D.209.
^For details see Q. Ahmad, op.cit., pp. 194-209.
^Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 13 February 1915, enclosed in Hardinge 
to Grewe, 17 February 1915, H.P.. vol. 121.
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From 1914 the Mu jahidin. no doubt seizing the opportunity
of British involvement inthe War, stepped up their activity. Their
colony, moved in 1915 to Samasta in Buner, provided a rallying
point fo.r intriguers against the British, like the "seditionists"
from the Punjab and the Haji Sahib of Turangzai. The Haji, who
joined the Mujahidin in June 1915* was '’probably the most respected
and trusted" mulla in the tribal territory, his influence being
strongest in the Peshawar district and its tribal border where
he enjoyed a "reputation for sanctity and unselfish benevolence".
The Haji intermittently visited the Swatis, Bajauris and Mohmands
to preach jihad. He also established contact with the anti-British
party at Kabul and set up a press from which he issued a series of
2
"rousing jihad leaflets".
Some time in the middle of 1915 a branch colony of the 
Mujahidin was set up at Chamarkand in Bajaur, possibly by the "sedi­
tionists" from the Punjab. Chamarkand was chosen because it lay "very 
handy for communicatinns with India and Kabul". Soon after its foundation, 
one hundred and ten Indian "seditionists" who lived in Kabul and a 
hundred others livingan ^amasta joined the new colony which eventually 
became the Muj ahidin headquarters.
Sedition Committee Report. 1918, 6p.cit., p.124- Viceroy to Secy, 
of State, Tel. 9 March 1915, P.S.S.P.. vol. 22, 1915, Pile Ho. 622,
Reg. Ho. 951. Roos-Keppel to Secy. Govt, of India, 30 July 1915,
P.S.S.P., vol. 47, 1913, File Ho, 1364, Keg. Ho. 3275. Vov Haji of
Turangzai see G. D. Mehr, Sarguzasht-i-Mujahidin, pp. 344-5.
^Roos-Keppel to Secy. Govt, of India, 30 July 1915, P.S.S.P.. vol.
47, 1913, File Ho, 1364, Reg. Ho, 3275. P.P.» vol. 18, 1918, Cd, 9162,
Fast India (Progress and Condition), p.70.
^Roos-Keppel to Secy. Govt, of India, 20 September 1916, enclosed in
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Muj ahidin were directly implicated in a tribal attack
1
on the village of Rustam on the Peshawar border in April1915.
The Government retaliated by blockading the Mujahidin. The blockade
pressed hard on the Mujahidin. By January 1917 Hiamatullah Khan,
their Amir, was driven to appeal "in miser icoAum" to Roos-Keppel
and Abdul Qaiyum to raise the Hoclcade. Hiamatullah stated that
the Hockade had caused "unbearable loss" to his people, who could
not move out even for their "everyday necessaries". He further
2
contended that inlhe tribal disturbances in 1915 the Muj ahidin 
had not joined of their own accord; they had been compelled by the 
Haji and the people of Buner to launch an attack on the Government.
He assured Roos-Keppel that the Muj ahidin colony "neither cherishes"
ill-feelings towards the Government, nor does anything prejudicial
3
to the interests of the Government". Roos-Keppel was not impressed; 
he did not relax the blockade. Hiamatullah continued to appeal 
that the blockade had really reduced his men to sore straits. How­
ever, in April 1917 two Bengali Muslims were arrested . at Peshawar
A
while carrying eight thousand rupees for the Muj ahidin. This
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 28 September 1916, P.P., vol. II.
1Sedition Committee Report, op.cit., p.124; Mehr, Sarguzasht-i- 
Muj ahidin, pp. 544-5.
2See p. \5t.
Niamatullah to Chief Commissioner, and to Abdul Qaiyum, enclosed in 
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 19 January 1917, C.P., vol. III.
^Roos-Keppel to Grant, Secy. Govt, of India, 7 May 1917, enclosed 
in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 13 May 1917, C.P., -vol. III.
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strengthened the Government’s decision not to raise the blockade, 
but they forebore from any stronger step against the Mu.i ahidin in
Niamatullah was given some hope that the Government would accept 
his overtures for a settlement, Abdul Gfaiyyum was instructed to
After four months of negotiations, in October 1917, when the Mahsud
disturbances had been dealt with, an understanding was reached,
the Government giving Niamatullah certain allowances on condition
that he kept his men away from anti-British elements in the tribal 
4
territory. Mamatullah was thus won over. Later, in recognition
of his friendliness to the Government during the third Afghan War
(1919) Roos-Keppel recommended a reward of Rs. 25,000 and twenty-
5
five squares of good land in the Punjab for his family. Hiamatullah1 s
See below, p|M§kT*
^Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 31 May 1917, C.P.. vol. III.
Roos-ICeppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 16 May 1917, enclosed in 
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 31 May 1917, ibid.
4G. R. Mihr, Sar guzasht-i-Mu.iahidin. p.504.
^Roos-ICeppel to Hignell, 21 August 1917, C.P., vol. 23. Roos-Keppel 
to A. H. Grant, 1 September 1919, R.P*
view of the Mahsud distuibances. During these disturbances the
Government in fact adopted a temporising policy towards the 
2Mujahidin. Ihe blockade was continued, but at the same time
ask Niamatullah to send representatives to meet him for a settlement.
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attachment to the Government made him unpopular with the extremists
1among his followers who assassinated him on 4 May 1921. The
Mujahidin were a Muslim body whose opposition to infidel rule in
India was of long standing and cast in a traditional orthodox mould.
But there were other revolutionariesdn the tribal territory, the
small but well-organised group of Indian "seditionists", Hindu and
Sikh as well as Muslim, whose terrorist aim was to overthrow the
British Government in India by violent means. They took their models
from Europe and looked for support there as well as in India. They
saw in the war an opportunity to stir up troubles by appealing to
2
"the ignorance and fanaticism" of the frontier tribes. During
the War years the " seditionists ” from the Punjab, East Bengal and
3even the Par East found their m y  into the tribal territory. They 
included eight students fbom the North-West Frontier Province as 
well.^  In August 1915 the famous Indian anarchists, Barakatullah
5and Mahendra Pratap, reached Kabul along with the Turko-German Mission.
■i
Anti-British Conspiracy... on the Indo-Afghan Frontier. P.S.M., a-195.
0!Dwyer, "The Mohammedans of India, and India's Mohammedan 
Neighbours", J.R.C.A.S., vol. VIII, part IV, 1921, pp. 197-218.
3
Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 12 January 1917, enclosed 
in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 19 January 1917, C.P., vol. III.
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 9 March 1915, P.S.S.F.. vol. 22,1915, 
File No. 622, Reg. No. 951; Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt, cf India,
4 March 1917, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 10 March 1917,
C.P., vol. III.
5
For Mahendra Pratap and his activities, see P.S.S.F., vols. 34-5,
1914, File No. 3443; vols. 1-3, 1915, File No. 33; vol. 22, 1915,
File No. 622; vol. 15, 1916, File No. 1287. See also his autobiography, 
My Dife Story of Fifty-five years; "My German Mission to High Asia",
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*■* 1Obaid Ullah Sindhi, one of the leaders of the Mujahidin, joined
them. They induced the Amir to declare a holy war against the
2British; they hatched the "silk-letter plot"; ' they were in 
close touch with the Mujahidin, the Haji Sahib of Turangzai and 
all important mull as on the northern sector of the border. The 
"seditionists" remained active on the border until the early 
i920s.
The "seditionists" made use of Turkish ^ents to intrigue 
with the tribes, and their operations bad the financial support 
of Nasrullah, who sent Kazim Bey, the principal member of the 
Turkish Mission at Kabul, to the tribal territory to report on 
the developments there. The most serious attempt to incite the 
tribes was made in the Tirah where in June 1916 two emissaries 
were sent; one was IChired Bey, a staff colonel of the Turkish 
army, and the other rwas Mohammad Abid, alias Abidin, an Arab,
Asia, vol. 25, May 1925, pp. 382-5.
8
For Obaid Ullah Sindhi see Muhammad Sarwar, T j al imat-i-Mawl ana 
(Obaid Ullah Sindhi, Kabul Mein Sat Sal.
2
In August 1916 the "silk letter plot" was discovex-ed by the Govt, 
of India, This was a conspiracy hatched in Kabul by Mahendra Pratap, 
Obaid Ullah and Barkatullah, who formed a "Provincial Government 
of India", with Mahendra Pratap as its President. Obaid Ullah wrote 
letters to his friend, Mawlana Mahmud Hassan, at Mecca, urging him to 
persuade the Turkish government to form an alliance with the "Pro­
visional Government of India" against the British. These letters were 
written on yellow silk, and, hence, the "silk letter plot". P.S.S.F.» 
vol. 55, 1916, File No. 4260. Also see Jawaharlal. Nehru, An Auto­
biography* pp. 148-52.
17 5
formerly employed by the Turks as a drill instructor .1 in Kabul.
1
Turkish agents also operated in Bajaur and the Mahsud country.
Before the Turkish emissaries arrived in the Tirah, one
of their agents, Mir Mast by name, had already been intriguing
with the Afridis. Mir Mast was a Kambar IChel Afridi and an ex-
Jemadar of the 58th Rifles, from which he had deserted in France
and then accompanied the Turko-German Mission to Kabul. The
"uneasy feelings" in the tribal area as a result of the intrigues
of the Turko-German Mission at Kabul were further intensified by
2
Mir Mast’s activities in the Khyber*
Ontheir arrival in the Tirah the Turkish emissaries were 
welcomed by iMirMast and a prominent mull a of the Kambar Khel.
The emissaries delivered a number of speeches at Bagh in the IChyber, 
where they unfurled a flag which they claimed ..chad, been blessed 
by the Turkish Caliph. They declared themselves 'to be the Turkish 
Sultan’s plenipotentiaries and offered the Afridis his protection 
and assistance against the British. The Afridis were promised arms, 
ammunition and money and were called upon to assist the emissaries 
who declared that they were serving the Afghan Government.
•i
Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, November 1916, R.P.; Roos-Keppel to Secy. 
Govt, of India, 29 July 1916, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain,
4 August 1916, C.P.» vol. II.
A^dministration Report of N.W.F. Province, 1916-1%, pt. 1, p.vii; 
Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 31 Jul'y I9T6, enclosed in 
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 11 August 1916, C.P., vol. II.
■^Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 21, 29 July 1916, enclosed in
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 4 August 1916, C.P., vol. II.
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In the middle of 1916 deserters and dismissed Pathan Sepoys 
from the Indian army swelled the ranks - mainly pro-Afghan Afridi - 
of the emissaries. The latter started recruiting for what they gave 
out to he sometimes a "Turkish army" and sometimes to he the "Amir1 s 
army". Roos-Keppel'., who had kept a close watch on these developments, 
believe^d that the Turks wanted to raise an Afridi army and keep 
it in Baaar "for use as escorts to further Turkish or German visitors 
and to act as a thorn" in the British side "whenever demonstration
■j
is considered to he advisable". By July 1916 the total number <f
Afridi recruits enlisted by the Turkish agents was reported to have
reached about four hundred; the recruits were posted at three Kambar
Khel villages and drilled every day by M r  Mast under the supervision
2
of Khired Bey, the Turkish Colonel.
Mahendra Pratap came to the Tirah in August 1916, bringing 
money from Nasrullah for distribution among the local mull as. He 
soon returned to Kabul with a delegation of seventy Afridis who 
probably wanted to make sure that the Amir endorsed the promises of 
arms and allowances held out to them by the Turkish emissaries.
Roos-Keppel, whose policy was to keep on good terms with the 1 
Afridi tribe, was concerned that the tribe was slowly being divided
^Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 29 July 1916, ibid.
%toos-Keppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 31 July 1916, enclosed in 
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 11 August 1916, ibid.
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 15 August 1916, P.S.S.F.. vol. 22, 
1915, File No. 622, Reg. No. 3281.
177
into two camps: the one in favour of maintaining peace and
friendship with the Government, and the other advocating the 
opposite policy. The latter consisted of deserters and discharged 
soldiers from the Indian army and other pro-Afghan elements, while 
the former was composed chiefly of Maliks and elders who were 
looked upon by Roos-Keppel as the "best element" in the tribe.
The pro-Government faction had, indeed, "a very difficult part 
to play not unlike that of the Amir with his people" in controlling
i
the rival faction. Roos-Keppel believed that the Turkish agents
were responsible for creating the schism in the tribe, but he could
not ask the Government to take action against the agents for fear
of aggravating the hostility of the anti-Govemment Afridis, and
thereby disturbing what he saw as "a very delicate equilibrium"
in the tribe. Besides, strong measures to foil Turkish intrigues
were most likely to strain the Indian government’s relations with
the Amir whose policy, as seen by A. H. Grant, the Secretary to
the Foreign Department, was one of "cognizance if not connivance"
in these intrigues. The Amir was fully aware of Nasrullah* s policy
of "keeping the frontier sore open". Nasrullah, Grant noted,
has always aimed at preventing, so far as possible, 
the establishment of really good relations between 
us /BritainJ and our trans-border tribes. A belt 
of disturbed territory is a safeguard to Afghanistan,
■j
Roos-Keppel to y. Govt, of India, D  August 1916, enclosed 
in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 18 August 1916, C.P., vol. II.
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so Nasrullah thinks. This does not, however, mean 
that Nasrullah wants war between Afghanistan aid 
India - at present anyway. All 1b wants at present 
is to detach the Afridis from their allegiance to 
us in case circumstances later make war between 
Afghanistan and India inevitable. I do not believe 
that the Amir is a definite party to this business, 
though he probably gives Nasrullah a free hand to 
intrigue as he thinks fit up to a certain point. 1
In such circumstances, Roos-Keppel considered it better to "leave
2
the Turks alone".
However, the Turkish intrigues with the Afridis could not
get very far. The pro-Government Afridis, so their leaders reported
to Roos-Keppel, told the Turks that unless they saw "the Amir, the
Germans and the Turkish armies with their own eyes", the Afridis
would never raise any trouble with the British. The Turks were
further asked not to expect any help from the tribe unless the
Amir himself led a ,jihad and unless the tribesmen were given "very
large quantities of arms ammunition and money",^' The Turks, for
their part, could not procure from Nasrullah more than £1,500 in
all, and later bitterly complained that "Nasrullah had ruined the
movement by failing to send the money and ammunition which he lad 
5promised. The time, too, was not suitable for the success of ^
•i
National Archives of India, Foreign Secret War Proceedings. April 
1917, Nos. 22, 25, Notes , cited by Adamec, op.cit., p.98.
^Roos-Keppel to Secy. Govt, of India, 29 July 1916, enclosed in 
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 4 August 1916, C.P., vol. II.
■^Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 18 August 1916, enclosed in 
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 25 August 1916, ibid.
4
Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt, of India, If, August. 1916, enclosed in 
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, II: August 1916, ibid.
5Roos-ICeppel to Secy. Govt, of India,4:10ctpb,$£, 1916, enclosed in
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the Turkish intrigues. The Turkish agents began their activity 
late in summer when iiie Afridis eagerly looked forward to ihe 
approach of cold weather when they wDuld go to British territory 
for their allowances and employment. This naturally had a restrain­
ing effect - so at least Roos-Keppel believed - on Afridi desire 
to indulge In overt hostility towards the Government. Finally,
Abdul Qaiyyum successfully played upon the mutual jealousy of the 
Afridi mull as. and kept some of them attached to the Government.
The Afridi delegation which had gone to Kabul with Mahendra Pratap
2
returned disappointed, with very small allowances. Eventually, 
in the middle of September 1916, the Afridis under a ,lgentle press­
ure" from the British officers at Khyber drove off the Turks to Raj- 
gal, near the Afghan border. Here the Turks got protection from
3
an anti-British Kuki-IChel mull a and remained active for a further 
six months. Then in March 1917, Malik Zaman IChan, an influential 
pro-British Afridi elder, led a four hundred strong lashkar (a 
tribal force) into Raj gal and killed the anti-British mulla. ^ In
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 12 October, 1916, ibid.
•l
Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 18 August 1916, enclosed in 
Chelmsford to Chambexplain, 21 August 1916, ibid.
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 5 September 1916, F.S.S.F., vol. 22, 
1915, File 622, Reg. Ro. 3726.
Roos-ICeppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 4 October 1916, enclosed in 
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 12 October 1916, C.P.. vol. II.
^Roos-ICeppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 4 March 1917, enclosed in 
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 10 March 1917, ibid. .vol. III.
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Jun© 1917 the Turks were reported to have finally left the
tribal territory and crossed over to Afghanistan. ^
Turkish maehinatinns were more successful in the Mohmand
country and in Bajaur where two Pathans, who had lived for a
long time in Berlin and then had accompanied the Turko-German
Mission to Kabul, acted as agents of Turkish intrigues. These
intrigues, fomented by the local mull as. served as one of the
2causes of the Mohmand troubles in November 1916. In September 
1916 the Mohmands demanded the immediate restoration of their 
allowances which had been suspended since 1915. Receiving what 
they dismissed as an unsatisfactory reply from the Government, the 
Mohmands began to raid extensively in the Peshawar district.
The Government promptly reinforced the Shablcadr garrison 
by despatching troops from Peshawar and decided to impose a blockade. 
In October 1916 a barbed wire fence strengthened by a live electric 
wire was erected from Michni to Abazai - a distance of seventeen 
miles - and was guarded by block-houses at intervals of about 
eight hundred yards. Four hundred Mohmands were caught and electro­
cuted by the wire. No stronger measures were adopted hy the Govem-
Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 26 June 1917, P.S.S.F.. vol. 22, 
1915, File No. 622, Reg. No. 2622.
2
Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, November 1916, R.P.
5See p. |£*7.
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ment because of their preoccupation with the War, although Roos- 
Keppel for his part had no doubt that the 11 only final solution1' 
to the Mohmand problem lay in the despatch of an expedition to 
their country with the object of crushing the tribe and then
i
opening up the country by roads. The blockade notwithstanding,
2Haji Sahib of Turangzai and Mull a Babra encouraged the Mohmands 
to attack Shabkadr. The attack m s  launched on 15 November 1916, 
but was successfully repulsed by Government troops with thirty 
guns and ten aeroplanes - the first time in Indi an warfare that 
aeroplanes were used. The blockade continued until duly 1917 
when a settlement was made with the Mohmands by which their allow­
ances and jagirs in British territory were forfeited; the tribes-
4men restored stolen rifles, and then the blockade was lifted.
The Government made peace with the Mohmands because of
5troubles with the Mahsuds. Since the Tank outrage of April 1914, 
the Mahsuds had been openly hostile to the Government, and this 
hostility was fanned by the pro-Turkish and anti-British elements
^Roos-ICeppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 14 June 1917, P.S.S.F., 
vol. 48, 1913, File No. 1364, Reg. No. 3755*
^Tor Mull a Babra see Maulvi M°hammad All Qasuri, Mushahidat-i- 
ICabul wa Yaghistan. p.77.
^Roos-ICeppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 15 November 1916, enclosed 
in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 24 November 1916, C.P., vol. II,
The Times, 20 November 1916.
^"Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 20 July 1917, P.S.S.P., vol. 48, 
1913, Pile No. 1364, Reg. No. 2972.
^See Chapter II , p.(j4.
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from Kabul. In 1915-16, the Mahsuds committed nearly a thousand
offences, killing and "wounding one hundred and seventy persons
and ld.dnapping ninety three, chiefly Hindus.'*' In January 1916,
Roos-ICeppel described the situation thus:
Ho village is safe, and the Mahsuds raid from their 
hills right down to the hanks of the Indus and kill, 
entrap and abduct Hindus... altogether the position 
of the people is pitiable, and we can do very little  ^
to protect them or even to alleviate their sufferings.
On 24 March 1916, in a speech Hardinge announced that the cup of 
"Mahsud misdeeds was already overflowing1' and that "the day of re­
tribution only delayed till our pre-occupations elsewhere should be
3relieved". Chelmsford, on assuming power, also saw that the Mah- 
sud ’’infernal nuisance" had created a complete reign of terror in 
Dera Ismail Khan and in the southern half of the Bannu district,
but that the Government had to put up with it because of the war
4situation. In the beginning of 0917 the Mahsuds attacked Govern­
ment picquets, garrisons and convoys. In March and April, in two 
encounters, Government losses were heavy: one British and two
Howell, A Monograph on the Mahsuds. 1913f p.38.
^Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 31 January 1916, R.P.
E^. Howell, op.cit., p.36.
^Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 26 April 1916, C.P.♦ vol. II.
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Indian officers and forty-two sepoys were killed, twenty-five 
sepoys were wounded, thirteen were taken prisoner; forty-six 
rifles were taken away. Of the raiders, only three were killed.
On 1 May 1917, a convoy of camels was attacked between Nili and 
Khajuri Kach. Two British officers, two Indian officers and 
fifty-one sepoys lost their lives; fifty-three were wounded 
and sixty-four rifles were lost. Mahsud losses were only one
i
killed and one wounded. This incident gave a great shock to
the Government; to Roos-Keppel it amounted to "an act of war"
2against the British by the tribe. The Government had three 
alternatives in dealing with the Mahsuds; First, to send a puni­
tive expedition. This Chelmsford knew was inevitable, but im­
practicable under the circumstances. Second, the Government could 
withdraw from the advanced positions such as Wana, but this would 
be damaging to the Government's prestige. The last course ms, as
Chelmsford described it, "muddling along but strengthening our
3forces considerably". Bit ornately, this last course was adopted.
A column was sent to Sarwakai, the Deraj at Brigade m s  reinforced, 
and a field force was organised to keep communications open between
•j
Howell, Q-p.cit., p.37.
^Roos-ICeppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 7 May 1917, enclosed in 
Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 13 May 1917, C.P., vol. III.
•^ Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 7 May 1917, C.P.. vol. III.
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1Wana and Sarwakai and to deal with Mahsud gangs. On 10 May 
1917 another fierce encounter took place between Government 
troops and Mahsud gangs between Khuzmasar and Sarwakai. Govern­
ment losses were two British and one Indian officer and thirty- 
six sepoys killed, sixty-three sepoys wounded and seventy missing;
one hundred and twenty-three rifles were lost. On the Mahsud side,
2
seventy were killed. Roos-Keppel, whose patience had by now been
exhausted, pressed for an immediate punitive expedition, and both
Chelmsford and C. C. Monro, the Commander-in-Chief, with all their
reluctance to take this course, could not help agreeing that prompt
3punishment of the tribe was imperative. On 16 and 19 May came 
more news of Mahsud outrage. On 21 May the Secretary of State 
was informed of the Government of India’s decision to adopt puni­
tive measures against the Mahsuds. The Viceroy declared that the
present policy of passive defence was no longer 
tenable and ..• punitive measures alone would 
prevent a general rising of the tribes between 
the Murrain and the Gomal rivers with danger of 
further extensions.
Accordingly an army called the Waziristan Field Force was mobilised
under the command of Major-General Beynon. The armed strength of the
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 11 May 1917, F.S.S.F.» vol. 49, 
1913, File No. 1364, Reg. No. 1953*
2
Howell, Qp.cit., p.37.
^Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 13 May 1917, C.P., vol. III.
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Mahmuds was estimated at 11,450 men having 333 magazine rifles 
and 3,349 breech-loading rifles. Chamberlain communicated the
Government of India’s decision to the Cabinet, which, unanimously
£
2left the matter to the Government of India’s discretion.
Meanwhile Chelmsford had kept Habibullah informed of the
Mahsud outrages. Habibullah ms told that the Mahsuds had forced
the Government’s hands and that a decisive action against the
tribe could no longer be avoided. The Amir was requested immediately
to askhis officers at Khost to restrain the local Afghans thorn
5joining the Mahsuds. Habibulla made a favourable response to 
this request. His officers at Khost were instructed in the way 
the British desired and the Amir also discouraged the Mahsuds, 
telling them not to come to Kabul for allowances while they were 
fighting the British Government. The Mahsuds were also advised 
against risking a war unless British troops entered their country. 
This message was annoiinced to the Mahsud .iirga at ICaniguram on 
27 May 1917* Habibullah also requested the Viceroy to avoid an 
expedition if he could; he wanted the British to punish the Mahsuds 
only mildly, otherwise a general border conflagration would follow
Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 21 May 1917, P.S.S.P., vol. 49-, 
1915, Pile Mo. 1364, Meg. No. 2211.
^Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 23 May 1917, C.P., vol. III.
Viceroy to Amir, 6 March 1917, P.S.S.P.. vol. 49, 1913, Pile Ho. 
1364, Meg. Ho. 1275.
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which would not only cause great embarrassment to the Afghan 
Government but might even draw them into a war with the British. 
Habibullah’s discouragement seemed to have a telling effect on
the Mahsuds, who appeared to show willingness to come to terms
2 ^ with the Government. The latter, too, were keen to sieze any
opportunity to patch up a settlement with the tribe cn "fairly 
generous terms", in order to avoid what was considered as a most 
unwelcome and untimely military diversion. However, the Govern­
ment’s hopes were soon dashed. On 31 May a Mahsud gang occupied 
the Tut Narai post in Tochi, killing six and wounding eight of
the small garrison defending the post. The raiders decamped with
4fifty-nine rifles and eight thousand rounds of ammunition. This
incident convinced Chelmsford that one action against the Mahsuds
was "absolutely necessary" before any negotiations were attempted
with them at all. Accordingly, on 13 June, Beynon marched into
the Mahsud country; the operation lasted until 2 July, when the
6Mahsud maliks sued for peace.’ On 9 July 1917 a five hundred strong
^Amir to Viceroy, 11 March 1917, ibid.. Reg. No. 1723; Viceroy to 
Amir, 12 May 1917, Amir to Viceroy, 2 June 1917, ibid., Reg. No. 2951.
^Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 31 May 1917, C.P.» vol. III.
V b i d .
4Howell, on.cit.. p.37.
Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 6 June 1917, P.S.S.P., vol. 49, 1913, 
Pile No. 1364, Reg. No. 2309.
6Full account of the Mahsud operations is given in a Despatch by 
A. A. B:arrett, March-August 1917, P.S.S.P., vol. 50, 1913, Pile No. 
1364, Pt. 6.
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Mahsud .iir ga undertook to return the rifles looted and to try
the offenders according to tribal custom. The Government, for
their part, agreed to restore Mahsud allowances, to release Mahsud
prisoners, and not to make any new roads or set up new posts in
the Mahsud country. The Mahsud .i irga handed over one hundred and
twenty-four rifles, gave hostages for those still undelivered and
1tried the men implicated in the Dodd murder case. On 10 August 
1917, Donald and Beynon met a fully representative jirga, three 
thousand strong, whitman agreement was arrived at. Of the three 
hundred and eighty-five rifles demanded by the Government, the 
tribesmen brought all but ninety-seven, for whi da they gave guarant­
ees. The Government agreed to restore the Mahsud allowances when
2the remaining rifles were delivered. This brought the Mahsud affair
to an end to the great relief of the India Office. "The North-
West frontier of India", the Political Secretary hopefully com-
3
mented, "is now free from trouble." In March 1913 a free bonus
of one year's allowances was given to the Afridis - " a good in-
4vestment" so Roos-Keppel thought, in the existing situation. The
Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 11 July 1917, P.S.S.F., vol. 49, 
1913, Pile No. 1364, Reg. No. 2833.
Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 11 August 1917, P.S.S.F.> vol. 50, 
1913, Pile N0. 1364, Reg. No. 3262.
Vote by Political Secy., India Office, 16 August 1917, ibid.,
Reg. No. 3265.
Voos-Keppel to Secy. Govt, of India, 22 February 1918, P.S.F..
vol. 26, 1912, Reg. No, 3067.
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Nawabs of Amb and Dir and the Mehtar of Chitral were also re- 
warded for their loyalty, and Roos-Keppel for himself had already, 
in 1917, earned a G.C.S.I, for his war services. The War ended 
in November 1918, and for some months afterwards the frontier 
appeared to the Chief Commissioner to be settling down to a quieter 
and quieter state. There was uno history for the year 1918-19",
1Roos-Keppel commented^ the Administration Report of that year.
It proved, however, to be a deceptive calms a lull before
thesbom. Within one year and a half of the end of the World War
the third Afghan War broke out, setting the tribal area once more 
2
aflame. It has already been seen how Habibullah1 s neutrality
during the War had estranged the anti-British party in his court
and caused his general unpopularity. Egged on by Nasrullah and
his men, the Amir, on 2 February 1919, wrote to the Viceroy that
Afghanistan must be represented in the Peace Conference and that
the "absolute liberty, freedom of action and perpetual independence"
3
of Afghanistan must be recognised. Before an answer explaining 
to the Amir that the Peace Conference was confined only to the 
belligerents could be despatched, the Amir was a s s a s s i n a t e d  o n  20
1Administrative Report of the N.W.F. Province, 1918-19. pt. I, p.l*
2PjZij vol. XXXVII, 1919, Cd. 324, Afghanistan. P.S.S.F.. vols. 28-30, 
1919, File No. 1061. Adamec, op.cit., pp. 108-23; G. N. Molesworth, 
Afghanistan. 1919'-
Adamec, op.cit., pp. 104*05; Fraser-Tytler, op.cit., p.194*
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February 1919.
In the bids for the throne, Amanullah, the third son of 
the late Amir, emerged successful. He was hardly in the saddle, 
however, when a "distinct reaction" was seen gainst him. The 
orthodox elements ±a the country were displeased with him as he 
had interned Nasrullah for complicity in Habibullah* s death; 
the army turned against him because he had released the Mosahibin 
family,who were the suspected accomplices in the murder, and the 
popular belief was that Habibullah* s death had been caused by 
Amanullah* s connivance. Amanullah, for his part, distrusted both 
his people and the army and felt his throne- tottering. He there­
fore sought a diversion by launching an attack on the British and 
rallying his people’s support. He had received many accounts of 
the unrest in India caused by the Rowlatt Act, the Satyagraha 
movement and the Jallianwalabagh massacre. Most of the accounts 
were supplied by Afghan agents in India and moie particularly by 
one Ghulam Haider, the Afghan Postmaster at Peshawar. Indian 
"seditionists" tried to exploit the waivweariness of the British 
and stir up trouble in the Frontier Province, especially in Peshawar
■4
Rowlatt Act (1919) iwas designed to stamp out "sedition" by highly 
autocratic methods, Gandhi started a campaign of Satyagraha or 
passive resistance gainst the action taken by the Government to 
deal with "sedition*1. In April 1919» widespread disturbances 
broke out. At Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar, General Dyer resorted 
to firing to disperse a peaceful meeting which, resulted in the, 
death of 379 persons and the wounding of about twelve hundred.
For details, see Nehru, on.cit., pp. 40-44.
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city. A mob of ten thousand collected in the city and was 
assured by the ‘’seditionists1 of gifts of arms and money and 
prospects of loot. The useditionistsu planned to wreck the 
mobilisation stores in the city, the treasury, wireless in­
stallations and railway stations, as eoon as the news of the
first fight between British and Afghan troops at Landi Kotal
2
reached Peshawar. The city was thus ripe for revolt when
'Z
Amanullah attacked on 6 Hay 1919.
But the plan miscarried. The Peshawar plot was discovered
by the Government on 7 May and on the following day Roos-Keppel
took drastic action. The city was cordoned off by British troops.
The Afghan Postmaster was arrepted with all his principal associates,
who were later deported to Burma. One lakh of rupees was found
in the Postmaster1 s house, evidently meant for the planned rising.
On the 9th, martial law m s  proclaimed in the Peshawar district
and five hundred regular troops were posted in the Peshawar city.
These moves cowed the city and the danger of large scale disturbances 
4passed off,
*1
Roos-Keppel to Maffey, 5 Hay 1919, C.P.. vol. 22. Administration 
Report of the North-West Frontier Province, 1919-20. part 1, pp. i-ii.
^Roos-Keppel to Chelmsford, 15 May 1919» C.P.. -vol. 22.
^Dairy of Events, 29th April to 4th August 1919*BE
^Chief Commissioner to Private Secy, to the Viceroy, Tels. 9, 11 
May 1919, C.P.. -vol. 22.
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The Afghan War lasted in wa half-hearted fashion’1 for 
about a month during which the Afghan troops were beaten on every 
front* The bombing of Kabul which had a salutary effect on 
morale soon obliged Amanullah to ask for an armistice on 31 May
1919.1
The Afghan War was soon over but its disastrous effect in
unsettling tribal territory was long felt* It had been an anxiom
with frontier officers having an intimate knowledge of the region
that the frontier tribes would rise at once in the event of an
Afghan Amir declaring Holy war against the British government,
and the Afghan; plan of campaign was, hi fact, based on that belief.
Simultaneously with the outbreak of hostilities, a proclamation
against the British, 1 couched in the most hostile terms*1 was
distributed by Afghan agents in the tribal territory, summoning
2
the tribes to take part ±1 the ,j ihad. Intrigues with the tribesmen 
were carried 011, and arms, ammunition, money and inflammatory
3
messages poured into the region, particularly the Afridi country. 
This was accompanied by the sedulous efforts of the seditionists 
in Peshawar to undermine the loyalty of the Khyber Rifles, and this
1
Diary of Events, 29th April to 4th August, 1919? R*B*
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, tel. 25 May, 1919? P*P* * vol. 37? 1919? 
Gd. 324, p.19.
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 22 May 1919? ibid.
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was accomplished without much difficulty. The IChyber Rifles
lacked the support of regular troops. The British officers of
the Militia were so occupied with fighting the Afghans on the
main fronts that they neglected the outposts held by their men.
The latter were fed with messages from anti-British elements in
Peshawar city that the Afghans were winning on every front*
that their victory at Landi Kotal was certain, too, and that
the Peshawar had risen against the Government. The Militia
then began to desert in large numbers. On 18 May 1919 the Govern-
*1
ment were obliged to disband the IChyber Rifles.
Happily for the Government, there ms no rising in the Afridi
country, and this was attributed by Roos-Keppel to British success
against the Afghan troops cel the IChyber front. The Afridi situation,
2
so Roos-Keppel assured the Viceroy on 24 May, was stable.
It was otherwise in Waziristan. There the Afghan general, 
Hadir Khan (afterwards His Majesty Hadir Shah) advanced slox^ ly from 
Khost towards the Indian border with Afghan regulars and ’tribal 
levies. The British decided on 26 May to evacuate the militia posts 
in Upper Tochi and on the Thal-Idak line, aid to concentrate troops 
at Miranshah. The evacuated posts were immediately occupied by
^Roos-ICeppel to Kaffey, 17, 39 May 1919. C.P..-vol. 22. Adamec, 
on.cit.. p.115.
2
Chief Commissioner to Private Secy, to Viceroy, Tel. 24 May 1919, 
C.P.. vol. 22.
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Mahsuds and Waziris. Spinwan fell to the Afghans, The ganger of
an all-out Mahsud and Waziri uprising having become imminent,
the Political Agent of Wana ordered the withdrawal of the Sarwakai
and lower Comal posts, and the Wana and upper Gomal posts.**- The
Waziris and Afridis in the Worth and South Waziristan Militia then
mutinied. Twelve hundred rifles and seven hundred thousand rounds
of ammunition fell into their hands, and Wana was occupied by Afghan 
2
troops. The #iole of Waziristan was now in arms. The tribesmen 
chased away the few loyal men of the South Waziristan Militia 
across the Comal to Baluchistan. Many desertions took place in 
the 2hob Militia, too, and Port San deman was attacked. The Govern­
ment thus lost the whole of Wasiristan except the line of the Tochi 
Valley up to Miranshah x*hich was also seriously threatened.
Roos-Keppel m s  utterly dismayed. It was quite "heart-breaking1 
for him to see that the Afridis who were the most important tribe 
in frontier politics had managed to keep quiet while Waziristan rose.
The Chief Commissioner was convinced that Amanullah had "lit a fire
3
which will give us a lot of trouble before we can put it out”.
Chief Commissioner to Private Secy, to Viceroy, tels. 26, 27 May 
1919* ibid.
^Howell, on.cit., p .40.
^Roos-Keppel to Chelmsford, 27 May, 3 June 1919, C.P., vol. 22.
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The armistice with Afghanistan did not lead to the cessation
of irihal troubles. Tribal lawlessness which continued well into
1920 resulted in. 611 raids in the settled districts of the frontier
province. During these raids 298 British subjects were killed,
392 wounded and 463 kidnapped. The loss of property was estimated
at thirty lakhs of rupees. Towards the end of 1919, the Government
undertook military operations against the Mahsuds. These operations
lasted for nearly four years and resulted in the re-establishment
1of Government control over Waziristan.
The Afghan war and its effects on tribal territory exposed
the weakness of the existing tribal policy of the Government and
led them to formulate and adopt a new policy. The existing policy,
as it had been framed by Curzon, had the militia system as one of
its main features. This system broke down under the strain of the
Afghan war, when tie Afridis, Was iris, Sherwanis, Bhittanis and
Orakzais who composed the IChyber Rifles and the Korth and South
Waziristan Militia proved their 11 treachery and unreliability". But
then, the Government had themselves to blame for this. As Roos-Keppel
pointed out, "the Militia^rstem grew up as a cheap expedient to
relieve regular troops from irksome and arduous duties in a country
2where service is unpopular". The militia outposts were located
1P.S.S.F.. -vol. 13, 1921, Pile Ho. 877; P.S.S.F.. vols. 74-6,1920,
Pile Ho. 8929; P.S.S.P.. vol. 65, 1921, Pile Ho. 5245; P.P., vol.
XXVI, 1921, Cd. 202. Report of the Tribal Control and Defence 
Committee. 1931, pp. 54-5, P.S.P.P.. B-295.
^Roos-ICeppel to Private Secy, to Viceroy, 21 August 1919, 0.P*» 
vol. 23*
\
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far off in tribal areas, and miles of hostile and dangerous
country separated them from the nearest posts of regular troops.
In such circumstances, and particular^ when there were no regular
troops to support them during the Afghan war, the militia men
could hardly be expected to remain loyal to the British Government in
the face of the cry of ,iihad in Afghanistan and the aggravated anti-
1
British feelings in the tribal territory.
Besides, as Roos-Keppel, quarter of a century of
experience on the frontier, pointed out in August 1919 the existing 
tribal policy had three other defects. First, it provided no real 
security to the people of the settled districts against recurrent 
tribal mids which the Government dealt with by a policy of only 
"patched up peace or truce". There was no compensation for the 
loss the people suffered nor any effective provision to guard
against similar raids in future. Second, the policy proved a failure
0
in so far as Afghanistan was concerned. It provided no defence 
against constant Afghan intrigues with the tribes on the British 
side of the border, intrigues which proved an abiding cause of 
misunderstanding between the Afghan and the British governments.
Third, the Government’s policy of non-interference with the tribes, 
Roos-ICeppel held, had been carried too far. It was a clear indi-
■j
Fraser-Tytler, on.cit.» p.259? Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, "The 
North-West Frontier of India". J.R.C.A.S.. vol. XI, 1924, pp. 137-46; 
G. A. Oourt Repington, "The North-West Frontier", The Nineteenth 
Century and After. February 1924, pp. 269-77*
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cation, in his opinion, of a shirking of responsibility and duty
towards the tribesmen. The same policy, he said, had been observed
with the Zulus of South Africa and with similar consequences.
To illustrate his point, Roos-Keppel cited Sir Bartle Frere's
letter to Gladstone an which Frere had dram attention to the
dangers of British policy towards the Zulus. "The tfu© causes of
the Zulu, as of the Afghan War", Frere wrote,
are neglect of neighbourly duties and responsibilities 
incumbent on a rich, civilised and powerful nation 
towards poor barbarious tribes on its borders. We have 
allowed a noble people, capable of rapid and permanent 
advancement in civilisation, to grow in numbers, whilst 
they festered in barbarism, till they became a serious 
danger to us. We have shut out eyes and turned our 
backs on their wants and defects, left them as much as 
possible to themselves, endeavoured to sse and know as 
little of them and to let them see and know as little 
of us as possible, and then we are surprised to find 
that they have grown into a danger only to be averted 
by war.
Roos-Keppel then sketched out a new frontier policy, the aim of
which, he contended, should be to
civilise the Frontier tribes up to the Durand line, 
first by crushing their fighting power and disarming 
them, and then by making roads throughout their countries 
and establishing and maintaining order, which would be 
welcomed by a large percentage who are tried by the 
anarchy which prevailed in tribal territory.^
The Zulu war in 1878-9 coincided with the second Afghan war. Sir 
Bartle Frere was the Governor of Cape Colony in 1877-80. In defence 
of his policy towards the Zulus and in refutation of Gladstone’s charges 
against his policy, Frere wrote a series of letters to Gladstone which 
were published in 1881 under the heading, Afghanistan aid South Africa, 
a letter to the Right Honourable W. F. Gladstone regarding portions 
of his Midlothian Speeches. Frere was Governor of Bombay in 1862-67, 
xihereafter he became a Member of the Council of India.
%ee Chapter II, p^ oCj.
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He would not start "immediately and without provocation" a general 
crusade against all the frontier tribes: that would be both ex­
pensive and inexpedient. Nevertheless, a start to this new policy 
must be given. He urged that now that the Afghan war had ended, 
an expedition at least against the Mahsuds should be immediately 
undertaken. Subsequently, whenever any tribe rose, similar ex­
peditions should follow with the ultimate object cf civilising 
the tribe. "By this policy and by this alone," he emphasised,
"we can secure immunity from further trouble and expense on the 
Frontier and at the same time discharge our obligations to the
people who live under our rule and to the tribes for whoa vie are 
1responsible."
This policy, called the "modified forward policy", was adopted
2
by the Government after the Waziristan campaign in 1919-25. Its
main features were to ensure British control of Waziristan through
3a road system and the maintenance of some 4,600 Khassadars and 
about 5*000 troops at Wana and Razmak. It was, as Denys Bray, the
^Roos-Keppel to Hignell (Private Secy, to Viceroy), 21 August 1919*
C.P.. vol. 25.
p
Report of the Tribal Control and Defence Committee, 1931* P.S.D.h., 
B-295.
^The Khassadars were tribesmen, mainly trans-border, employed for 
watch and ward on and across the border. They patrolled and picketted 
roads, furnished escorts and intercepted raiders. They fed, clothed, 
housed and armed themselves. They received a monthly salary from the 
Government which in 1922 was between twenty and thirby rupees. Extract
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Secretary to the Foreign Department, elaborated, "a forward
policy in a very real sense of the wo id”; it was, he added,
a policy of progress... a hig step forward on the 
long and laborious road towards the pacification through 
civilisation of the most backward and inaccessible and, 
therefore, the most truculent and aggressive tribes on 
our border.
The Government were determined,- as Bray stated, that "come what
may, civilisation must be made to penetrate" the hills of ¥aziristan,
and this object had to be achieved by the development of communi-
1
cations ii the region. Although the policywas originally adopted 
in ¥aziristan, it was gradually extended to the whole frontier 
from the G-omal river in the south to the Mslalcand pass in the north, 
and was in continued operation until 1947.
from official Report of the Council of State Debates. 7 September 
1922, p.62, P.S.S.F., vol. 74, 1920, File Ho. 8929, Reg. Ho. 2792; 
P.S.F., vol. 35, 1922, File No. 1685.
Denys Bray on British Policy towards the Frontier tribes, 5 Marchl923,
C. H, Philips, The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858-1947, pp. 495-9.
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Chapter IV 
STRATEGIC RAILWAYS AHD ROADS
There were three main considerations behind the British 
Government’s construction of strategic railways and roads in 
the frontier regions* First, the steady advance of Russia in 
Central Asia since the 1860s; second, the uneasy relations be- 
tween the Governments of India and Afghanistan, e specially In 
the last decadejbf the 19th century; third, the disturbed situation 
in fie tribal territory.
The Russian conquests of Central Asian territories had in­
variably been consolidated by the construction cf a network of 
railways. The Central Asian or the Trans-Caspian line reached ICizil 
Arvat in 1881 and was extended to Askabad in 1885, and to Merv in 
1886* From Mervr the line was carried to Samarkand in 1888 and 
linked with Tashkent and Andijan in 1899* Another line was extended 
in 1900 to Kushk on the Russo-Afghan border. In the same year the
construction of the Orenburg-Tashkent line begap.; it was completed
1
in September,1904.
The Russian advances in Central Asia alarmed the British govern­
ment, and the fear of Russian aggression in India prompted them to 
strengthen Afghanistan as a buffer state. But the relations between
Military Report an Ruswian Turkestan or Central Asia, by General Staff, 
India, 1911, P.S.D.L.* A-107; The Central Asian Railways in Russian 
Turkestan, by D.A.O., 1907, ibid.» A-96; Viceroy to Secy, of State, 
Tel. 4 June 1904, 0.1.P.P.. Cat>. 38/5, no. 54.
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the Government of India and of Afghanistan failed to xemain as
friendly as the British would have liked. Amir Abdur Rahman of
Afghanistan (l880-190l) was extremely suspicious by nature and
1
jealous of his independence, and proved a troublesome ally.
After his death there was fear of a bloody struggle for succession
with the consequent risk of political instability at Kabul and
2
further deterioration in Anglo-Afghan relations.
the attitude of frontier tribes, as seen already, was hostile, 
and it was considered necessary to bring them under greater British 
control, one means of doing this being to construct roads and rail­
ways for the quick movement of troops into the tribal territory.
It was during and after the second Afghan war (1876-80) that 
the British made determined efforts to improve their lines ofcommuni­
cation on the frontier. In anticipation of a Russian thrust towards 
Afghanistan, the British were anxious to occupy the approaches to 
the Afghan cities of Kabul ^ hazni and Kandahar, these cities guarded
the approaches to the main passes leading from Central Asia to India,
3
and hence had great strategic importance. the Government of India 
■1
Correspondence betweenthe Viceroy and the Amir 1885-86, P.S.M.,
A-54; Memorandum on British Relations with Afghanistan, by ¥. Lee 
Warner, 24 January 1896, ibid.» A-109; Adamec, op.cit., pp. 17-28.
^Davies, op.cit., p.165; Mote on the Afghan succession aid Russia1s 
Advance, by W. Lee Warner, 26 August 1896, P.S.M., A-110.
^the Defence of the Worth-West Frontier of India, by F. Roberts,
22 June 1886, P.S.M., A-117, P.P.. 1881, vol. LKX, C.2811, 2852, TOO.
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concentrated their efforts on constructing railways in two main
directions: to the south towards the Bolan pass, and to the
north towards Khyber and Kurram. Lord Roberts, when Commander-
in-Chief in India (1885-93), was an ardent exponent of frontier
roads and railways. He wanted to "push on" with their construction
in "all possible speed"; he urged:
we must have roads, and we must have railways; 
they camot be made on short notice, and every 
rupee spent upon them now will repay us tenfold 
hereafter. Nothing will tend to secure the safety 
of the frontier so much as the power of rapidly 
concentrating troops on any threatened point, and 
nothing will strengthen our military position more 
than to open out the country and improve our re- 
lations with the frontier tribes. There are no 
better civilisers than roads and railways; and 
although some of those r ecommended to be made may 
never be required for military purposes, they will 
be of the greatest assistance to the civil power in 
the the administration of the country.
In Hay 1880 the Government of India completed the first strategic
railway from Ruk to SIbi and extended it to Quetta In 1887- Rive years
later it reached Chaman cnthe Afghan boundary. Abdur Rahman strongly
2disliked, it, regarding it as a "knife in his vitals". On the north­
ern side, a railway was extended from Jhelum to Rawalpindi in October 
1880. Two lines forked from this terminus: one to Khushalgarh, which
was completed in 1881, the other to Peshawar, completed in 1883- In
1P. Roberts, Rorty one years in India, vol. II, pp. 407-8.
2
Abdur Rahman, The Ljfe of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan, vol. II, 
p.159-
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1889 there were only forty-four miles of railway in the frontier
districts of the Punjab.
The railway system was supplemented by several important
roads not only in the settled districts but in the tribal terri-
tory as well. The Grand-Trunk Hoad was constructed in 1863-4
parallel to the railway from Attock to Peshawar. In the 1890s
the construction of the North-West Frontier Hoad (234 miles)
began, connecting the headquarters of the four trans-Indus districts
of the Punjab - Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. This
road while passing through the Kohat pass, linking Kohat and
Peshawar, was not metalled. Another road connected IChushalgarh,
2
the railway terminus from Rawalpindi, with Kohat and Thai. From 
Thai a rough country road fifty-severn miles long, which ran through 
the Kurram valley to Parachinar, was improved. From Parachinar a 
trade route followed over the Peiwar and Shutargardan passes to 
Kabul. Another road from Dera Ismail Khan to Murtaza via Tank
3
was metalled. In 1897-8 Bannu was linked with the Tochi Valley
4by a metalled road passing through Miranshah to Datta Khel. A
•j
The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Provincial Series, Punjab, pt. I, 
p. 91*
^he road was ninety-six miles long.
3The road was sixty miles long.
4The road was sixty-four miles long.
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metalled road from Bargai In lower Swat was also built up the 
Swat Valley to Chakdara. From Chakdara an unmetall^d road was 
carried through the Upper Swat and Dir, ai&bn to the top of Lawarai
I2
pass ’ to Chitral. Abbottabad, the headquarters of Hazara, was
linked with Hassan Abdal, which was eight miles from the boundary
2
of the Haripur plain, by a metalled road, forty four miles long.'
In 1900-01 there were four hundred and forty-eight miles of metalled
roads m  the fiontier districts of the Punjab.
The development of communications formed one of the main
principles of Curzon’s frontier policy, his object being to rapidly
concentrate troops at any threatened point and to reinforce tribal
militia, to inspire the militia men with "greater confidence in
themselves" and to give them "security in their loyalty” to the 
4Government. "Half these frontier questions of forts, canton­
ments and moveable columns", Curzon pointed out to Hamilton, would 
be solved if only the Government constructed railways. Railways 
were expected to give an impetus to trade as well which in its turn 
would, Curzon, added, bring prosperity to the frontier tracts and 
foster peace and good understanding between the Government and
\
From Dargai to Lawarai pass the distance is 118 miles.
2Imperial Gazetteer. Provincial Series. North-West Frontier Province. 
1908, p.55.
3
Ibid. Reports on the Tribes of Dir. Swat and Bajaur, by Captain 
A. H. McMahon and Lieutenant A.D.G.Ramsay, 1901, p.30, C.C., vol.
703, S. W. C, Sandes, The Military Engineers hi India. II, pp. 71-2; 
C. M. Enriquez, The Pathan Borderland, pp. 3-5. G, Lyons, Afghan is tan 
the Border State, pp. 144-5*
^Raleigh, op_,cit., p.425.
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1
.the local people.
In January 1901 a narrow gauge (21 6") railway was built from 
Nowshera to Dargai - about forty miles - to strengthen the British 
position at Malakand. Another, a thirty-three-mile line, was con­
structed from Khushalgarh to Kohat In May 1902, and about a year 
later extended to Thai. In January 1908 the Khushalgarh-Kohat section 
was converted to broad gauge (51 6n) with a bridge over the Indus at 
Khushalgarh.
Alongside railways some roads were also constructed, the most 
important of them being the Kohat Pass road, the Murtaza-¥ana road 
and the Thai-Parachinar road. In April 1899 Ourzon took up the pro­
ject of improving the road between Peshawar and Kohat through the
Kohat pass; this improvement, he believed, would repair a serious
2break in border communication. The Government of India asked the 
Punjab Government to assure the Kohat pass Afridis that the project 
would involve no change in the Government's existing relations with 
the tribe nor any interference in its internal affairs. The tribes­
men would be given labour work on the road, if they wanted it, and 
their allowances would be moderately increased, if they assisted in 
the execution of the project, but if not, the Government would take
^Curzon to Hamilton, 9 March 1899, G.C., vol. 158.
p
In 184-9 the British government entered into an agreement with the 
Kohat pass Afridis by which the latter undertook to keep open communi­
cation through the pass after being assured of an annual payment of 
5,700 rupees. The Afridis, however, honoured the agreement more in 
the breach than in the observance. Aitchison, op.cit., pp. 31-2.
Also see Speeches by lord Curzon of Kedleston. vol. 1, pp. 344-6.
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all necessary measures for both the construction and maintenance 
•t
of the road. In order to buy off the tribesmen, who "generation
after generation’1 had evaded their engagements, the Punjab govern-
2ment proposed a large increase in their subsidy. In the beginning 
Curzon was not enthusiastic but in September 1899 lie accepted the 
recommendations of the Punjab government. The Kohat pass Afridis 
agreed to let the Government construct a metalled road through the 
pass on the condition that the tribal subsidy would be increased by 
3,000 rupees; 2,500 rupees would be given to deserving maliks; 
reasonable compensation would be paid individually to owners of culti­
vated land through which the road would pass and the tribe TOuld be
consulted if the Government desired to construct railway and tele-
4graph lines through the pass. ¥ithin two years the load was com­
pleted and, thus Curzon was able to wipe out what he considered a
5standing disgrace to the British prestige in the area.
Having achieved the object which in Curzon Ts wor&g had taken 
"exactly half a century to realise", the Government of India entered 
into agreements with the Wasiris in Horth Waziristan for opening
1Govt, of India to Govt, of Punjab, 16 April 1899, enclosed in 
Govt, of India to Secy, of State, 21 September 1899, P.S.L.I., 
vol. 116, Reg. Ho. 929.
^Govt. of Punjab to Govt, of India, 1 June 1899, ibid.
^Govt. of India to Govt, of Punjab, 20 June 1899, ibid.
^Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to Dane, Tel. 5 September 1899, Govt, of 
Punjab to Govt, of India, 12 October 1899, ibid.; Aitchison, op.cit., 
p.107.
^Curzon to Hamilton, 27 September 1899, 0.0.« vol. 158.
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1and safeguarding the routes passing through their territory.
Inl903 the construction of a road from Murtaza to Wana - sixty- 
four miles - through Kajuri Kach in South Waziristan was under­
taken and completed in 1906. The road passed along the Gomal 
river valley through which lay an ancient trade xoute from Af­
ghanistan to India. Every year hundreds of well-armed Powindahs
2
passed through this route. In 1904-05 the Government of India 
improved the Murrain valley road from Thai to Parachinar - a dist­
ance of fifty-four miles. The improvement was undertaken mainly 
on "military grounds", the Government’s object being to keep the
road in a thoroughly efficient condition, fit for wheeled traffic
3
throughout the year. However, for financial reasons the road 
could not be metalled.
It was in the Khyber that the most important communication 
projects were undertaken, Curzon's policy being to confirm the 
Government's hold on this strategically important pass and to se­
cure it not only against any external threat but against the ever­
present troubles from the Afridis. ¥ithin two months of his talcing 
over as the Viceroy of India Curzon considered the feasibility of
1
Deane to Secy., Govt, of India, 10 April 1904, I.P.P.P.. vol. 6884, 
June 1904, Proc. Nos. 115-7; Aitchison, op.cit., pp. 141-9.
2
Summary of Curzon's Administration. Poreign Dept.. North-West 
Prontier and Baluchistan. C.C., vol. 526, p.43. I.P.P.P., vol. 
6884, February I9O4, Proc. Nos. 119-22; May 1904, Proc. Nos, 17-8.
3Secy., Govt, of India to Deane, 17 May 1904, Deaneto Secy., Govt, 
of India, 8 July 1904, I.P.P.P.. vol. 7125, February 1905, Proc. 
Nos. 16-8.
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constructing a railway through the Khyber pass with the object 
of linking Beshawar with Jalalabad and later with Kabul. A 
railway through the Khyber was not Curzon1 s brainchild. His pre­
decessor, Elgin, had, in June 1898, proposed a narrow gauge rail­
way from Peshawar to Landi Kotal up the Khyber, and the Home 
government had approved the project which, however, could not
be taken up on account of Elgin's departure shortly thereafter.
1
Curzon took up the issue where Elgin had left it. Technical 
and political difficulties in putting the project through engaged 
the attention of the Government for several years.
There were two possible routes for a railway from Peshawar 
into Afghanistan: the Khyber pass route, and the Kabul river valley
route. Several objections were raised to the Khyber pass route. The 
high and rocky terrain involved great engineering difficulties and 
consequent expense, as a result of which the railway had to be a 
narrow gauge one. But this would not have adequately served the 
purpose of moving large bodies of troops in times of emergency. 
Expensive to build and difficult to maintain, the railway w>uld have 
aroused Afridi opposition and the Government would have been con­
stantly involved in ensuring the safety of the line. Curzon was 
therefore, totally averse to "placing too valuable a hostage" in
^Govt, of India to Secy, of State, 20 July 1899, P.S.L.I.» vol. 115, 
Reg. No. 775A.
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the hands of the Afridis. Further, the Government feared that the 
railway plight produce a “widely diffused apprehension1 in other 
tribes that through the construction of the railways the British 
wanted to suppress the independence of the tribes . Fearing that 
the venture would involve the Government in constant friction 
with the tribes, none of the members of Curzon's council except 
Edwin Collen thought that the railway would be so profitable as
1
"to justify the constant expense which its maintenance must involve".
The second route was through the Kabul river valley, which 
had been surveyed by Captain Macdonald in 1890-91 under the orders 
of Roberts, the then Commander-in-Chief. Macdonald had reported that 
a broad gauge line could be constructed from Peshawar to Dakka along 
the southern bank of the Kabul river. The route presented no great 
engineering problems, and the temper of the neighbouring tribes - 
so Curzon expected - was such as to make the line less exposed to 
attacks than if it were built through the Khyber. In the circum­
stances, the Kabul river valley route commended itself to Curzon 
and his colleagues who from a political point of view regarded it
2as "the permanent line of advance" from British India into Afghanistan.
But it was one thing to draw the project on paper and quite 
another to implement it. Curzon had no doubt that the project must 
embroil the Government in hostility with the Amir. Therefore, he
I^bid.
2Ibid.
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in February 1899 bad taken steps to invite the Amir's views.
Abdur Rahman had no objection to the construction of railways 
through the British territory but he was determined not to allow 
any railway pass through the Afghan territory "to the extent of 
even a single span". To be of any "positive military value at 
all, the Une had to be carried on to Dakka or Jalalabad lying in 
the Afghan sector. This could be done either through British 
occupation of the two places - an impolitic course - or by im­
proving relations with Abdur Rahman or in the event of his death 
with his successor. Gurzon and three members of his council, Collen, 
G. E. Dawkins and T. Raleigh, were extremely uncertain about the 
"political future of Afghanistan and of the part we ^British/ 
shall play in it" and therefore they regarded it "unwise at present 
to spend money on so large and costly an experiment" as the project 
involved. The line could not even be carried on to Shinpokh and
Smatzai because they were on the still undemarcated section of the
2Indo-Afghan boundary and the Amir had laid claim to iOtiE, Neither 
place was deemed suitable for a railway terminus, and Curzon 
clearly saw that "if we ?j?an the line to either and went no further 
we should be caught in a cul de sac" which would be politically 
unwise. Besides a railway extended to Smatzai or Shinpokh only
A
Viceroy to Amir, 15 February 1899> Amir to Viceroy, 4 April 1899, 
C.G., vol. 286.
2See Chapter II , p.\t<\ ,iJ5"-6 .
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would be of no commercial value, because the Amir x*jould never
permit his people to use it. In such circumstances Curzon wanted
the project to stand over, particularly when there were "many
1other pressing demands" on the Government finance.
But the Commander-in-Ghief, General ¥. S. Lockhart, and
two members of the Council, S. Rivaz and R. Gardiner, took the
opposite view: the line must be built at once at least up to
Smatzai or Shinpokh. They were influenced "more particularly by
a sense of the great military value" of the line which, in the
event of emergency, would enable the Government to land men and
material within a comparatively short distance cf Jalalabad and, if
necessary, to occupy it. They strongly held that if the zailway
were built at least up to the border during the existing peace time,
the Government would
not only construct it at half the cost which would 
be necessary if it were made in a hurry in time of 
war
but they would
when the emergency arose, have gained practically 
a start of two years in the matter of railway con­
struction towards Afghanistan. 2
Pending the settlement of the issue, Curzon, impressed by 
the tribal uprising or for facilitating an advance into Afghanistan, 
recommended to the Secretary of State the construction of ^twelve
1Govt. of India to Secy, of State, 20 July 1899, P.S.L.I.. vol. 
115, Reg. No. 775A.
2It>id.
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mile broad gauge railway from -^eshawar to Jamrud. The "commercial"
utility" of the line was also impressed; the railway was to cost
1five to six lakhs of rupees only. In August 1899 Hamilton sanctioned
the scheme expressing his agreement with Curzon and the majority of
his colleagues in the Council about the inexpediency of commencing
2
the construction o f the Kabul river line.
¥hile the construction was in progress, the Government in 
May 1900 noticed increasing signs of -unrest among the Afridis who 
were persuaded by the Amir(s officials to obstruct the vrork. The 
position seemed intolerable to Curzon who directed Roos-Keppel to
3
remind the Afridis of their agreement of 1898 whereby they had
accepted the British right of making railways in the Khyber. At
the same time they were warned to keep themselves off the railway
which lay entirely within the British territory or else they would
be severely dealt with.^ The threat worked, the Afridi opposition 
5"fizzled out", and the line was opened in January 1901. A daily
g
train service was, introduced ±1 October 1901.
1’rbia.
2Secy, of State to Viceroy, Tel. 30 August I899, Secy, of State 
to Govt, of India, 1 September 1899, P.S.h.I., vol. 115, Reg. Ho. 577B.
3
See Chapter p.
^Curzon to Hamilton, May 1900, C.0.» vol. 159- 
3
Curzon to A. Godley, 4 July 1900, ibid.
6Summary of Curzon's Administration, fforeign Bent., vol. II, Horth- 
West Frontier and Baluchistan, p. 64, C.C., vol. 526.
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In Julyl901 the Government of India appointed a Light 
Military Railway Commission to report cn the best ppssible route 
for a railway from Peshawar to Afghanistan. In their preliminary 
report of 18 September 1902, the Commission recommended the con­
struction of a light military railway of 2' 6" gauge from Peshawar 
via Ifarsak to Dakka. The line should be laid along the Kabul river 
up to the point where the river met the Kam Shilman valley. From 
that point the milway should be taken via the Loi Shilman valley 
to Dakka, the route being considered "the easiest and quickest" .
The section from Peshawar to the point where the Kabul river met 
the Kam Shilman valley, as pointed oxit earlier, had already been 
surveyed by Colonel Macdonald in 1890-91. The other section, 
between Kam Shilman and Dakka needed reconnaissanee and survey. 
Accordingly, in September 1902, a team of four members with Colonel
1
¥. R. L, Macdonald as the chairman was sent for the reconnaissanee. 
They submitted their report on 5 November 1902, examining the exist­
ing means of communication between Peshawar and Dakka and proposing 
their inprovement aid development. The report pointed out that 
there were three routes of advance from Peshawar to Dakka; first, 
the unmetalled Khyber road connecting Jamrud and Landi IChana - a 
distance of twenty-four miles. From Landi IChana to Dakka - ten miles
1
Col, ¥. R. L. Macdonald, Roos-Keppel, Major ¥alton and Major N.
Dundee were the members. Ibid.
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the road was merely a nulla bed. The second route was the old 
Kafila route, a very rough mule track passing through the Mulla- 
gori country to the east of Khyber. The third route was through 
the Kabul river which was navigable from War sale to Dakka. All 
the three routes, the Macdonald Committee pointed out, were 
"lamentablydefective", and were utterly insufficient for the 
movement of a large body of troops. The Committee, therefore, 
urged the absolute necessity of improving roads and constructing 
railway in the Khyber. It recommended that a railway be built 
along the Kabul river from Peshawar to the Indo-Afghan border; 
the line should proceed via War sale to the point where the Kabul 
river met the Loi Shilman valley, whence the line should cut 
across the hills nn $he side of ihe Lo i Shilman gorge to Multan 
Kill a. and thereafter it should proceed up the open valley to 
the summit of the Shilman-Ghakke pass which was close to the 
Durand line. From Peshawar to the Shilman-Ghakke pass the distance 
was about thirty-nine miles. The Committee assumed that both Shin- 
pokh and Smatzai were in Afghan territory, and therefore in neither 
of the two places could the Government secure a terminus for the 
railway unless the Amir agreed to modify the Durand line and give 
the two places to the British.'*'
Report of Colonel Macdonald’s Committee on Communications between
Peshawar and Dakka, 5 November 1902, enclosed in Govt, of India to
Secy, of State, 11 August 1904, P.S.S.F., File No. 382 1905, Reg. 
No. 1515.
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On the political aspect of the project Roos-Keppel pointed
out that the development of communication through the Khyber
pass would be ’’distasteful" to the Afridis who “hate the idea
of a railway through their limits’1, and to the Amir who wielded
considerable influence over the Western Kohmands north of the
Kabul river and who maintained close and constant touch with 
1
the Afridis.
In the circumstances, Cur son, after considering the report 
of the Committee, decided to postpone the construction of the
2
railway until relations with Habibullah the new Amir improved.
The Viceroy, then took up another project: a military road through
the Mullagori country in the Khyber linking -Landi Kotal with
Peshawar - a distance of forty-two miles - and passing through
the territories of the Shinwaris, Shilmanis and Mullagoris who
3
were friendly to the Government. Such a road had been recommended 
by Warborton in 1887 and necessary survey had been conducted by 
Captain Macdonald in 1888-9, whereafter the construction had com­
menced. But the work had soon been abandoned because of Roberts'
4preference for a railway along the Kabul river valley.
i
Memorandum on Political questions connected with the proposals 
of Colonel Macdonald’s Committee, by Roos-Keppel, 5 November 1902, 
ibid.
habibullah succeeded Abdur Rahman in 1901.
3CSummary of Curzon’s Administration, op.cit., p.65.
^Secy., Govt, of India to Deane, 10 May 1901. P.S.L.X,, vol. 133, 
Reg. No. 673*
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In 1900-01, Roos-Keppel also had strongly proposed the 
constructinn of a road through the Mullagori country* Afghan 
opposition and Afridi resentment were, of course, anticipated, 
but Roos-ICeppel believed that the local friendly tribes, if 
promised increased allowances and trade facilities with Peshawar, 
were unlikely to be influenced by Afghan or Afridi iicitement. 
Roos-Keppel had suggested that construction work should be under­
taken in cold weather when Afridis with their families migrated 
to the Peshawar plain, thus enabling the Government to hold them
as sureties. Beane went a step further, contending that the road
1must be built even at the risk of tribal troubles.
The idea appealed to Curzon : the Mullagori road would pro­
vide an alternative to the Khyber pass route and would enable the 
Government to reinforce their position at Landi Kotal and if needed 
to move troops against the Afridis. Thus, as Curzon explained to 
Hamilton,
instead of all our eggs being in one basket, as they 
now are with the present Khyber route, and the Afridis 
being practically able to dictate terms to us in the 
event of a frontier campaign, we shall have them com­
pletely in our hands, by our ability to leave the Khyber 
pass severely alone, and shall have a permanent guarantee 
for their good behaviour. 2
Secy., Govt, of India to Roos-Keppel, 4 May 1901, Roos-Keppel to 
Secy., Govt, of India, 5 May 1901, Deane to Secy., Govt, of India, 
13 May 1901, P.S.L.I., vol. 113, Reg. No. 673-
2
Curzon to Hamilton, 8 May 1901, C.C., vol. 160.
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Curzon did not take the Afridi opposition to the Mullagori road
very seriously; the trihe might just "fret and fume". Nor did
he expect "any sort of protest'* from the Amir because the road
would be on the British side of the Durand line. He therefore
appealed to Hamilton to accord immediate sanction to the proposed 
1project. The Secretary of State while agreeing with Curzon
about the usefulness of the road advised caution; the construction
of the road at a time when the South African War lay heavily on the
British Government's hands and which might cause alarm in the tribal
territory necessitating a military undertaking to which the Home
authorities would be averse. Moreover, the Frontier Province was
then being formed, and any disturbance on the border, so Hamilton
warned Curzon, would encourage the Punjab Government to intensify
their opposition to the formation of the new province. Prudence,
2
therefore, dictated that the project had better be postponed.
It was after the establishment of the Frontier Province that 
in October 1902 Hamilton telegraphically authorized the cffended
3
Viceroy to start the construction of the Mullagori road. Curzon 
with his usual zeal, within ten days of the receipt of the Secretary 
of State's telegram, put Major Dundee in charge of the work with
1
Curzon to Hamilton, 10 July 1901, ibid.
^Secy. of State to Govt, of India, 28 June 1901, P.S.h.I., vol. 133» 
Reg. No. 673. Also sec Hamilton to Curzon, 21 June 1901, C.O* , 
vol. 160.
^Seoy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 18 October 1902, P.S.h.I., vol. 148, 
Reg. No. 1311.
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instructions to carry out the project without any delay. Small
contracts for different sections of the road were given to
1friendly tribes through whose territory it passed. The road,
which was metalled, was completed in the beginning of 3905 at
a cost of Rs. 4-04,000 and without any tribal opposition. For
their good behaviour during the construction of the road, the
Mullagoris, Shinwaris and Shilmanis were rewarded with an 3n-
2crease in their allowances.
The successful completion of the ^ullagori road encouraged 
Gurzon to improve the existing m eans of communication between 
Peshawar and Landi-Khana through the Khyber pass itself. The 
main road in the pass was commonly known as the North IChyber road 
which was unmetalled. In addition, there was a track running 
close and parallel to the North Khyber road and sometimes used 
by ICafilas (caravans); this track ms known as the South Khyber 
road. The Government wanted to widen and metal the North Khyber 
road and improve the South Khyber road - both the operations being
■|
Secy., Govt, of India to Dean$,28 October 1902, Beane to Secy.,
Govt, of India, 15 November 1902,ibid.. vol. 145, Reg. No. 1546.
‘Jxovt. of India to Secy, of State, 11 August 1904, P.S.S.F.,
No, 382/1905, Reg. No. 1515; Khyber Political Diary for the 
week ending 27 May 1905, P.S.L.I., vol. 178, Reg No. 1067.
Aitchison, op.cit., pp. 100-01. I.P.W.P. (Civil Works Communication), 
vol. 6838, May 1904, Proc. Nos. 1-11; l.F.F.P., vol. 6884, June 1904, 
Proc. Nos. 118-28.
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called the udoubling1 or "duplication'1 of the Khyber pass road.
1
Major Dundee, with his recent experience of the construction 
of the Mullagori road, was put in charge of the new project and 
the same method of construction was followed. First, contracts 
were given to the friendly Shinwaris of Loargai for the section 
Landi ICobal to Landi IChana. The progress having teen found "extra­
ordinary”, contracts were next given to the maliks and elders 
of the ICuki Khel and Malikdin IChel Afridis for the section Jamrud 
to Gurgurra which lay three miles beyond Ali Masjid. The con­
tractors had to contend with "every kind of pressure direct and 
indirect" by other Afridi clans who were influenced by Afghan 
mullas. There were cases of firing on the coolie camps, necessitating
the reinforcement of the Khyber Rifles between Jamrud and Ali Mas j id,
2
Patrols were organised and armed; chowkidars engaged. At the end 
of December 1905, Habibullah protected against the construction 
of the road when it approached Landi Khana, contending that as the 
Indo“Afghan boundary near Landi Khana was still undemarcated, the
3
British should desist from their activity. But the Government 
of India ignored the Amir's protest. By the middle of 1907 the North
Memo, of Frontier Affairs, June 1905, p.13, P.S.L.I., vol. 179, 
Reg. No. 1215.
‘IChyber Political Diary for the week ending 6 Januaiy 1906, 
PP* 1-3, P.S.L.I., vol. 184, Reg. No. 564.
3
Trans-Frontier Journal, January 1906, p.11, P.S.L.I., vol. 185, 
Reg. No. 448.
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Khyber road had been metalled to a width of twelve feet and the
South Khyber road, though unmetalled, had been considerably 
*1
improved. Six years later further improvements were made in
both the roads. In 1910 two motor cars of the Amir passed through
the Khyber road to Peshawar - an event which, in the Government1 s
opinion, "deserved to be placed on record as a land-mark in
2
the history of the road".
Roads in the Khyber were no doubt an achievement cki the
part of the Government but, from the military point of view, they
were not enough - particularly in Kitchener's eyes. The Commander-
in-0hief would have railways, too, and shortly after his assumption
of office he pressed for the implementation of the Kabul river
railway project which Curzon had earlier put off. Until the left
India in 1909 Kitchener did not cease urging the Government to
construct the railway which he looked upon as an essential military
requirement. In March 1903 Kitchener visited the Loi Shilman valley
with a view to "thoroughly looking" into the project. He returned
convinced of the feasibility and urgency of constructing a broad-
gauge railway from Peshawar to Smatzai through War sale, Loi Shilman
4valley and Shilman-Ghakke pass. Curzon, however, was reluctant to
i
P.P.. 1907, vol. 59* C.149, Bast India. Progress and Condition.
P*182; p.p.. 1908, vol. 75, C.145, Bast India. Progress and Condition, 
p.179.
^P.P., 1912-13,vol. 61, 0.147, Bast India. Progress and Condition, p.124. 
See above p. £10.
4-Kitehener to Lord Roberts, 12 March 1903, K.P., vol. 29. Viceroy to
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take up the project because although Smatzai and Shinpokh had
•j
been occupied by the British in April 1903, the occupation had
not been recognised by the Amir nor the Indo-Afghan boundary in
2
this sector demarcated yet.
In London the Committee of Imperial Defence discussed the
issue in several meetings. The Prime Minister, A. J. Balfour,
was ufairly puzzled” by the difficulties, both political and
technical, of the project. Roberts, now the Commander-in-Chief
of the British army and a member cf the Committee, repeatedly urged
the imperative necessity of "keeping Russia where she is as long
as possible” and "endeavouring by every means in our power to ex- ,
tend our railway syston so that when the time comes we may be
able to meet the Russians with a sufficiently large army”. In
March 1904, in a private telegram to Curzon, Brodrick the new
Secretary of State apprised the Viceroy of the Defence Committee's
anxiety regarding the Amir's consistent opposition to the British
4railway project in the Khyber region,
’Se^y. of State, Tel. 28 April, 1903? P.S.L.I., vol. 153, Reg* Mo.
558, C.X.P.P.. Cab. 38/3, no. 51.
1 Chapter IX , p. \Z^ ,
2
See ChapterXI , fcP*|36-7.
^Roberts to Kitchener, 27 March, 3 April, 21 May, 4 June 1903, K.P.» 
vol. 28. Mote on the "Diary of Movements cf Russian and British Porces 
in Afghanistan”, by Roberts, 20 April 1903, C.I.D.P., Cab.38/2, no. 22.
^Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 28 March 1904, Viceroy to S®cy. of 
State, Tel. 30 March 1904, C.C.. vol. 174*
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This, together with Kitchener1s insistence, led Curzon, 
in April 1904, to agree to the undertaking of a survey of the
1
Loi Shilman route, A preliminary reconnaissance of the route
was undertaken in July-August 1904 when Amp thill was the Acting 
2
Viceroy. Brodrick while approving of the survey operation 
reminded Ampthill that not merely strategic factors hut the 
British government's general political relations with the Amir 
should he carefully considered before the construction of the 
railway was started.
In December 1904 Captain Hopkins of the Koyal Engineers 
submitted a report of the survey of the Loi Shilman route. Hop­
kins maintained that a railway from Peshawar to the Indo-Afghan 
border through the Loi Shilman valley and the Shilman-Ghakke pass 
had many disadvantages compared to its construction along the 
south bank of the Kabul river which Captain Macdonald had already 
surveyed in 1890-91. The Loi Shilman route was more expensive than 
the river valley route, for engineering difficulties were relatively 
greater. A railway through the Loi Shilman route would have less 
hauling capacity than the other route, which had also greater com­
mercial prospects. Whereas a railway through the river valley route
■j
Summary of Curzon's Administration, op. cit., p. 65.
^Govt. of India to Secy, of State, 11 August 1904, P.S.S.E.» Ho. 
582/1905, Reg. Ho. 1515.
S^ecy. of State to Govt, of India, 23 September 1904, ibid.
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could be a broad gauge line and “would take tiro and a half years
to complete, that through the Loi Shilman route had to be a
narrow gauge line which could not be completed in less than three
1and a quarter years. Dundee also favoured the river route, and 
2
so did Deane.
Louis Dean©’s mission to Kabul offered the Government of
India an opportunity to raise the Kabul river railway issue with
the Amir. Deane was instructed to persuade the Amir to agree to
a rail-head at Loi Dakka or Kam Dakka. Deane raised the matter
several times with the Amir but only succeeded in eliciting from
the latter an assurance that the British government could build
railways cn their side of the demarcated section of the Indo-
Afghan boundary, but they must keep off the undemarcated section
3of the boundary. The Amirfs attitude was clear enough from his 
remark: MYour Khyber railway is a spear pointed at my heart,
Meanwhile, the Imperial Defence Committee in London was 
anxiously awaiting the decision of the Government of India regarding
■j
Report on Loi Shilman Hail way by Captain Hopkins, 1 December 1904,
P.S.3.?., No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 382.
2.
. H. J. Dundee to Commanding Royal Engineer, N.¥.F.F., 9 December 
1904, Deane to Secy. Govt, of India, 17 December 1904, ibid,
^Deane to Secy. Govt, of India, 27 March 1905, P.S.S.P.. No. 1552/4903, 
Reg. No. 1094; Extract from a letter by L. ¥. Deane, 15 April 1905,
P.S.S.P., No. 582/1905, Reg. No. 212A; Govt, of India to Secy, of 
State, 4 May 1905, P.P.. vol. 5.
^Gited by E. Haward, "Indiafe Defence as an Imperial Problem11, 
J.R.C.A.S.. vol. XIII, 1926, p.125.
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the Kabul river railway project, and on 17 April 1905 Brodrick
1
telegraphed Curzon voicing this anxiety. Curzon ms  at first
2against the Loi Shilman route but ultimately yielded to Kitchener
3
who wanted this route and no other. Brodrick was informed on
9 June 1905 that a railway would be built up to the Shilman-Ghakke
pass but its extension towards Dakka had to wait until the Amir's
4attitude changed for the better. The estimated cost of the rail­
way was put at Rs. 15,100,000,
The Imperial Defence Committee, however, expressed its pre­
ference for the river route rather than the Loi Shilman route.
But Brodrick pointed out to the Committee that the first ttrenty- 
five miles - Peshawar to Haidar Khan - were common to both the 
routes, and so the Government of India should be allowed to commence 
the construction of this section of the line pending the decision 
regarding the route the line would take from Haidar Khan onwards.
Brodrick's suggestion ms accepted by the Committee and the Govern^
5ment of India were instructed accordingly. The Government of India
"j
Minute of 68th Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on Indian 
Frontier Railways, 29 March 1905, C.I.D.P., Gab, 58/8, No. 29;
Secy, of State to Viceroy, Tel. 17 April 1905, P.S.S.F.. No, 582/ 
1905, Reg. No. 2857.
2
Curzon preferred the River valley route.
Curzon to Brodrick, 5 January 1905, C.C., vol. 164; Kitchener to 
Roberts, 12 January 1905, IC.P., vol. 29.
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 9 June 1905, P.S.S.F., No. 582/19O5, 
Reg. No. 985.
3
Minute of 74th Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the
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were further asked to review their decision to take the line 
through the Loi Shilman route and to send to the Secretary of 
State a more detailed report on the merits of this and the 
river route.*
The constriiction of the 1 ine up to Haidar Khan duly started.
Since the railway was exposed to attacks by the Afridis on the
right bank of the ICabul river and by the Mohmands ca the left
bank it was decided to strengthen the Khyber rifles, who would
guard the line, by employing the friendly Mullagoris, Shilmanis,
2Shinwaris and some Mohmands from the "assured clans" as escort 
3parties.
In November 1905 Minto took over from Curzon, Unlike his 
predecessor, the new Viceio y was at first not enthusiastic about 
pushing railways on to the Afghan frontier. Regarding the Kabul 
river railway the Viceroy's personal opinion was that no matter
Peshawar-Dakka Railway Extension, 6 Jxily 1905, C.l.P.P., Cab. 38/9, 
No. 54; Secy, of State to Viceroy, Tel. 11 July 1905, P.S.S.F., 
No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 1086b.
The Peshawar-Dakka Railway Extension, Note by Sir George Clarke 
(Secretary cf the Committee ,of Imperial Defence), 11 July 1905, 
C.I.D.P., Cab. 38/9, Nos. 59-60; Secy, of State to Govt, of India, 
21 July 1905, P.S.S.F.. No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 1086b.
^See ChapterXI , p.|£,6.
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 5 August 1905, Secy, of State to 
Viceroy, 24 August 1905, P.S.S.F., No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 1253; 
Govt, of India to Secy, of State, 4 January 1906, Secy, of State 
j to Govt, of India, 16 March 1906, ibid., Reg. No.- 264.
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what route the railway took after Haidar Khan had been reached,
it would be 1 in tensely unpopular*' with the frontier tribes, as
well as with the Amir, and therefore the project had better be
abandoned. Minto explained
To my mind it is of immense importance to us to 
keep on good terms with the .Amir and to encourage 
him to trust us, and the advance of our railways 
will, I am afraid, militate against our .influence 
with him. Again, as to the frontier tribes, every­
thing points to an inflammable state of affairs, 
and the advance of the railway may lead to a blaze 
- and a frontier war on a big scale would be a 
harder nut to crack than it has ever been before 
ox-ring to the better arms and the large supply 
now in possession of the tribes.
Besides, the Viceroy thought that the Anglo-Russian general political 
relations were showing signs of improvement, and that the nego­
tiations which were afoot in London and St. Petersburgh promised re­
laxation of the century-old tension between the two powers and com­
position of their differences. In such circumstances Russian press­
ure on the Indian frontier was most likely to be released ha the 
near future which would proportionately diminish the need for ex­
pensive railway projects by the Government of India. Minto, there­
fore, questioned the need for extending the projected railways be­
yond Haidar Khan, believing that the recently improved Khyber roads
2were sufficient for military purposes.
 ^Minto to Kitchener, 19 May 1906, Minto Papers, H 978, 
2Ibid.
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Kitchener, when consulted, very strongly advocated the con­
struction of frontier railways and carrying them to the Afghan 
border. Giving a comparative survey cf railway construction in 
Central Asia by Russia and such construction by Britain towards 
Afghanistan, Kitchener sought to establish that the Russians had 
one "ultimate view", viz., "the menacing of Afghanistan, Persia 
and India", The Merv-ICushlc line, built in 1900, had brought Russia 
within about seventy miles of Herat, posing a threat to the Kanda­
har line, while the completion of the Orenburg-Tashkent line in 
September 1904 was an equally great danger to the Oxus-Kabul line. 
These railways appeared to Kitchener to have completely changed 
the strategic conditions affecting the defence of India. Kitchener, 
warned that the Government of India "must on no account allow" 
the Kabul-Ghasni-Kandahar line to be menaced by Russia, and that 
the preparations for the defence of India should take this paramount 
factor into consideration. The construction of the projected Loi 
Shilman railway, Kitchener pointed out, was an attempt by the British 
government, "in a modest fashion" to restore the military balance 
which had been disturbed by the latest Russian railways in Central 
Asia. The railway would meet the Russian danger on the "Kabul 
flank of the strategic front", it was not "only an essential measure 
of precaution" on this flank, but also one the abandonment or post­
ponement of which at the present moment would make it necessary for 
the British to recast their entire defensive preparations. Kitchener
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would, therefore, go on with the project no matter what turn
the international politics might have taken. He warned;
Any power dominating Afghanistan at Kabul and 
attracting to her side the tribes on our frontier, 
would constitute so serious a menace to our Empire 
that I consider that no matter how peaceful the 
immediate aspect of the international horizon may 
appear, we should lose neither time nor chance now, 
in time of peace, and with money available, to take 
the simple and obvious measures which alone can 
avert so dangerous a state of affairs.-*-
The hoi Shilman railway was looked upon by Kitchener as not only 
of "the greatest value in the critical phases", but probably 
"a saving factor" in war in Afghanistan. Kitchener added that 
Roberts with his unrivalled knowledge of the frontier and its 
military requirements had been pressing him for the immediate 
construction of a railway from Peshawar to the Afghan border.
Its abandonment in Kitchener's view would leave the British 
"impotent" in regard either to defence of the Amir against Russia 
or "even to coerce him ourselves",if necessary. The Amir, already 
hard to manage, would become harder still, while the tribesmen 
would regard the abandonment as an "exhibition of extraordinary 
weakness" on the part of the British government. The railway pro­
jects of the Government on the frontier, Kitchener held, provided 
"the shortest, safest and most economical" means of securing British 
control on the border; they constituted "the best guarantee of
•i
Kitchener to Minto, 73 May 1906, enclosed In Minto to Morley,
12 June 1906, ibid., vol. M 1005*
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continued peace on the frontier" by enabling the Government 
uto dominate ... the most formidable and important section of 
the whole border land", and at the same time providing the tribes­
men with "those increased facilities for trade which have hither­
to invariably proved a great civilising factor amongst the Pathans".
As for the route which the railway would take from Haidar 
Khan onwards, although Kitchener admitted that the river route 
would pose less engineering difficulties, he stuck to his prefer­
ence for the Loi Shilman route because it passed through the 
friendly Shilman country and hence carried less risks of political
■j
troubles.
Minto also asked Deane as to the effect of the abandonment
2of the Kabul river railway project on the Amir and the tribesmen.
The Chief Commissioner, like Kitchener, considered that the abandnn- 
ment would be a political mist alee; the tribesmen would take it as 
a manifestation of the Government's weakness, while those engaged 
in the con struct inn and protection of the line would lose confidence 
in the Government. Deane also pointed out that the Amir would not 
object if he were assured that the line would be extended only up 
to Shinpokh and not beyond until the Khyber section of the boundary were
•7
delimited.
^Kitchener to Minto, 23 May 1906, ibid. Also see A Mote on the 
Military Policy of India by Kitchener, 19 July 1905, &.P. > vol. 30.
D^. Smith (Private Secy, to Minto) to Deane, 23 May 1906. Minto Papers, 
vol. M 978.
^Deane to D. Smith, 29 May 1906, ibiJ-
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Minto was very much impressed by Kitchener's views and
entirely agreed with his line of argument. The projected
railway to the Afghan border was indeed a great military necessity
and this he impressed upon Morley in a private letter dated 12
June 1906. Morley had asked Minto'g views regarding the Home
government's proposal to include as one df the terms in the
contemplated Anglo-Russian agreement a ten-year moratorium on
railway construction towards the Afghan frontier by both the
powers. But Minto was "strongly opposed to any agreement with
Russia in respect to railways" because such an agreement woul d
"grievously cripple" the security of the Indian frontier and
would "tend to c&Lay" for a decade "the prosperous development
and better government" of frontier tracts. Minto urged;
we must surely be masters in our own house. We 
surely cannot agree to sacrifice the security and 
internal improvement of a portion of our domains  ^
for the sake of our relations with a foreign power?
Developing his arguments further, Minto pointed out that from the 
British military point of view the proposed agreement with Russia 
regarding railway construction would suffer from onesidedness; a 
ban an such construction. would put the British at a serious dis­
advantage. The construction of the railway from Peshawar to the 
Afghan border which ms in progress would take at least two and 
a half years more to be completed, while the Russians could connect
•i
Minto to Morley, 12 June 1906, Minto Papers, vol. M 1005*
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Samarkand with the Afghan frontier by railway in a few months. 
Besides, Russia had the advantage of water transport along the 
Oxus river, while the British had no such facility. It was also 
reported that the Russians had a railway plant at Charjui ready 
for an immediate advance parallel in the Orus, and another plant 
at Kushk preparatory for an advance on Herat. The Russians had 
a military base on the Afghan frontier which wouLd give them a 
definitely better position than the British could have in the 
event of a war in Afghanistan. Thus, even if the Anglo-Russian 
entente lasted for ten years, at the end of that period "Russia 
would still be ii the same superior position as regards aggression 
in Afghanistan" as she now was, while Britain would "still be at 
the same disadvantage". Besides, discontinuance of frontier rail­
way construction would seriously handicap the Government in dealing 
with any future Afghan or tribal hostility. Minto also drew Morley*s 
attention to the civilising influence of railways and the economic
setback to frontier tracts which the abandonment of railway pro-
1jects would entail. These views prevailed with the Home government
who ultimately decided to drop the rail x-ray issue from the Anglo-
2Russian negotations.
Minto then tackled the still undecided issue: the alignment
Siinto to Morley, 12 June 1906, ibid.
^The Cambridge History of India, vol. VI, p.430*
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of the railway after it had reached Haidar IChan. In January 1907 
the Railway Board appointed H. S. Harington, the Chief Engineer, 
to examine the issue and submit to Minto an,,unprejudiced,t report, 
Harington decided ii favour cf the Hoi Shilman alignment. However, 
Minto soon came to know and was "surprised" that Kitchener had ad­
vised Harington to report against the river valley route. Minto 
thereupon hinself went jnto the matter and wrote a memorandum in 
support of the river valley route. But lest the members of his
Council felt any "hesitation" to agree with him, Minto proposed
2that another railway expert report on the issue. Accordingly,
¥. H. Johns, a Superintending Engineer, was entrusted with the 
task in October 1907. John^’ report established that the river 
valley route was preferable to the Loi Shilman route on grounds
3
mainly of economy and greater carrying capacity. Deane also sup-
4ported this route, as he had done earlier. But before a decision
could be taken by the Government of India, the Mohmand troubles
5broke out in the beginning of 1908. All work on the railway ms
■i
Report on Loi-Shilman-Dakka Railway by H. S. Harington, 10 lay 1907, 
enclosed in Deane to Secy., Govt, of India, 18 May 1907, P.S.S.P.,
Ho. 382/1905, Reg. N0. 1195-
^Memorandum on Kabul River Railway by Minto, 28 August 1907, enclosed 
in Minto to Morley, 29 August 1907, H.P.» vol. 12.
3
Report on Survey of the Kabul River and Shilman routes to Smatzai 
by ¥. H. Johns, 18 December 1907, P.S.S.P., Ho. 382/1905, Reg.Ho.326.
^Deane to Secy,, Govt, of India, 6 January 1908, P.S.S.P., Ho. 382/1805, 
Reg. Ho. 326.
^See Chapter 11 , |)p. 137- ^,
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then stopped. The railway had not yet reached Haidar Khan.
Towards the end of 1908, the Kabul River Railway project
was reviewed by the India Office. L. Abrahams, the Pinancial
Secretary, pointed out the great increase in the estimated outlay
1
on the project since it was sanctioned in Hovember 1905. He asked
the Political Department if it was worthwhile to go on with such
an expensive project. Richmond Ritchie, the Secretary of the Political
Department,did not think that the railway was at all essential in
view of the improved political relations between Russia and Britain
as a result of the Convention of 1907. The Convention in M s  opinion
had "completely altered" the political situation justifying the contin-
2
uation of the project. Morley agreed with Ritchie, and telegraphed
Minto on 21 December asking him to stop further expenditure on the 
3railway. The scheme was then abandoned. In 1911, lines and girders 
were removed leaving no trace of what was regarded as "the most ex­
pensive line in the world".^:
Another project which ms abandoned in 1908 and on the same 
grounds was the scheme for the conversion of the narrow-gauge Ilohat-
A
In November 1905 the estimated expenditure was Rs. 5,042,874; in 
1906 it was increased to Rs. 7,230,000 and by November 1908 it was 
further increased to Rs. 10,875,157-
^Minute by L. Abrahams, 17 November 1908, Minute by R. Ritchie, 18 
November 1908. P.S.S.P.. No. 382/1905, Reg, No. 212A.
^Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 21 December 1908, Secy, of State to 
Govt, of India, 25 December 1 905, ibid.; Summary of the Administration 
of Lord Hardinge, Army Dept., p.87, H.P., vol. 131; Magnus Philip, 
Kitchener: The portrait of an Imperialist, pp. 232-3-
A^. H. McMahon to P. Hirtzel, D.O., 4 October 1911, P.S.S.P., No. 382/1905,
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Thai line to broad gauge and the construction of a broad gauge 
line from Thai to Parachinar. In February 1907 Morley had al­
ready pointed out that the revised estimate of the cost of the 
project had far exceeded the original estimate which had been
sanctioned in December 1906, and so the scheme should be sus-
1 2 pended. Kitchener greatly regretted the decision. In December
3
1908, the scheme was scrapped altogether.
Further improvement in the Khyber pass roads was the most 
important communication project undertaken under Hardinge. The 
improvement was urged by Indian military authorities who pointed 
out that notwithstanding the relaxation of Anglo-Russian tension 
following the Convention of 1907, the need for strengthening the 
Governments position in the frontier by roads and railways remained 
because relations with the Amir were still far from satisfactory 
and there had been no diminution of tribal disturbances. In July 
1912 Percy Lake, the Chief of the General Staff, pointed out that 
in the event of a war with Afghanistan the Government would have 
to depend "almost entirely" on the road communication through the 
Khyber which, unless improved in peace time, might cause a serious
    i I ■ ■■ i in I ■ I I ■■ ,h.«. * uaiiw w « i i  m m i ii, [ii ■ -i »    m rm ,,i ■■ in H ih ith' m ' w y  i ■,niii. < <•*     i in n  mu ■iik.w
Reg. No. 1722; Sandes, op.cit.. p.160; H. B. IC. Malik, Hundred 
Years of Pakistan Railways, p.117.
-j
Minto*s Administration of India, Afghanistan and North-Nest Frontier, 
1906-7, pp. 6-7, Minto Papers, vol. M 957.
^Kitchener to Roberts, 21 February, 1907, H.P.,vol. 29.
3
The estimated cost of the project in 1906-7 was Rs.85,00^000* ; 
in 1907-8, the estimate was increased to Rs. 115,53,452; in 1909-10, 
it was put at Rs. 162,52,288, Minute by L, Abrahams, 17 November 1908, 
P.S.S.F.» No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 212A.
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breakdown in the Government's plans of operation in Afghanistan.
Lake, therefore, recommended that the existing twelve-foot
wide metalled North Khyber road be widened to twenty-four feet,
and the South Khyber road, which was unmetalled, be metalled
to a width of twelve feet. Because of Afridi opposition, the
work, Lake noted, wotild require great caution and tact on the part
of the political officers. It should be taken up "gradually bit
by bit" and as "unostentatiously" as possible. Lake suggested
that the Government, of India should maintain "perfect secrecy1
in the matter, the Viceroy informing the Secretary of State only 
1privately. Roos-Keppel agreed with Lake about the need for tact­
fully handling the Afridi tribe, the guardian of the pass, and 
suggested that the cultivated tracts through which the South Khyber 
road passed be purchased piecemeal at a high price. The Amir, in 
Roos-Keppel's opinion, was unlikely to object to the improvement 
of the Khyber pass roads if he were assured that the improvement
was being effected for facilitating the movement of Caravans,
2
which was in the interest of Afghan trade. In a telegram, dated 
6 August 1912, Hardinge strongLy urged Creweto sanction the scheme, 
stating that
the military authorities cannot accept responsibility 
for success of possible operations /in Afghanistan/
1Note by Lake, 3 July 1912, P.S.F.,1912, vol. 26, Keg. lo. 458§.
Note by Roos-Keppel, 20 July 1912, ibid.
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unless proposed improvement is effected.
Crewe, however, refused to oblige Hardinge before the latter sub-
2
mitted a detailed report on the scheme. It was not until April 
1913 that the sanction was accorded by the Secretary of State.
Without any further delay, the Government of India took steps to 
start the project as the conditions on the frontier at the time 
were favourable. Roos-ICeppel had informed the Government of India 
that the Afridis were suffering under a prolonged drought and were 
pressing for some employment to mitigate their suffering. The 
Assistant Political Agent of Khyber, Abdul Qayyupa, who enjoyed the 
confidence of the Afridis to "a remarkable degree'1 and so was "the 
fittest" person to induce the Afridis to part with their cherished 
land for the road, was shortly going on leave - and this was ad­
duced by Roos-Keppel as a strong reason why the project should be
4? 5immediately taken ..in hand.* These arguments prevailed with Crewe.
The work was completed by the end of 1914 without any unfavourable
^Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 6 August 1912, ibid., Reg. Ho. 3067.
^Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel, 21 August 1912, ibid.
%ecy. of State to Govt, of India, 20 September 1912, ibid., Reg.
Ho. 3352, Govt, of India to Secy, of State, 14 Hovember 1912, ibid., 
Reg. Ho. 4585A, Roos-Keppel to Secy. Govt, of India, 13 March 1913» 
Secy. Govt, of India to Roos-Keppel, 21 April 1913» enclosed in
Govt, of India to Secy, of State, 8 May 1913* ibid., Reg. Ho. 2043.
^Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 13 March 1913* ibid.
%ecy. of State to Govt, of India, 20 June 1913, ibid.
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incident. It was carried out nso quietly and with so little
friction” that few people among the general public of the
province were aware of the project. The successful implementation
of the project was a testimony to the "tact and discretion”
of both the Political Agent of Khyber, S. E. Pears, and his
1assistant, Abdul Qayyuii)*
Another example of employing tribal labour in frontier
communicatinn projects at a time of economic distress prevailing
in the tribal territory was afforded by the extension of the
2
Kalabagh-Bannu line from Laklci to Tank. In March 1913? 4? 500 
Mahsuds were working on this narrow gauge line and their economic 
dependence on the Government kept them - as was the Government’s 
declared object - quiet. The line was constructed to strengthen 
the Government’s position towards North and South Waairistan as 
well as to tap the trade which hitherto passed between Afghanistan
•z
and India through the Gomal pass. The line was opened to traffic 
in October 1917.
The road and railway building activities were interrupted 
during the war years, partly for financial xeasons and partly fee to
*]
Donald to Secy., Govt, of India, 19 January 1915? ibid., Reg.
No. 974.
2Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 24 October 1911? Secy, of State 
to Viceroy, Tel. 24 November 1911? l.R.P.. vol. 8986, July 1912, 
Proc. Nos. 125-151. The section from Laklci to Tank was 46.48 
miles long.
3
P.P.. 1914? vol. 63? 0.288, East India; Progress and Condition, 
p.75. Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 6 March 1915. H.P., vol. 85.
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the Government’s anxiety to avoid troubles with the tribes which 
such activities were most likely to cause. However, after the 
Afghan war (1919), and in pursuance of the Government’s new policy 
in Waziristan, important communication projects were taken up 
and completed between 1921 and 1925. A broad gauge railway, twenty - 
seven miles long, was constructed through the Khyber pass and linked 
Jamrud with Landi Khana. In Waziristan one hundred . and forty 
miles of roads fit for mechanical transport were constructed con­
necting all the important posts of the irregulars and regular troops 
such as Jandola, Dwa Toi, Razmak, Miranshah, Datta Khel, Wana,
Tanai and Sarwakai. Along the border cf Deraj at, one hundred miles 
of road were built for lateral communication.
Dictated by strategic considerations, the period under review 
witnessed considerable activities^ the building of roads and 
railways in the province. Out of a total of 1,015.26 miles of 
metalled roads in 1919-20, no less than 651.20 miles of roads were 
’’military communications”. Likewise, the railway lines, which in­
creased from forty-four miles in 1899 to 285.49 miles in 1919-20,
D^efence of the Worth-West frontier, P.P. (Lords), 19^2? vol. XLV,
51 May 1921; The Worth-West frontier, P.P. (Lords), 1925, vol. LIII,
5 May 1925; P.P., 1927, vol. XVIII, 0.29, East India. Progress and 
Condition, pp. 202-8. Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, ’’The Worth-West 
Frontier of India”, J.R.C.A.S., vol. XI, 1924, Part II, pp. 137-146;
"The Influence of communications on Military and other Policy on the
Worth-West Frontier of India”, J.R.C.A.S.» vol. XI, 1924, Part III,
pp. 244-62; I.L.A.D.. 13 Harch 1924, pp. 1614-5, P.S.S.F.. Ho. 5665/1921.
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were all military in nature. Curzon ms mainly responsible for 
the improvement and extension of these roads and railways; his 
policjr of the withdrawal of troops from advanced positions in the 
tribal territory had created a great urgency for such measures.
Even though a railway prior to Curzon1s reign had reached Peshawar 
and another touched Kliushalgarh 011 the Indus, Curzon with his 
characteristic zeal pushed these lines to Dargai, Jamrud and Thai, 
the points which dominated the Mai ale and, the Khyber and the Kurram 
agencies. Simultaneously the existing roads were improved and new 
ones added in the ICohat pass, Khyber and ICurram valleys and in Waziri­
stan. Like Curzon, Kitchener was a great exponent of the extension 
of means of communications on the frontier. Under his influence 
the permanent bridge across the Indus at Khushalgarh was constructed 
and the narrow gauge line from Khushalgarh to ICohat was con "verted 
to broad, gauge. He advocated the construction of both the Kabul river 
and the Kurram valley railways. In fact it was under his pressure 
that their construction started. But a conflict of views appeared 
between Kitchener, Minto and the India Office authorities over the 
possible alignment of the Kabul river railway after it had reached 
Haidar Khan. Kitchener insisted on the Shilman route whereas Minto 
and the India Office were inclined towards the Kabul river valley 
route. While the issue was still being debated, the Angl0-Russian
1Convention of 1907 "decreased the presumption of war with Russia".
•j
Summary of Hardinge’s Administration. Army Dept., p.87, H.P., vol. 131.
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Consequently, the strategic considerations and financial stringency 
demanded a change in policy. By the end of 1908 Morley, the Secret­
ary of State, decided to abandon the projects.
Unlike the Russian threat the possibility of trouble from Af­
ghanistan and the tribesmen could not be ruled out. This led Unto 
and Hardinge to carry on improvements in roads on the frontier and 
to build a narrow gauge railway line from Kalabagh to Bannu and ex­
tend it from Laklci to Tank. The Third Afghan War (l919) and. the 
consequent unrest in the tribal territory once more with greater force 
brought home to the British authorities the neOd for further con­
struction of roads and railways on the stormy frontier.
Though built purely for mili>tary purposes, the railways and 
roads did serve, to some extent, commercial and political purposes 
as well. It was expected that they would give impetus to trade and 
through trade to peace on the border. Addressing a durbar (reception) 
at Peshawar in April 1902, Curzon foreshadowed the beneficial ef­
fects of railway lines:
The Pathan is a curious mixture. He is a man of war, 
but he is also a born trader. I see him conducting 
business right away in the bazars of Bengal. I have 
come across him in Burma and Assam. The trade of 
Swat pours down the line to Nowshera. Some day the 
trade of Afghanistan will descend the other Frontier 
lines. As people trade together they get to know each 
other better, and every mile of Frontier railroad 
that we build will turn out ii the long run to be a  ^
link in the chain of friendship as well as of peace.
Raleigh, op.cit.t pp. 425-26.
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Besides, the Government tried, as far as possible, to employ tribal 
labour on the communication projects in order to keep the tribes­
men busy and quieb. This afforded a valuable inducement to their 
good behaviour as was done by Hardinge1 s Government in 1912-13*
The roads and railways opened up new avenues for trade not 
only in Afghanistan but also in Dir, Swat, Bajaur, Tirah, Kurram
■j
and Waziristan. The Frontier Province, so far as the commerce 
was concerned, mainly depended on its external land trade. Situated 
as it was across the historic trade routes, the province linked 
the tribal territory and the markets of Afghanistan and Central 
Asia with India. The important routes of trade from Afghanistan 
were the Khyber pass to Peshawar, the Peiwar-Kotal to Kurram and 
Kohat, and the old Gomal route to Deraj at. The caravans laden with 
merchandise and passing through these routes were registered near 
the entrances of the passes. Improved and new roads in the area 
facilitated the flow of passenger and goods traffic. For instance, 
the new Murtaza-Wana road, it was reported, was increasingly be­
coming popular with the Powindahs (nomad merchants). Some of the 
affluent among them were even travelling in tumtum (carriages drawn 
by horses). Similarly the Wowshera-Dargai railway became highly 
popular with the tribesmen of Swat. When in 1901 the line was opened
R^eports on the External hand Trade of K.W.F.R., 1901-02, 19O7-O8. 
^Administration Report of P.W.D. N.W.F.P., 1905-06, p.p.
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for traffic, "the platforms were soon three feet deep in grain*1
and the tribesmen were uclamouring for more room for their
produce1*. Five years later, in April 1906, when Minto visited
Dargai, the inhabitants of Sam Ranizai requested the Viceroy
for a daily return service between Dargai and Mar dan and the con-
2version of the line to broad gauge. Minto accorded his acceptance
to the first request, but the conversion of the line to broad gauge
had to wait because it was not urgently required on political and
military grounds. Nevertheless, by 1906 the passenger traffic on
the railway had increased sixty per cent and the goods traffic
3had more than trebled since 1901. The overall external land trade
with Afghanistanjtribal territory and between Kashmir and Hazara
also registered a steady expansion and this increase, in part,
was attributed to the extension of road and railway facilities
4as would appear from the following figures:
Year Imports Exports
Rs. Rs.
1901-02 8,760,325 14?514,475
1910-11 9,442,108 24,778,790
1920-21 19,156,717 39,128,262
1E. ¥. C- Sandes, The Military Engineers in India, vol. II, p.157.
2Extract from the Dir, Swat and Chitral Political Diary for the 
week ending 15th April 1906, I.P.P.P., November 1907, vol. 7672,
Proc. Nos. 57-61.
3Dephty Secy., Govt, of India to Deane, 22 June 1906, Secy., Govt, 
of India to Deane, 25 January 1907, Deane to Secy. GSvb, of India,
12 April 1907, Deputy Secy., Govt, of India to Deane, 29 October 1907, ibid.
^Report on the External Land Trade of N.W.F.P., 1901-02, p.2;
Gensus of India, 1921, N.W.P.P., p.26.
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It is, however, doubtful if the increase in trade caused 
any corresponding increase in prosperity at the populace in the 
Frontier Province. A statement made in 1911 referred to this as­
pect in the negative. It ran thus;
It was observed many years ago that the advent of 
the railway on the left bank of the Indus had 
lessened the importance a^ trade centres of the 
towns of Dera Ismail Khan District; and similar 
causes appear to have had the same effects else­
where in the Province. The railways have facili­
tated the carriage of merchandise far iato India.
It has always been the custom of the Powindah 
traders from the west to carry their goods to long 
distances beyond the Indus; the railways have 
given a great impetus to this tendency, and while 
the amount of trade as registered at the frontier 
stations has largely increased, there has been no 
corresponding rise in the importance of the markets 
of the Province; for goods, instead of being sold 
in them, are carried further and further afield 
to be disposed of.I
Census of India, 1911, N.VMF.P.. p.32.
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Chapter V 
THE LAND RBVMUE APMXKXS TRATIOh
To the British administratari the most striking feature of 
all Indian land systems was the absence of absolute private property 
in land and the presence everywhere of communal shares in the pro­
duce of the soil. The classic English pattern of landlord, tenant
farmer and landless agricultural labour was replaced by the Indian
k
pattern of the grain leap in which ruler, officials, zamindars, 
cultivating ryots and village servants all had a customary share.
In the Frontier districts this communal property, not so much in 
the soil perhaps as in its output of crops was particularly clear, 
though with the one difference that only at intervals ms a ruler 
^ able successfully to demand a share in the tribal property.
The most notable features of Pathan land tenure, then, was 
that it was based on a strong sense of territorial right which was 
collective, while providing for the separate enjoyment of the in­
dividual family share in the land. The first important feature of 
the Pathan tenure was taqsim or the division of newly conquered 
tracts among the tribes, their clans and sub-sections.
... the possession of a separate tract by each tribe 
was pareelled out into blocks and held separately by 
different clans or sections of clans. Thus, there were 
tappas representing the lots of different main sub­
divisions of a tribe and estates consisting of blocks 
of land in each tappa alotted to different sections 
or khels. Inside the estates were Icandis or tarafs
24 4
representing .the minor sub-divisions of tiles© khds, 
generally the different branches of what was originally 
the same family, while inside each kandi each indivi­
dual proprietor had his share or bakhra. Bach bakhra 
was not, however, represented by a single compact plot 
of land, for to osecure an equality of distribution 
each kandi was subdivided mto wands according to 
the nature of the soil or facilities for irrigation, 
and each share was represented by a field or fields 
in each wand which usually ran the whole length of 
the block.I”
The main allotments of territories were originally made by tribal
chiefs, while the further sub-divisions of land were effected
/ \ 2 by the various sub-sections of tribes (khels) themselves. The
tagslm in the Peshawar district, for example, was associated
with the name of Sheikh Mali of the Akazai clan, who was the chief
3mulla of the Xusufzai tribe.
According to tribal custom some portion of land was set 
apart for the purpose of common grazing (shamil at). The individual 
share of the shamil at was called in am. The tribal land was called 
daftar, and the individual having a share in the daftar was known 
as a daftari. In Dir and Swat the status of a daftari was con­
sidered very important, because the very membershjp in the tribe
V Administration Report of the |QqV°3> *l’3.
2B. H. Baden-Powell, The Indian Village Community, p. 250.
3H. R. James, Settlement Report of the Peshawar District, 1965* p*33*
E* G. G. Hastings, Report of the Regular Settlement of the Peshawar 
District. 1878, pp. 85-7*
The taqsim took place about 1530 A.D. Olaf Caroe, The Pathans, pp. 181-4* 
In the Hazara district the original distribution of tribal land was known
24 5
was based on the holding of that title, A man, who ceased to
*>e a daftari Has no longer entitled to be called a Pathan",
but became a "fakir, without a voice in village or tribal 
-|
councils". The Pathan clans had not only their general terri­
torial boundary which they were prepared to defend resolutely as 
a body, but also every clansman had an indefeasible right to a 
certain share in the territory.
The second interesting but very complicated feature of 
Pathan land tenure was the custom of periodical redistribution 
or exchange of all tribal lands by the casting of lots - the 
custom being locally known as vesh or Ichasanye. The practice 
was originally intended to remedy the defects of the first dis­
tribution of land, idiich was "admittedly imperfect", and to keep
up a common interest in the land and the "feeling of a sort of
2general clan ownership". It no doubt reflected the jealous and 
democratic nature of the Pathans, and was an attempt to seek equal­
ity by ensuring the enjoyment of the better lands by turn and to
as wirasat or inheritance, the owner being called waris or in­
heritor. See E, H. Waoe, Report of the Land Revenue Settlement 
of the Hasara district, 1868-74. p. 109.
A. H. McMahon, and A, D. 0, Ramsay, Report on the tribes of Dir, 
Swat and Baiaur, 1901. p.21, 0.0., vol. 703. J. M. Spain,
The Pathan Borderland, pp. 81-2,
astings, op.cit., p.85.
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1
check "the development of leadership hased on economic power1*.
These exchanges of land were done both among the different sections
of a tribe and among the different members c£ the same sections at
fixed intervals* The system involved
no mere adjustments of possession according to 
shares, but complete exchanges of property between 
one group of proprietors and another, followed by 
division among the proprietors of each group,
Nor were these exchanges and distributions confined to the proprietors
of a single village. The tribe, and not the village, was in many
cases the true proprietory unit, and the exchange was made between
the proprietors residing in one village and those of a neighbouring
village. In some cases land alone was exchanged; in others the
2exchange included houses as well as land.
In the course^of time the vesh system fell Into desuetude.
This may be attributed in part to the overriding of Pathan traditions 
by foreign rulers such as the Sikhs, in part to the fact that in such 
districts as Dera Ismail Khan ot Haaara the Pathans formed only 
twenty nine and ten per cent respectively of the total population, 
and in part to the greater availability of land as more and more 
forests were cleared. However, the system was still found during 
the first regular settlements in I8 6 8 - 8 0 in the Tank tahsil of Dera
■)
Spain, op.oit.* p.84.
2B. H. Baden Powell, A Manud. of the hand Revenue Systems and Land 
Tenures of British India* p.405, f.n.
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Ismail Khan, the Upper Miranzai of ICohat district, in the Marwat
tahsil of Bannu and in some Peshawar villages, though in a
languishing form. In the tribal territories of Dir, Swat, Bajaur
and the Utman Khel country, indeed, the system was found existing
with "little or no change" as late as 1901."*'
Tribal custom allowed khans (chiefs) and maliks (leading
men) as a rule to claim no more land than their fellow tribesmen;
they had no "territorial revenue", only their personal share of
the tribal possession. Originally the khans and maliks were, in
fact, no more than leaders of the tribesmen in war and their agents
in dealing with others; they possessed influence rather than
2power, which lay in the .iirga or tribal council. The priestly
classes, mullas and sayyids, were allowed no share in the tribal
daftar. However, since their services were considered indispensable
to the community, some portions of the oommon land, called seri,
were assigned to them. Sometimes such assignments were also made
to important khans to enable them to meet the expenses which their
position warranted. But the grant of the seri land was not always
"a matter of unselfish generosity", for they were
as a rule lands on the border between two communities, 
disputed lands, and lands which for some reason or 
other would be difficult to hold except by those whose
■l
McMahon and Ramsay, oo.cit., p.21; Administration Report of U.W.F.P., 
1901-05, p.14; Baden Powell, Village Community, on.cit., p.255.
2rbia.. p.245-
248
strength, religious status etc. both enabled them 
to hold such lands in peace and also to form useful 
buffers for the rest of the community.
The maliks and khans might receive some recognition of
their responsibilities iithe form of seri land, but otherwise
they were on the same footing as the other full members of the
tribe, the daftaris. Each daftari cultivated his own share in
the tribal land, paying "no tribute, or share of the produce to
anyone". Uhat he did contribute was his obligatory participation
in all tribal defensive and offensive operations, in accordance
2 ,
with the decision of his ,jirga.
Besides the full tribal members, Pathan villages contained 
dependent cultivators, called fakirs and also village servants, 
menials and artisans d^io held land rent free in return for the 
service to the tribe in peace and war. There were also hamsayas 
(neighbours) who were dependent cultivators occupying bandas (hamlets) 
on the outskirts of tannas. These men held lands on condition 
that they would assist the tribe to whom the lands belonged in re­
pelling the raids of rival tribes. Such hamsayas could not claim 
a share by descent within the tribe, but could in this way be given
pseudo-daftari status. Only the daftari, of course, had a voice
3
in the tribal council.
1
McMahon and Ramsay, op.cit., p.21; Olaf Garoe, op.cit., p.182.
2H. R, James, Settlement Report of the Peshawar District, 1865» 
para 296.
Baden Powell, Village Community, op.cit., p.255; Gazetteer of the 
Peshawar District. 3897-8. p.158.
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Under the Durrani and Sikh rule the position* khans and 
maliks in the tribal society was strengthened as a result of 
their individual ambition and prowess and the official recognition 
given them by the rulers. The Durranis and the Sikhs gave the 
khans and maliks large tracts of land on lease at fixed sums, 
leasing it to them to reimburse themselves from the revenue col­
lections they made. The Sikh revenue system was based upon the 
principle of dealing not "with the people but with the chiefs"; 
the Sikhs "did not collect land revenue but exacted tribute" from 
the chiefs. Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and parts of Dera Ismail Khan 
were actually "tributary areas". Hashtnagar in Peshawar, for 
instance, was assigned to one Sardar Sultan Muhammad Khan Barakzai.
In Bannu the tribute levied on local maliks was "never paid ex­
cept under compulsion". The more powerful khans took possession 
of the waste lands set aside for common pasturage. Sometimes they 
appropriated the lands of those tribesmen who had left the country 
or died childless. Sometimes they even overruled the old tribal 
division of land, "becoming virtually owners of the whole of the 
land". The khans and maliks did not personally cultivate their 
lands but handed them over to tenants such as fakirs and hamsayas
on condition of the latter1s pledge of assistance against rival
1khans and maliks.
■j
J. M. Douie, The Punjab Settlement Manual (thirdl edition), pp. 73-4;
S.S. Ball, British Policy towards The' Punjfah. 1844-9, London University 
unpublidled Ph.D. Thesis, 1963, p. 205; G. A.Barron, Settlement Report of 
the Kohat district, 1900-1905, p.7; Gazetteer of the Peshawar District. 
1897-8, pp. 156-9; J. M. Spain, op.cit., p.83.
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The Sikhs usually collected the tribute in kind, the rates 
being one-half of the produce on irrigated lands, and from one- 
third to one-eighth on unirrigated lands. Besides, they imposed 
numerous cesses and vexatious dues. In Hazara the Sikhs destroyed 
the proprietory rights of the old land-owning community, the 
warises, and claimed the entire area as belonging to the state.
The warises and their tenants were treated alike, being allowed 
to hold their land at the will of the State and on condition of 
paying the full rent which was in theory one half of the gross 
produce, but in practice it varied in different taluks.
The blurring oi the lines of the old tribal structure of 
landholding which occurred under the Durranis and Sikhs continued 
after the annexation of the Punjab in 1849 by the British. The 
successful imposition of a state demand upon the independent tribes 
had necessarily given the khans and maliks who were made responsible 
for the apportionment and collection of tribute the appearance of 
super landholders. The movement towards a landlord-tenant relation­
ship fitted British predispositions and was to continue. However, 
in the peculiar circumstances of the Frontier districts, questions 
of tenures and agricultural usages were not raised for some consider­
able time: the immediate problems were those of assessment and
Barron, op.cit., p.7; James, op.cit., para.325.
2Wace, op.cit., pp. 110-11.
25 1
collection.
2
The districts were first put under summary settlements 
which were very light and no regular settlement, in the district 
was carried out for many years because it was considered “in- 
expedient,t.^  It was no^intil 1868 -1880 that the first regular 
settlements of the frontier districts were undertaken.
Settlement operations required, first, the framing of a 
record of rights in land and, then, the making of a fair assess­
ment of land revenue, for this an accurate map of each village 
was needed indicating the position and boundaries of each field.
This was accomplished through a systematic survey of the fields.
The survey parties, while engaged in their operations, encountered 
many difficulties, for instance, on the Waziri border in Bannu 
they had to be escorted by militia and to sleep in outposts, while 
the local Babbu Khel at first refused to let them enter their 
lands unless a promise was given that the demand for land revenue 
would not be increased. One survey party without escort was “-sur-
rounded, robbed and stripped naked in broad day light, and then 
4allowed to gon. Owing to these difficulties and to the general
Report on the Land Revenue Administration of the Punjab and its 
dependencies. 1871-2, pp. 103-4.
2Summary settlement consisted of “fixation of a preliminary amount 
of revenue, pending a more exact adjustment and pending arrangement 
for a survey and record of rights.11 The hand Systems of British India, 
vol. I, p.304. In the Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Bera Ismail IChan and 
Hazara districts, there were two, four, two, three and two summary 
settlements respectively beti*een 1847 and 1858.
Bouie, op.cit., pp. 22-3*
4&azetteer of the Bannu Bistrict, 1883-4, p.179*
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reluctance of the Pathans to furnish the settlement officers
with accurate Information, the Survey operations during the
first regular settlements could not he satisfactorily carried out
1in all parts of the frontier districts.
The Survey operations resulted in the production of village
boundary maps (Hakshi Thakbast), field maps (Sha;}ra-Kishtwar) and
a register (iChasra) showing for each field the name of its owner
and the person who cultivated it, its lineal dimensions and extent,
2the class of land it contained and the crops grown.
The next step was the determination of the rights of differ­
ent individuals in the soil with the object of fixing the land 
revenue. In fact, in the first regular settlements, the framing 
of the record of rights in land was considered much more important 
than assessment of land, because
the result of one operation was permanent and for 
all practical purposes final; the result of the 
second was temporary and remediable.
The settlement officers were armed with judicial powers for de­
termining the titles in land which were in 1 very confused and doubt- 
ful condition**. The settlement officers took great pains to make
•i
R.I.R.Giancy, Pinal Report of the Second Regular Settlement of the 
Bannu District, 1903-07, p.28; H.D.Watson. Review of the Pinal 
Report of the Second Regular Settlement of the Hazara District, 
1900-07. by the Revenue Commissioner, p.10.
2Douie, op.cit., pp. 112-3.
3Ibid.. pp. 53-4.
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the people understand that
this was the time to establish all their rights and 
claims; and to prevent any man raising the ob­
jection that he did not know what was recorded about 
his status, because of his inability to read.l
The result of these operations was that the five classes of men 
holding permanent proprietory rights in land were recognised: 
full proprietors, Malik Kabza (owners by possession), superior 
proprietors, inferior proprietors, and occupancy tenants. A 
full proprietor was one who cultivated bis land himself and 
was entitled; to the full produce of his land. He had unrestricted 
power of alienating the land, subject only to the right of pre­
emption vested in the co-sharers, relations and other proprietors
2of the Kandi or village. In the Hazara district, the rights of 
the old proprietory class, the Harises, who had suffered during 
the Sikh rule, were in most cases reaffirmed and recorded in 
the first regular settlement in 1868-74. A Malik Kabza was often 
a Kamin or Hindu who had acquired his proprietory right in land 
by purchase or by favour of the government. He occupied an inter­
mediate position between the full proprietor and a tenant. He was 
not a member of the co-percenary body of the village proprietors 
nor could he claim any share in the common land of the village. He
H.CJ.Gr.Hastings, Review of the Regular Settlement of the Peshawar
District, by Deputy Commissioner Macnabb, 29 September, 1876, p.ii.
2Report of the Administration, N.W.ff.F., 1901-05, p.15.
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was responsible for the payment of the revenue and cesses on his
1holding and could alienate his land. A superior proprietor
was one whose interest in land was confined to the receipt of
quit rent; sometimes he had 1 arge rights in waste land, though
he had little control over cultivated holdings. The inferior
proprietor was often the actual cultivator but sometimes he
2
might have tenants under him. Where superior and inferior pro­
prietors co-existed, the policy was to make the settlement with 
the latter.
The tendency was to commute the superior rights 
where they were established dnto a moderate per­
centage on the revenue and to take engagements from 
the inferior proprietors and allow them the sole 
management of the estates.5
The area under dual owner ship was not great except in Kohat, where
the Khan of Xeri had been recognised as the superior proprietor
of hie tahsil after its settlement of 1885-1895. He was allowed
to collect certain dues fixed by the Government from the tenant 
4of his tahsil.
Simultaneously with the question of rights of owners in the 
land came that of the rights of tenants as well. Two classes of 
tenants - occupancy tenants and tenants-at-will were recognised.
■i
Wace, op.cit.. pp. 118, 121; Bowie, op.cit., pp. 66-7, 88.
^Administration Report of the N.W.ff.P., 1921-22, p.20.
*5"Douie, op.cit., pp. 58,60.
^Administration Report of the H.W.ff.P.» 1901-03., P*l6;~ ft, A.Barron, 
on.cit.t pp. 6, 70-73.
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The former were known as Maurusi or hereditary tenants, and the 
latter as Ghair Maurusi or non-hereditaiy. The occupancy tenants 
were those who paid noient beyond the share of the State revenue 
demand and the village cesses and had continuously remained in 
possession of their land for twenty years or more. They had a 
right to hold their land so long as they paid the fixed rent. A 
tenant-at-will, on the other hand, was a tenant from year to year. 
His rent was determined by agreement between himself and his land­
lord. He was liable to ejection at the end of an agricultural 
year in pursuance of a notice of ejection issued by a revenue 
officer on the application of a landlord.'*'
The status of tenants in all the frontier districts, except 
Hazara, was first officially determined by the Punjab Tenancy Act
XXVIII of 1868, *" In the Bera Ismail Khan district tenants like
2
butemars and lathbands acquired permanent rights In land by 
bringing waste lands under cultivation. In the Hazara district the 
determination of tenants1 rights \... necessitated a special re­
gulation. Captain Wace, the settlement officer of Hazara, pointed 
out that if the Punjab Tenancy Act (1868) was applied to Hazara 
many tenants who were fairly entitled to occupancy rights would 
be excluded from such privileges, and that the Act would “degrade
■i
Baden Powell, A Manual of the hand Revenue Systems and Land Tenures 
of British India, op.cit., pp. 426-7.
2
Butemar and lathband were tenants who acquired permanent rights in 
the land by clearing it of jangul and by embanking fields. Tucker, 
ope cit., p.106.
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them to a position of insecurity lower than they have ever pre­
viously occupied”. Wace strongly advocated that the occupancy 
rights of the tenants in the district should he protected:
proprietors of Hazara are, as a class, lamentably 
deficient in those principles of generosity and 
fair dealing without which their investment with 
unlimited powers over their tenants could only 
result in the material degradation of the t enantry 
and ill fame to the Government that permitted it.
The tenantry of Hazara are a very numerous body, 
and have prospered greatly -under our rule; they 
are a thrifty set, well-off, contented, and well- 
disposed to our rule. To cut off from them the pro­
tection of the state which they have hitherto en­
joyed, would immediately and materially lower their 
present prosperity, discontent them with our rule, 
indefinitely retard much promising agricultural 
improvement, and destroy a cardinal element of the 
stability of our revenue*1
Accordingly, a Special Regulation (5 of 1873) was passed which
gave a broader interpretation to the term “occupancy right” than
2that given in the Punjab Tenancy Act. The Regulation conferred 
the right of occupancyon every tenant who either himself or through 
his predecessor had continuously occupied his holding from a period 
earlier than the summary settlement of 1847.
As regards assessment of land JHie policy in the frontier 
districts was the same as in the Punjab. Two methods of assessment
Wace, op.cit., pp. 124-7.
2Watson, op.cit.. p. 18. The Punjab Tenancy Act of 3868 was replaced, 
later by the new Punjab Tenancy Act of B87. Similarly, ihe Hazara Re­
gulation of 1873 was also revised and a new regulation called the 
Hazara Tenancy Regulation 13 of 1887 was passed which determined the 
status of tenants in the Hazara district.
Wace, op.cit., pp. 126-7; Watson, op.cit., p.18.
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were introduced at the time of the first regular settlements: 
fixed cash assessment and fluctuating assessment. Under the 
former, which was introduced in all the frontier districts ex­
cept some parts of Dera Ismail Khan, the state demand was fixed 
for the entire ;term of the settlement, The fluctuating system was 
applied in the Daman tract of Dera Ismail Khan where the yield' 
of crops was liable to extreme variations due to the uncertainty 
of supply of water. Under this system, land revenue was assessed
at prescribed rates on such crops only as actually matured at 
2each harvest. The assessment of land revenue was based on the 
principle of half-net assets. It was laid down that Government
demand of land revenue should not exceed nthe estimated value of
\
half the net produce (nisf mahsil milkiyat) of an estate, or, in 
other words, one-half cf the share of the produce of an estate ord- 
inarily receivable by the landlord either in money or kind". But­
in fixing the land revenue demand, the policy was laid down that 
the assessment of the frontier districts should be light and the 
border villages should be favourably assessed, because
 ^Daman represents the plain which slopes down from the Sulaiman 
range to the Indus where cultivation is carried on in embanked 
fields by means of irrigation from the hill streams which is^ sue 
from that range. Baden Powell, The hand Systems of British India, 
vol. II, pp. 595-8. See also Chapter Ml/?]5.
2
Administration Report of N.W.P.P.. 1901-05, p.18.
3
Tucker, op.cit, p.165; Gazetteer of the Bannu district, 1885-4, 
p.179•
\
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administrative and political questions on this 
border intimately connected with the land revenue 
demand, and other considerations than tie productive­
ness of the sdl and the resources of the people must 
determine the measure of assessment. From border 
villages the Government expects effective assistance 
in repelling raids and robberies by tribes beyond 
the frontier, and in return for active service con­
cessions may fairly be made in tie settlement. 1
The determination of half-net assets was a laborious process.
The district was first divided into homogeneous assessment circles. 
Then all cultivated land was graded into separate categories accord­
ing to productivity. To estimate the gross produce of each district, 
the average area annually under each crop was ascertained by circles 
and soils. Next, the percentage of the average matured area having 
principal crops and their yield per acre in the circles and differ­
ent kinds of soil was set out. The results attained were then valued
2
at commutation prices. To work out the half-net assets, the rent 
rates were applied to the value of the gross produce of the district. 
Broadly speaking, three kinds of rent were prevalent in the frontier 
districts: batai (kind) rents, zabti (cash) rents and chakota or
kalang rents (consolidated cash rents on a holding). Bents in kind 
were common; cash lents were uncommon in all districts except Hazara 
where twenty-four per cent of the cultivated area was held by tenants
Report on the Land Revenue Administration of the Punjab and its
Dependencies, 1871-2, pp. 66-7.
2
Glancy, op.cit., pp. 15-19; Douie, op.cit., pp. 157-8.
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paying such rents. The rent rates varied from, district to 
district and from tract to tract in each district. For instance, 
in the Daman tract of the Dera Ismail Khan district, the rent 
rates on good Bodhkohi (hill torrent) lands were forty five to 
fifty per cent; on Kalapani (perennial streams of clear water
issuing from hills) lands about fifty per cent, and cn the poorest
2 5Dagar tracts about a thix’d of the gross produce. In the Kohat
district the rent rates were usually half of the produce for abi 
(streams) lands and a quarter for barani (rain) lands.^
In the frontier districts, as elsewhere in the Punjab, for 
purposes of revenue collection, the system of joint village re­
sponsibility whs^intrpducedrihhtaad of the tribal resxxonsibility
5
obtaining Hnder the Sikh rule. The collection of land revenue
was entrusted to a number of lambardars, whowere representatives
of the whole or part of a proprietary community. The lambardars
were usually maliks and other influential men and were allowed a
6
five per cent commission on the actual revenues collected. This
•i
Tucker, op.cit., pp. 90-91; ¥ace, op.cit., p.265; Hastings, op.cit., 
p.166; Gazetteer of the Bannu District, 1885-4, p.89; Gazetteer 
of the Hazara District, 1885-4, p.96.
2
A steep slope like the bank of a river,
■5
Gazetteer of the Dera Ismail Khan District, 1885-4, p.87.
^Gazetteer of the Khcjfct District, 1885-4, p.90.
5Gazetteer of the Peshawar District, 1897-8, p.154.
^Baden Powell, Land systems, vol. II, pp. 285, 741.
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commission was called the lambardari cess.
The terms of the first regular settlements were, twenty- 
five years for Peshawar, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan, and thirty 
years for Bannu and Hazara.
An important feature of the British land revenue administration
of the frontier districts was the large assignments of government
land revenue to the local Nawabs, Khans and other leading men
with a view to attaching the influential to the Government. The
practice was partly inherited from the Durrani and Sikh rule and
partly created by the British themselves, who confirmed many old
grants and gave new grants after the annexation of the Punjab and
after the Mutiny when the general policyof the ^British government
1was to treat liberally all those who had rendered them service.
Before the first regular settlements the ,jagirdars» who were 
’'adepts at the art of rack renting'1, were allowed to collect re­
venue in kind with the result that their exactions bore hard on 
the tenants. In order to protect the latter it was decided during 
the first regular settlement to abandon the practice of assignment 
of revenue in kind. The change affected the ,iagirdars1 pecuniary 
interests as well as their influence and position among the tenants. 
The Government, therefore, made the ,iagirdars some extra cash grants
1
Wace, op.cit., p.277; Tucker, op.cit.t p.255. The assignments to 
individuals of revenue due to the State were called .jagirs and the 
assignees, jagirdars.
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a measure which was justified thus;
... it was found on examination into their 
/jagirdars 7 status, that if their assignments 
were cut down to the letter of the grants they 
held from the British Government, and they were 
to be prohibited from talcing ought from their 
jagirs beyond the bare amount of the Government 
demand assessed thereon, they would be ruined, 
all their influence and power for usefulness 
would be gone, and we should have for our .leading 
men a body of needy malcontents.
The cash grants - a purely British creation - were otherwise 
called ’’political pensions". In Peshawar they were known as 
muwajib. Similar allowances given to the important chiefs of 
the Marwat tahsil of the Bannu district were called Bar at. These 
allowances had been given by the Sikhs, too, but the British con­
verted them from kind to cash. Leading zamindars, lambardars, 
religious families like the sayyids and ulema and sometimes re­
ligious shrines were given revenue-free lands, called muafies, 
within the boundaries of assessed villages. These grants were 
made either for life or for -the term of the settlement. The con­
tinuance of each grant depended on the goo d conduct of its re­
cipient and on proper maintenance cf a religious institution if
2the grant was made towards its upkeep.
"I
Hastings, op.cit., Review of the Peshawar Settlement Report 
by Deputy Commissioner Macnabb, 29 September 1876, pp. 9-10, 
by settlement secy, of the Punjab, 22 January 1877, p.20.
2Wace, op.cit., pp. 277-9; Hastings, op.cit., p. ; Tucker, 
op.cit., pp. 511-3; Glancy, op.cit., p.56; S, S. Thorburn,
Report of the First Regular Settlement of the Bannu District, 3879* 
p.227.
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There were several kinds of Inam or cash allowance made 
to leading men of the frontier districts for political or ad­
ministrative purposes. The lambardars were allowed a fixed re­
muneration of five per cent on their collection, but it was 
considered ”desirable to reward specially the most deserving, 
influential and useful members of this class", and the end was 
achieved by giving the leading lambardars inams in addition 
to the five per cent cess. In Bannu the leading Haziri maliks 
were granted lungi inams, similar inams were given to maliks 
of Peshawar. Then there were sufedposhi inams granted to lambardars 
in the Dera Ismail Khan district. Leading daftaris in the Mobmand 
and Daudzai tappas received daftari inams.^
Villages adjacent to the tribal border and families requiring 
special consideration for services rendered to the Government were 
favourably assessed. This grant of frontier remissions was designed 
to encourage the settlement of tribesmen within British territory 
and to encourage these villagers on the border who were most vulner­
able to tribal raids and who se services as militia levies were
■i
Tucker, P. 1. Khan Settlement Report, op.cit., pp. 514, 554-6;
Glancy, op.cit., pp. 57-8; Hastings, op.cit., p. 300; Gazetteer 
of the Kohat District, . 1835-4;. p. 199; Deane to 8ecy. Govt, 
of India, 6 November' 19&7. I.L.A.P*. (Land Revenue), vol. 7612, 
December, 1907, Proc. Hos. 18-19. The percentage of the gross 
revenue alienated in revenue assignments in the frontier districts 
during the first regular settlement was: Peshawar - 27.6, Hazara ,
29.3, Dera Ismail Khan 34.8, and Kohat both assigned and remitted 
56.65.
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required by the Government for "repelling raids, pursuing raiders,
capturing dacoits or outlaws aid recovering stolen property”.
The concession could he withdrawn wholly or partly upon neglect
of these duties.'*'
The British system of land revenue administration brought
considerable changes in land tenures. The villages were constituted
into Eamindari, Battidari and Bhaiachara .types, and were made
2units for assessment of land revenue. The Vesh system of periodic 
repartition was not recognised because it was again st the spirit 
of the new land revenue j>rocedure. The fixity of tenure which became
Hastings, op.cit., pp. 302-3; Tucker, Kohat settlement Report. 
op.cit., pp. 165-6; Barron, op.cit., p.40; G-lancy, Review of the 
Report, op.cit., p.10.
w w V  I i i iwiiiiwiH^  ■■i.jKiii t r pwiiii * •*.
2In the Zamindari villages "the land is so held that all the village 
co-sharers have each their proportionate share in it as common property 
without any possession or title to distinct portions of it'. and the 
measure of each proprietor’s interest is his share as fixed by the 
customary law of inheritance”. Paftidari villages are " a form of 
joint or landlord village in which the land is divided out on shares 
purely ancestral; here there is a several enjoyment, but the com­
munity is not dissolved”. Bhaiachara villages are those which were 
once"ancestrally shared, but where the shares have been (wholly 
or partly) lost or upset. The term also represents villages 
which were "never shared at all - each man's possession the measure 
of his right". Baden Powell, The hand Systems of British India, 
vol. I, pp. 157-77.
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more possible under the settled Government was further helped 
by the introduction of canal and well irrigation on a larger 
scale giving a great impetus to agricultural improvement. More­
over the framing of the records of rights in land and maps made 
it increasingly hard to adhere to "die -vesh system except in 
alluvial lands where changes were expected due to river action."** 
The Punjab revenue administration treated the Frontier 
districts very differently from the rest of the province, leaving 
them for a considerable period very much as they were untfL it 
became practicable to undertake regular settlements. These when 
concluded naturally brought changes but the people were pacified 
by the light revenue demand. When tie Frontier Province was formed 
in 1901, the terms of the first regular settlements had come to 
an end In four of the five districts. Between 1900 andl908 there­
fore, revised settlements were undertaken in Kohat, Hazara, Bannu 
and Dera Ismail Khan. (The Peshawar district had been resettled 
in 3896-7. ) The Valley xl the To chi Agency and the Kurram
Agency were also brought for the first time under regular settle-
3
ments between 1903 and 1907. The term of the new settlements in 
the four districts and in the Kurram Agency was provisionally
•j
Baden Powell, The hand .Systems of Bi*itish India, vol. II, p. 638.
2.
For the revised settlement of the Peshawar district, see L. ¥. 
Dane, Final Report of the Settlement of Peshawar District, 1898. 
The teim of the settlement was for twenty years.
3There had been only one summary settlement m  the Kurram Valley
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fixed for twenty years and in the Daur Valley for ten years.
II
The second regular settlements sought to adjust the Govern­
ment’s demand for land revenue to the changes "brought about during 
the currency of the first settlements and to rectify the defects 
of the earlier settlements. The revision of settlement necessitated 
the revision of maps and records of rights in land and water in 
almost all districts. The previous maps and records were, in many 
cases, found misleading and inaccurate. Thus, in Hasara, one-fourth
of the old records of the remote and inaccessible tracts had to
1
be discarded during the revised settlement. The unreliability
and inaccuracy of old maps and records were not merely due to
2
the indifference of the local people. In Dera Ismail IQiap-j 
for example, the extraordinary diversity of tenures, the intricate 
system of irrigation, the partition of large areas of common tribal 
lan$L, the recurrence of seasons of drought and scarcity and the 
vagaries of the Indus had rendered the old records out of date. 
Besides, since the first regular settlement in 1872-79 there had 
been frequent sales and mortgages of land, improvements in canal ir­
rigation and extension of cultivation. But the revenue establishment
in 1895-4 which was for ten years. As for the Daur Valley, the 
Government in 1895 collected a tithe of the gross produce which 
was commuted into a payment of Rs. 6,000 levied by means of a 
house-tax.
^Glancy, op.cit., p.28; Watson, op.cit., p. 10.
2
See above, Plp.fcSI'S..
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being ''insufficient and inefficient", had not been able to keep
pace with the rapid changes in the. agricultural conditions and
1
consequently were not in possession of up to date records. There­
fore, during the revised settlements new records of rights in land
2were compiled, and in the new Riwhj-j-Abpashl a very exhaustive 
description of rights in water was given in the hope that in 
future it would help in the expeditious settlement of disputes 
over watex* rights.
The revised settlements effected no changes in the methods 
of assessment except in Dera Ismail Khan where because of its 
extremely precarious irrigation system and the consequent uncertainty 
of cultivation, the ’fluctuating system had been extensively adopted. 
The Government of India were at first not favourably disposed to­
wards its adoption because under this system, as the assessment 
varied annually with the out turn of crops, no maximum limit hi 
cash could be fixed. Moreover, it gave the subordinate revenue • 
officials an "undesirable amount of power", since the assessment 
of revenue depended upon their first-hand reports. In short, it 
was a "retrograde step" and amounted to a "reversion to the methods
1
H. N. Bolton, Review of the Settlement Report of the Der,a Ismail 
district, p. 12; II. D. Watson, ffinal Report .of the Second Regular 
Settlement of the Ilazara district, p.31; R.I.R.Glancy, Review 
of the fflnal re-port of the second-regular settlement of the Bannu 
district. p.11.
2See Chapter VI, -7.
Watson, op.cit., p.36; Bolton, op.cit., pp. 35-6; Barron, op.cit.,
pp. 65-6.
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of native rule”.^  But then, despite their aversion to the
system, the Government of India ultimately relented when Deane
the Chief Commissioner drew their attention to the peculiar
conditinns prevailing in the district. Deane asserted that
there ms no other tract in the Frontier Province or in the
Punjab where the conditions of life were so arduous:
with a rainfall averaging less than 10 and often 
falling short of 5 inches; where for months in 
the hota weather, the bulk of the population has 
to migrate to the river banks, while those who 
remain behind can dunk only once a day and water 
their cattle only every other day; a land without 
shade or water, where the summer heat and the 
winter cold are equally inclement; where the culti- 
vator has no guarantee that he will reap where he 
has sown, it is a wonder to find any agricultural 
population at all.2
Deane attacked what he called the "short-sighted and illiberal
policy” hitherto followed by the Government in matters relating
to revenue administration in the district, The revenue history
of the tract, ;he continued, ms a record of "unsuitable forms
of assessment which broke down in bad years, of frequent but
partial efforts to adjust the revenue demand to the extraordinary
fluctuations of agriculture, of want of system and continuity in
3managing the hill torrent floods on which the success of agriculture
■i
Resolution on the hand Revenue Policy, 16th January, 1902, 
para 36.
o
H. H. Bolton, Review of the Settlement Report of the Dera Ismail 
District» p. 2.
S^ee Chapter Vl 31
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mainly depended. In the circumstances, Deane felt that the 
fluctuating system was the only suitable method of assessment 
for Dere Ismail Khan. ¥ith such strong advocacy from Deane, the 
Government of India had no choice but to accept his recommendations. 
Consequently, in the new settlement ninety five per cent of 
the estimated land revenue of the district was made fully fluctu­
ating. ^
The principle of assessment remained the usual half-net
assets, but the rent rates had shorn a steady upward tendency
brought about by factors such as the growth of population, the
improvement of markets and rising prices. In the Haripur tahsil
of the Haaara district, for instance, rents of tenants-at-will
had risen from one-third to two-fifths of the produce on unirrigated
and from forty-one to forty-five per cent on irrigated land since
the last regular settlement in 1868-74. Similarly, in the Abbotabad
tahsil of the same district the increase had been from thirty-
r*)
eight to forty-four per cent. In the thole Bannu tahsil the rise 
in the rent rates was forty-eight per cent during the new settle-
4ment as against thirty-sis per cent at the last settlement in 1872-8.
1
H. N. Bolton, Review of. the Settlement Report of the Dera Ismail 
Khan district, p.12.
^Ibid.t p.9-
%
W at son, op.cit., Review, p.6.* ■ ■■■m an ■ in ■!nm i i ■ *
G^lancy, op.cit., p.11.
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As a consequence of these rent rises, the xevenue demand based 
upon the half-net asset '.;rule also rose proportionately.
In Hazara district however the Government were faced with 
the problem that the cash rents there were mostly lump sums fixed 
on the individual holdings (cliakota) which could not normally 
be enhanced except by voluntary agreement between landlord and 
occupancy tenant or by a suit in the revenue courts. If Govern­
ment demand was here increased in line with other districts there 
was the prospect that "hundreds of law suits" would be filed by 
the landlords. To avoid tie waste involved in such suits a special 
regulation, Ho. Ill of 1904, was issued empowering the settlement 
officer to adjust the cash rents paid by the occupancy tenants by 
expressing the rents in terms of the revenue. The result was that
the Government could hereafter enhance these rents whenver assess-
1
ments were revised and the general revenue demand increased.
Regulation III gave the revenue authorities considerable 
power, but it did not solve the difficult question of how, in 
the xevision of assessments, to strike a balance between political, 
social and economic advantage. Both political and economic con­
siderations/called for moderation, leniency and caution in assess­
ment, while the changes which had occurred since the time of the
-i
Summary of the Administration of Curzon, Department of Revenue and 
Agriculture, p.62, G.C., vol. 493; Watson, op.cit., pp. 38-41, 
Appendix L, Regulation No. Ill of 1904; H.D.Natson, Gazetteer 
of the Hazara District, 1907, p.110.
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first settlement operations justified an enhancement in the 
revenue demand, For political reasons, the settlement officers 
were reluctant to change the existing "I?deliberately accepted'1 
policy of light assessments because "any marked or sudden
1alteration of that policy would now be felt as a hardship".
They also had to take into account other factors such as the 
general smallness of proprietory and tenancy holdings, the de­
ficiency of agricultural stock, and the burden of debt commonly 
caused by litigation and by extravagance during marriages an d 
funerals. "The Pathan's love of display, gambling, litigiousness 
and the costly luxury of crisis" had ruined many leading families. 
Any enhancement which involved "a revolution in the domestic 
economy1* of the landlord," wrote Glancy, was certain to provoke 
the "most serious resentment" even if the rates imposed were low 
in comparison with those prevailing elsewhere in nothern India.^ 
On the other hand, there was considerable justification for an 
enhanced assessment:
The local conditions bearing on the assessment, prices, 
communications... have been so completely revolutionised 
within the past twenty five years that the old settlement 
is no longer even a guide, though the principles of
W. B, hatson, Review of the Final report of the second regular 
settlement of the .Hazara district, p.7; Baron, op.cit., p.38*T ■ --   _--------------------------------------------------- ---- ' i ■     '  * M'pr*.'  ~"i ~r—ti i  i ■iTiiwiTm
2
Barron, op.cit., p.21.
3SIancy, op,cit., p.19.
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assessment remain the same,
The rise in the value of land, in rents and in food grain prices; 
the increase in the irrigated and cultivated area, and at places 
improvements in the methods of cultivation, the development of 
communications and new markets, and the growth of such supplementary 
sources of income as Government service, all these factors justified 
the abandonment of the old rates of assessment.
The latter arguments won and the new revenue demand was there­
fore considerably increased. In certain tracts and villages it was
2
'•doubled, or even trebled and quadrupled". In the Hazara district 
the revenue demand was increased by sixty-seven per cent over the 
first assessment; in Bannu by sixty-five per cent; in Kohat by 
forty-four per cent; in Hera Ismail Khan by twenty-four per cent; 
in Kurram by 180 per cent and in the Daur Valley by 60o per cent.
The following table shows the exact amount fixed for each district.
1
Barron, op. cit., p. 38.
2R.I.R.Glancy, Review of the final report of the second regular 
settlement of the Bannu district, pp. 9-10.
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. District Demand under New demand as Percentage of
the imposed under the Enhancement
First Settlements' Second Settlements
Rs. Rs.
Hazara 2,94,006 4,91,228 67
Bannu 2,61,366 4,31,258 65
Kohat 1,93,139 2,77,895 44
D.I.Khan 2,72,097 3,18,691 24
Kurram 31,435 88,000 180
Daur Valley 6,000 36,000 600
This drastic enhancement hi the revenue demand was not in 
keeping with the general policy of the Government of India who be­
lieved that any increase in revenue
must be considered from the practical point of 
view, and with reference to the conditions of 
human nature. The State cannot without hesitation 
call upon people suddenly to effect a great
R.I.R.Glancy, Review of the Final Report of the second Regular 
Settlement of the Bannu^ district, p.8; C.A.Barron, Review of the 
Settlement Report of the ICohat Harriet, p.7; H*3).Watson, Review w  
Final Report of the Second Regular Settlement .of the Hazara district, 
pp. 7-8; H.N,Bolton, Review of the Settlement Report of the Dera 
Ismail Khan district, p.9; W.R.H.Merk to Secy, Govt, of India,
11 duly 1910, l.L.A.P. (Land Revenue), vol. 8455, August 1910,
Proc. Nos. 17-19.
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reduction in their domestic expenditure, however 
wfel-1. justified in theory its demand may be.^ *
It became necessary, therefore, for the revenue authorities ”to
ease off1' the burden of enhanced assessment of the application
2
of the principle of progressive assessment. Consequently at the 
time of the completion of the settlements the local government 
sanctioned deferments in Hazara of Rs. 57,596, in Kohat of Rs.17,556, 
in Bannu of Rs. 68,587 and in Kurram of Rs. 16,500 of the enhanced 
demand.^
But these measures of relief were not deemed sufficient by 
the Supreme Government. In their orders on the final reports of 
settlements of the Kohat, Hazara and Bannu districts in 1908, they 
criticised the local government for the insufficient steps taken 
by them to mitigate the effects of heavy assessments. The Supreme 
Government expressed their opposition to nany large and sudden in­
creases of revenue1 in the frontier districts. They asked the local 
government to afford a relief of Rs. 48,000 to the revenue payers 
of the Upper Hiranzai circle in the Kohat district where the en­
hancement of revenue under the new settlement had been enormous.^
Resolutions cn the Land Revenue Policy, 16 January 1902, paras. 55-54.
2
By this method the full amount of the new revenue demand was 
announced to the landowner, but the actual collection of part of the 
increase was deferred for a few years.
Watson, op.cit., p.25; Glancy, op.cit.t p.27; Barron, op.cit., p.41.
^The assessment had been raised from Rs. 7,518 to Rs. 16,000 initial, 
rising to Rs. 24,000 after ten years.
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The local government was also asked to extend the term of settle­
ment of the Hazara district from twenty to thirty years, and to 
grant a relief of Rs. 355,808 to the revenue payers of Bannu.
Deane was instructed to show "more liberality" in the matter of 
deferring enhancements and to submit proposals to the Government
of India for the reduction of assessments in regard to part-icular
1cases of excessive enhancements.
2
Roos-Keppel also commented upon excessive Increase in the
revenue demand, which appeared to him "extraordinary and without
precedent". He believed that popular discontent had not yet erupted
into the open because there were no means of conveying it - "no
press, no bar and no public opinion" - not even rioting, for the
3p»eople knew "that the province is crammed full of troops". In 
the summer of 1904 Roos-Keppel received petitions from the in­
habitants of the frontier districts "complaining of the excessive 
increase in the revenue demand". Por four months - September to 
December - he made on the spot enquiries an the districts as well as
^Secy. Govt, of India to Chief-Commissioner, 30 Hay, 1908, I.L.A.P. 
(hand Revenue), vol. 7895, January 1908, Proc. Nos. 43-4; 8ecy.
Govt, of India to Chief-Commissioner, 4 June 1908, ibid., Proc.
Nos. 45-6; Secy. Govt, of India to Chief-Commissinner, 16 July 1908, 
ibid., vol. 7895, August 1908, Proc. Nos. 22-5.
2Roos-Keppel had taken over from Deane in June 1908.
^Roos-Keppel to Secy. Govt, of India, 10 August 1908, enclosed in 
Minto to Horley, 25 August 1908, H.P., vol. 17.
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in the Kurram and To chi Agencies. He "met in each district at
c-v
every stage, deputations of cultivators begging for relief from 
what they described as a 'crushing impost' " levied on them by 
the Government. Roos-Keppel was convinced of the "genuineness 
and spontaneity1' of these appeals: the very high enhancement,
he said, had, indeed '‘completely destroyed the equilibrium of 
their domestic economy". He felt so strongly about the situation 
that he soon called for the services of Major Rawlinson, the 
late Officiating Revenue Commissioner of the Frontier Province, 
to enquire into the whole matter and submit a report. 1
Rawlinson made a thorough enquiry. He visited Hasara, Kohat 
and Barmu and discussed the subject with the Deputy Commissioners, 
Revenue Assistants and leading men ofthe districts. In Bannu 
R&Wlinson tried to conduct on the spot enquiries into villages 
where the increase in the revenue demand had been excessive.
But having found that the enquiries were taking an inordinately 
long time to complete, he stopped the investigation and prepared 
statements from the revenue records of those villages in Hazara, 
Kohat and Bannu where the total gross new assessment had increased 
by more than the district average of enhancement. Rawlinson!s 
findings led him to conclude that theoretically the enhancements
1
Roos-Keppel to Secy. Govt, of India, 24 April 1909, I.L.A.P.> 
(hand Revenue), September 1909> vol. 8173 > Proc. Hos, 37-8.
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were justified, and the burden of enhancements had been lightened 
in practically all cases by the introduction of deferred or pro­
gressive assessments. Yet, he wrote
whatever the improvements effected during the currency 
of the former settlements, it may be said that as a 
whole communications remain poor, markets are few and 
distant, and the efficiency of ^riculture is not of 
a high level.1
Conditions in general were still harder and more sbrenuous than 
in the plains of the Punjab. Moreover, in the Frontier districts 
the average cultivator experienced "an ever present sense of in­
security" due to his constant exposure to raids and attacks by 
"trans-border gangs of robbers and dacoits" - fears from which 
the average Punjab peasant was immune.
Rawlinson pointed out a further factor - the popular ex­
pectation of general relief excited by the review he and other 
officials were making. Exaggerated stories and rumours were in 
spate and it was commonly believed that all 1he four settlements 
would soon be "favourably revised in toto". A flood of petitions, 
verbal and written, followed, indicating the expectations of the
people. These the Government could neither completely ignore nor 
2fully meet.
£
Memorandum upon the large and sudden enhancements of RQvenue 
at recent settlements in North-West Frontier Province by 
C.B.Rawlinson, 15 March 1909, p.11, X.F.P.P., November 1909, 
vol. 8232, Proc. Nos. 1-9.
‘YCbid., p. 4 .
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In such circumstances Rawlinson recommended ‘'leniency in 
the matter of all assessments", and equal treatment to all the 
districts, because any "marked distinction in treatment between 
the districts concerned will inevitably lesult in heartburnings, 
discontent and jealousies". In elaborating his recommendations, 
Rawlinson examined four ways of granting relief. First, a fresh 
settlement of the districts could be made, but this was a costly 
measure and so undesirable. Second, relief could be limited to 
those villages which were most heavily assessed - a step likely 
to provoke jealousy and discontent. The third possibility was to 
grant an all round vr&duction of revenue of iwo annas in a rupee. 
This, too, was not advisable because it would cause a heavy loss
to the jagirdars. Finally Government could discontinue the col-
2 3lection of the local rate and the lambardari cess. This last
course seemed to Rawlinson the best, for it would afford relief 
to all the revenue payers without distinction. Rawlinsom recommended 
that the Government themselves should provide money to the district 
boards for iiie maintenance cf rural schools, dispensaries and 
roads and also make the payments to the lambardars; this would in­
volve an annual expense of two lakhs of rupees on the part of the
I^bid.
^The local rate was 8.54 per cent of the land revenue collected from 
the revenue payers for the maintenance of village school^, dis­
pensaries and roads etc.
3
The cess was five per cent of the land revenue.
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Government.
Roos-Keppel strongly urged the Government to accept Rawlinson1s 
recommendations. He also suggested that in the Kurrarn Agency where 
people were uthoroughly loyal, reliable and devoted to the British 
RanM the Government should altogether remit the deferred land re-
p
venue. For Tochi, Roos-Keppel proposed an increase of fifteen per 
cent in the Muafis and Inams. The total amount of relief proposed 
hy Roos-Keppel for the four districts and two agencies was 
Rs. 220,400.^
The Government of India accepted Roos-Keppel1s recommendations 
regarding the agencies. They also extended the term of the settle­
ment in the Tochi valley from ten to twenty years. But the recom­
mendations of the Chief Commissioner regarding the districts were 
not accepted. The Supreme Government held that the general abolition 
of local rates and of the lambardari cess throughout the four districts 
would amount to giving a relief to all areas, unnecessary in some, 
insufficient in others. The Government of India therefore decided 
to give relief in individual cases of excessive enhancement in 
the Bannu and Hasara districts and to follow "a somewhat more liberal 
policy" in granting frontier remissions in the Kohat district.
Rawlins on, op.cit.,pp.11-13.
2T?he deferred revenue amounted to Rs. 16,500.
^Roos-Keppel to Secy. Govt, of India, 24 April 1909, I.P.P.P., 
vol. 8232, November 1909, Proc. Nos. 1-9.
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Accordingly the Chief Commissioner was asked to make recommenda­
tions.^
In the meantime Merle had takenfover as the Officiating Chief 
Commissioner. Merk, who was formerly the Financial Commissioner 
Of the Punjab, opened the issue afresh. A careful comparison of 
the frontier districts with the neighbouring districts of Rawal­
pindi, Attoclc and Mianwali in the Punjab, which had been settled 
at the same time as the frontier districts, led Merk to the con­
clusion that
throughout, the tendency was to raise the frontier 
districts far too rapidly, and this quite irrespect­
ive of the powerful ground of political expediency.
Merk suggested outright remission of the deferred revenues in
ICohat, Bannu and Hazara, totalling Rs. 143,339, arid of another
Rs. 75,000 to relieve cases of individual hardships in these
districts which were not covered by the deferments. In addition,
he recommended the lemission of the goat tax in Hazara and the.
date-palm tax in the Tirkha circle of the Bannu district as both
2these taxes had been introduced inthexew revised settlements.
The Government of India accepted Merit’s proposals regarding 
the remission of the date-palm tax and the goat tax; they also 
agreed to remit deferred revenue in Hazara but only to the extent
Secy. Govt, of India to Chief-Commissioner, 23 Sex>tember 1909, 
ibid.
^Merk to Secy. Govt, of India, 18 Fa&uary 1910, I.L.A.P. (Land 
Revenue), vol. 8454, April 1910, Proc. Nos. 19-22.
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of Rs. 13,559. fox* the rest, the Supreme Government asked 
for more detailed and definite information befox^ e agreeing 
to the "large surrender* of revenue proposed1*.'*'
Accordingly, Merk, with the assistance of his Revenue Com­
missioner, and the Deputy Commissioners of Hazara, ICohat and 
Bannu, undertook a detailed scrutiny of the village note books 
and revenue administration papers. After this enquiry, Merk
proposed that a total of Rs. 79,599 he remitted fox'* the Hazara,
2ICohat and Bannu disti’icts. The proposal was accepted by the
Govexmment of India. They also granted, on Merle’s suggestion,
frontier remissions of Rs. 2,205 to the border villages of Teri
tahsil of the ICohat district, and extended the term of the
ICurram settlement from twenty to thirty years. ^  As a result of
these modificatioas in the revenue demand, the percentage of
enhancement in the Hazara, ICohat, Bannu and ICurram districts
4was reduced to 42, 30, 35 and 127 respectively.
Secy.,Govt, of India to Chief-Commx*., 31 March 1910, ibid.
^Meik to Secy., Govt, of India, 11 July 1910. I.L.A.P.(Land 
Revenue), vol. 8455, August 1910, Proc. Nos. 17-19.
^Under Secy., Govt, of India, to Chief Commr., 16 November 1910,
I.L.A.P. (Land Revenue), vol. 8456, November 1910, Proc. Nos. 23-5*
^Merk to Secy., Govt, of India, 11 Jxily 1910, I.L.A.P. (Land 
Revenue), vol. 8455, August 1910, Pix>c. Nos. 17-19.
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In addition to the remissions, the Government also con™ 
tinued their policy of revenue assignments to men of mark and 
influence in the Province. Howeverr, except in Sera Ismail Khan, 
the total amount of assignments was everywhere lower than it had 
been under the first regular settlement.^ In Sera Ismail Khan 
the amount was slightly increased. O’Dwyer, the Revenue Com­
missioner, justified the increase thus:
The liberality shown in the past and the present 
settlements in the matter of assignments have 
borne good fruits. There is no other district 
on the frontier where Government can count on 
such prompt and willing assistance both from- 
Chiefs and'people whether in internal administration 
or in the event of trans-border complications; there 
is no district in which the relations of all classes 
of the people and the local officers are closer and 
more cordial.2
One other policy was adopted to soften the effect of the increases 
in revenue demand. This was to introduce a local element, prefer­
ably Muslim, in the subordinate ranks of the settlement establish­
ment in the districts, formerly the patwaris and qanungos were all 
Hindus from the Punjab; most of them were either moneylenders them­
selves or related to the local Hindu moneylenders; the majority of 
them had acquired lands, profiting by the increasing rural indebted­
ness. The Government strongly disapproved of such land alienation
■J
The percentage of the gross revenue alienated in revenue assignments 
and frontier remissions at the time of the second regular settlements 
was: Peshawar 17.3, Bannu 11.6, Hazara 23.0, D.I.Khan 39.0 and ICohat 
both assigned and remitted 48.0. For comparison see p.
2H.N.Bolton, Review of the settlement import of the Dera Ismail IChan 
district,v p. 11.
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to members of a non-agricultural community. Many Hindu natwaris
and ^anungos were therefore replaced by new ones, mostly local
Muslims, and the change, so the settlement officers claimed,
resulted in the improvement of the character and efficiency of
1
the subordinate settlement establishment.
Ill
An important feature of the land revenue administration 
of the Frontier Province was the application of several legislative 
acts designed to ameliorate the condition of the agricultural com­
munity. Curzon, who held that the Indian peasants "should be the
2
first and final object of every Viceroy's regard", was mainly re­
sponsible for enunciating two important principles on which the 
British land revenue administration came to be based hereafter.
The declared object of the principles was
to save the peasant from ruin by restricting his 
power to alienate the land; and to encourage the 
people to cooperate for the mutual supply of capital 
at cheap and reasonable rates.3
1
Glancy, op.cit., p.35; Watson, op.cit., pp. 4b-7; Bane, op.cit., 
pp. 52-3.
2■ Lovat Fraser, India Under Curson and After, p.148.
^Summary of Quezon's Administration, department of Revenue and 
Agriculture, p.17, G.C., vol. 493.
28 3
Of the several resolutions and acts under Curzon’s rule, 
the Punjab Land Alienation Act (1900), the Land Revenue Re­
solution (1902), the Gooperative Credit Societies Act (1904)? 
the Suspensions and Remissions Resolution (1905), the Resolution 
on takavi advances (1905), land :the Resolution passed in the same 
year regarding the exemption from assessment of improvements made 
at the cost of private capital were the most important. Min to 1 s 
victory was chai*acterised by the "continuance and development" 
of Curzon’s policy.^
These measures were applied to the Frontier Province with 
some amendments to suit local conditions. In bringing about the 
improvement of the lot of agriculturists in the Province, the 
Government had to reckon with the age-old local customs and 
practices associated with the land. There were, besides, political 
considerations dictating restraint on the part of the Government.
The Land Revenue Resolution of 16 January 1902 set the guide 
lines for land revenue administration in the Frontier Province, as 
in other Provinces. The Resolution was an outcome of the famine 
of 1899-1900 which exposed the Government to the criticism of pro­
minent civil servants that "the intensity and frequency of recent 
famines were largely due to poverty caused by over-assessment".
Summary of Minto!s Administration, Department of Revenue and Agri­
culture, p.31, Minto Papers, vol. M 851.
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The Resolution w as a itank exposition and a spirited defence
of the Government * s land revenue policy. It averred that
the cause of famine is want of rain and not over- 
assessment, and that improvement in assessment can 
at most he a mitigation, and not a preventive of 
distress.1
It also laid down "liberal principles'', emphasising moderation
in revenue assessment and collection in respect of the progressive
and graduated imposition of large enhancements; greater elasticity
in the revenue collection, and a more general resort to reduction
2
of assessment in cases of hardship. No doubt, while asking the 
government of the Frontier Province to leview their second regular 
settlements, the Supreme Government has taken these principles
■z
into consideration.
The extension of the P&njab Land Alienation Act (1900) to 
the Frontier Province was another wholesome measure. The Act 
was passed to restrict the transfer of land from agriculturists 
to non-agriculturists, such transfer being attributed to the in­
creasing rural indebtedness. Land was passing from the hands of 
old land-owning families to an entirely new : class of men such 
as the money lenders, the townsmen, the successful landlords 
and prosperous merchants. Rural indebtedness was caused by several
■1
Summary of Curzon's Administration, Department of Revenue and 
Agriculture, pp. 17-30, C.C., vol. 493•
2XMd.
S^eeKp.gfa-l),
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factors; the general poverty of the peasants which forced 
them to borrow in poor seasons or for any investment in their 
land, their improvidence and extravagance, their proneness to 
litigation and gambling, excessive subdivisions and fragmentation 
of the soil, and the insecurity of harvests due to lack of ade­
quate rainfall and irrigation facilities. The increased value 
of land, caused by improved communication facilities and the 
opening of new markets, provided a good security upon which to 
borrpw. At the end of the nineteenth century, rural indebtedness 
and the sale and mortgaging of land had reached "an acute stage", 
especially in the Punjab, and the Government viewed it as a 
phenomenon likely to breed not only economic but "social and 
political discontent". The Punjab Land Alienation Act aimed at 
allaying this discontent.
For the purposes of the Act, the population was divided into 
three categories; first, the agricultural tribes the protection 
of whose interests was the prime object of the Act; second, 
statutory agriculturists - "a more or less artificial class" - 
who -were not members of any agricultural tribe but who had "long 
and settled interest" in the land, a class "who were considered 
to have certain prescriptive claims which could not be "ignored
•]
Summary of Curzon's Administration, Department of Revenue and
Agriculture, pp. 22-3, C.G., vol. 493; Vera Aristey, The Economic
Bevelonnent of India, pp. 185-8.
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by the Government" and who included the agriculturist money
lenders and, third, the ’’trading usurers” from whom particularly
the agricultural 'bribes had to be protected. The second and
third categories of people were free to sell or mortgage their
land, without restriction, but the first category of people were
not given this freedom. The ^ ricultural tribes could sell their
land only to an uagriculturist” of the same village or to members
of the same agricultural tribe or group of tribes. They could,
however, mortgage their land to members of the second or third
categories of people provided that the mortgager should "remain
in cultivating possession” of the land at a reasonable rent
or that the mortgagee should hold possession of the land "for
a reasonable time not exceeding twenty years, at the expiry of
which the mortgage debt and interest thereon will be considered 
1
cancelled”.
As in the Punjab, so in the Frontier districts, land was 
passing from the hands of agriculturists to non-agriculturists.
Between the first and second regular settlements, land aliena­
tions in the Frontier districts showed a slow but steady passing of 
agricultural tracts into the hands of Hindu sahukars or money­
lenders. The extent of land acquisition by non-agriculturists 
was considered especially serious in the Dera Ismail Khan district.
■]
Ibid., p.25* Por a detailed study of the Act, see Norman G. Barrier,
The Punjab Alienation of Land Bill of 1900.
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In this district,eleven per cent of the total area under mort­
gage at the revised settlement in 1900-05 had been alienated 
to Hindu sahukars. The total area sold since the first regular 
settlement in the same district was 38b,495 acres of which 
112,680 acres had been sold to Hindus. The percentage of the 
total proprietory area held by Hindus at the first regular
settlement had been 3*4 and this increased to 8.1 at the second 
*1
settlement. In the Bannu district, the total cultivated area 
mortgaged was 99>484 acres, of which Hindu money lenders held 
43>843 acres. In the Kohat district, 5.3 per cent of the culti­
vated area had been mortgaged to money lenders of which two per 
cent had been sold to them since the first regular settlement.
In this district most of the sales and mortgages, however, had
3been confined to landowners themselves. In the Hasara district, 
the total cultivated area under mortgage to non-agriculturists 
was four per cent, while three per cent of the area had been 
sold to them sine© the first settlement. H. I). ¥atson, the 
settlement officer, reported that the Hindu sahukar had not yet
TiT n n m . t iiTVM» -irT fg n ti»i—1 i n.a i i i n i    ■■■ 1 I n  I 1 ■ 1 1 ‘  1 t 11 1 - " i i r I 1 i - ■ t T r T ■ ■■ ■» —  — ■■ ■ «- ■.-» — ■ «■> ..
*1
Ii. N. Bottom, Settlement Report of the Dera-Ismail IChan District,
*1906, p.15.
2R.I.R.Grlancy, Final Report of the second Regular Settlement of 
the Bannu District, 1905-07» pp.11-2.
G^,A.Barron, Settlement Report of the Kohat District, 1900-05, pp.20-21.
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obtained much hold on the land in t he district, but "he was
exhibiting an undoubted tendency to get more and more land into 
1his clutches".
In 1898-99, while the Punjab Land Alienation Bill was under 
discussion, the Government of India had asked for the opinion 
of the Punjab Government as to whether or not the frontier 
districts should be covered by the proposed legislation. The 
Supreme Government were against the idea because they thought 
that
it might be politically inadvisable to extend to the 
Pathans of the trans-Indus measures which might safely 
be applied to the Sikhs and Muhammadans of the cis- 
Indus districts.2
The Punjab government, however, were generally in favour of 
the proposal. In 1899, the Commissioners of Deraj at and Peshawar 
fully discussed the draft Bill and ascertained the feelings of 
the agricultural population in the districts of Hazara, Dera Ismail 
Khan and Bannu where both official and non-official opinion was found to 
in support of the scheme. As for Kohat the scheme was adjudged un­
necessary. In Peshawar, the official opinion was favourable, but 
the local agriculturists1 feelings were not ascertained. In 1900, 
the Act was passed but its extension to the frontier districts
1
H. D. Watson, Pinal Report of the second Regular Settlement of the 
Hazara District, 1900-07, pp. 15-16.
2 ^
Deane to Secy., Govt, of India, 10 October 1903, I.X.A.P. (Land
Revenue), vol. 6824, March 1924, Proc. Wos. 14-5.
o
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was deferred, pending further discussion, on the methods of 
applying the Act to the said districts. The Punjab Government 
had not yet reached their final decision when the question of 
separating the frontier districts from the Punjab arose and 
the Punjab Government decided that the practicability of the 
Land Alienation Act could best be considered by the new admini-
'l
stration when it came into being.
Nearly two years elapsed before the issue was taken up
by Deane. He and 0’Dwyer, the Revenue Commissioner, discussed
the matter afresh with officials and the local agricultural
population. It was found that
as in the Punjab, owners of land were at first 
inclined to regard the proposed legislation with 
suspicion and disfavour, and since its introduction 
in the Punjab they have been jealously watching 
its working.
- „ v- 1 \ *
In Hazara and Dera Ismail IChan, where the population was "more 
Punjabi than Pathan", there was ^nqwna.great preponderance of 
opinion" favourable to the Act. In Bannu, opinion was at first 
averse, but appeared’to be gradually veering round". However, 
in the "purely Pathan" districts of Peshawar and Kohat local 
opinion was uon the whole adverse particularly to any inter­
ference with the freedom of transfer"; here the feeling of
1
Deane to Secy., Govt, of India, 10 October, 1903, on.cit.
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personal and individual ownership of land was particularly
strong. The small peasant-proprietors apprehended that the
restrictions on the right to transfer land to an outsider
"will place him at the mercy of the khans and make them
masters of the situation", while for the well-to-do khans
and maliks complete freedom of transfer of their land m s
the most essential means of living an extravagant life and
1gratifying their "love of litigation”. In such circumstances 
Deane considered it "impolitic to force the Punjab legislation 
on people who are not at present willing or able to appreciate 
its advantages"; he was, therefore, disposed to leewe things 
as they were in Peshawar and Kohat, while recommending the ex­
tension of the Act only to Hazara, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan.
Deane suggested two modifications In the Act. Pirst, instead 
of three classes of people as specified in the Act, Deane would 
recognise only two classes - agriculturists and non-agrieulturiste 
- thus omitting the class designated in the Act as "Statutory Agri­
culturists". Deane felt that it was from the latter community, 
too, that the agricultural tribes needed protection. In the Hazara, 
Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts there ms a strong community 
of agricultural moneylenders, mostly Hindus, who expropriated
^Deane to Secy. Govt, of India, 10 October 1903, op.cit.; Report 
of the Land Revenue Administration of North-West Frontier Province, 
1901-02. pp. 1.4-5.
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the hereditary agricultural tribes as effectively as common 
usurers elsewhere. As Lewis Tupper, the Financial Commissioner 
of the Punjab, wrote in 1901, the "dividing line" between agri­
culturists and non-agriculturists in the frontier districts 
was "really one of religion”, and that the Government should 
"protect the bonafide agricultural tribesmen against the encroach­
ments of the despised kirars /Hindu money-lenders/". In Deraj at, 
especially, it was these "statutory agriculturists" or land­
owning kirars who were regarded as the chief danger to the agri­
cultural community, and it was the expropriation of land to them
i
which Deane wished to prevent.
Secondly, Deane wanted to bring the occupancy tenants within
the purview of the Act, imposing the same restrictions on their
right to sell or mortgage their land as had been imposed on the
agricultural tribes. Between these tribes and the occupancy tenants,
Deane pointed out, there were close ties of religion, race and
vocation. In the three districts of Hazara, Bannu and Dera Ismail
Khan aboxit one-sixth of the total cultivated area was in the possession
2
of occupanc3r tenants. The Government of India accepted Deane's 
proposals, and with these two amendments, the Punjab Land Alienation 
Act was extended to the districts of Hazara, Bannu and Dera Ismail
1 'Ibid.
2Ibid.
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IChan in June 1904.^
The effectiveness of the Act was soon realised. After
three years of its working, it was reported that the gamin&ars
regarded it as a ^real boon". To belong to an a gricultural tribe
was now considered a privilege which was keenly sought after.
The contraction of credit popularised the talcavi advances which
were liberally given. A decrease both in sales and mortgages
was noticed, as was curtailment in the unnecessary expenditure
on social occasions. Later in 1921-22 the Act was extended to
Kohat and Peshawar districts as well, when the Government found
2the local egricultural tribes favourable to the measure.
A necessary corollary to the Punjab Land Alienation Act 
was the amendment of the Law of Preemption in 1905. The new Pre­
emption Regulation was applied to the frontier Province in 1906.
The Regulation provided that the right of preemption, that is, 
the right of a person to acquire agricultural land or village 
immovable property, would be restricted to the members of the 
agricultural tribes alone. The regulation was intended to be 
complementary to the Land Alienation Act. Whereas the main ob­
ject of the Act was to prevent agricultural land passing permanently 
out of the hands of the old established agricultural communities
^Secy., Govt, of India to Chief Commr., 14 March 1904, ibid.;
Secy., Govt, of India to Chief-Ooiiimr., 4 June 1904, I.L.A.P.
(Land Revenue), vol. 6824, June 1904, Proc. Mo. 30.
2 - . - — . •
Report on the Administratidi of Land Revenue in M.W.P.P., 1906-07, 
p.25; ibid., 1907-08, p.24; ibid., 1920-21, p.18; ibid.. 1921-22, 
p. 19.
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of the province, the Preemption Regulation sought to afford
facilities for preserving the possession of such land, when
a member of an agricultural tribe wanted to sell, within the
family or tribe to which the vendor belonged; and when a
member of a non-agricultural tribe sold land which he happened
to have acquired the Regulation was intended "to provide a
means of its ordinarily reverting to the possession of some
1
members of an agricultural tribe".
The Suspensions and Remissions Resolution of March 1905
was put into effect inthe Frontier Province in September 1907-
fhisOpr.oyided for greater elasticity in Government revenue
demand in times of failures of crops. It was, in Curson's words,
an act of compassion on tie p art of the State, but it 
is compassion in a form little distinguishable from 
justice; for it relates to cases and seasons in 
which the cultivator cannot pay his fixed demand, 
because the crops which he has reaped barely suffice 
for his own sustenance, and where, if he is called 
upon to pay it, he can only do so by plunging deeper 
into debt. In such cases rigidity of collection is 
not only a hardship but an injustice.2
The Resolution established two circumstances justifying
suspensions and remissions of land revenue: local calamities
resulting from hailstorms, floods and locusts; and widespread
calamities such as droughts and famines and general failure of
1The Morth-West Frontier Province Pre-Sniption Regulation, Deane
h.A.P. (Landto Secy., Govt, of India, 2 February 1906, I.
Revenue), vol. 7335, July 1906, Proc. Mo. 55
T^. Raleigh, Lord Curzon in India (1898-1905), pp. 157-8
29 4
crops. In case of local calamities the Collector would inspect 
the affected fields and ascertain the damage done to the crops 
in each field before granting any suspension of revenue. There­
after, the Collector would await Government orders for remissions.
In granting suspensions or recommending remissions, the Collector 
should use hLs discretion, talcing into account the wealth or 
poverty of the revenue payer and the extent of damage to the crops. 
Three classes of people might be excluded from the relief offered: 
men who were known to be bad landlords and rackrenters; those well- 
to-do landowners who could pay revenue without jeopardising their 
future solvency, and the capitalists, money lenders and such 
other men who held land as an investment. In case of widespread 
calamities, resulting in the failure of more than half the normal 
crops, the principle of relief was; uthe degree of relief should 
increase, as the field decreases, more rapidly than the degree of 
failure". Suspension or remission of land revenue should follow 
a proportionate suspension or remission of rents payable by the
tenants to the landlords. Mo differentiation should be made between
1
the rich and poor villages and the. rich and poor revenue payers.
Another Resolution prepared under Curzon but passed in May 
1906 under Minto provided that agricultural improvements effected
1 ~Revenue Circular Mo. 31 Suspensions and Remissions of hand Revenue, 
enclosed in Deane to Secy., Govt, of Indit, 2 September 1907, I.L.A.P. 
(Land Revenue), vol. 7612, October 1907, Proc. Mos. 39-4-0,
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by private individuals should,be exempted from the enhancement 
of land revenue, The exemptions were applicable to reclaimed 
waste lands and to privately constructed wells, tanks and einbank-
■i
ments. In the Frontier Province these exemption rules were 
thought sufficiently liberal to provide a "strong stimulus" 
to the improvement of land by private initiative. In regard 
to reclamation of small areas of waste land adjoining cultivated 
tracts the rule was that if these areas had been reclaimed during 
the currency of a settlement, they would not be assessed until 
the term of the settlement had expired. The considerable stimulus 
provided by the rule was seen in the reclamation of 27,000 acres 
of waste land in the Kohat district in just two years from 1904 
to 1906. Similar reclamation had been done in the Hazara district 
as well. Lands whose productivity had increased as a result of 
the construction or renovation of wells, tanks aid embankments 
by the local people were also exempted from assessment for a term 
of twenty years. In cases where private irrigation works had 
ceased to be in use, the Deputy Commissioner had the power to remit 
the revenue from the land under such works. There was also provision 
for relief to individual revenue payers when their holdings deter­
iorated during the currency of a settlement on account of diluvium,
■\
Summary of Curzon's Administration, Department of Revenue and Agri­
culture, pp. 21-22, C.C., vol. 493.
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1deposit of sand, spread of salt and. water-logging.
Two other important measures for agricultural development 
deserve mention: first, the grant of state assistance to ryots 
in the form of takavi loans and second, the provision of credit 
facilities to agriculturists through cooperative credit societies, 
established by an Act of 1904. Tn the North-West Frontier Pro­
vince, as elsewhere in India, the grant of takayi loans to ryots 
was made under the Land Improvement Loans Act of 1685 and the 
Agriculturists Loans Act of 1884. The object of the first Act 
was to grant long term loans for permanent improvements such as 
the sinking of wells, construction of dams and embankments, ex­
cavation of new tanks and channels. The second Act provided 
short term loans for current agricultural needs such as the pur­
chase of seeds, cattle, manure and implements. In 1905 the 
Government of India passed a Resolution which aimed at securing 
"greater liberality, greater simplicity and greater elasticity" 
in the grant of state loans to agriculturists. The Resolution pro­
vided for greater leniency in the Government demand for security 
from the agriculturists. It was left to the local government's 
discretion to remit outstanding instalments or part of them, when 
the worlc for which the loan was granted failed due to unforeseen
-]
Exemption of Improvements in the North-West Frontier Province from 
Enhancement of Assessment, enclosed in Beane to Secy., Govt, of 
India, 13 August 1907? I.L.A.P. (Land Revenue), vol. 7612,
October 3907? Proc. Nos. 29-30; Watson? op. cit., Appendix E.
circumstances. It was also provided that the suspension of
land revenue should automatically involve the suspension of
1tajffiYi payments. In the frontier Province a slow and gradual
increase took place in the amount of agricultural loans advanced 
by the G-overmnent. In 1901-02 the loans amounted to Rs. 142,844 
which increased to Rs. 176,655 in 1910-11 and to 251,4©^ in
2
1919-20 - an increase of seventy-five per cent in two decades.
These takavi loans, though useful, mpe too small in amount 
to make good the contraction of credit caused by the passing of 
the Punjab Land Alienation Act. As a further meastire to restore 
credit, and as a means of imbuing the peasants with the spirit 
of self-help, the Co-operative Credit Societies Act was passed 
in 1904. The object of the Act was, as expressed by Curson, "to 
make the cultivating classes themselves the borrowers", to improve 
their credit, develop their thrift and to train them "to utilise 
for their own benefit the great advantage ... of mutual co-operation". 
The justification for the co-operative movement lay in the fact 
that
Summary of Mjntofs Administration. Department of Revenue and 
Agriculture, p.3, Minto Papers, vol. 1 851.
2Report on the Administration of Land Revenue. H.W.ff.P., 1901-02, p.10 
ibid., 1910-11, p.6; ibid., 1919-20, p.5.
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an isolated and powerless individual can, by 
association with others, aid by moral develop­
ment and mutual support, obtain /in his own de­
gree the material advances available to wealthy 
or powerful persons, and thereby develop him- ^
self to the Stillest extent of his natural abilities.
The co-operative movement in the Frontier Province had a 
very slow beginning. In 1904 the local government decided to 
start a few co-operative societies on an experimental basis.
The societies would be managed by Settlement Officers and Revenue 
Assistants, their object being to provide capital to the peasants 
for the purchase of seeds and implements, for effecting improve­
ment in the land and for enabling them to tide over the difficulties 
resulting from bad harvests. Two such societies were opened in Dera
Ismail Khan. In 1907-08 their total membership was ninety-eight
2
with a total working capital of Rs. 86CU In 1905, it was decided 
to start a society in the Marwat tahsil of the Bannu district, but 
"the opposition by an orthodox Muhammadan population to the talcing 
of interest" was so great that there was doubt about the success 
of the society. It took several years before the co-operative 
movement got a truly sound footing in the Frontier Province. Bjr
Vera Anstey, op.cit., p.190.
v  f paamnMmiipiinaii 1*1111 ■■ ■« *
^Deane to Secy., Govt, of India, 26 October 1906, I.L.A.P. (Land 
Revenue), November 1906, vol. 7336, Proc. ho. 10; Report on the 
Administration of Land Revenue, N.T-f.F.P., 1903-4, p. 15; ibid., 
1907-8, p.15.
^Ibid., 1904-5, p*16.
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1930 the number of societies had increased to 106, the number
of members to 3,325, and the amount of capital to nearly nine
lakhs of rupees. The Government’s attitude to the move-ment was
one of "wise restraint" because
experience had shown tie difficulties that had to be 
overcome in instilling Into the Pathan mind the true 
spirit of cooperation, without which the movement 
could not hope for success.1
The measures so far outlined had all been designed to protect 
the agricultural classes and to provide financial aid for them 
in the pursuit of their own traditional farming. In 1901, however, 
a first move was made to apply the resources of Government to the 
improvement of farming methods when the Imperial Agricultural 
Department was set up in 1901 with an Inspector General of Agri­
culture as Its head. In pursuance of Curzon's "new economic policy
2based on science and efficiency", an Agricultural Institute was 
opened at Pusa in Bihar in 1904 which loafer became a famous centre
5
for 'Agricultural research, experiment, education and demonstration". 
The Provincial Governments were also encouraged to set up agri­
cultural departments and to open agricultural colleges and experi­
mental farms. In 1905, Deane submitted his proposals for an agri-
Census of India, 1951* vol» 3CV. North-West Frontier Province, p. 24.
2Vera Anstey, op.cif., p.165.
Lovat Fraser, India under Curaon and After, pp. 172-3.
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cultural department for his Province under a Superintendent 
of Marins. He also |>i’°posed to establish an experimental agri­
cultural farm in the Peshawar district. Accordingly, an area 
of 100 acres was selected in 1906 for that purpose about ten
•j
miles east of Peshawar, The faim, known as the Tarnab farm, 
served later as a centre of %riculture research in the Province,
To equip the farm with trained staff the Government of India in 
1905-07 granted agricultural scholarships to five frontier stud­
ents, belonging to agricultural tribes, for a three-year training
p
in the Cawnpore Agricultural College; all were later employed 
on the farm.
However, Deane's scheme to establish a Department of Agri­
culture for the Province did not materialise until four years 
later, when in May 1910 Robertson-Brown, the Superintendent of 
the Agri-Herboriculture Gardens of Lahore was appointed the head 
of t he Department. J
Roos-Keppel exliibited a keen interest in the development both 
of agriculture and fruit culture in his province. District officers,
1Report 011 the Administration of Land Revenue, H.W.M.P., 1904-05, 
P-16? ibid., 1905-6, p.15.
2Xbid.. 1906-7, p.13.
L b id . . 1909-10, pp. 10-11.
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political Agents and Extra Assistant Commissioners were urged 
to visit Tarnab farm and to encourage agricultural improvements 
which the Chief Commissioner believed would “appeal more to the
1 npeople thati anything else". At larnab farm were grown improved
strains of cereals imported from Australia and America, and finer
varieties of cash crops like sugar cane and tobacco with the help
of English and American imported implements. The finest varieties
of peaches, plums, apricots, grapes and oranges were brought from
Pusa, Simla, Quetta, Saharaupur and Lahore for the Peshawar,
2
Hazara, Bannu and ICurram farms.
The administration of the Frontier Province began with the 
heavy;’ work of the revised settlements in four frontier districts.
In addition the Dau-ar valley and the ICurram agency were also settled 
for the first time. The resettlement operations removed the de­
fects rfound in the records of rights in land and water of the pre­
vious settlements, while much relief was afforded to the cultivators 
of Dera Ismail IChan by the adoption of the fluctuating system of 
assessment on a large scale. The very large increases proposed in 
Government revenue demand under the revised settlements for a moment 
threatened to make the Frontier Province administration generally
*1
Chief Commisssaier' s remarks on the Agricultural operations in 
H.W.F.P., 10 August 1911, Report on the Agricultural Stations 
in H.¥.F.P., 1910-11.
^Reports on the Agricultural stations in H.W.F.P., 1910-11 - 1919-20.
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disliked. But rethinking over the next few years led to 
smaller and more gradual increases being imposed which did 
secure to Government a modest share in the increased prosperity 
of agriculture but avoided any outcry. A more £)opular change 
was that which came over the subordinate revenue establishment 
when local people, especially the Muslims, were recruited as 
•patwarls and qanungos . (This was an indication, too, that the 
Muslim community was by this point talcing to education.) These 
changes apart, however, the land administration of the Frontier 
Province did not seem very different from that of its predecessor.
The establishment of the Agricultural Department in 1911 was a 
great landmark in the agricultural development of the province.
The personal interest shown by Roos-Keppel did much in popularising 
the newly-established agricultural farms in the districts and the 
agencies alike.
Various measures relating to the land, passed by the Supreme 
Government for India as a whole, or for the Punjab were introduced in 
the Frontier Province but here one tendency was noticeable. New 
measures were applied with more caution than in other areas as a 
special regard has to be paid to local usages, customs and traditinns 
of the people.
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Chapter VI 
IRRIGATION
A review of irrigation in the North-¥est Frontier Province 
in this period pre-supposes a general understanding of the meteorologi­
cal conditions in the province which rendered such irrigation nec­
essary. Except in Hazara, where annual rainfall varied from thirty 
inches in the south to fifty inches in the hill tracts, the annual 
average rainfall in the rest of the province was under twenty inches; 
it was, besides, uncertain and uneven in distribution and liable 
to failure or serious deficiency.^ In such circumstances, culti­
vation had to depend on artificial watering of crops, for which 
there were varied methods: the use of wells, hill torrents, per-
. ennihl. streams and canals.
The Pathan knew the value of irrigation which was expressed 
in a proverb: “there are four good things in life - river water,
wheat on irrigated land, weeping /wet/ rice and the strength of a 
young man." No wonder, then, the Pathan jealously safeguarded his 
rights and interests in water. These rights, like those in land, 
were very old and usually inherited. Originally land for culti­
vation which depended on irrigation was parcelled out among the main
sections of the tribes. Subsequently the amount of labour which the
i
Report of the Land Revenue Administration, N.W.F.P., 1901-02, p.10; 
Province, 1908, p.11.
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different sub-sections of the tribes contributed to the mainten­
ance, improvement and extension of the odlsting irrigation facilities 
determined their shares in-water, These practical shares hardened 
into rights which passed from generation to generation. During Sikh 
rule, in some places, these rights were replaced by new ones based
upon the principle that one who paid kalang or tribute should re-
1cerve the proprietory right to both soil and water. In tappas 
having abundant water supply, shares and rights hi water created 
no problems, but where the water supply was inadequate, the tribes­
men were naturally extremely tenacious in maintaining their rights 
and fought over them. In fact, they looked upon these rights as
distinct from those in land - as "separate properties, being bought,
2
sold and mortgaged independently".
The distribution of water among villages was determined by 
local customs of great variety and intricacy;, t. Investigation into 
water rights during the time of the first regular settlements of 
the frontier districts between 1868 and 1580 provided the settlement 
officers with much information about the local customs and traditions 
regarding the distribution and use of water. In the Bannu district, 
each main canal was the joint property of a number of villages most
1See p. 2.^ 3-
2
S. S. Thorburn, Report of the First Regular Settlement of the Bannu
Dis.triof;'1879? pp. 92-5. H, St. G. Tucker, Report of the Settlement 
of the IQohat District. 1884, p.87.
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of which had a fixed share in the water, whether drawn off directly 
or from a branch channel. Water was distributed into these villages 
by means of sluices, known locally as sitta,^  and the unit of 
measuring the volume of water to be distributed was called a ganda 
or gut a. At the important points of diversion, watchmen (chalweshtas)
were posted to superintend the distribution of water. The cultivator’s 
turn (war) for using the water was regulated by the casting1 of lots 
(isk).^  In the Peshawar district, water was turned from the river 
bed into walas (irrigation channels) by means of dams. The village ss 
near the head of the channel were called sar-i-warakh, while those 
further down were called pain-warakh. The system of division and 
distribution of water in a section (lcandi) of a village was rather 
complicated. The shares (bakliras) of a kandi were first grouped by 
fours; for the irrigation of every four bakhras, a period of time 
(waqat ) was fixed, this being either from sunrise to sunset or vice- 
versa. Lots (pucha) settled the order of turns (naubats) among the 
cul t i vat o x* s 1" war ah f i el d s got the water first and then the pain- 
war akh fields. But if, due to insufficient supply of water, the land 
of a proprietor remained unirrigated, at the next turn of water distri-
•j
A log or board of wood laid horizontally under water across the 
main and branch channels for regulating the flow of water. Thorburn, 
op.cit., p.98.
2Boards or stakes backed by clods, stones and brush-wood used to 
divide the width of the water section. The smaller unit is called 
ganda, and the larger guta. Ibid., p.98.
hbid.
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1bution, be was entitled to claim the water first. In Hazara 
and Dera Ismail IChan similar customs called lara and saroba-paina 
prevailed, according to which, lands at the head of a stream of
2channel were entitled to be watered first and then the lower fields. 
Water disputes usually took place when supply was scanty and when 
people failed to agree to a fair and equitable distx-ibution of 
water anong themselves. It was on such occasions that interference 
by Government officials became necessary. In the Peshawar district 
complaints were mostly made by the propi’ietors of pain-wax*akh vil­
lages against those of the sar-i-warakh villages who were charged
with theft of water and tampering with the heads of the distribut- 
3aries.
When the North-West Frontier Province was formed, of the 
gross cultivated area - 2,639,727 acres - only twenty eight per cent 
was irrigated. Of the total irrigated area about W o  pei* cent was 
under well irrigation, confined mostly to the Swabi tahsil of th$ 
Peshawar distx-ict and the Indus valley in Dera Ismail Khan; three 
per cent of the irrigated area was watered by perennial streams in 
all the five districts; another three per cent was inundated by
©1
-E. G. G. Hastings, Report of the Regulax^  Settlement of the Peshawar 
District, 1878, pp. 271-5*
2
E. G. Wace, Report of the Hand Revenue Settlement of the Hazara 
District, 1868-74, p.312. Gazetteer of the Dera Ismail Khan District, 
1883-4, p.114*
■5
Hastings, op.cit., p.279* Wace, op.cit., p.312. Thorburn, op.cit.,
p.98.
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river floods, mostly in Dera Ismail Khan aid Bannu. The final 
twenty per cent was canal irrigated. With forty per cent of i ts 
area under irrigation, Peshawar was the most fully irrigated 
district.^
The canals of the province utilised the waters of the Swat
and Kabul rivers in Peshawar; cf the ICurram river in the Kurram
agency and Bannu; of the To chi river in the Daur valley (in north
Waziristan) and Bannu; and of the minor tributaries of the Indus
in Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail .Khan. The Indus formed the eastern
boundary of the province for about two hundred miles. The Punjab
government had until 1901-02 done nothing to utilise the waters of
this river for irrigating the frontier districts. The .mountainous
nature of the country along the Indus banks in Hazara and Kohat
and its rapid fall to the river in Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan
2made canal construction difficult.
There were four categories of canals in the frontier districts
under the Punjab administration. The first, the private, ’’unscheduled"
3
canals, existed in all districts except Peshawar. These communal
Administration Report of the North-West Frontier Province. 3L901-rQ3'. 
p.13. Imperial Gazetteer, op.cit., p.152. R.L.R.A., 1901-02, p.10.
^Ibid., p.10.
3 _ _
The North India Ganal and Drainage Act, 1873 and the Peshawar 
Ganals Regulations, 1898, described the unscheduled canals as those 
not constructed, controlled, and maintained by the Government.
P. Hari Rao, The Punjab Acts (Civil, Criminal and Revenue). 1798-1924, 
pp. 441-2, 525-7.
t-
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canals were the "property of the people".'** Some of them were 
very old, like the ICachkot and Chasna canals in Bannu, built 
by the Mangals and Hanni tribes ±x the fourteenth century. These 
canals had always been managed by the representatives of the govern­
ment of the day, whose supervision ensured their efficient working. 
Under the British government, the Deputy Commissioners undertook 
the management of these canals on behalf of the people, ho canal tax 
beyond a small cess to cover the expenses of an establishment of 
Mirabs or supervisors of irrigation was levied on these private 
canals. The irrigators had the customary obligation to furnish free 
labour for the construction of dams (bund) and for silt clearance. 
Bund-making was performed jointly by all the share-holding villages 
of a canal under their tappa-maliks ox* other representative managers* 
Wbenva.oyillage failed to furnish its quota of laboxirers, the m a n a g e r  
levied a fine called Uagha or absentee fee. The receipts from this 
fine were credited to special canal funds in the districts."*
The second category of canals was the "Samindari" or "Scheduled" 
canals of the Peshawar district. Most of these canals had been con­
~*Ibid., 1901-02, p.8.
^Ibid., p.9•
Thorburn, op.cit., pp. 100-02.
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structed by the Mughal or Durrani kardars^ in the sixteenth- 
eighteenth centuries. The most important of these works were 
the Jui Zardad, the Jui Mamun, and the Shahi Mahal. The last named 
canal used to irrigate six villages "forming the privy purse estate 
of Ahmad Shah Abdali". As was the case with private canals in 
other districts, a Hirabi cess was levied on the Zamindari canals. 
These canals were managed from 1898 by the Deputy Commissioner under 
the. Peshawar Canals Regulation (1898).  ^ This Regulation gave 
the Government full authority over the canals, vesting the Deputy 
Commissioner with all powers of control, management and direction 
necessary for the efficient maintenance and working of the canals 
and for fair distribution of their water. The right-holders (those 
entitled to use the canal) were obliged to furnish unpaid labour 
for effecting the annual silt clearance and maintaining the canal 
in an efficient state. The Deputy Commissioner was empowered to 
resolve disputes between right-holders regarding the use of water, 
the construction and the maintenance of the water -courses. But the 
order of a Deputy Commissicner. was not final, because it could be 
set aside by the decree of a civil court. The Regulaticn further
provided that the local government might direct that the cost of
^Governors.
2
L. V/. Dane, Pinal Report of the Settlement of Peshawar District,
1898, pp. 10-11.
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any establishment necessary for the control and management of
the c anal should be recovered from the right-holders. The local
government might also at any tine "suspend or extinguish" any
right to which a person was entitled over any "scheduled" canal;
1but compensation would be paid to the person affected. On these
2canals also a Mirabi cess was levied.
The third category of canals was that constructed with 
District Board Loans. The 1wo examples in this period were the 
Michni Ganal begun in 1896, which took off from the left bank of 
the Kabul river about a mile above Michni fort, and the Shabkadar 
branch canal of 1896 from the right bank of the Swat river in the 
Peshawar district. The Michni canal ms some eight and a half miles 
long and irrigated three thousand six hundred acres. The Shabkadar 
branch canal was one and a half miles long and watered about one 
thousand eight hundred acres. A water rate was charged on the users 
of both these canals.
Finally in the fourth category there were the most important 
canals in the province, those owned and managed by the Punjab Govern­
ment - the Swat, Kabul and Bara river canals in the Peshawar district.^
P^. Hari Rao, op.cit., pp. 526-7.
*T) an e, op.cit., pp, 10-11.
^Ibid., p.11.
‘imperial Gazetteer of India, M.W.F.P.. 1908, pp. 44-5.
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Over all these categories of canals Government exercised 
some degree of control, and in all it had a variety of economic 
and political interests. All Indian Governments, the British in­
cluded, were interested in irrigation because irrigation increased 
the yields and security of agriculture from which governments drew 
a major part of their revenues. The extension of irrigation also 
meant an extension of the settled population of tribesmen with 
a valuable permanent stake in the land who, for that reason, were 
more open to Government control. Both these aspects of irri­
gation were readily grasped by the Punjab Government. Prom the 
first, therefore, it was government policy to maintain, improve 
and extend the indigenous irrigation works, canals especially.
This was an inherited duty, a potent means of extending government 
influence, and also a useful source of practical experience which 
might later be applied to larger works for harnessing rivers and 
constructing canals. Revenues might be increased, waste tracts 
populated, as elsewhere&n India even financial unproductive works 
might be undertaken as an instirance against drought and famine, 
and at all times irrigation works might be used to "pacify" the 
lawless tribes.
The first of the Government's projects to be undertaken, the 
D, G. Harris, Irrigation in India, p.99.
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Swat River canal, very clearly demonstrates the many purposes
canal construction might serve, for though it was designed to
irrigate the dry, unproductive plains in tie north-east of the
Peshawar valley, its construction was also prompted hy political
considerations. It was clearly hoped that
if only members of the Mohmand and other tribes from 
beyond the frontier could be induced, by the promise 
of good crops, to settle peaceably in British terri­
tory, a great step forward would... have been made 
in the direction of promoting habits of industry and 
friendly intercourse among the border clans.-*-
The original plan, made in 1874, was to irrigate an area of 
126,000 acres at a cost of Rs. 1,945,000; the canal was expected 
to yield a return of 10.7 per cent on capital outlay. The con­
struction of the canal posed a formidable problem for the Govern­
ment. It was to pass through ”a most forbidding country” with 
an average annual rainfall of only fourteen inches; it was a 
barren, treeless and unpeopled tract. The tribesmen beyond the 
border raided the work and killed a number of labourers, while 
those within were sullenly hostile. In consequence, armed guards 
had to be employed to protect the working parties at a considerable 
cost, which increased still further when it was found that workers
KZ
had to be given higher wages to restrain them from fleeing. The
1Harris, op.cit., pp. 42-4.
2Gazetteer of the Peshawar District, 1897-8, pp. 348-56.
H^arris, op.cit., pp. 42-4.
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work also suffered interruption daring the second Afghan war
(1878-80). A revised estimate put the cost at Rs. 3,454,810,
and the net area to he irrigated at only 90,000 acres; the net
revenue yield was 3.7 per cent on the capital outla,y. The canal
was classed as a "Famine Relief Protective Public Work1*. It
1was completed in 1885 and proved a great success. "Even the
most optimistic hopes originally entertained of the project fell
2far short of the results actually achieved.u
Contrary to all expectations, it was developed with 
astonishing rapidity and soon became an outstanding 
financial and political success. Cultivation, green 
fields, trees and peaceful villages sprang into exist­
ence; despite its early vicissitudes, a canal has 
seldom been so happily and unexpectedly favoured by
fortune.2
The waste and deserted land (Maira) was brought under cultivation,
resulting in an increase in the production of crops and in popu- 
4lation. Within four years of its completion the canal provided 
water to over 107,910 acres. In 1900-01 the area irrigated in­
creased to 166,031 acres; the percentage of net revenue on capital
5
outlay was 10.41. The tribes also derived such economic benefits 
1
Peshawar District Gazetteer, op.cit., pp. 348-56.
2
Harris, op.cit., p. 45.
■2
Newhouse (Frederick) and Others, Irrigation, p.54.
4Dane, op.cit., p.8.
f;
Report of the Indian Irrigation Commission, 1901-03, part II, p. 5.
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from the canal as made them change their earlier hostile atti­
tude to it, which led the Chief Engineer, J. Benton, to remark 
that the tribesmen "generally regard the canal as wholly bene­
ficial, and are the enemies of any who would seek to injure 
1
canal works".
The Kabul river canal was aiother important state-owned 
project. Its construction began in 1885 and took five years 
to complete. The canal was taken out at the right bank of the 
Kabul river at Warsak; its total length was thirty-eight miles 
of which twenty-three were in the Peshawar and fifteen in the 
Nowshera tahsils. The canal proved highly remunerative. The 
capital outlay on the canal up to 1903-04 was Rs. 501,241, the 
total area irrigated was 29,427 acres, and the net revenue earned 
was Rs. 55,135, or 11 per cent on the capital outlay. The re­
venue management of the canal rested with the Deputy Commissioner
of Peshawar, and its maintenance and the regulation of water
2supply was the responsibility of the Irrigation Department.
The Bara River canal was of the "Scheduled" type. The Bara 
river supplied water for drinking and irrigation purposes, to
3
the Hohmand and Khalil, villages as well as to the Cantonment and
■j
Report by J. Benton on... the Upper Swat Canal, 5 August 1905, 
enclosed in 0*Dwyer, Offg. Chief Commissioner to Secy. Govt, of 
India, 4 September 1905, I.P.W.P. (irrigation), vol. 7349, February 
1906, Proc. Uos. 45-6.
^Peshawar District Gazetteer, op.cit., pp. 357-9.
^There were about 34 villages to the west and south of the Peshawar 
district inhabited by the settled clans of Mohmands and Khalils 
of the Mohmand tribe.
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City of Peshawar. The supply of water often ran short in summer 
whioh gave lise to constant disputes between the Mohmands and 
Khalils and created difficulties for the peoples in the cantonment 
and city as well. In 1897 therefore the weir and upper distributaries 
of a canal from the Bara river were constructed by the Punjab irri­
gation department to ensure a better distribution of the river
1water. Hater rate was levied on this canal.
The formation of the Frontier Province in 1901 coincided with
2the appointment of the Indian Irrigation Commission which con­
sidered. the utility of irrigation as a protection against famine 
and drought. The Commission made certain recommendations regarding 
irrigation in the new province; with the implementation of these 
recommendations, the irrigation development hi the province entered 
upon a new phase.
The Commission emphasised the potential protective and remuner­
ative value of the construction of the Hazarkhani branch of the 
Kabul river canal in the Peshawar district and the Paharpur canal 
in the Dera Ismail Khan district; their construction in the past 
had been held in abeyance 1 solely for want of funds". The Com­
mission also recommended the improvement and development of private
1
Dane, op.cit., pp. 5, 12.
p
Thomas Raleigh, ed., Lord Curson in India, 1898-1905, pp. 456-7;
Lovat Fraser, India under Curzon and After, pp. 299-304.
3
Report of the Indian Irrigation Commission, op.cit., part II, para 55.
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irrigation works in the montane and submontane districts of 
the province, because their collective protective value was 
thought to be considerable. The Commission advised the con­
struction of "long low dams across the beds of the streams as 
they debouch from the hills, so as to form, not storage re­
servoirs, but distributary basins by which flood waters can 
be drawn off into a radiating system of distributaries". The 
Commission'.v1 s recommendations also included assistance to the 
farmers in the foam of takavi advances, liberal grants in aid 
and departmental aivice. To resolve water disputes, the Com­
mission advised that rights in water should be as carefully re-
•i
corded as those in land.
These recommendations were gradually implemented. The first
step taken was to improve the minor canals and to bring them
under closer governmental supervision, management and control;
with this end in view the Punjab Minor Canals Act III of 1905
was extended to the Frontier Province in 1907. Hitherto, as al- 
2
ready observed, the management of the minor,private canals, 
though under the Deputy Commissioners, was in fact based on the acqui­
escence of the people, their local customs and traditions. By and
^Ibid., para 63.
2See pp. 307-lo.
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large it worked well, but its working depended "almost entirely" 
on the initiative of the Deputy Commissioners. An enterprising 
and bold officer could, with the consent of the people, extend 
and improve the irrigation, but one who lacked these quaJ.ities 
aid who wanted' to avoid involvement in disputes ever water 
distribution aid water rights could easily justify his inaction 
by pleading the want of necessary legal powers. Further, the 
increased value of rights in land and water over the years had 
to a great extent altered the attitude of the people. How they 
questioned executive orders in matters of canal administration 
in the courts of law; consequently it was difficult for the 
revenue officers to carry out this administration. In fact, all’ 
the Deputy Commissioners and Settlement Officers had been urging 
the local government for a regulation on the lines of the, Punjab 
Minor Canals Act; even the judicial officers supported this de­
mand because they found it "almost impossible" to decide the cases 
involving complex questions of water rights and disputes. The 
Punjab Minor Canals Act embodied several of the useful provisions
of the Peshawar Canals Regulation (1898)7 but it also went beyond
■\
and was an improvement on the latter. For instance, section 13 
of the Peshawar Canals Regulation had empowered the Collector to
The new act was an improvement in the eyes of the executive; 
whether the summary procedures, untestable in the courts, were an 
improvement in the eyes of all the people might have been more 
open to doubt.
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pass orders on a water-dispute which remained in force until 
set aside by orders of a civil court, while under section 43 
of the Punjab Minor Canals Act, the Collector's order was final 
unless set aside on appeal by the Commissioner, and it could 
not be questioned in a civil court at all. The latter provision 
was considered to be useful in dealing with a population prone 
to ruinous litigation and with cases which could be more easily 
disposed of by the revenue officers than by the civil courts.
Again, the Nagha, or the compensation payable by a defaulter to 
furnish unpaid labour for canals was recoverable under section 
9(2)(e) of the Peshawar Canals Regulation as a fine, while under 
section 68 of the Punjab Minor Canals Act, it could be realised 
as an arrear of the land revenue. On these grounds Deane in De­
cember 1905 urged the Government to apply the Punjab Minor Canals 
Act to the Frontier Province. The interests involved, both cf 
the people and the Government, he pointed out, were considerable.
The total irrigated area under private canals in the four districts 
of Kohat, Hazara, Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu was 432,000 acres, 
of which the latter two accounted for 200,000 and 154,000 acres 
respectively; a special arrangement for the efficient working 
of the private canals In these two districts was, therefore, essential. 
Deane's proposal was accepted by the Government, and in February 
1907 the Punjab Minor Canals Act was extended to the Frontier Pro­
vince with certain modifications to suit local conditions and the
319
lPeshawar Canals Regulation was repealed.
The next step taken by the Government was the improvement
of the Daman system of irrigation in the Dera Ismail Khan district.
The Daman is the upland tract lying between the Indus valley
and the Suleiman range and forming the western boundary of the
district. In this area agriculture depended - and still depends to
some extent - mainly on floods caused by hill torrents (Rodhkohi)
swelled by melted snow or heavy rains in the hills. In describing
this system of irrigation, Captain Crosthwaite, the Settlement
Officer of Daman, wrote in 1903:
... the waters of these torrents are caught by dams 
and spread out through shallow channels into the em­
banked fields. These fields are flooded and the water 
sinks into the ground leaving/rich deposit of silt.
As the lands attached to each series of dams are irri­
gated, the dam is cut and the water sent down to the 
next dam of the series. These torrents, when held 
up by the dams, which are often imperfectly built and 
break under the rush of the fipod-water, continually 
cut out new channels or form ravines, and the whole 
country is seamed by the scour of the flood-water.
Throughout the tract, especially in its centre, there 
are large areas of land which are above the reach of 
beyond the limits of the flood-water. In these culti­
vation is only possible by draining the barren plains 
of their meagre rainfall and collecting the supply 
so obtained in embanked fields.2
Under this system of irrigation cultivation was precarious and
i
Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 22 December 1905, 1 February 1906, 
Secy., Govt, of India, to Agent to Governor-General, N.U.F.P., 12 May 
1906, IIR.A.P. (Land Revenue), vol. 7335, May 1906, Proc. Nos. 19-21. 
Deane to Secy., Govt, of India, 28 November 1906, Under Secy, to 
Govt, of India to Agent to Governor-General, N.W.F.P., 2 February 1907, 
ibid., vol. 7610, February 1907, Proc. Nos. 4-5*
N. Bolton, Settlement Report of the D. I. Khan District, 1906, p.3.
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the condition of the people, naturally, hard.
"There is no tract in the Punjab", Crosthwaite pointed 
out, "or in the North-West Frontier Province, in which the 
conditions of life are so arduous. The extremely precarious culti­
vation depends on the hill torrents. These often fail... Without
the laborious building of dams, the embanking of fields and the
1
construction of many channels and of the 'pals* on the catch­
ment areas, the Daman would lie a desert plain scored with huge
2
ravines with a few "trees in their beds".
Under the Daman system of irrigation the cultivators, in 
keeping with age-old customs, supplied free labour for the con­
struction and repair of the irrigation dams, called sadds, and 
for the maintenance of the channels. Fines (Nagha) were levied 
on defaulters and credited to an "Excluded Local Fund" known as 
the "Saddana or Embankment Fund".
Until 1903 the Government had taken 110 interest in Daman 
irrigation, which led J. Wilson, the then acting Settlement Com­
missioner of the Dera Ismail Khan district, to condemn the Govern­
ment's policy as "short-sighted" and "illiberal". He observed 
that although the income from land revenue depended on the maintenance
1
Pals are flanking embankments forming a continuation of the main 
dam which prevents the water falling back into its old channel.
H^. N. Bolton, op.cit., p.3.
^0'Dwyer to Deputy Eecy., Govt, of India, 3 August 1905, l.R.A.P.,
(Land Revenue), vol. 7334, January 1906, Proc. Nos. 37-9*
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of the many embankments which stemmed the floods caused by
the hill torrents, the Government had
hitherto contributed practically nothing towards 
their cost. They are made and maintained by the 
labour of the people, and even the pay of the 
establishment necessary has been defrayed from a 
fund made up of fines levied from absentees. This 
is not only shabby but short-sighted policy. More 
especially in future where the assessment will pro- 
■ bably be entirely fluctuating, any improvement in 
irrigation will at once result in an increase of 
land revenue, and any falling off in the area irri­
gated will be at once followed by a decrease... It 
is therefore to the pecuniary interest of the Govern­
ment to contribute to the cost of these embankments.
Wilson recommended that the Government should not only defray
the expenses of the irrigation supervisory staff but allocate
substantial llmds towards the construction of new embankments.
This was in keeping with the recommendations of the Irrigation
Commission. He also suggested that a separate fund be created
1for carrying out Irrigation works in Dera Ismail Khan.
But no action was taken on these recommendations until 1905
when 0!Dwyer suggested the improvement of Daman irrigation.
For raising the funds required for the improvements, he recommended
that a revised cess of Rs. 3-2-0 per cent on the land revenue be
paid by the cultivators j the Government and the assignees of 
2land revenue, should also contribute an equal amount. Secondly,
■i
Ibid., cited by O'Dwyer in the above letter.
2
See Chapter V , pjp.nbb-8 -
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O'Dwyer asked for the enlargement of the existing irrigation
establishment at Government cost. Finally, to do away with
the "oppressive1 Nagha system, under which labour for canal
clearance, repair and construction of dams etc. had hitherto
been provided free, O'Dwyer suggested moderate uwages for the
1labourers. The Government of India accepted these proposals.
Improvement was also effected in the irrigation system 
of the Bannu district where the principal means of irrigation 
were the ICurram and Lohra canals. The defective working of 
the Kurram canals was pointed out in 1907 by R,I.R.Glancy, 
the Settlement Officer of Bannu.
"There is no masonery weir," Glancy pointed out, "at
the head of the /Kurram/ valley: wherever possible
water is dram off from the river all along its 
course by means of rough boulder dams which are 
carried away by any heavy flood: many of the canals 
are aligned- on wrong principles: proper escapes are 
not provided: the natural line of drainage is often
blocked and large areas are water-logged. The system 
is faulty .and wasteful in the extreme.1'2
It was in September 1907 that Deane asked for the improvement 
of irrigation wo lies in Bannu, emphasising how heavily the Govern­
ment receipts out of land revenue depended on these works. He
pointed out that m  the resettlement operations of 1903-07,
O'Dwyer to Deputy Bee. to Govt, of India, 3 August 1903, I.R.A.P. 
(Land RevenueJ, vol. 7334, January 1906, Proc. Nos. 37-9- Secy, 
to Govt, of India to Agent to Governor-General, N.N.F.P., 19 
December 1905, ibid.
2R.I.R.Glancy, Final Report of the Second Regular Settlement of
the Bannu District, 1903-07, p.4,
^See Chapter V ,
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the fixed assessment in the district had been raised to
Rs. 2,60,000, that but for the existing private canals as
much as 21,000 acres of land would not have been cultivated
at all, or at the most would have paid a dry rate of not more
than four annas per acre, yielding a total revenue of about
Rs.30,000 for the Government, and that without irrigation Govern-
1ment would have lost Rs. 2,30,000 land revenue from the district.
Deane's conclusion was that the Government should take a greater
interest in the private canals in the district, and that as a
first step a small but experienced engineering establishment
should, be appointed, to maintain the canals in good working order
and to draw up schemes for their improvement and extension. The
appointment of a qualified canal engineer frcrn the Irrigation
Department was asked for because the control and supervision of
the perennial canals in Bannu involved a task
of a delicate and arduous- nature requiring not 
only considerable technical skill but special 
tact and force of character in d.ealing with the 
Pathan population, jealous of their rights and 
apt to resent any ill-considered interference with 
the traditional system of canal management.^
Deane also wanted an enlarged revenue establishment to deal with
the complicated issues of water distribution, the allotment and
1Deane to Secy, to Govt, of India, 2 September 1907, Deputy Secy, 
to Govt, of India to Chief-Ooramissioner, 7 December 1907, I.L.R.P., 
vol. 7612, December 1907, Proc. Nos. 41-6.
2Deane to Secy, to Govt, of India, 26 February 1908, ibid., vol.
7895, Jnne 1908, Proc. Nos. 37-9.
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collection of statutory labour, preparation of lists of de­
faulters, collection of fines and reporting cases of damage 
from deficient or excessive water supply. Deane also proposed 
a uniform cess of 2 /2 per cent cn the land revenue and an 
equal amount from Government to pay for the enlarged revenue
•j
establishment. The Government of India accepted Deane's re­
commendations except the one regarding cess; they were inclined
to abolish the cess altogether, because this would be in keeping
2
with their general policy to abolish cesses wherever possible.
Deane insisted on the retention of the cess and pointed out 
that since the owners of canal irrigated land in Peshawar and 
Dera Ismail IChan were paying a similar cess, its abolition in 
Bannu would make it hard to justify its retention in the former 
districts. Further, the new assessment on canal lands was "ex­
tremely light", and the people could easily pay the cess. More­
over the labour supplied by the people was light as the canals 
were perennial, the population dense and the need for canal clear-
3
ance, owing to the rapid slope of the ground, comparatively slight.
^Deane to Secy, to Govt, of India, 2 September 1907, I.h.R.P., 
vol. 7612, December 1907, Proc. Dos. 41-6.
^Deputy Secy., to Govt, of India to Chief Commissioner, 7 December 
1907, ibid.
r-y
^Deane to Secy, to Govt, of India, 26 February 1908, ibid., vol.
7 8 9 5, June 1908, Proc. Dos. 37-9.
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These arguments had the desired effecti the Indian government
did not press for the abolition of the cess aid they asked the
Chief Commissioner to pay a moderate rate of wages to those
who had the customaiy obligation to provide free labour for
-1
the maintenance of the canals. The arrangement, so Roos-ICeppel
observed later, proved "popular and fairly satisfactory",
2
which justified its continuance.
Deane did not find much opportunity for the improvement of 
minor canals in other districts - Hazara, Kohat and Peshawar.
The hill streams in the three districts were snow fed and perennial. 
In Hazara and Kohat, they were fully utilised bjr a system of 
distributaries constructed and maintained by the people themselves.
In Peshawar, the hill streams were diverted into Government and 
private canals. ^
The recommendation of the Irrigation Commission for takavi 
loans and liberal grants-in-aid to the cultivators for irrigation 
works was also acted upon by the North-West Frontier administration. 
From 1903? sums varying from Rs. 20,000 to 11s. 32,000 per annum were 
spent as takavi loans for the construction of minor irrigation
1
Deputy Secy, to Govt, of India to Chief-Commissioner, 4 Kay, 11 
June 1908, ibid.
2Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 12 July 1916, ibid., vol.
9963? September 1916, Proc. Nos. 38-9.
^Deane to Secy, to Govt, of India, 24 August 1907, I.R.A.P. (FAMINE),
vol. 7617, September 1907? Proc. No. 2.
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works in the Province, 1'hese grants, Deane informed the Indian
government, were much appreciated by the people and a good many
1useful but ’'unpretentious1' schemes were carried out.
In 1906 the Indian government took another important step 
to improve private irrigation works by legislating for the enforce­
ment of the obligation to repair them. All the local governments 
were asked to report, first, on the existing laws and customs 
obliging the landlords and tenants to repair the works, and,
secondly, whether any step was necessary to make such laws and
2customs mox^ e definite so as to enforce such obligations.
For the Frontier Province Deane reported that in the five 
settled districts the obligations of the irrigators had always 
been embodied in a statement called the Riwa.j-i-Abpashi. The 
statement was first compiled for the Peshawar district during the 
settlement of 1892-6, and for other districts during the revised 
settlements (1900-1907). It embodied the customs regarding water 
distribution, construction of new channels, their maintenance and 
repair and silt clearance. Penalties were imposed on land owners 
and tenants for non-performance of their stipulated duties and ob-
1I M d .
p
Govt, of India Circular Ho. 7-40-1 of 9 March 1906, para 5* cited 
in Deane's letter to Seoy. to Govt, of India, 3 August 1906, 
I.R.A.P. (FAMINE), vol. 7341, August 1906, Proc. No. 40.
See Chapter V , p. ,
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ligations which were well-known and accepted. The disadvantage
of working through the Riwaj was that no clear enforcement system
existed. Deane therefore proposed that the Punjah Minor Canals
Act should be extended to the Frontier Province so as to provide
a legal and administrative mechanism for enforcing penalties on 
1
defaulters. Sections 26 and 27 of this Act empowered the local 
government to compel the irrigators to furnish free labour for 
clearing the canals and keeping them in an efficient state. The 
Collectors would frame rules regarding the amoxmt of labour to 
be furnished, the attendance, distribution and control of labourers. 
They would assess and recover the cost of such labour from de­
faulters and spend that money on the upkeep of the canals. These 
provisions, in Deane's view, were sufficient to ensure the effi­
cient working of the private canals in his Province, and no further 
definition of existing irrigation laws and customs was required. 
Deane's proposals were accepted by the Government of India and
in February 1907 these sections of the Punjab Minor Canals Act
o
were duly extended to the Frontier Province.
From improving and extending private irrigation works the 
Frontier Province authorities turned again to the construction of
See pp. 307-10.
^Deane to Secy, to Govt, of India, 3 August 1906, l.R. A.P. (FAMIDE), 
vol. 7341, August 1906, Proc, No. 40.
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State irrigation projects: the Paharpur Inundation Canal, the
Hazarkhani branch c£ the Kabul River Canal and the Upper Swat
Canal in the Dera Ismail Khan and Peshawar districts.
It was in 1900 that the scheme for the Paharpur Inundation
Canal was first mooted by H.W.Gee, the then Deputy Commissioner
of Dera Ismail Khan. Its object was to utilise the Indus waters
for irrigating those parts of the district which had suffered
most in the prevailing drought of that year. For some time no
action was taken by the Puhjab government mainly due to the l-ack
t
of necessary funds. In 1904, J. Benton, the Chief Engineer, Punjab, 
who ms also the Secretary for Irrigation, North-West Frontier 
Province,1' submitted a definite plan for the construction of the 
canal. The tract to be irrigated lay on the west side of the Indus 
and extended from Bilot to Dera Ismail Khan cantonment, an agri­
culturally insecure area, The estimated expense m s  Rs. 7,25,000;
the gross area to be irrigated was 41,588 acres, and the hoped-
3
for return ms 7.03 per cent an the total capital outlay. The 
local government recommended the project as a minor work, but the
After the construction of the new Swat River canal, the old Swat 
River canal (see ppjn-^O came to be known as the Lower Swat Canal, 
and the new canal as the Upper Swat Canal.
2See p.315”'
Note on the pronosed Paharpur Inundation Canal, by J. Benton, 6 March 
1904, enclosed in the letter from the Jt. Secy, for Irrigation, 
N.W.F.P. to Secy. Govt, of India,18 July I9O4, I.P.W.P. (irrigation), 
vol. 684C, December 1904, Broc. Nos. 26-7-
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Government of India found the scheme fulfilled the conditions
1of a productive public work and approved it a s such. In December
1908 a revised estimate put the total cost at Rs. 9?88,282, and
2
the return at 4-33 per cent on the total capital outlay. In 
March 1910 the canal was completed. Its total length, including 
the Hafiskur dis tributary was fifty-seven miles.
An area of about 10,000 acres of Government waste land was 
commanded by the new canal, aid the expected income from this 
tract was regarded by the Government as one of the main assets 
of the canal. InVL907 Deane submitted a scheme for the colonisation 
of the Government waste land; the scheme was based on the Chenab
ty
and Jhelum Colonies System''’ with some modification to suit the
^Ibid.. % Govt, of India to Secy, of State, ho. 34, 1 December 1904? 
ibid.
2
Roos-Keppel to Secy, to Govt, of India, 21 December 1903,
! . W.P. (irrigation), vol. 8185, July 1909, Proc. Mos. 15-7.
3 -
The vast tract of land now irrigated by the lower Chenab, Jhelum 
and Bari Doab canals in the Punjab, ms originally a desert with 
very scanty rainfall. Hence, "it was necessary simultaneously 
with the introduction of irrigation to transport bodily whole com­
munities into the new areas thus opened up." Before the colonists 
arrived, the alignment of the water-course was made, the land in 
each colony tract was demarcated into large and small blocks, and 
land was set apart in the vicinity for grazing and other communal 
pui'poses. These colony villages were thus systematically!- planned.
The colonists who were chosen by British revenue officers had a 
fair proportion of hereditary landlords or occupancy tenants among 
them. The average area allotted to each individual was generally 
from f o rt y to fifty acr e s. Harr i s, op. cit., p p. . B*.' J athar,
and S. G. Beri, Indian Bcohbnlcs, I IPourth edn.), pp. 229-3C.
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local conditions. Deane proposed that Jats, Baluchis, Marwat 
Pathans and other Pathans who were the main agricultural tribes 
of Dera Ismail Khan and known to be the best cultivators in the 
district should be settled on the lands. The new settlers were to 
be grouped according to tribes ’into four or five new villages.
Deane wished that one-fourth of the land should be reserved for 
the Rawabs, Raises (chiefs), .and the leading Khans of the district 
as a reward for their loyalty and past services to Government.
In order to woo the Rawabs and Khans, Deane suggested specia.1 
terms for them; they were to pay nazrana to be realised in in­
stalments and also malikana at the rate of eight annas per rupee 
on the land revenue for the first three years and twelve annas 
per rupee thereafter. However, the peasant colonists would pay, 
in addition to land revenue and cesses, a malikana of twelve annas 
per rupee for the first three years and thereafter a sum equal to 
the land revenue. Deane also proposed that the Khans be at once 
granted rights of occupancy which would pass to their successors 
in accordance with the rules of primogeniture. The peasant grantees, 
on the other hand, would not be given occupancy rights before the 
expiry of five years and only after they had fulfilled certain 
conditions a.s regards cultivation and payment of sums to covei1 
the oost of construction and maintenance of water courses. The 
Government would assist the settlers with takavi loans aid allow 
them full remission of land revenue for the first two harvests
331
reaped after the commencement of the tenancy. However, Deane’s
colonisation scheme could not he put through. The Government
of India withheld their sanction as they had before them a hill
amending the law relating to the colonisation of government waste
lands in the Punjab and wanted the same to be extended to the
2Frontier Province.
In the meantime, the Mahsud problem on the border caused
great anxiety to the Government and various measures to deal
with the situation were examined. One of these was to settle
the Mahsuds on government waste lands an the Paharpur canal which
4would bring about their’future pacification’! To U.R.H.Merk, 
the Acting Chief Commissioner, whose opinion was sought by the 
Government, the scheme appeared feasible and worth trying. Herk 
suggested the settlement of one thousand Mahsud families over 
an area of about ten thousand acres of waste land. The selection 
of the families to be settled was to be entirely left to the 
tribesmen themselves, because any Government attempt at general
1 -Deane to secy. to Govt, of India, 25 January 1907, I.E.A.P. (hand 
Revenue), vol. 7611, April 1907, Proc. Nos. 10-12.
2Under Secy, to Govt, of India to Chief Commissioner, 15 July 1907, 
ibid., July 1907, Proc. Nos. 25-7.
'''See Chapter IX ,
D^epy. Secy, to Govt, of India to Chief Commissioner, 17 November
1309, I.R.A.P. (Land Revenue), vol. 8455, June 1910, Proc. Nos. 2-3.
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selection might cause resentment among those excluded. The 
management of the colony would, however, be exclusively under 
the direct orders of the Chief Commissioner and the Resident in 
Masiristan. The colony would be placed rnder the immediate charge 
of an Extra Assrisbant Commissioner or Tahsildar who would deal 
with its revenue and magisterial administration. As regards the 
conditions of colonisation Merk recommended that for the first 
two years nothing should be charged from the colonists; for the 
next three years eight annas per acre should be levied, and then 
one rupee per acre for the next five years; thereafter the rates 
might be further enhanced. But the assessment should always be 011 
consolidated rates since the Mahsuds were and would remain in­
capable of understanding the British land revenue administration 
with all its complexities of owner's rate,occupier's rate, water 
rate and so forth. The Mahsuds, since they were financially not 
well off, should also be assisted by advances of fifty rupees per 
family. The terms on which land would be given to the Mahsuds 
were, according to Merk, "loyalty to Government, good conduct, 
aid to Government officers in matters relating to the tribe, 
and reasonable punctuality in the payment of sums due on the land”. 
Merk pointed out that if by adopting this scheme, the Cov3rnment 
could pacify the tribe and avoid the need for expeditions into the 
Mahsud country, they would escape "a grievous and deplorable burden
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on India". ^
The Government cf India then asked for the opinions of
2
other officers having an intimate knowledge cf the Mahsuds; 
these opinions were divided. H.B..Fraser, the Deputy Commissioner 
of Dera Ismail Khan, for instance, was not opposed to the scheme 
in principle but he could not at the same time overlook that 
there was some danger in the settlement of the Mahsuds, "a tribe 
of notoriously criminal propensities", in close proximity to 
the peaceful iDopulatimi of the district. Besides, the preferential 
treatment proposed for the Mahsuds in the form of lighter water 
rates and land revenue would cause soreness to the British sub­
jects in Hie district who might feel that misdeeds rather than 
loyalty to the Government were being rewarded. Major G. Dodd, 
Political Agent, Nana, however, welcomed Merk’s scheme as an im­
portant means of 1 securing satisfactory relations" with the tribe.
He suggested that
the land should be made available to the Mahsuds, and 
that no secret should be made of the fact, and that 
the tribe should be infoimed that it would be given to 
them when they had set their own house in order and had 
shorn by their continued behaviour that they were worthy 
of confidence, and when they were capable of allotting 
the land among themselves in such a way as would be 
satisfactory to the whole tribe and would comply with 
Government conditions as to tenancy.
1Merk to Secy, to Govt, of India, 21 December 1909, ibid.
^Depy. Secy, to Govt, of India to Chief Commissioner, 1 June 1910, 
ibid.
Fraser to F.W. Johnston, Offg. Resident, vfaziristan, 2 August 1910, 
ibid., vol. 8725, January 1911, Proc, No. 15.
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Dodd believed that this policy was the "very best" for bringing
1about the pacification of the tribe. P. :,1, Johnston, the
Officiating Resident of Maziristan, "generally agreed" with
both Fraser and Dodd, but added that any preferential treatment
to the Mahsuds would have "bad effect on the tribe as well as
2on the inhabitants of the district". Merk appreciated the doubts 
and qualifications of his subordinates, but held to his own view 
Ihat the Mahsud colonisation scheme ought to be given a trial.
He recommended, that the Mahsud settlers be given "easy terms in 
the outset** but he treated equally with the British subj ects in 
the district in the long run. Merk pointed out that "a clear, 
reasonable and firm policy" towards the Mahsuds would, promote 
better understanding between them and the Government, enabling 
the latter to construct works of public utility like roads, hosp>itals 
and wireless stations in the Mahsud country - as had been done in 
the Khyber and Mai ale and Agencies.
The Mahsud Colonisation Scheme was still hanging fire when 
Roos-ICeppel returned from England in late 1)10. Roos-Keppel did 
not agree with Merk, whose scheme* he condemned as both "tactically 
and morally wrong". The British subjects in the district, Roos-Keppel
1
Dodd to Johnston, 18 August 1910, ibid.
2
Johnston To Secy, to the Chief-Commissioner, 5 September 1910, ibid. 
^Merk to Secy., Govt, of India, 7 October 1910, ibid.
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argued., had a stronger claim on the Government waste land than 
the Mahsuds. Besides,the grant of such land had always heen made 
as a reward for good conduct, not as "bribes to induce unrepentant 
criminals to reform". Roos-Keppel believed that the proposed 
Mahsud colony "would fail, that the ultimate result in improving 
Government’s relations with the tribe would be nil, and that it 
might make things worse than they were now". The colony might 
serve as a base for dacoity, and the loyal British subjects of 
Dera Ismail Khan might resent "the dumping of undesirables" in 
their midst. Roos-Keppel also doubted if the Mahsud colonists 
could be held as a guarantee for the good behaviour of the rest 
of the tribe; the Government could not, of course, punish the
1colonists for the crimes of their brethren in the tribal territory. 
These arguments went home, the Indian government ultimately abandoned 
the scheme and the waste land was distributed among British sub­
jects. 2
The construction of the Paharpur canal necessitated the re­
organisation of the subordinate revenue establishment of the Dera 
Ismail Khan district in connection with hie working of the new 
canal. To avoid the inconveniences of double revenue establishment -
-i
Roos-Keppel to Secy, to Govt, of India, 1 December 1910, ibid.
2Deputy Secy, to Govt, of India to Chief-Commissioner, 10 May 1912,
ibid., vol. 8968, May 1912, Proc. No. 18.
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the ordinary district establishment to assess the land revenue, 
and a special canal establishment for the recording of irri­
gation and assessment of water rates - the two functions, Deane 
proposed, should be discharged by the district establishment 
under the Collector. The latter would be responsible for the re­
venue management of the canal, the assessment of water rates, 
their collection and furnishing of returns to the Irrigation De­
partment. The Irrigation Department would be responsible for 
the maintenance of the canal and the proper distribution of its 
water. To cope with the consequent increase of work of the
1district revenue staff, Deane asked for an enlarged establishment.
All these recommendations were accepted by the Government of India,
and the arrangements worked "fairly satisfactorily" in the period 
2under review.
However, the Paharpur canal did not prove remunerative. In 
1919-20, the total area irrigated amounted to only 20,670 acres, 
while the culturable area originally estimated had been 63,450 
acres. The total revenue realised from the canal in 1919-20 was only 
Rs. 14,193, but the working expenses ran to Rs. 95,609 in that year.
There was, thus, a deficit of Rs. 79,416. The loss was 8.62 per
5cent on the capital outlay, * The unremunerative character of the
Deane to Sec}*-, to Govt, of India, 27 November 1907, Deputy Secy, 
to Govt, of India to Chief Commissioner, 11 February 1908, I.R.A.P. 
(Land Revenue), vol. 7894, February 1908, Proc. Nos. 3-4.
2 • ■Under Secy, to Govt, of India to Chief Commissioner, 11 July 1912, ■ 
ibid ., vol. 8969, July 1912, Proc. No. 8, Roos-Keppel to Under Secy.
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canaL was attributed to two main causes; first, the water rates
were extremely low'** - and for a two fold reason: it was an
inundation canal usable for only about four months in\bhe year -
May to September - and the construction of the canal had resulted in
the closure of two natural channels with which the cultivators
had previously been irrigating their land. As a concession to
these cultivators the water rates on the canal had to be kept 
2
low. Secondly, nearly every year the canal was extensively
breached by hill torrents, putting it out of action at the time
of the ’keenest demand” for water; besides, heavy expenditure
had to be incurred to repair the canal. In 1917-18 the Indus had
k
changed its course to the easpbank. As a result the Bilot creak
from which the canal led off, silted up and eventually the flow
of water into the canal ceased at any but the highest floods of 
4the Indus.
to Govt, of India, 8 January 1913, Under Secy, to Govt, of India 
to Ghief Commissioner, 3 March 1913? ibid., vol. 9219, March 1913,
Proc. Bos. 3-4.
Report of Irrigation, B.W.F.P., 1919-20, Resolution by the Chief 
Commissioner, p.2.
•1
The water rates varied according to circles and nature of the crop;
in 1907, the average incidence per acre was between Rs. 1-2-3 and
Rs. 2-5-0. I.P.W.P. (irrigation), vol. 7625, March 1907, Proc. Bos. 40-42.
^Ibid., vol. 9477, April 1914, Proc. Bos. 6-9.
Report of Irrigation, B.B.P.P., 1917-18, pp. 5-6.
4,Ibid., p. 5.
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The second state project was the Hazarlchani branch of the 
Kabul River canal in the Peshawar district. The need for this 
work which would supply water to the cantonment and city of 
Peshawar and irrigate the Hazarlchani boundary area was realised 
by the Punjab Government in 1895. The lack of funds prevented 
its construction until 1902 when M.R.Field, the Officiating Chief 
Engineer and Secretary for Irrigation, North-¥est Frontier Prov- 
nice, submitted an estimate for the work. A more detailed 
estimate was prepared two years later by J. Benton, Field's 
successor. The area to be irrigated was 11,251 acres. The revenue 
return on the cajjital expenditure was expected to be 5.57 per
p
cent. ~ The project was completed in 1906-07. In 1905-06 the 
canal irrigated an area of 51?668 acres; in 1907-08, 57?652 
acres. In 1905-06, the total revenue assessment of the canal was 
Rs. 1,26,572 and in 1907-08, Rs. 1,41,477.''
Finally, the boldest irrigation scheme of the Government was 
the Upper Swat Canal in the Peshawar district. In the words of 
Harris, nalthough of moderate size," there are ’’few irrigation 
works in India which make so direct an appeal to the imagination
■j
Field to Secy, to Govt, of India, 18 September 1902, X.P.N.P. 
(irrigation), vol. 6575? November 1902, Proc. No. 22.
2Benton to Secy, to Govt, of India, 7 September 1904? i bid., vol. 6840, 
December 1904? Proc. No. 54.
r~r
Revenue Report of the ^anals in H.Vf.F.P. for the triennial period. 
1905-06. to 1907-08, p’.9.
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as this canal.
The great success, both financial-.,’ and political, of the 
2Swat Kiver Canal inspired the Chief Commissioner, Deane, to 
extend irrigation in the Peshawar valley still further. Prom 
time to time various schemes had been put forward with the object 
of enlarging and extending the waters of the Indus for irrigating 
the khadir (low-lying lands near river) lands in Swabi tahsil. 
Early in 1904, Benton inspected the Swat River Canal and was con­
vinced of the necessity of constructing an entirely new canal 
■taken out of the Swat river at a much higher level so as to command 
a much greater area. Benton*s plan was to lead a canal about half- 
a-mile down stream of Chakdarra fort, and to carry it along 
fairly low land, nearly parallel with the Chalcdarra-Malakand road 
to the Malakand pass. There the range of hills would be pierced 
by a tunnel about five hundred feet long. The water on emerging 
from the tunnel would fall into the Dargai Nulla, forming a three 
hundred foot cataract. On reaching Dargai, the madia line (l7 
miles; would bifurcateathe Machai (50.6 miles; and Abazai (18.6 
miles) branches. The Machai branch would follow the foot of the 
hills on the east until the crest of the Swabi plateau commanding
'Harris, op.cit., p.76.
2
See pp. 311-4 •
5Mint o's Administration of India, Public Works Dept., pp. 11-2, 
Minto Papers, vol. M 855.
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the Indus valley and both sides of the Swabi range of hills
was xbached. Then it would split again into the Pehur (14.6
miles), Indus (21.5 miles) and Maira (20.4 miles) branches.
The Abazai branch would go along the foot of the hills to
the west. The entire seventeen-mile main line cf the canal, from
Chakdarra to Dargai, would be located an tribal territory. The
total area to be commanded by the canal was estimated at
448,895 acres, of which 382,000 acres or eighty-five per cent
would be perenially irrigated. The canal would yield a revenue
of Rs. 1,458,057, representing a return cf eight per cent on
1
the total capital outlay of Rs. 18,240,284.
This "exceedingly bold project" had two important features: 
the con struct ion of its headworks and upper reach across the 
frontier in tribal territory, and the great amount of tunnelling 
work "never before attempted in canal construction".
In September 1905, O’Dwyer, who was officiating as the Chief 
Commissioner, observed that the scheme was "financially sound, 
politically expedient and administratively desirable". 0*Dwyer 
quoted beane to emphasise the political advantages of the canal.
1Benton to Secy, to Govt, of India, 30 March 1905, enclosing his 
Note on the proposed Upper Swat Canal, 19 Karchl905, I.P.U.P* 
(irrigation), vol. 7081, Mayl905, Proc. Nos. 16-7- 0!Dwyer to 
Secy, to Govt, of India, 4 September 1905, enclosing Benton's estimate 
for the Upper Swat Canal, 5 August 1905, ibid. , vol. 7349, lpebruary 
1906, Proc’ Nos. 45-6.
^Ibid,
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11A work of tliis sort," Deane had written, "which 
necessarily assists in settling down and bringing 
prosperity to a restless people must have a good 
political effect. It further affords employment 
to a considerable number of trans-border men who 
have poor lands of their own and who come in as culti­
vators. The Swat Canal was originally undertaken as 
a political work. It has paid in. every respect be­
yond expectations, and I see no reason why this new 
canal should not be as successful.
A shrewd Pathan had also advised O'Dwyer in like terms. The Pathan
had said that
were it not for the Swat River Canal the inhabitants 
of our town territory north of the Kabul river would 
have been against us /British/ to a man in the disturb­
ances of 1897. The hold which the ^anal gives us 
/British/ over them /tribes/*, he said, not only kept 
our own people straight, but about 30 to 40 per cent of 
the tribal population on the Peshawar border, whose 
interests were director indirectly bound up with 
the canal,
The result of the new canal, the Pathan assured O’Dwyer, would 
be, in the first place, "to make the possibility of a rising like 
that of 1897 very remote” and should one occur "to keep 70 to 80 
per cent of the tribes to the north of Peshawar" on tee British 
side.^
The attitude of the tribes, so iit was reported, was most 
favourable. Both within the settled districts and in the iribal 
territory people were already beginning to calculate the benefits 
they would derive from the canal, and were eagerly looking forward
^Ibid.
2Revenue forecast of the Upper Swat canal, by O’Dwyer, 30 December 
1904, X.P.W.P, (irrigation), vol. 7081, May 1905, Proc. Bos. 16-7.
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to its construction. Reports had it that the -value of land
in the Babuzai tract below the Malalcand had already risen from
thirty to eighty rupees per acre, and it had become difficult
to purchase even fallow lands. Moreover the maliks of Upper
Swat whose tracts were beyond the scope of the new canal scheme
had begun to approach the Political Agent of Malalcand to get
-]
contracts to supply labour for the canal.
In sanctioning the scheme the Home government advised the 
Government of India to observe "caution and tact” during both 
the construction and subsequent administration of the canal, 
especially in so far as it involved dealings with the frontier 
tribes.^
In June 1907 the construction of the canal began. About 
fifteen months later, in September 1908, it was found that the 
attitude of the tribesmen was not as friendly as had been expected. 
It had been planned that the first half of the eight or nine 
miles of the canal in tribal territory would be carried through 
the Amandarra pass. This, however, ms a sacred place containing 
a large number of graves, and the Khan IChels of Batlchela protested 
against this. Moreover, the Alizai Ilians raised objections to labour
1O'Dwyer to Secy, to Govt, of India, 4 September 1905, ibid., vol. 
7349, February 1906, Proc. Uos. 45-6.
o
'Govt. of India to Secy, of State, 18 January 1906,
I . P . ¥. P . (irrigation), Vol. 73^-9, January 1906, Proc.
N o . ^-6. Secy of State to Govt, of India, 23 March 1906, 
Ibid, Vol.7350* June 1906, Proc.No.36 *
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being imported for the canal.'3' Though Deane had originally-
intended to execute one-fourth of the work by local labour, it
had been found impracticable to do so. The Swat is, through whose
villages the canal would pass, were too well-off to agree to
work as "navvies". They refused to undertake hard work at market
rates of wages. The ,jirgas wanted to supply labour at rates
which were much higher than the Government could give. The maliks,
too, would take large contracts from the Government at favourable
2
rates and then sublet the contracts to other contractors. Besides, 
trouble was also anticipated regarding the existing tribal water 
rights which were likely to be affected by the new canal. Roos- 
Keppel pointed out to Government that these political difficulties 
had not be si given due consideration when the construction of the 
canal started, and that the work had been undertaken without 1 suffi­
cient regard to the feelings and apprehensions of a suspicious, 
ignorant and fanatical people", ^
In February 1909, the Government of India asked Roos-Keppel 
for a fuller report on the attitude of the tribesmen towards the 
canal and the political effect of dropping the project altogether.
1
Minto's Administration of India, Public Works Dept., p.3,
Minto Papers, vol. M 853.
2Benton's Inspection Report on the Upper Swat Canal, 1 January I9O9, 
I.F.P.P. (Frontier), vol. 8513, May 1910, Proc. Nos. 1-17.
3
Minto's Administration-of India, Public Works Dept., p.3, Minto Papers, 
vol. M 853.
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The Chief Commissioner reported that the tribes of Sam Ranizai 
on the south side of the Malakand pass were strongly in favour 
of the canal because it would provide irrigation facilities to 
their lands hitherto unirrigated. The tribes of Ranizai living 
on the northern side of the Malakand pass were also favourably 
disposed towards the canal. But the tribes of Lower and Upper 
Swat resented the construction of the canal, because theyfwould not 
derive any benefit from it while the canal would give the Govern­
ment a further footing in Swat. Roos-ICeppel was against the aban­
donment of the canal project, because it would give a chance to 
the mull as and other influential men of Lower and Upper Swat to 
boast that merely by na show of opposition" they had foiled the 
Government's plan. If the project were abandoned the tribes of 
Sam Ranizai would think that they had been misled by the Government.
In view of these political difficulties, Roos-ICeppel reported, 
the canal authorities had made some alterations ha 'the original 
plan of the canal. A new low-level alignment of the canal was
selected to obviate many of the difficulties of the original line
2and to remove the grievances of the tribesmen. Next, measures
Roos-ICeppel to Secy, to Govt, of India, 1 May 1909, I.F.P.P. 
(Frontier), vol. 8515, May 1910, Proc. Nos. 1-17.
^Roos-ICeppel to Secy.,Govt, of India, 1 Mayl909, I.F.P.P,
(Frontier), vol. 8515, May 1910, Proc. Nos. 1-17.
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had been, taken to obtain the tribal goodwill; some allowances 
and "quarrying royalties" were paid to the ,jirgas ; "very 
liberal rates were given for the land required for the canal, 
this being in many cases taken on a perpetual lease instead 
of, as usual, being acquired outright so as not to affect the
1position held in their villagess by the owners as landlords."
A la age force of khassadars was also engaged to provide employment 
to the tribesmen as well as to make them responsible for the 
safety of the canl works during c o n s t r u c t i o n . 2
The new low level alignment of the canal shortened the main 
channel by about four and a half miles, but involved the con­
struction of a tunnel 11,234 feet long (later known as the Benton 
tunnel) which was more than twice the length originally planned. 
These changes led in December 1913 to revised estimates; the total
cost now stood at Rs. 1,99,24,287 and the return expected at 7.5
3per cent cn the capital outlay. The canal was opened in 1914 
but it was soon found that the capacity of the Benton tunnel was 
much below the full requirements. To remedy this and some other 
defects, the second revised estimate was made in May 1915. The cost
1
Harris, op.cit., p.77.
Slerlc to Secy., Govt, of India, 29 October 1910, Roos-Keppel to 
Secy., Govt, of India, 29 April 1911, I.F.P.P. (Establishment), 
vol. 8770, October 1911, Proc. Nos. 12-18.
3R. Eggerton Pervez, Secy. Irrigation, N.W.F.P., to Secy.to Govt, 
of India, 15 December 1913, Govt, of India to Secy..of State,.
13 August 1914, Secy, of State to Viceroy, Tel. 23 September 1914, 
IKP.N.P. (irrigation), vol. 9477, August 1914, Proc. Nos. 4-7.
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now estimated was Rs. 2,01,29,088 and the revenue return was 6.5
1per cent on the capital outlay.
financially, the canal proved a failure. It was expected 
that in 1919-20, the canal would water ££83,682 acres of land 
but only 138,191 acres or a little less than half of the original 
estimate was irrigated in that year. The gross revenue realised 
as water-rates in 1919-20 was Rs. 5,16,125, but the working ex­
penses of the canal in that year were Rs. 5,24,265, which meant
2a deficit of 0.038 per cent on the capital outlay. The unproductive
nature of the canal was partly attributable to political causes.
In 1914-15 when the Government first intended to levy water rates,
Roos-Keppel advised that only light rates should be imposed on
the tribesmen as a conciliatory measure during the existing War 
3
situation. In September 1915 a permanent remission of canal water 
rates on one thousand acres of land in the tribal territory was 
granted to the tribesmen as a mark of appreciation of their co­
operation in the construction of the canal. This involved the
4Irrigation Department in an annual loss of Rs. 45,000. Moreover
\secy. Irrigation, N.W.P.P., to Secy, to Govt, of India, 10 May 1915, 
ibid., vol. 9966, July 1916, Proc. Efos. 1-4.
^Report of Irrigation, N.W.P.P., 1919-20, p.7.
■^ Secy. Irrigation, W.W.P.P. to Secy, to Govt, of India, 19 June 1915, 
12 August 1915, I.P.W.P. (irrigation), vol. 9755, December 1915, 
Proc. Hos. 3-6.
^Secy. Irrigation, R.W.P.P. to Secy, to Govt, of India, 27- May 1915, 
Asst. ^ecy. to Govt, of India to Chief Commissioner, 31 August 1915,
ibid. , September 1915, ’Proc. Dos. 11-2.
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the Government had to incur some additional expenses for main­
taining special establishments like the khassadars and guards
for the protection of the canal. In 1921 the expense on this
■]
head was Rs. 47,000. The Government of India was not unduly 
disturbed, however, that the canal had proved unremunerative in 
a strict sense. Por, as they put? it, if the canal tended "to con­
vert the turbulent and restless tribesmen of the Swat valley into 
peaceful and contented husbandmen, such a result will have been
cheaply purchased even if the canal were to fail altogether to
2satisfjT- the conditions of a. productive public work”.
The extension of irrigation in the frontier Province resulted 
iii a change in the system of administrative control of the canals. 
At the time of the formation of the province it was decided that 
the state canals in the new province should, be managed, as they 
had hitherto been, by the Punjab Irrigation Department. The Chief 
Engineer and Secretary to the Department would act in like capacity 
for the new province. The new province had only one division, 
called the Kardan d.ivision, with jurisdiction over the Swat River 
canal and the ICabul River canal. The division formed a part of 
the Jhelum circle under the control of a Superintending Engineer.
Note by N, White, Secy. Irrigation, N.W.P.P., on the working ex­
penses of canals in N.W.P.P., 22 June 1921,ibid., vol. 11055, 
December 1921, Proc. Nos. 1-2.
^Govt. of India to Secy, of State, 26 May 1916, Secy, of State to 
Govt, of India, 28 July 1916, ibid., vol. 9966, September 1916, 
Proc. No. 25.
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With the construction of new canals in the Frontier Province, 
considerable change took place in the canal administration. In 
1903 the levenue management of the Kabul River Qanal was trans­
ferred from the Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawar to the Irrigation 
Department of the Punjab Government. In 1905? the Paharpur in- 
undation canal was placed in charge of the canal officers of the 
Jhelum Circle. In 1907, when the Upper Swat Canal Project was 
taken up, a new circle called the Swat River Canals Circle was 
constituted. It included all the Government canals in the Pes- 
awar district. The Paharpur Canal was later transferred to this 
circle.
In August 1911, Roos-ICeppel pointed out that the great ex­
pansion in irrigation in the province had rendered the existing 
administration of the Irrigation Department unsatisfactory. under 
this administration, a closer relation between the Chief Commissioner 
and his Irrigation Secretary was not possible. The irrigation De­
partment received its funds direct from and referred financial
matters direct to the Government of India. But in 1910, by the
1
introduction of the quasi-provincial settlement, the expenditure 
on all the state canals, except the Upper Swat River Canal, which 
remained Imperial, had become provincial. Therefore, for the 
maintenance of financial control, direct relations between the
See Chapter I ? .
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Chief-Commissioner and his Irrigation Secretary were essential.
But the Secretary lived at Lahore, and it was only on the 
’’rarest occasions” that he and the Chief-Commissioner could 
meet. Roos-Keppel therefore proposed that with the exception 
of the Upper Swat River Canal, which would remain Imperial, 
all the other state canals should be placed under the control 
of the Superintending Engineer, Swat River Canals Circle, who 
would also be the Secretary to the Irrigation Department 
of the Frontier Province. His headquarters would be at Peshawar 
so that the Chief-Commissioner could consult him whenever nec­
essary. * However, the Government of India decided not to change 
the existing system until the completion of the Upper Swat River
Canal. It was thus not till 1915 that the Frontier Province ac-
2
quired a separate Irrigation Department.
A survey of the development of irrigation in the period
under review shows certain facts, the most important of them being
the increase in acreage under irrigation. In 1911, the area Irrigated
by the state canals was 225,890 acres, in 1921, 533,809 acres - an
3increase of 47.78 per cent.
1Roos-Keppel to Secy, to Govt, of India, 26 August 1911, I.P.W.P. 
(Establishment), vol. 8977, March 1912, Proc. Hos. 13-16.
2Deputy Secy, to Govt, of India to Chief-Commissioner, 8 February 
1912, ibid.; Secy., Irrigation, H.W.F.P., to Secy, to Govt, of 
India, 28 April 1913, Offg. Secy, to Govt, of India to Chief- 
Commissioner, 23 August 1913, ibid., vol. 9229, September 1913,
Proc. Uos. 10-11, Uhder Secy, to Govt, of India to Chief-Commissioner, 
19 February 1915, ibid., vol. 9736, February 1916, Proc. -Uos. 39-42.
C^ensus of India, 1931, vol. XV, il.U.F.P., p. 23* N .U .F.P. Caw.a l_Repor fc
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But in spite of this fairly progressive development of 
irrigation in the province, there was still room for further 
expansion of irrigation facilities. The table illustrates this.
length of main lines Culturable Average area Date,of
Name
Lower Swat 
Canal
Kabul
River
Canal
Paharpur
Canal
Upper Swat 
Canal
in miles
Main Distrib-
channels utaries 
and
branches
22
60 
42 
144:
187
17
15
306
area com­
manded by 
each in 
acres
irrigated 
in 1919-20 
in acres
150,406
34,915
63,450
309,996
162,073
45,773
20,670
138,194
first
irrigation
1887-88
1903-1904
1907-1908
1914- 151
It is evident that the Lower Swat and Kabul River Canals irrigated 
more area than they had originally been expected to do, but there 
was still room for extension of the area irrigated by the Upper Swat 
and the Paharpur Canals. These two canals involved heavy and increas-
1910-11, Sta,t:isbical Statements, I.A., p.9, ibid., 1919-20, p. 10.
"N.U.P.P. Canal Report, 1919-20, Statistical Statements 1A, p.10, 
Report of Irrigation, N .U.P.P., 1919-20,pp. 1,3,5,7.
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ing working expenses for the Irrigation Department of the Province, 
In 1918-19 the net loss to the Department from the two canals was 
Rs. 4,39,974; in 1920 Rs. 5,08,231; in 1921 Rs. 6,91,331.1
It was mainly due to the implementation of the recommenda­
tions of the Indian Irrigation Commission (1901-03) and the keen 
interest taken by the local authorities of the Province that a 
satisfactory progress in the field of irrigation became possible. 
The development was two-fold; the improvement and extension of 
the private irrigation works and the construetinn of new canals 
by the Government.
The private irrigation systems of the Daman in Dera Ismail 
Khan and Bannu were improved with active financial support from 
the Government. Also for iheir efficient administration, a large 
establishment was created. Moreover, the powers of the Deputy 
Commissioners of supervising, managing and controlling the 
private irrigation works were enhanced in 1907 when the Pun­
jab Minor Canals Act was extended to the Frontier Province.
The local Government constructed the Hazar IChani branch 
of the Kabul River Canal, Upper Swat Canal and the Paharpur 
Inundation Canal. These developments created the necessity of 
a separate Irrigation Department for the Province, which was
1
North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee Renort, 1924, p.42.
established in 1915* The change broke the utter dependence of 
the Frontier Province on the Punjab Irrigation Authorities 
who, in the past, had not been able to pay adequate abtention to 
the irrigational needs of the Province.
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Chapter VII 
EDUCATION
Compared with other provinces of British India, the 
development of modern education in the Frontier province has a 
relatively recent history. With the exception of Burma, the area 
which constituted the Northwest Frontier Province was the last 
acquisition of the British and hence the last to receive the 
benefits of the educational system. Since the regions were out­
lying ; tracts, the Government’s efforts in introducing and ex­
panding education in the territory were more restricted than in 
centrally situated areas. Local prejudice and indifference to 
Western education had a considerable effect in retarding the 
spread of education. The mullas and such other religious men who 
wielded overwhelming influence ai the local population were host­
ile to British schemes of popular education, suspecting them to 
be deliberate attempts at undermining the sacerdotal authority 
and destroying the leligious faith of the population.^ The in­
habitants of the province, proud of their martial character,pre­
ferred ’the sword to the pen”. In fact,the Pathan
•j
Report on popular Education in the Punjab and its Dependencies, 1860-61. 
pp. 41-4; Report by the Punjab, Provincial Committee. Evidence taken 
before the Committee and Memorials addressed to the Education Com­
mission, 1884, pp. 161, 296; Syed Mahmood, A History of Education 
in India (1781-1893). p.164.
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always despised education as fit only for Hindus 
and cowards. He had little need for spelling, 
but much for swordsmanship, and if the Hamsayah of 
an alien creed, whom he employed to look after 
his money matters, cheated him so flagrantly that 
even his ignorant master could not overlook it, 
there was short shrift forihe accountant, and a 
fresh start was made with a clean sheet.1
Two stages can be clearly identified in the educational 
development of the province during the period under review.
The first (190141910) was a period when the system of education 
obtaining in the Punjab was continued in the Frontier districts, 
the educational administration being in the hands of the officers 
of the Punjab government. During these years education made slow 
progress primarily for two reasons: the lack of initiative and
drive on the part of the educational authorities; and the paucity 
of funds - the strings of the Imperial Exchequer were quite 
tight. The local boards did not have enough funds; private 
initiative was not forthcoming and the majority Muslim community 
lacked both the spirit of cooperation and enthusiasm about secu­
lar instruction. The second phase of educational development 
extended from 1911 to 1921. These were years full of promise, 
hope and aotivity; the authorities displayed resourcefulness, 
energy and initiative; funds were available; above all, a clear- 
cut, ambitious programme was laid out, the object being
i
Census of India, 1911« N.W;F.P.t p.176; Census of India, 1921 > 
N.W.F.P.. 177.
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a wide diffusion of free primary education... 
the consolidation and re-organisation of existing 
facilities for secondary education and the en­
couragement of local effort for the extension of
collegiate education on popular lines.T
At the time of the formation of the new province there 
were three kinds of schools; those established and maintained 
by private munificence, endowments and customary gifts of the 
communities; those established and managed privately, but re­
cognised and aided by Government; those managed and maintained 
by the Government through local boards. The existing private 
schools had been set up by the three main communities, the 
Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. The Muslims had their mosque schools, 
maktabs and madrasas. In maktabs, the maul vis and Imama taught 
chiefly the Qur‘an by rote, taking no fees from the pupils. In 
madrasas instruction was confined to the teaching of Arabic and 
Persian. Girls also attended schools where the Qur ‘an was taught
to them by the wiyes of men who were teachers by prof ession. The
Hindus had their pathsalas and the Sikhs their Gurmukhi schools; 
instruction in both being confined mainly to sacred scriptures. 
They also maintained Mahajani schools where commercial instruction 
was imparted to students. In general the private schools were 
beginning to decline, the Government giving little encouragement
i
Annual Report oti Public Instruction in the N.W.F.P. 1911-12, 
p.4; P.P.. 1914, vol. 6 3, Cd. 288, East India, Progress and 
Gondition, p.103.
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1
particularly to those schools imparting only religious instruction. 
In 1901-02, there were 927 private schools in the settled districts 
with 15,636 pupils.^
The aided and the Government schools were divided Into two 
categories, primary and secondary, the latter having middle and 
high classes. Secondary schools were classified into Anglo- 
Vernacular and Vernacular according to whether instruction in 
English did or did not form part of their regular curriculum.
High Schools were all Anglo-Vernacular, while Middle and Primary 
Schools were of both kinds. In the Anglo-Vernacular schools 
emphasis was given to the teaching of English and in the higher 
classes instruction in all subjects was imparted through the 
medium of English. The High Schools ,:, had two classes, the Middle 
Schools three. The primary schools were divided into two cate­
gories, upper primary (having two classes) and lower primary
(haying three). More than half of the school-going children did
3
not study beyond the upper primary stage,
1 . . .
G. W. Leitner, H-jstory of Indigenous Education in the Punjab
since Annexation and in 1882. part I, pp. 2, 10; Report of the
Indian Education Commission. 1884. p.20; Report of the Punjab
Provincial Committee. op.cit..pp. 185S91, 296-303; Review of
Quinquennium Report on Public Instruction in N.W.P.P.. 1897-
1202, p.1.
Report cn Public Instruction in N.W.E.P., 1901-02, p.3.
3 ibicb.- p. Ji .
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The curriculum in the primary schools consisted of reading, 
writing and arithmetic besides some lessons in Geography, Persian 
and Mensuration. The courses of study in the secondary-.schools 
were the same as prescribed for such schools in the Punjab. In 
the Anglo-Vernacular middle schools the curriculum consisted of 
vernacular languages, English, arithmetic, history, geography, 
mensuration, elementary science aid drawing; geometry and al­
gebra were optional. The same course was taught in the Vernacular 
middle schools with the only difference that English did not form
part of the curriculum. The High Schools prepared students for
1the matriculation examination of the Punjab University.' In 1901-
02, there were one hundred and fifty-four primary schools for
boys in the Province, of which one hundred and thirty-one were
maintained by local bodies, sixteen were aided, and seven unaided.
2
These primary schools contained 7,365 pupils. The Province poss­
essed only twenty-eight Vernacular and Anglo-Vernacular middle 
and high schools for boys, of which seventeen were maintained by
local bodies, five- were aided, aid six were unaided. The total
3number of students in these institutions was 5,082.
1
The curriculum in High Schools consisted of English, a classical 
or vernacular or oriental or Western language, elementary math­
ematics, History and Geography. In addition, • there were alter­
native courses in science and commercial subjects.
^Report on Public Instruction in U.W.P.P., 1901-02.p.2.
3Quinquennial Review of Educational Progress in India, 1897-1902, 
Statistical Tables, p.95.
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The Government's grants-in-aid to private schools were 
given partly per capita, the amount of aid p er pupil varying 
according to his instructional stages. Further, schools for 
purposes of grants-in-aid were classed according to the 
standard of instruction imparted in them into excellent, good and 
fair; the better the standard, the more liberal the grant.
Schools with sixitably qualified teachers received more money 
than those with none. The main purpose of the grant-in-aid 
system obtaining in the frontier districts was to encourage 
private enterprise to improve the standard of instruction in
1
schools rather than the expansion of educational institutions.
To encourage primary education, fees in schools were kept low; 
the special rates had to be continued for many years because 
of ’’the backward state of education in almost all the districts1". 
In 1901-02, there were no scholarships for pupils studying at 
the primary level except a sum of Rs. 14-7 granted in student­
ships to a few Waziri and Dauri boys in Dera Ismail IChan and
2Bannu districts. One hundred and five scholarships of the
total annual value of Rs. 4,217 were given for middle and high
3school students.
1Roos-ICeppel to Joint Secy, to Oovt. of India, 26 September 
1912, I.E.P.. vol. 9194, May 1913, Proc. Nos. 198-209.
2
Annual Reporb on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P., 1901-02,
p. 10.
3Ibid., pp. 7-9.
Of the three main communities - Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs, 
the former was the most backward in education. Though it con­
stituted 92.1 per cent of the total population in 1 9 0 1, the 
percentage of boys attending institutbns of all kinds m s  only 
11.7 compared with 36-3 and 22.3 per cent in the case of Hindus 
and Sikhs respectively. The Government encouraged education among 
Muslims by granting fee concessions and special scholarships. 
There were nine high and thirteen middle school Victoria scholar­
ships awarded annually and special elementary schools were main­
tained at Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu and Abbottabad for Muslim boys.
Peshawar had an Islamia Anglo-Vernacular high school and an
\
Anglo-Vernacular middle school.
The main difficulty in the expansion and improvement of
education was the lack of funds. In January 1905 Beane, the
Chief Commissioner, asked for a grant of at least four lakhs of
rupees which, in his opinion, was the minimum amount needed if
any improvements were to be carried out in the educational system
2
especially primary education. The Government of India, however, 
sanctioned only Rs. 40,000 which was hardily sufficient even for 
opening a few new schools. Out of this meagre su$ the cost of
•j
Quinquennium Report on Public Instruction in N.W.P.P.. 1897-1902 
pp. 13-41. . . . . . .
2
Deane to Curzon, 26 January 1905, O.C., vol. 210.
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establishing a training school for primary teachers at Peshawar
1- the first of its kind in the province - was also met.
As for secondary education, the general policy of the
Government of India as set down by their Resolution of 1904
was not implemented in the Frontier Province*According to
this resolution local governments were asked to bring about an
improvement in the existing institutions by three ways - the
Government providing one high school in each district as a
model for private enterprise; the Government helping private
secondary schools by large grants-in-aid to raise them to the
standard of Government schools and finally providing greater
2
facilities for the training of secondary school teachers. Be­
cause of lack of funds no scheme of any importance was undertaken 
in the period (1901-1910) by the local government for the improve­
ment of secondary education with the result that the education 
reports of the period showed nothing except a routine slow in­
crease in the figures of schools and students, the former being 
3
negligible.
-j
Quinquennium Report oi Public Instruction in R.W.F.P., 1902-07,
p.12.
2 „  . . 
Indian Educational Policy. Being a Resolution issued by the
Governor-General in Council on the 11th March 1904, pp. 21-22, 
41-44.
3
In 1901-02, the number of secondary schools in the province was 
twenty-eight and it increased to thirty in 1910-11; the number 
of students in corresponding years was 5,082 and 9,128. Quin­
quennium Report, 1897-1902, p.l; ibid., 1907-12, p.5-
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However, Collegiate educati cn received some encouragement
under the new educational reforms introduced by Curzon. The
first College in the Province grew out of the Edwardes Collegiate
(Mission) school established by the Church Mission Society. The
Society had established its mission at Peshawar as far back as
1853 through the efforts of Herbert Edwardes, the then Commissioner
of the Peshawar Division. In May 1855, the Society opened a
primary school in the Peshawar City which was named after Ed- 
1
wardesr mad was raised later to a high school. It was the first
institution in tbe frontier districts to impart modern education
to the local Pathans and members of other communities. The school
soon achieved remarkable success being considered "one of the 
2best in India". The Viceroys, Lord Canning and Lord Lawrence, 
and the Lieutenant-Governor of tie Punjab, Robert Montgomery, 
in particular showed keen interest in its progress. A hostel was 
built in 1872 with the alleged intention of bringing the "sons 
of Pathan... chiefs under Christian influence". In 1883-4 the 
school had five hundred students, mostly sons of gentry from
•i
Eugene Stock, A History of the Church Missionary Society, 
vol. II, pp. 208-13.
2 .
Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 147. Report on Popular Education in the Punjab,
1860-61, p.50; ibid.. 1861-62,p.68. "A letter from Reverend
C. G. Pyander from Peshawar, 14 July 1855", C.M.l.. January
1856, pp. 23-4. "Mi ssionary Address delivered at Oxford" by
Reverend R. Clark of Peshawar, 29 May 1857, ibid., August 1857, pp. 168-76.
3"The Edwardes Ghurch Mission College", The Punjab Mission Hews, 
15 July 1908, pp. 5-6.
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1Peshawar and ICohat. In 1901, an intermediate arts class
was opened in the school with six students to meet what was
claimed by the missionaries as a demand for more advanced studies
on the part of local young men who hoped to qualify themselves
for a professional career. In the second year the college had
seventeen students which led the Principal to hopefully record
2that "there has been a growing interest in the new college", 
in annual grant of Rs. 1,200 was given to the college in 1904 
and in 1907 a special grant of Rs* 25,000 was made to the col­
lege for the construction of new buildings, a science laboratory, 
a hostel and a library.^ " In|l908 four college scholarships were 
instituted for the students of the Frontier province tenable
at the Edwardes College or at any recognised college in the Pun-
5jab or at the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh.
1
Gazetteer of the Peshawar District* 1885-84* p.98. The Society 
also opened schools at Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. See "Mission 
Activities in Frontier Districts", C.M.I.* November 1861, 
pp. 264-71; "The Derajat", ibid.* May 1862, pp. 108-15; "The 
Derajat", ibid** June 1865, pp. 144-6; Stock, op.cit.. pp. 276-9, 
564-5.
2
Annual Report on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P., 1901-02* pp. 1-2,
6; The Punjab Mission News* 15 July 1908, pp. 5-7; "The Edwardes 
Church Mission College, Peshwar", P.M.S. Gazette*'! October 1908, 
pp. 506-7; Imperial Gazetteer of India. N.W.F.P.* 1908, p.74.
3Annual Report on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P.* 1904-05* p.9.
^The Punjab Mission Mews* 15 July 1908, pp. 5-7.
^Roos-Keppel to Secy. Govt, of India, 9 July 1908, Deputy Secy., Govt,
of India, to Chief Commissioner, 11 August 1908, I.E.P., vol. 7877,
August 1908, Proc. Nos. 29-30.
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In the Agencies, the state of education m s  worse than
in the settled districts. There were only six aided primary
schools in 1901-02 in the Kurram Agency with one hundred and
ten students. In the next decade, the activity of the local
Government was confined to the opening of a few primary schools
in the Tochi Valley, Khyber and the Shirani country. These schools
were under the control of the Political Agents and in fact owed
their existence to the individual efforts, personal interest and
initiative of these officers. Education was free for the tribal
boys, and the schools were periodically inspected by the officers
2
of the Education Department.
Educationally, the period 1901-10 was marked by little 
conspicuous progress. In fact, the percentage of literacy had 
fallen from 5.5 in 1901 to .50 in 1911.^ The facilities for pri­
mary education in the rural areas were entirely inadequate. For 
an area of 4,530 square miles with a population of 1,065,097 
there were only 214 District Board Schools and forty aided schools. 
The educational facilities in the urban areas were no better.
•j
Quinquennium Report on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P., 1897-1902.
p.10.
2Quinquennium Reports on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P., 1902-7. 
p.20; ibid.. 1907-12, p.21; ibid., 1912-17, pp. 48-50.
3The male population of the province had increased from 1,105,683 
in 1901 to 1,182,102 in 1911, while the number of literate males 
had decreased from 61,264 to 60,113. Roos-ICeppel to Joint Secy,, 
Govt, of India, 6 September 1911, I.E.P., vol. 8943, November 
1912, Proc. No. 48.
3 6 4
The educational expenditure of the five municipalities - 
Peshawar, Abhottabad, ICohat, Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu - had 
been largely absorbed in the maintenance of the five municipal 
high schools while primary education had been left to private 
enterprise. Out of a population of approximately eighty 
thousand males in these five municipal areas, only 3,250 boys 
were receiving educatioh in all kinds of recognised schools.^
The state of affairs was highly unsatisfactory; education 
had made little or no progress. Roos-ICeppel attributed this to 
official apathy, ineffective control and supervision^)! the edu­
cational establishments and inadequate finance. He saw that
veiy little interest was taken in Pathan education 
by the Punjab Government which always looked upon 
the trans-Indus tract more as a sbep-child than as a
child.^
The trouble was that after the formation of the new province 
no material change had taken place in the educational set up; 
the entire machinery of education continued to be run and con­
trolled as before by the Punjab Government. A temporary arrange­
ment was made regarding the educational administration of the 
Frontier province. An Assistant Inspector of Education of the 
Punjab Government was put in charge of education while the Dir-
'ibid.
2 -Review by Roos-ICeppel, Annual Report on Public Instruction in 
H.W.F.P., 1911-12,p.1.
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ector of Public Instruction, Punjab, exercised general super-
m, 1vision. The district inspectors in all districts, except Kohat, 
also belonged to the Punjab service. The teaching staff in 
the schools, too, was mostly Punjabi. It was the Punjab edu­
cational institutions again to which the Frontier Province turned
for Collegiate education, the training of teachers, examinations
2and the choice of text books.
It is interesting to note that when the local government 
of the Frontier Province were enthusiastic about the spread of 
education, it was the Government of India who failed to provide 
adequate support. Thus within one year of the formation of the 
province, Deane had asked the Supreme Government for the appoint­
ment of an officer cf the Indian Educational Service to take 
charge of the Education Department. However, more than two 
years elapsed before, in January 1904* M.A.Stein^ was appointed 
as the Inspector-General of Education and Archaeological Surveyor 
for the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Stein had
1ICohat did not have any District Inspector until 1905. I.E.P., 
vol. 7049* Februaiy 1905, Proc. Nos. 5708.
2
Scheme for the administration of the N.W.F.P., 1901, pp. 71-4,
C.C., vol. 520.
Deane to Secy., Govt, of India, 24 October 1902, Govt, of India to 
Secy, of State, 28 May 1905, Secy, of State toGovt. of India, 10 July 
1905, I.J.P.F.. vol. 658, 1905, Reg. No. 1119.
4Dr. M.A.Stein was the Registrar of the Punjab University and Princi­
pal of the Oriental College, Lahore. Earlier he had served as 
Principal of the Calcutta Madrassa. He was a famous archaeologist.
36 6
hardly been in the province for two years when, In the beginning
of 1906, he was sent to Turkestan cm an archaeological expedition
and his duties were performed by officers of the Punjab Edu-
1
cational service until 1910.
The combination of the two responsibilities - the super­
vision of archaeology and man cement of education - by the same 
officer had been a blunder for Stein was too occupied in archaeologi­
cal excavations and exploration in distant countries to find time 
for effecting educational development in the province. The re­
sult was that "while research gained education languished".
The system of loaning officers from the Punjab Educational Ser­
vice was defective as these officers "disliked what was to them 
foreign service" and always longed to go back to their parent 
province. They had shown least inclination to visit the rural 
areas, where schools were in a deplorable state. The newly 
established schools which these officers had "shown with pride 
in the returns" were "wretched beyond degree". The Punjabi teachers 
in these schools "with little or no knowledge of Pushto, draw­
ing Rupees 6 or Rupees 8 a month - less than ihe pay of a sweeper 
with practically no qualifications for teaching" had proved a 
failure. They combined with their
*1
Annual Report on Public Instruction in E.W.ff.P., 1905-6, p.7.
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educational work the functions of post master, 
unlicensed petition-writer, shopkeeper and private 
secretary to the local Khan, represented in man^ 
cases the entire teaching staff of what appeared in 
the annual returns as a flourishing school with 3.0 
or 40 pupils.1
No wonder the education offered in these schools appeared to 
the Chief Commissioner as na sham”.
The books prescribed for the schools were out of date 
and in most cases unsuitable for the pupils. Roos-Keppel, while 
visithag some of the schools, patiently listened to recitation 
of English poetry by Pathan boys which appeared to him "unin­
telligible nonsense". The pupils themselves were least inter­
ested in what they read:
Neither lullabies to infants, nor poems on English 
flowers are attractive subjects for recitation by 
Pathan boys of 16 years of age. 2
The state of affails deeply disappointed the Chief Commissioner 
in whose opininn the entire educational system needed over-hauling. 
He therefore embarked upon large scale reforms which were carried 
out in the period 1911-21. The policy was the handiwork of Roos- 
Keppel who brought into his office anew and clear vision, a high 
purpose, a resolute spirit and ambition. He left education in­
vigorated in all spheres, awakening the authorities to the fullness
1
Review of the Annual Report on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P.,
1911-12. by Roos-Keppel, pp. 1-2.
2
Ibid., p. 3.
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of their responsibilities for the moral development of the 
people of his province. The personal interest he took in 
the matter carried him to far-flung rural areas, from where 
he returned convinced of the defects of the existing educational 
machinery and determined to remove them.
The most conspicuous feature of the reforms lay in the 
formation by the local government of a comprehensive and system­
atic policy of education and their ability to secure the nec­
essary support from the Supreme Government to implement it. 
Roos-Keppel1s first task was to secure effective control of the 
educational administration b.y demanding its separation from the 
control of the Punjab government. In 1909 he had proposed that 
the Education Department of the frontier province be placed 
under a separate Director of Public Instruction who should be­
long to the Indian Educational Service. The Government of India 
accepted the proposal but appointed a Director who held the 
combined charge of the Frontier province and Baluchistan.
The change in Roos-Keppel1s opinion had hardly been advantageous; 
the officer had sufficient work to do in the Frontier alone, 
and it was "ridiculous" that the Government should ask him "to 
inspect and direct education at places which are as far apart as
1
Govt, of India, to Secy, of State, 23 December 1909, Secy, of 
State to Viceroy, Tel. 8 Margh* 1910, I.E.P.. vol. 8424, November 
1910, Proc. Nos. 100-117. Also see I.J.P.P.. vol. 892, 1910, Reg. 
No. 497; Joint Secy., Govt, of India, to Chief-Commissioner, 15 
March 1911, I.E.P.. vol. 8698, larch 1911, Proc. No. 145.
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are London and Warsaw”. Roos-ICeppel kept on protesting; the 
Government of India took heed and in 1914 the educational 
charge of Baluchistan was separated and the frontier Province 
got a whole-time Director of Public Instruction of its own.^
A separate provincial educational cadre was created for the 
new province and a revised scale of pay for the officers in
%
the Education Department of the Frontier Province was introduced.
Row that the battle m s  won, Roos-Keppel with the coopera­
tion of the new Director launched upon a comprehensive plan of 
educational reforms the aim of which he spelled out thus:
Our desire is not to be brilliantly successful with 
a few selected schools or merely to aim at the higher 
education of picked scholars, but rather to lay the 
foundation of an educational sysbem, the result of which 
would be apparent many years hence. We hope eventually 
to provide every village with a primary school on demand; 
a proportion of scholars of these primary schools will 
go on to the Middle Schools and a percentage of those 
of the Middle Schools will go on to the High Schools, 
being aided whenever necessary, by scholarships...
From the High Schools we shall get our College students 
and select our future generation of teachers, training 
them ourselves at the Peshawar Normal School, get a 
class of Primary teachers of good standing, conversant 
with the language of the country and in touch with the 
parents instead of the dregs of the Punjab, which is all , 
we could expect to get before on the miserable pay offered.
't
Review by Roos-Keppel, Annual Report on Public Instruction in 
N.W.F.P. . 1911-12, 3,
^Annual Report on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P., 1914-15, p.S.
^Roos-Keppel to Joint Secy., Govt, of India, 27 November 1911, 
I.E.P.. vol. 8942, April 1912, Proc. Nos. 8-12; Roos-Keppel 
to Secy., Govt, of India, 15 June 1912; Secy., Govt, of India
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Roos-Keppel hoped that "with the Government of India, missions, 
private individuals and Indian Societies working together” he 
could make the province a "model educational Province” by estab­
lishing
at laast one Primary School in every village, a 
Middle School within easy reach of every village,
High Schools in all cities and at the capitals 
of all sub-divisions, and above them, competing 
in friendly rivalry, the Edwardes Mission Arts ^
College and the Provincial Islamia Arts College 
both affiliated to the Punjab University.^
The first item in Roos-Keppel1s programme was to bring
about a rapid development of primary education throughout the
province. This was in keeping with the Government of India’s
educational policy as set out in their Resolution of 21 February
31913. In July 1911, the Government of India had asked the local 
governments to submit schemes for the etpansion of primary education.^
to Chief-Commissioner, 4 November 1912; ibid.. vol. 8943,
December 1912, Proc. Nos. 22-23.
^Review by Roos-Keppel, Annual Report of Public Instruction in 
N.W.F.P., 1911-12. pp. 2-3.
See below, pp.37Cj.-qR, *
^Review by Roos-Keppel, Annual Report of Public Instruction in 
N.W.F.P., 1911-12, p.3.
3Resolution on Educational Policy of the Government of India, 21 
February 1913. I.J.P.P., ^ 4^  , . Government’s policy had
been considerably influenced by G.K.Gokhale1s agitation for free 
compulsory primary education throughout India. In March 1910, Gok- 
hale had moved a resolution in the Imperial Legislative Council.
See G.K.Golchale, Speeches, pp. 615-20. Also see U u m M & U  <vnol Mccf id ,fljAccb-j
m&z-kz-
Joint Secy., Govt, of India, to Local Governments, 6 July 1911,
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Accordingly in September 1911, Roos-Keppel submitted his plan 
which aimed at the opening of four hundred and forty five new 
primary schools in the rural areas within the next five years.
He had even selected the sites for these schools and had de­
voted considerable time in examining the curriculum which he 
wanted to be as simple as possible. Only Pashtu speaking teachers 
were to be engaged and the maximum number of pupils for a teacher 
was fixed at forty. In order to attract trained teachers, a 
special Elementaiy Teachers' Service consisting of four grades 
of salary was to be created. Theschools would be under the 
District Boards as Roos-Keppel did not have any hope of private
initiative and enterprise playing any encouraging role in spread-
2ing primary education in the near future. In order to ensure 
the supply of trained teachers for urban primary schools he re­
commended that the number of stipends at the Normal School at
■3
Peshawar should be increased from sixty to one hundred.
To ensure better inspection of the schools, Roos-ICeppel sug­
gested the appointment of two additional inspectors, one for 
Peshawar and Hazara and the other for Bannu, Kohat and Dera
I.E.P.. vol. 8699, July 1911, Proc. No. 80.
1
The various grades were fixed at salaries starting at rupees 
fourteen, sixteen, eighteen aid twenty per month,
2Roos-Keppel to Joint Secy., Govt, of India, 6 September 1911,
I.E.P., vol. 8493, November 1911, Proc. No: . 48.
3Ibid.
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Ismail Khan, who would relieve the District Inspectors of their 
administrative and clerical duty and enable them to exercise 
greater supervision over the instructional methods. The 
expenditure for all these plans would be met from three sources: 
funds of the local bodies, provincial revenues and grants from 
the Government of India which Roos-Keppel wanted to be liberally 
made available to him.'*'
An important step towards the popularisation of primary 
education was taken when, in November 1911, it was made free 
in the schools under District Board management. At the same 
time English was eliminated from the primary section of the 
Anglo-Vernacular schools.
Thanks to the Chief Commissioner's sustained interest and 
enthusiasm and liberal grants from the Government of India 
primary education made considerable progress. The number of 
schools in the settled districts increased from 260 in 1911-2 
to 585 in 1916-7, and the number of students from 14,129 to
1m a .
2 ■J.A.Richey, Director of Public Instruction, N.W.F.P., to all the 
Headmasters of Anglo-Vernacular Secondary Schools, 11 November 
1911, I.E.P., vol. 8942, February 1912, Proc. Nos. 83-90.
Free primary education was imparted in the schools of Baluchistan 
and Assam only. Govt, of India to Secy, of State, 8 February 
!912, I.J.P.P., vol. 1071, 1912, Reg. No. 1260.
3The Govt, of India made a recurring grant of rupees 50,000 for 
primary education in 1912-13, of Rs. 55,000 in 1913-14, and of 
Rs. 38,000 in 1914-15. Quinquennium Report on Public Instruction 
in N.W.F.P.t 1912-7, p.13.
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25,097.1
However, Roos-Keppel showed no great enthusiasm for rapid
expansion of education in tribal territories through Government
efforts. He believed that
education in the independent areas will only make 
progress by force of the example of the districts.
It was only in 1912 that the first Government primary school
was opened in the Malakand Agency and a vernacular Middle School
in 1914-15. The standard of in structio n imparted in the schools
was low because of lack of trained teachers; the local teachers
were as reluctant to go to the Normal School at Peshawar as
trained teachers from settled districts were to serve in the
tribal agencies. In order to facilitate the exchange of teachers
between the districts and the agencies Roos-Iteppel, in 1918,
instituted in the agencies the system of provident fund and pension
3scheme existing hi the districts.
Between 1917 and 1922, educational progress in the Province 
was retarded by the Governments preoccupaticn in the War and 
the disturbed political situation and the consequent diversion
Ibid., p. 1.
2Review by Roos-Keppel on the Annual Report on Public Instruction 
in N.W.F.P.. 1911-2, p.3.
Quinquennium Report, 1917-22, pp. 50-2; Quinquennial Review. 
1917-22, p. 3D5. Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 29 May
1917, Secy., 'Govt, of India, to Chief Commissioner, 8 July
1918, I.E.P.. vol. 10361, July 1918, Proc. Nos. 5-8.
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of Government funds to meet the military and political exi­
gencies. During these five years, the District Boards could 
open only forty new primary schools and the number of students 
increased by only 902 over the 1917 figure.'1* The economic 
difficulties in the War years hit the privately run institutions 
hard. Politically the year 1919-20 proved worst when the third 
Afghan War, the Rowlatt Bill agitation, the non-Cooperation 
and Hijrat movements, the prolonged tribal disorder and extensive
tribal raids on the Bannu and Dera Ismail districts created a
2sense of general insecurity. The number of students attending
3
public schools decreased.
These events held out one important lesson for the local 
government and for Roos-Keppel in particular. The Chief Commissioner 
firmly believed that the ignorant and credulous Pathans had fallen 
an easy prey to the "insidiousness of religious and political 
propaganda" of anti-British elements who sought to create trouble
A
in the Province. The best means to avert the recurrence of such 
events, Roos-Keppel believed, lay in "education, more education
Quinquennium Report. 1917-22, p.l.
2 . . . . .  
Ibid., p.2. Annual Report on Public Instruction in W.W.P.P.,
Review by the Chief-Gommissioner. 1919-20, p.l. Ibid., 1920-1,
■p*5.
3
In 1919-20, the net decrease in attendance ms 1,329. Annual 
Report, 1919-20, p.5.
4See ; Ljll|r6.C«
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and better education'1. He, therefore, proposed the opening
of five hundred new primary schools in the next decade. To
provide greater opportunities for the training of teachers,
he recommended the opening of a second training class in 1920
with thirty stipendiaries who would be attached to the Govern-
2
ment high school at Bannu. The pay of the teachers was in- 
creased from fourteen rupees to thirty-one rupees per month. 
Although Roos-Keppel laid main emphasis on primary education, 
he did not neglect secondary education. So far as the verna­
cular middle schools were concerned, he saw scope for "considerable 
expansion". He proposed to open five such schools in the next 
five years, thus bringing their total to nineteen. The schools 
were required to employ trained staff on adequate rates of pay, 
and local boards were provided with special grants from the pro­
vincial revenues to help the schools. These reforms, in Roos-
4Keppel's opinion, wer© "now reasonably adequate".
In regard to high schools, Roos-Keppel brought about con­
siderable changes. The total number of high schools in the Pro-
Review by the Ghief-Commissioner in Annual Report on Public 
Instruction in N.W.P.P.. 1919-20, pp. 1-2.
^Roos-Keppel to Secy. Govt, of India, 19 May 1919» I.E.P. , 
vol. 10584, June 1919, Proc. Nos. 13-5.
3
Quinquennium Report. 1917-22, p.2.
4Roos-Keppel to Joint Secy., Govt. of India, 26 September 1912,
I.E.P.. vol. 9194, May 1913, Broc. Nos. 198-209.
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vince in 1911 was twelve, of which fi-ve were at the head­
quarters of the five districts of the Province; they were 
maintained by municipalities. The remaining seven were under 
private management and in receipt of grants-in-aid from the 
Government. Roos-Keppel proposed to convert the municipal
high schools into Government high schools, a reform which
1was in line with Curzon's policy. This measure was expected 
to relieve the municipalities of the burden of maintaining 
high schools and set their resources free for the improvement 
of primary education which, as already noted, was in"an ex­
tremely unsatisfactory state" In addition, Roos-Keppel pro­
posed to raise hie status of the Anglo-Vernaculr middle school
tv
at Harden, managed by District Board, into a Government high 
school. Thus, altogether there would be six Government high 
schools in the Province. The Chief-Oommissioner further recom­
mended that a uniform standard of staff and scale of salaries 
be adopted in all Government high schools. Roos-Keppel proposed 
that the pay of the head-masters and district inspectors should
be made identical so as to facilitate the interchange between
2
the teaching and inspecting branches.
1Nurullah and Naik, op.cit.. pp. 475-85.
^Roos-Keppel to Joint Secy., Govt, of India, 26 September 1912,
I.E.P., vol. 9194, May 1913, Proc. Nos. 198-209.
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As regards the seven aided high schools under Private
management, Roos-Iteppel’ s object here was to ensure "a high
minimum standard of efficiency I' His main recommendations
were: to provide more liberal grants to the schools, to fix
a minimum standard for teachers’ qualifications and their
pay, to give additional grants to teachers whose qualifications
1
were higher than the prescribed minimum.
A new curriculum was introduced in the secondary schools,
a uniform and higher rate of fees was levied, more free student-
2ships and scholarships were given to students belonging to the
agricultural community, "admittedly the most backward section
3of the population". It was provided that scholarships would 
be distributed district-wise and according to population in 
each district. The award of scholarships to students was to be 
governed by the two conditions of poverty and merit.^
In accordance with thelesolution of the Government cf India 
of 21 February 1913, the Government of the Frontier Province
1rbid.
2
In 1901-02 there were 105 secondary school scholarships; in 
1912 the number increased to 162. The Educational Code of the 
North-West Frontier Province. 1915, pp- 34-9.
3Circular issued by J. A. Richey, 11 November 1911, I.E.P., 
vol. 8942, February 1912, Proc. Nos. 83-90.
T^he Educational Code, op.cit., pp. 34-9.
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provided secondary school teachers with greater opportunities 
for training than hitherto available. In 1916 the Normal 
School at Peshawar was made a Teachers’ Training College, 
thus releasing the Province from its erstwhile dependence on 
the Central Teachers' College at Lahore where teachers from 
the North-West Frontier Province found it hard to get ad­
mission in view of the competition from teachers of the Punjab
schools. In the same year the local government introduced
2
the Secondary School Leaving Certificate examination. In 
April 1919 Roos-Keppel made vernacular middle school education 
free hoping that this would provide an incentive to the boys, 
who gave up studies after primary education, and would prevent 
their “relapse into illiteracy".^ Another reform suggested 
by Roos-Keppel was the placing of the five Government High 
Schools in the Province under head-masters in the Indian Edu­
cational Service to ensure better academic standards and more 
efficient supervision. The students of these schools were ex-
1D.S.Donald, Officiating Chief Commissioner, to Joint Secy., 
Govt, of India, 7 March 1914, I.S.R.. vol. 9445, September
1914, Proc. Nos. 24-8. See also, I.E.P., vol. 98-09, October
1915, Proc. Nos. 68-74.
^I.S.P., vol. 10165, April 1917, Proc. Nos. 94-106,
3Review fof Chief Commissioner of the Annual Report on Public 
Instruction in 1919-20. p. 20.
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pected to play in future an important role in the life of 
the Province, and the type of education they received, so Roos- 
Keppel pointed out, would considerably influence their future 
attitude towards the Governmentj closer governmental associ­
ation with these institutions of higher education would earn 
political dividends in future.
That the local government were keen on controlling the 
centres of higher education was all the more evident by their 
involvement in the Islamia College movement at Peshawar. The 
movement was launched by some leading men cf the local Muslim 
community, of which Abdul QjCUyyum was the most prominent. Prom 
its very inception in 1907-8, the local government had kept 
themselves in dose touch with the movement. The Education Report 
noted in 1907-8 thus:
Both in the districts and across the frontier 
there exists a strong feeling among Mohammadan 
gentleman in favour of a Provincial College, 
established under religious auspices, where 
Arabic would be taught side by side with more 
modern subjects.2
The issue was brought several times to the notice of the local
government which encouraged the move while keeping themselves
informed of the local public reaction to it. In 1910, Merk,
1Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 2 January 1919, I.E.P., 
vol. 10584, ^ay 1919, Proc. Mos. 88-9.
Review by Chief Commissioner of the Annual Report on Public
Instruction in M.W.F.P., 1907-8, p.l.
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while officiating as the Chief Commissioner, invited Theo­
dore Morrison, the Principal of the Aligarh College, to 
discuss the subject with the leading men of' the Province;
Merk was convinced that there was Uwidespread desire" for 
a local Islamia College. A Committee was formed and a scheme 
for the college was discussed with Moirison. On 24 May 1910 
the leading men of the Province made a fonnal representation 
to the Chief Commissioner requesting help for the establish-
•j
ment of the College. In April 1911, a Provincial Committee 
and District Committees were fomed to collect subscriptions 
for the ^ollege. Hamilton Grant, the Deputy Commissioner of 
Peshawaaj and Abdul QOiyyum were appointed Joint Secretaries of 
the Provincial Committee. The response of the Muslim Glommunity 
to the scheme was overwhelming. In May 1911 it was reported
that "utmost interest has been excited and all classes, including
3the most bigoted mullas are exerting themselves to help". The 
Afridi chiefs contributed one month1s allowances and sent a 
deputation to Roos-Keppel urging that a college should be set
■\
Merk to Secy., Govt, of India, 3 October 1910, enclosing letter 
from leading gentleman from Peshawar to the Chief Commissioner, 24 
May 1910, I.E.P., vol. 8699, August 1911, Proc. Mo s. 53-$.
^Roos-Keppel to Butler, 1 May 1911, B.P., vol. 32. ‘
3 - • TTExtract from the P.Provincial Diary, ho. 19 for the week
ending 13 May 1911, I.E.P.. vol. 8699, August 1911, Proc. Hos. 53-4.
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1up for their sons. The Khyber Rifles gave 3,520 rupees. With­
in six months - hy October 1911 - five lakhs of rupees had been
collected. Roos-Keppel hoped that very soon the collection 
would reach seven to eight lakhs. This, so the Chief Commissioner 
informed the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, clearly showed that "Fathers 
of sons are realising the necessity for education". But
family affection is so strong among Pathans that 
few will send their sons to Aligarh, while they
will not send them to mission schools, as these, ^
without making Christians, manufacture agnostics.
In such circumstances the proposed Islamia College at Peshawar
was bound to be popular.
By the beginning of 1912 the total subscription for the
college had risen to more than eight lakhs of rupees. Roos-Keppel
and Abdul QCL&yyum selected a spot for the site of the college
near the mouth of the historic Khyber pass. On 21 March 1912,
3Roos-Keppel laid the foundation stone of the college.
The college was a ’’triple institution": a high school, an
arts college where provision was made for "the study of modern 
languages and sciences", and an oriental faculty providing for 
religious instruction. This faculty was expected to turn out men
^Roos-Keppel to Butler, 1 May 1911 > B.P.t vol. 32.
2
Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 27 October 1911, H.P., vol. 82.
3
Roos-Keppel to Joint Secy., Govt, of India, 26 September, 1912, 
enclosing a letter from the Islamia College Committee, 22 May 
1912, I.E.R.t vol. 8943, November 1912, Proc. Nos. 176-7.
with tolerant religious views who, while retaining their
influence with the local people would alsp be attached to
the Government. The Islamia College Committee set out the
object of the Oriental faculty thus:
Our chief aim in this faculty will... be to turn 
out mull alls not of the ignorant and fanatical type 
that we have got at present, but gentlemen imbued 
with enlightened and civilised ideas, their fanati­
cism eradicated, and their minds tilled with rational, 
humane and sound religious principles, with their 
whole nature permeated with devotion and loyalty 
to the British Crown, a duty which is ordained by 
our religion in its true spirit and light, and which 
should be the marked characteristic of every true 
and sincere follower of Islam,1
The Committee believed that the mullahs who would pass out of
the College would exercise a humanising and civilising influence"
over the peoples in the tribal territory and in trying to make
them "the most loyal adherents of the British Empire" would
contribute to the peace and, tranquillity of the settled, districts.
Regarding the management and control of the college, the
Committee submitted certain proposals to Roos-Keppel, which while
giving the local government considerable power of control left
its general administration to three bodies, partly nominated and
partly elected. The first was a Board of Governors, comprising
one hundred members, whose selection would rest with the existing
Ibid.
2Xbid.
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college committee, the selection being subject to the approval 
of the local government. The members of the governing body 
would be chosen from those who had contributed to the establish­
ment of the college, and whose influence was necessary for the 
success of the institution. The governing body's main aim would 
be to make the institution popular with the Muhammadan community 
of the Province and to further its interests. The second was a 
Board of Trustees of twenty persons who would hold office for 
five years. The Board's function would be purely financial: 
looking after the public funds and contributions to the college. 
The third body was called the Council of Management consisting 
of fourteen members, five of them being high ranking Government 
officials. and the rest being chosen by the Board o f Trustees, 
and holding office for one year. The Council was to exercise 
a general control over all matters connected with the organisation 
and management of the College, frame the annual budget for sub­
mission to the Board cf Trustees, and hold the power of dismissing 
the members cf the college staff. The Chief Commissicner would 
be the ex-officio patron of the institution having the power
2of vetoing any measure recommended by any of the three bodies.
*1
The Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, The Director of Public 
Instruction in the Province, The Inspector General of Police, The 
Commanding Royal Engineer and Chief Medical Officer.
2Islamia College Committee to Roos-Keppel, 22 May 1912, op.cit.
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However, Roos-Keppel wanted more powers, considering that 
his right of veto was not enough. The right, he said, did 
not empower him to initiate measures he deemed necessary nor 
did it give him power to interfere with the mam gement of the 
institution except by rejecting a resolution passed by the 
three managing bodies. Therefore, Roos-Keppel asked the Govern­
ment of India to suggest means which would enable him to exer­
cise stronger influence and control over the college without
1offending the susceptibilities of the College Committee.
Roos-Keppel was in no doubt that with Government control "the
2College will be an influence for good, without it of evil".
The Government of India responded favourably and suggested 
that the College rules should provide that the Chief Commissioner 
should have the power to suspend the constitution of the institu­
tion and to direct its authorities to take such action as might 
appear to him desirable. The College Committee, however, op­
posed this suggestion, considering that it gave "altogether too 
sweeping" powers to the Chief Commissioner and that it might 
have the effect of converting an independent aided college to 
a purely Government institution. As a compromise, Roos-Keppel
i
Roos-Keppel to Joint Secy, of India, 26 September 1912,
I.E.P., vol. 8943, November 1912, Proc. Nos. 176-7.
^Roos-Keppel to Harcourt Butler, 7 October 1911, 23 February 1912, 
B.P., vol. 32.
Joint Secy., Govt, of India,to Chief Commissioner, 22 November
1912, I.E.P., vol. 8943, November 1912, Proc. Nos. 176-7.
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thereupon proposed that the Chief Commissioner should have
powers to suggest to the governing bodies of the institution
any measure which he might consider beneficial, and that he
should also have the power to veto any measure passed by the
three managing bodies. This was accepted by the College Committee.
The Government’s active encouragement of the Islamia College
movement and close association with it were not without political
considerations. The Islamia College would not only educate and
enlighten influential Pathan families but was expected to attach
them to the Government. As Roos-Keppel expressed it:
1 believe that the effect on the peace of the border 
will be \ery great eventually, as I shall try to get 
in all sons of the tribal maliks, the chiefs of the 
next generation, to attend the School and to learn 
that the Feringhi and his administration are not so 
black as they are painted. 2
Hardinge wholly approved of the policy; like Roos-Keppel he, too,
was
quite certain that the spread of education is the 
most satisfactory means of revolutionising the 
situation on the North-West Frontier and keeping 
the tribes quiet.3
1Roos-Keppel to Joint Secy., Govt, of India, 8 January 1913. I.F.P., 
vol. 9194, Hay 1913* Froc. Nos. 175-97; Joint Secy., Govt, of 
India, to Chief-Commissinner, 23 January 1913> ibid.
^Roos-Keppel to Harding&o, 27 October 1911 > H.P., vol. 82.
3Hardinge to Roos-Keppel, 2 November 1911, ibid.
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In 1913$ the first year of the college, sixty-five students
representing almost every independent tribe were admitted. The
college authorities hoped that
as time goes on from this source vail spring a 
river which, though the current may be slow, will 
eventually carry knowledge and progress among 
our wild trans-frontier neighbours.
The Islamia College was expected to serve another political 
purpose: to keep the Frontier Muslims away from educational 
institutions in India and particularly from the ones, like Ali­
garh, which were regarded as hot-beds of Muslim political agi­
tation. The private correspondence of Hardinge, Roos-Keppel 
and Harcourt Butler, the Education Member of the Viceroy’s Council 
and a close friend of Roos-Keppel, provides clear proof of the 
Governments policy of keeping the Frontier Muslims away from 
the Aligarh influence. Butler saw to it that the Islamic College 
received liberal Imperial grants. In June 1911, in a secret 
Minute on the allotment of these grants, Butler strongly recom­
mended that Rs. 50,000 be earmarked for the Islamia College be­
cause it was
a matter of first political importance to civilise 
the frontier people through a big educational in­
stitution started under our control. It is an oppor-
•]
Review by the Chief Commissioner of the Annual Report on Public 
Instruction in N.W.F.P., 1913-4, pp. 3?22.
387
tunity not to be missed... on every ground it is 
important to isolate the frontier people and let 
them have their own institution... 1 regard it as 
a form of future insurance against frontier troubles 
which is worth the expenditure of a far larger sum.*®-
In April 1913 Butler wrote to Hardinge in clearer terms:
There is a tendency to isolate Aligarh, and I 
think we should be wise to foster this tendency...
If we strongly support the Islamia College,
Peshawar, the Islamia College, Lahore, the pro­
jected Colleges at Bombay and at Dacca, and perhaps 
also at Calcutta, Aligarh will cease to hold the 
position it has got now.2
3>
Hardinge cordially approved of the suggestion. “ 'The members of 
the Islamia College Committee, all influential local men and 
all loyal supporters of the British Government, were equally 
anxious to keep the frontier people away from political move­
ments in India and Abdul Qtiiyyum in particular acted in close 
collaboration with Roos-Keppel in achieving this object. The 
Muslim University Scheme launched by the Aligarh Muslims had 
little support in the Frontier Province, and the Islamia College
Secret Minute on Imperial Grants for Education by Harcourt 
Butler, 22 June 1911, B.P.. vol. 47.
2
Harcourt Butler to Hardinge, 3 April 1913, H.P.. vol. 85. Roos- 
Keppel came out even more clearly when he wrote to Hardinge that 
"the College will prove a very valuable barrier against Indian 
political sentiment, and especially against Aligarh, which is 
now a focus of Mahomedan discontent". Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 
26 September 1913, ibid.
Hardinge to Butler, 9 April 1913, ibid.
Committee saw to it that no subscriptions were sent to Aligarh 
in support of the University scheme. The Committee refused to 
entertain deputations from Aligarh for collection of subscriptions
a
and Abdul Qttfoyyum did not even accept the invitation o f the
Raja of Mahmudabad, President of the Aligarh Muslim University
Constitution Committee, to a meeting of the committee to be
held at Lucknow. The Aligarh Muslims had requested the Islamia
College Committee to provide a President for the forthcoming
Muslim Educational Conference from among the frontier Nawabs
and chiefs and to send many delegates from the Province to the
conference. The Islamia College Committee showed no favourable
reaction to the proposal, and Abdul Qttfoyyum, when approached
by the "S&fir" (messenger) of the Muslim Educational Conference
1to be its President, evaded the suggestion.
The Muslims connected with the Aligarh University scheme
did not fail to detect that the poor response from the frontier
Muslims was because of the Government. They thought that the
counter move for the establishment of the Islamia College was
"not a spontaneous desire of the people for education" but
the idea had been put forward by Government with a 
view to breaking up the growing unity of Indian ^
Musalmans and of damaging the University Scheme.
i
Abdul Qaiyyum to Roos-Keppel, 25 August 1912, R.K.
p
Roos-Keppel to Secy. , Govt, of India, 6 September 1912, ibid.
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The Islamia College Committee took great offence at such remarks
and resolved to do all they could in "keeping these Aligarhians
away from our people". Roos-Keppel was happy, convinced that
the pushing on of the work of the Islamia College 
will widen the breach between Peshawar and Aligarh.
The Hindu press in the Punjab denounoed the Islamia College 
2Scheme while the Muslim press of the Punjab and North-West 
Frontier Province welcomed it. Under the caption uSir George 
Roos-Keppel1s heap of sins", the Punjab Advocate pointed out 
that
the blackest part of his sinfulness is connected,..; 
with the interest which he has been evincing in 
the establishment cf the Islamia College at Peshawar.
However, the Muslim press fully supported Roos-ICeppel1 s
encouragement of the Islamia College movement and strongly
condemned the Hindu papers opposition to it. The Afghan of
23 January 1910 commented that the Islamia Collegiate School
will protect the frontier peoples from "the unholy influence
of the Hindu Schools", the sole object of which was to disseminate
sedition against the Government and false ideas about Islam and
its Prophet. The School will also save the frontier peoples
1Ibid.
2The Punjab Advocate. 6 July 1911, 27 Junel912; The Wakil. 3 
December 1913; ' ' -p. Tic ‘ ‘-nbuTvr;..
The Punjab Native Hews Papers Reports. 19U-1912, 19i-3.
^The Afghan. 15, 23 January 1910; The Paisa Akhbar, 5 March 1910,
4 May 1911; The~ Zamindar, 8 September 1911; The Observer, 18, 22 
May 191£, ibid., 1910, 1911, 1912.
4cited in The Zamindar, 4 May 1912, ibid., 1912.
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1from the pernicious influence of the mission schools. The 
Paisa Alchhar welcomed the Islamia College Scheme and hoped 
that the Amir of Afghanistan would give it financial help as he 
had been giving the Islamia College at Lahore. The Zamindar 
refuted the charge made by the Hindu press that the people 
of the Frontier Province had been forced to subscribe for
rz
the college, holding that all payments had been purely voluntary.
The Observer strongly defended Roos-Keppelf s active association
with the college, stating that the criticisms levelled by the
Hindu newspapers were
, the outcome of the hated imagination cf the Hindu 
press, for whom an Islamia College at Peshawar 
and Government sympathy for it are hateful...
Defending Roos-Keppel for his support of the college, the papers
wrote that Roos-Keppel ms ’*entirely free from all these unfounded
and unjustifiable blames and slurs".^ The Milan spoke in similar
5
terms.
On 5 April 1913 Butler, the Education Member, performed 
the opening ceremony of the Islamia Collegiate School. Expressing
The Afghan, 23 January, 1910, The Punjab Native newspapers Reports,
1910, p.128.
2
The Paisa Akhbar. 5 March, 9 July 1910, ibid.,pp.257, 632.
T^he Zamindar; , 4 May 1912,ibid., p.391*
^The Observer, 18, 22 May 1912, ibid., pp. 414-5.
T^he lilap, 24 May 1912, ibid., p.459.
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a great hope in the future of the institution he remarked:
Standing here on the most famous highway of 
Asia, facing the mouth of the Khyber pass, I 
confess that my imagination is powerfully 
affected at the prospect of the enlightenment 
which will radiate from this School and College, 
not only in this Province and along the Frontier, 
but far into the recesses of Asia.
The Islamia College was opened six months later. Qn the
staff there were three Cambridge graduates: L.Tipping, the
2
Principal; Inayat-Ullah-Khan, the Vice-Principal and Professor 
of Mathematics; and H.T.Bousfield, Professor of History. The 
college, which was affiliated to the Punjab University, attracted 
students from the settled districts as well as tribal territory.
In 1915 courses leading to Arts Degrees were started, and in 
1921, science classes were added. In 1917* the Collegiate School 
had three hundred students on its rolls and the Islamia College
1
Annual Report on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P.. 1913-4, p.4. 
Hardinge also sent a congrati.ilatory message to the college 
authorities showing his "appreciation of the unswerving loyalty 
of the M[ahommedans of the North incomparison with some of their 
brethren of weaker calibre". See Viceroy to Butler, Tels. 4, 9 
April 1913, H.P.. vol. 85.
2L, Tipping was formerly Professor of English at M.A.O. College, 
Aligarh. The Comrade, 29 March 1913, Syed Rais Ahmad Jafri, ed., 
Selections from Maulana Mohemmad Ali's Comrade1, p.420.
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had one huhdred. The success of the institution was due
mainly to the sustained interest of Abdul C^kyyum, its Honorary
Secretary, whom Roos-ICeppel described as "the Sir Syed Ahmad
of Mussalman education and progress in North-West Frontier 
2
Provin ce".
Female Education
Female education in the Frontier Province had made little 
progress as local prejudices against educating women were so 
great that the Government could hardly be expected to make much 
headway in establishing a system of education which diould meet 
the practical and social needs of women in the Province, Indeed, 
whatever attempts were made by the Government and whatever re­
sults achieved were all confined to the period 1911 onwards.
In 1901-02 there were only eight Government recognised 
primary schools for girls in the entire Province with four hundred 
and ninety-one pupils, and the total annual expenditure incurred 
to maintain them was not more than 2,477 rupees. The pupils;.' were 
mostly Hindu girls belonging to the families of Government ser­
vants and traders. There were no ^uslim girls attending public
•j
Quinquennium Report, 1912-7, op.cit., p.9,
^Roos-Keppel to Maffey, 4 April 1917, C.P.. vol. 18. In 1950
the Islamic College grew into the University of Peshawar, see 
Islamic College and Collegiate School, Peshawar. Golden Jubilee. 
1913-63. Mohammad Sarwar, Islamia Collegiate School, Peshawar; 
Report of the N.W.F. Enquiry Committee, 19244 , pp.' 20-21.
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schools in Peshawar and Hazara, educationally the most backward 
districts.'*"
The curriculum inthe girls' schools consisted of the 
three 3fs. In addition, needlework was taught in all schools, 
and those at Abbottabad had provisions for sewing, knitting 
and embroidery. The Arya Kanya aided school at Dera Ismail Khan, 
run by the : .local Hindus was the most flourishing female edu­
cation centre. For the encouragement of upper primary education 
among girls, the Government of the Punjab^instituted seventeen 
scholarships for twenty-three girls who constituted the total
number of students receiving upper primary education in the
2
entire Province. There was no secondary school for girls
until 1906, when the Arya Kanya School was raised to -the status
3
of a middle school. The Government's efforts were mainly 
directed towards improving the standards of female education 
rather than its expansion. In the absence of female teachers 
in general the girls* schools had to be staffed by old retired 
teachers of boys' primary schools. There was ,besides, hardly 
any inspection of girls’ schools, for the rigid purdah system
1
Annual Report on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P., 1901-02, pp. 11-2.
2rbid.
3  •
Quinquennium Report on Public Instruction in H.W.F.P., 1902-7,
p.14*
prevalent among the ^uslims did not permit such inspection.
In 1906-07 the local government secured the services of an 
Assistant Inspectress of Schools from the Punjab, but after 
two years she askeddfor transfer and it was not until 1916-7 
that the Frontier Provinoe had its own Inspectress of Girls' 
Schools. This was followed by the sending of six women to 
Lahore for training in the local Normal School for women. In 
1920 a Normal School for women was opened at Peshawar but
1after two years it had to close down for financial r easons.
In 1920-1 the curriculum in girls' schools was revised,
emphasis being laid 011 instruction in domestic science which
2
was "to form the chief function of a girl in after life". 
Elementary nature study and instruction in handicrafts were 
also introduced.
The number of girls' primary schools in 1920-1 stood at 
fifty-six as against twenty-eight in 1911-2; and the number 
of pupils was 3,513 and 1,925 in the corresponding years. Middle 
schools for girls, first established in 1906, increased from 
one to three, and the number of students from 322 to 783 in the 
same period.^
\ .
Annual Report on Public Instruction in N.N.F.P., 1905-6, pp. 17-8
Ibid., 1906-7, pp. 13-5; Ibid., pp. 20-2; Ibid..Review, 1917-8,
p. 2. Quinquennium Report on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P.,
1902-7, p.44; Ibid., 1917-22, pp. 4-5..
2
Census of India. 1921. N.W.F.F.. p.183.
rz •
^Quinquennial Report on Public Insfruction in N.W.F.P. ^ 917-22,
p. 41*
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Female education in the Province was still in its 
infancy. It had, as the Oonsus Report of 1921 put it, hardly 
gone beyond the primary stage, for there was little demand 
for secondary education,' There was no girls1 high school, 
while a girls1 college was "still a dream of the future". Pre­
judice against the spread of education among women, especially 
in the Muslim community, had "not yet appreciably weakened".
The "perpetual tutelage of women which had been practised 
so long among both Hindus and Musalmans" continued, and most 
parents still disfavoured female education which was "likely 
to result in the social emancipation of the weaker sex".
Considering the general lack of eagerness of the local 
people for western education and the consequent difficulty in 
implementing any large scale programme for the rapid develop­
ment of education, the Government could claim that their ef­
forts had borne fruit. In the two decades under review-.-edu­
cation had indeed made progress, though not with uniform steadi­
ness ; the number of educational institutions and students 
in the settled districts had increased, as had the Government's 
expense in maintaining the educational establishments. ‘ However, 
education made little progress in the tribal territory.
C^ensus of India, 1921. N.W.F.P., p.182.
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Among the local people there had been a slow awareness of 
the benefits of modem education, not the 1 east of which con­
sisted in the opportunity it provided for Government service.
The development of communicataons andt he need for increasing 
contact with other parts of India acted as additional incen­
tives. This would also explain why the Hindus and Sikh communi­
ties cf the Province took to the British system of education 
far more eagerly than the Muslims. It was the two former communi­
ties whose occupation as Government employees and traders made 
it necessary for them to a ttain proficiency in modern education.
trated mostly in towns where opportunities for education were 
more easily available than in the villages where the Muslims 
lived. Moreover, language was a handicap for the Pathans. Urdu 
which ms the medium of instruction in ‘the rural primary schools 
was foreign to the Pathans who spoke only Pushtu, their mother 
tongue, while those who. lived hi urban ,areas, like the Sikhs
1
Numerically, the strength of the Muslims in 1921 was about 
ninety-two per cent of the total population of the Province, 
but they had only 29 male and 2 female literates per 1,000 of 
the Muslim population, while the corresponding figures for 
Hindus were 322 male and 84 female and 469 male and 188 female 
for Sikhs in the Province. Census of India, 1921, vol. XIV, 
N.W.E.P.. pp. 172-3.
But the Muslims being agriculturists did not fully
the benefits of modern education.^ Besides, the former concen-
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and Hindus, were bilingual, knowing both Urdu and Pushtu.
1
Besides, the decline of private schools due to lack of adequate 
government support resulted in the loss of what could have 
been an effective means of popularising education in the rural 
areas among the Muslims.
In 1901-2, the total number of private schools was 927 with 
an attendance of 13,626 but in 1921-22, they decreased to 234 
and 4^519 respectively. Quinquennium Report, 1897-1902, p.l; 
ibid., 1917-22,p.l.
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CONCLUSION
The eighteen-year old history of the administration of
the North-West Frontier Province which forms the subject of
the present thesis had two main aspects: the application of
Curzon*s new tribal policy amidst strains and uncertainties,
and the development of the administration of the settled districts
rather on independent lines but in conformity with the new policies
of the Government of India.
*
Curzon*s tribal policy had its merits, although its success 
hung on a delicate balance. It was designed to secure so at any 
rate Curzon claimed - the contentment of the tribesmen and to en­
sure the security of British subjects in -the settled districts.
The withdrawal of regular troops from tribal territory had for 
its object the general reduction of military pressure on the 
tribes and theeasing of tension in the legion. Curzon1 s new militia 
scheme was a bold experiment and in normal circumstances worked 
well; but it;.broke down under the stress of emergency in 1919.
The influence which the British officers of the militia established 
over their men and tribal leaders through close personal contact 
was found useful for the Government. For instance, in the Khy- 
ber, the friendly maliks supplied secret information xegarding 
the movements of the raiding gangs, aided the Government in effect­
ing agreements between the tribe and the Government, and in con­
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structing roads and railways in tribal areas, Curzon, however, 
did not ignore the military defence of the Worfch-West Frontier, 
The number of regular troops was increased;^ the troops were 
stationed in Cantonments in the settled districts flanking 
the border, and their rapid concentration at a threatened point 
was facilitated by the construction of strategic roads and rail­
ways.
Despite Curzon1 s hold assertions, the pacification of the 
tribes - the goal of his policy - was hardly achieved as the 
Government's strained relations with the Mahsuds, Afridis and 
Mohmands, the most important tribes, testify. There was no dim­
inution in the number of daiing raids by the tribesmen which 
cost British subjects heavily both in lives and property. The 
Government's policy lacked consistency and their 'patch-up! 
arrangement with the Mahsuds, for example, with a vis* to avoid­
ing a full scale expedition clearly revealed the weakness of the 
systen. Had it not been for the increase of Afridi allowances 
and the co-operation of the Amir of Afghanistan, Habibullah, the 
maintenance of peace and order in the province during World War 
I would have been extremely difficult.
•]
In 1899, there were 15*289 regulars across the administrative 
border of ^ritish India which had been reduced to 4,156 in 1905 
while the supporting garrisons within the British border had 
been increased from 2,197 to 25,341* Summary of Curzon's Admini­
stration Foreign Department, H.W.F.P. and Baluchistan, part II, 
p.5, C.C.. vol. 526.
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The weakness of Curzon's tribal policy was evident to 
the men on whom fell the task of implementing it. Both Deane 
and Roos-Keppel, advocated modification of that policy and so 
did Minto, Deane urged that whenever a tribe misbehaved and 
forced upon itself a punitive expedition, the Government, 
after punishing it, should occupy permanently places of strate­
gic importance in the area and strengthen that occupation by 
the construction of roads. Besides, those tribes who desired 
to come under the Government * s protection should be taken over 
and their territories should be administered on the lines of 
the protected areas of fochi, Sam Ranizai and Kurram. Roos- 
Keppel in later years also criticised the Government of India 
for shirking responsibility by refusing t ^ interfere in tribal 
affairs. In his opinion the only lasting solution of *the front­
ier problem was to crush the tribes by force, to disarm them 
and to occupy their country. He urged this course because it 
was
desirable partly in our own interest, partly in the 
interests of the people of our settled districts 
to whom we owe protection... but mainly in the 
interests of the tribes themselves - in fact as a 
scheme for the reclamation from barbarism of a fine, 
manly and courageous people of great development
•]
Rote on the probable attitude of the Frontier Tribes and of 
Afghanistan in the event of an attempted invasion of India by 
Russia and on the Frontier Policy in connection therewith by 
H. Deane, 13 July 1906. F.S.D.M., A 166.
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and of becoming a source of strength instead of 
weakness to the Snpire,^
Minto was in agreement with the *forward* views of his 
frontier officers. He believed that the peaceful penetration 
into the tribal territory and its gradual absorption would 
bring prosperity and happiness to the tribesmen and would lead 
to ultimate peace on the border. But Morley had set his heart 
against any annexation and aggression on the frontier. He pro­
hibited any unnecessary interference with the tribes and the 
undertaking of any fresh responsibility in the tribal territory 
unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessity. He 
warned Min to that the forward move which the Viceroy and his 
frontier officers were advocating would involve increased ex­
penditure, alarm the tribes and estrange the Amir of Kabul.
This cautious but strong stand against urollir^ the tribes up 
to the Durand line1'1' was maintained by Morley*s successors until 
1921-22 when a new forward policy was adopted on the frontier.
There were several factors which had added to the complexity 
of the problem and to Government*s difficulty in resolving it.
While the local government and the Government of India viewed 
the tribal issue mainly as a local problem, the Home Government 
treated it as affecting the broader question of Imperial strategy *
i
Koos-Keppel to Hardinge, 13 March 1916, R.F.
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Strategic considerations dictated^ the adoption of more string­
ent measures than was probably necessary. It was thought ex­
pedient from a military point of view to take away from the 
tribes a tithe of their independence and to keep them under some 
sort of control. This the tribes resisted. They had a long 
tradition of independence which they were determined to maintain. 
This spirit of independence and hatred of outside control made 
their suppression a hurculean task. Moreover the tribesmen*s 
virile and martial character, their skill in warfare, increased 
by their acquisition of vast quantities of modern weapons and 
their staunch devotion to their faith made them formidable anta­
gonists. They had another advantage over their enemies in the 
inaccessibility of their country; in their mountain recesses 
they were extremely efficient guerilla fighters. By nature the 
Pathans were intractable. In their settlements with the Govern­
ment they insisted that their views must be taken into account 
as also their own notions of what x?as right and proper before 
an agreement could be arrived at. It was this attitude which 
often created difficulties in the distribution of allowances es­
pecially among the Mahsuds. Finally, the intrigues carried on ^  
intermittently from the Afghan side and the immense influence 
exercised by the Amir of Afghanistan over the tribes on the Brit­
ish side of the border, aggravated the tribal problem. The tribes­
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men^s racial, religious and linguistic affinity with the tribes 
on the Afghan side of the Durand line added to Governmentfs 
difficulties, for raiders, outlaws, deserters and in fact all 
anti-British elements found a safe asylum in the Afghan terri­
tory which for political reasons the British could hardly violate. > 
It was mainly to overcome the difficulties faced by previous 
administrations in dealing with tribal questions that Curzon had 
embarked upon the establishment of a new province. The experi­
ment was a success. It served the purpose of bringing the ad- 
mini st ration of one of the most difficult areas of British India 
under the direct control of the Supreme Government and this con­
trol didicontribute to the vigour and efficiency of the new ad­
ministration. The province was Curzon1 s child and he rejoiced 
seeing his child "robust and strong".^ Selected and able offi­
cers, a mixed body of civilians and soldiers were given charge 
of the new province. Although prophecies could not be made 
about a region where the course of events had been so uncertain, 
it can be reasonably assumed that the Punjab Government wouLd 
have had anv extremely hard time during the period of the First 
World War followed by the Third Afghan War, the Khilafat and 
the Hi&rat movements, had the frontier areas been under their 
control. The comparatively easy handling cf these events on the
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Frontier and the progress made in various fields of admini­
stration which had been neglected under the Punjab Government 
justified the creation of the new administration and vindicated 
Curzon*s stand.
But political considerations dominated the policies of 
the rulers and these account for the slow progress made by 
the province. The policy behind the construction of roads and 
railways in the proy;ihce was primarily to meet the require­
ments of the defence of India* s most vulnerable land frontier. 
Curzon gave great impetus to the extension of communications 
by his policy of withdrawal of regular troops from the tribal 
regions. Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief, enthusiastically 
supported this policy. But his remarkable scheme for the Kabul 
river railway was shelved by Morley on the concluaon of the 
Anglo^Russian ^reement in 1907, after which Minto and Hardinge 
carried on only half-hearted and piece-meal extensions and im­
provements in roads and railways. These roads and railways gave 
some boost to the external land trade of the region and to pass­
engers traffic, besides helping in breaking down the isolation 
of the border areas. But the development of communications for 
purposes other than strategic was neglected. Those already in 
existence were inadequate and could by no means meet the growing 
needs of the province.
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Lack of communications and other factors proved a great 
handicap in the way of settlement operations. For quite some 
time the Frontier districts had to he content with summary 
settlements. When the first and second settlements were carried 
out, the officials had to take into account the peculiar nature 
of the Frontier tracts and the political problems confronting 
the administration there. When it was found that the new revenue 
demand during the revised assessments in the districts of Kohat, 
Bannu and Hazara were somewhat heavy, the defect had to be re­
medied and the Government had to adopt a policy of light assess­
ment. The earlier policy of liberal land revenue assignments 
and frontier remissions was also continued in order to keep the 
class of privileged and truly loyal persons attached to the ad­
ministration. Various resolutions and acts passed by Curzon and 
his successor Minto for the welfare of the peasantry in India 
were put into effect; the most important being the extension of 
the Punjab Land Alienation Act and the Co-operative Credit Societies 
Act. The application of both these measures showed that Deane 
paid due regard to local customs and usages and did not push these 
policies on the agriculturists unless they themselves realised 
the utility of these measures. The creatinn of a separate department 
of Agriculture helped to promote an improved agronomy.
The measures adopted by1he Frontier administration to improve
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the state of irrigation both in extending and widening minor 
canals and constructing the new state canals were a great step 
forward. But here too political considerations could not be 
overlooked. The Upper Swat canal was a pyrrhic venture and poli­
tical motives played no less important a part in its construction.
It was not until the removal of the control of the Punjab irri­
gation authorities over the irrigation projects of the Frontier 
Province that the working of the Department of Irrigation reached 
a standard of efficiency.
As for education although Deane realised the need for its 
expansion, he could not achieve much because of the limitations 
imposed by inadequate funds and ill-equipped staff. A great step 
forward was taken by Roos-Kejpel when he managed to find the nec­
essary funds and embarked upon a systematic policy of educational 
reforms. Roos-Keppel*s educational reforms laid great emphasis 
on the extension of primary education and the improvement of second­
ary education. As for collegiate education, private efforts were 
encouraged. Grants were given to the Edwards Church Mission Col­
lege and financial assistance and active encouragement rendered 
to the project of Islamia College at Peshawar. World War I had a 
deleterious effect on the educational development of the province 
for the necessary funds were not forthcoming. Roos-Keppel, how­
ever, did not abandon these projects. His initiative and drive
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was mainly responsible for the impetus given to education in 
the province. However, the most to benefit from the educational
i
reforms were the Hindus and Sikhs. The Muslims as mainly an 
agriculturist community, did not fully avail themselves of the 
opportunities provided by the administration and more acceler­
ated efforts were necessary to popularise education among them.
The backward state of education and the nature of the 
administration of the Province were responsible for the conspicuous 
slow growth of political consciousness of the people. From the 
GovernmentTs point of view the political, strategic and military 
problems at the area justified the policy of keeping the local
people as far as possible away from political influences of other 
1parts of India. It is therefore no wonder that the province lacked
the means of formulating and articulating public opinion. In 1902-03
2
there were only three vernacular newspapers in the Province as 
against two hundred and nine Vernacular, Anglo-Vernacular and 
English newspapers in the Punjab, and even these ceased publication 
by 1906.^ * In 1905 the Frontier Advocate a weekly was started from
Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms. 1918. para. 198.
^Administration Report of the N.W.F.P.. 1901-05. p.72. The papers 
were Tuhfa-i-Sarhad. the Frontier Gazette and the Daulat-i-Hind.
3
Imperial Gazetteer of India; Punjab, vol. 1, p.144.
^Administrative Report of N.W.F.P.. 1904-05, p.39, 1905-06, p.40,
1908-o9, p.37.
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Dera Ismail Khan, with a circulation of two hundred copies.
In April 1910 the publication of the paper was stopped by the
2Government for its communal and anti-British tone. In 1909 
another newspaper the Afghan appeared from Peshawar with 
limited circulation. The Punjab newspapers had very few 
readers among the Pathans. There was no literary society 
worth the name in the Province, let alone any organised poli­
tical associations and platforms.
In fact apathy regarding public affairs was most no tic- 
able among the Frontier people. Local self-government was in 
its infancy and the people had neither acquired experience nor 
showed eagerness to associate themselves with it. ''Municipal 
feeling" was almost non-existent,^ the members of the munici­
pality themselves showing little interest in public affairs. 
Between 1867 and 1873 municipalities had been set up in all the 
district headquarters except Kohat and ten years later ICohat
^Punjab Native Newspaper Reports. 1906, p.2. 
^Administrative Report of N.W.F.P.. 1910-11, p. 28.
Punjab Mative Newspaper Reports. 1909, p.1195.
4Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of Local Self-Government in
India, Pakistan and Burma, p .51.
1
and seven other towns had municipalities. But by 1904 their
2
number was reduced to six as little use was made of them.
The five districts had a District Board each. Unlike other
provinces the members of the Municipal and District Boards
were wholly nominated; they often absented themselves from 
3the meetings. Two influential Khans of the province, for
instance informed the Decentralisation Commission (1909)
that they had been members of the District Boards for over
twenty years but one Khan had attended the meetings about
once a year only and the other had attended a mere five times
4in the entire twenty years.
Political consciousness in the province in its initial 
phase was a product of the stirrings caused by political de­
velopments in the Muslim world in general and by the political 
aspirations of the Indian Muslims in particular. Events in 
Turkey and its disintegration, Italy* s occupation of Tripoli
^Imperial Gazetteer; U.U.F.P.. p.67*
^ibid.» p.68.
* .
Roos-Keppel to Chelmsford, 20 August 1916, R.P.
4
Tinker, op.cit., p.79.
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(l91l), the Balkan wars (1912-3) and Russia*s encroachments in 
Northern Persia (1911-2) agitated the Islamic World where these 
events appeared as "a Christian conspiracy11 against the Muslims. 
In India the Government was faced with Muslim discontent over 
issues like the annulment of the partition of Bengal and the 
affiliation of the Aligarh Muslim University. Through the Ali­
garh Muslims "tides and waves of the so called national spirit" 
reached the province. "Their object is to get round us and, ig­
norant as we are, to work up pur fanatical ideas and then use us
2
as a cat's paw." But the Government had no immediate fear of any 
general disturbance in the province though there was little doubt 
that political situation in India would sooner or later set off 
repercussions on the Frontier. "A warlike and fanatical" Muslim 
population of four millions, observed Roos-Keppel "was a good
seed-bed for revolutionary ideas and.every effort will be made
3in coming years to sow,upon this fertile ground". In the circum­
stances Roos-Keppel advocatedd that
the longer we can stave off any close connection 
between the Frontier and India, the better it will 
be for the Province and for the Government. ^
\
Sharif-al Mujahid, "Pan Islamism", A History of the Freedom 
Movement. vol.Uf , p.107.
2
Abdul Qaiyum to Roos-Keppel, 25 August 1912, R.P.
3Roos-ICeppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 6 September 1912, ibid.
4Ibid.
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Roos-ICeppel was prepared to deal drastically with people 
who stirred up trouble; the Frontier Crimes Regulation had
X
given him the necessary powers to do so. His vigilant policy,
the operation of which was no doubt facilitated by the loyalty
and cooperation of the leading gentry of the province paid off.
During the War, the province remained peaceful, unlike other
parts of India especially Bengal and the Punjab, where revolutionary
activities grew in intensity necessitating rigorous measures on
2
the part of the Government, The Fronter Muslims, although
"deeply distressed" over the plight of Turkey could not be
roused. They prayed almost every Friday for the victory of their
3
"Sultan Sahib" but showed no hostility towards the Go'vernment. 
Political unrest of any kind was reported to be "practically 
non-existent" in the province;^ the local government received 
public co-operation in dealing with tribal disturbances and in 
obtaining men and money for the War; 45>231 men of whom 32,181
5
were combatants were recruited during the war. ^Though the 
 ^Ibid.
Report of the Sedition Committee. 1918, pp. 43-60, 104-113;
Lord Hardinge, My Indian Years. 1910-1916, pp. 116-8.
Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 6 September 1912, R.P. 
^Administration Report of the N.W«F.P.. 1916-17, Part I, p.l.
5 , . ,
Memorandum on India* s contribution to the War in Men, Material and 
Money, August 1914-November 1918, Tables 12, 13, P.S.S.F., File 
Ho. 3525/1914, Part II; M. O'Dwyer, uThe Mohammedans of India and 
India* s Mohammedan Neighbours", J.R.C.A.S.. vol. VIII, 1921, 
pp. 197-218.
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piovince was poor, with no industrial resources, it contributed 
sixty lakhs of rupees to the War loans.'*'
The post-war years saw significant constitutional reforms 
in India but for political reasons the Frontier Province was 
excluded from this policy, both the Supreme and local Govern­
ments regarding political reforms unnecessary and inexpedient. 
Chelmsford cleatfjy stated that the reforms scarcely concerned
the Frontier Province where the Chief Commissioner had nother
2things to think about11. This was quite in keeping with ^ 
Roos-Keppel1s own ideas; No political reforms were needed 
as there was no agitation or demand for them and the people 
were 1 curiously indifferent to purely Indian affairs1 being 
irmuch more interested in Cabul and Persia11.^  In the circumstances ^  
the Montford Report (1918) while recommending dyarchy in other 
provinces did not suggest any change in the administration of 
the Frontier Province. "For reasons of strategy11, the Report 
pointed out, the personal administration of the Chief Commissioner 
should continue and "no principle of responsibility11 be intro-
Roo^-Keppel to Secy., Govt, of India, 11 February 1919, I.F.F.P.. 
vol. 10891, December 1920, Proc. No. 23*
2
Chelmsford to Roos-Keppel, 6 October 1917, R.P.
Roos-Keppel to Chelmsford, 10 October 1917, ib id .
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1duc6d. However, "some form of advisory council, adjusted 
to composition and function to local conditions" was recom­
mended.^
But Roos-Keppel found considerable difficulty even in 
accepting this meagre concession. He was doubtful if the lead­
ing men of the Province would be willing to act as advisers 
to the local Government without receiving any salary. Roos- 
Keppel had hitherto taken their advice and had consulted them 
on various issues but only informally and privately. He doubted 
if these "confidential advisers" would be able to give him "as 
frank and honest" advice in a "semi-public Council" as they had 
hitherto done. All important questions, in his opinion, in the 
Province were political, stemming from the British Government's 
relations with Afghanistan aid the Frontier tribes or from the 
effect of events in Central Asia and Persia on the tribes. Thes© 
matters were treated as secret and could not be discussed "in 
a semi-public manner". And by the elimination of these subjects 
from discussion in the Council, only "parish politics" would 
remain which in Roos-Keppel1 s opinion could well be settled in 
consultation with the leaders of different communities. In short, the 
overwhelmingly political character of the administration required
1Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 1918, para 198.
2Xbid.
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that its decisions should remain quite outside the purview
of a local council. Roos-Keppel1s conclusion was
we ... are practically unaffected hy the domestic 
politics of India. It is thus difficult to see 
what advantage the institution of an Advisory Council 
would have?1
With this adverse comment from Roos-Keppel, the Government 
of India decided to shelve the issue for the moment, They thought 
that it was best to wait and see the general results of the intro­
duction of constitutional reforms in other provinces before talc-
2ing any definite action in regard to the Frontier Province.
The Pathans were no doubt low in ihe scale of political (
advancement, but they re not as immune from political influence 
or insensitive to political events in India as Roos-Keppel imagined 
- and this he himself had to admit when he saw the Pathan re­
action to the Satyagraha movement and the Rowlatt Bill agitation.
He received petitions against the Rowlatt Bill : ' .. '
from every tribe, every caste and every community in 
the Peshawar district; the biggest men have signed 
these, even including the ones who are most on our 
side, as they say that they would lose their position 
and what little power they now have to help us if 
they declined to forward to me a unanimous petition 
from the whole of their people. 3 \
1
Roos-Keppel to Govt, of India, 31 August 1918, I.P.P.P., vol. 
10891, March 1920, Proc. No. 11 (c).
2Extract from Official Report of the Legislative Assembly Debates, 
1921, p.426, P.S.S.F., File No. 5665/1921.
Roos-Keppel to Maffey, 8 May 1919» O.P.. vol. 22.
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in Roos-Iteppel *s own admission the Satyagrah movement, though
essentially Hindu and foreign to the province,^* had. ^united
all in hatred to British rule" and that Ma large number hate
us with such bitterness that they would work on even an in-
2vasion if they saw a chance of getting rid of us”. He was 
amazed
at the rapidity and completeness of its development 
The propaganda from down country distributing mis­
chievous descriptions of the Rowlatt Bill has af­
fected everybody. The illiterate classes believe 
these statements implicitly and even the most edu­
cated believe them in part. No counter propaganda 
had any effect at all.3
Emissaries were sent from the Punjab to Peshawar to encourage 
the people to observe hartal and take part in the non-cooperation 
movement. Panchayats were established to deal with civil and 
criminal disputes so that litigants could dispense with the 
Government courts.^ There were public demonstrations as well.
Satyagraha agitators were assisted by the Afghan Post­
master at Peshawar, and were active in the Utmanzai village in 
the Gharsadda tahsil of the Peshawar district. The synchronism 
of the third Afghan War and the Satyagraha movement made the
^Roos-Keppel to Maffy, 27 April .1919, R.P«
^oos-Keppel to Chelmsford, 5, 13 May 1919, H.P«
^Roos-Keppel to Maffey, 8 May 1919, P.P.. vol. 22.
^Administration Report of the H.W.P.P. .  1919-20, Part X, pp. 1-2.
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situation difficult for Roos-Keppel, but with firm and prompt
measures he weathered the crisis.3*
But the Satyagraha movement had given the local people
"a taste for public meetings and for the passing of resolutions".
These appeared portentous developments to Roos-Keppel because
political agitation might "prove troublesome in the future when
the people have a real grievance instead of a fancy one like 
2
the present". The winds of change blowing in India had reached 
the Frontier; Roos-Keppel could only hope that his province
"will change more slowly than the most advanced parts” of the
3country. It was, in fact, proving difficult to maintain the
policy of "intellectual and political segregation of the Pathans"^
from the rest of India, and in trying to do so Roos-Keppel seemed
to have set himself against the current of the times. As Olaf
Caroe observes, Roos-Keppel loved Pathans, he "cared and worked"
for them, but
he failed to weigh up the workings of the higher 
education on the Pathan mind, or to appreciate 
that if frontier pride was to be turned into new
1 .
Ohief Commissioner to Private Secy, to Viceroy, Tels. 8, 9, 12,
30 May 1919, C.P.. vol. 22. See also Chapter III, pp.\gq-£|0
2Roos-Keppel to Maffey, 27 April 1919, C.P.« vol. 22.
3Ib id .
4Abdul Quayyum, Gold aid Guns on the Pathan Frnntier, p .28.
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channels and harnessed in the service of a sub­
continent, the people must be permitted, indeed  ^
encouraged, to keep up with the latest fashions.
^Olaf Caroe, The Pathans,, p.425. S©e also J. Coatman, "The 
North-West Frontier Province and Trans-Border Country under 
the New Constitution", J.B.Q.A.S.. vol. XVIII, 1931, pp. 355-46.
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Lockhart. General Sir W. S. A.
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First Commissioned, 4th October 1858; served in the Bhootan
Expedition, 1864-66; A.B.C. to the Brigadier-General 
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Ahbab
Bach
Badmash
Badragga
Bakhra
Band
B£nda
Barat
Baramta
Batai
Butemar
GLOSSARY; DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS
Middleman. This applied specifically to the 
influential men cf the Peshawar border who 
acted as intermediaries between the Sikh 
Government and the trans-border tribes. The 
practice was continued by the British Govern­
ment until the end cf the 19th century. 
Distribution of revenue over holdings.
Scoundrel.
Tribal escort.
Share.
Bank of earth to obstruct the flow of water. 
Hamlet.
An assignment of land revenue.
The system of enforcing vicarious responsibility 
by which any member of a tribe or section was 
liable to distress upon his person or property 
to make good the misdeeds of other members of 
the same tribe or section.
Share of produce paid as rent.
A tenant who had acquired rights in land by 
clearing forests.
Lump grain rent in the rabi, and a fixed 
amount of cash in the liarif harvest.
An occcipancy tenant of superior position.
Mahsud tribal police; a canal watchman and 
share distributor.
Watchman.
Hue and cry; pursuit party.
Pathan expression for the settlement of 
ancestral shares.
Holder of an ancestral share; proprietor 
or land-awher::’.
Reception.
  An influential tribesman who was not himself a
recognised malik. In some agencies elders 
received annual rewards in the form of lungis.
Fakir Religious mendicant 1‘without status: cultivator
or farm servant.
Frontier Remission. A remission of land revenue enjoyed by 
villages in exposed tracts or actually on 
the border. It usually amounted to one-third 
or one-quarter of the demand.
Gan da Boards or stakes backed by clods, stones and
brushwood used to divide the width of the water
Chakota
Chakotadar 
Ghalweshtis
Ohaukidar. 
Chigha 
Daftar
Daf tar i
Darbar
Elder
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section. The smaller unit was called Gan.da 
and the larger Guta.
Hamsaya Dependent occupying outlying hamlets of a
Pathan estate on condition of assisting in 
repelling raids on the land of the proprietor.
Hartal Strike.
Inam A cash allowance paid to secure the services of
a man of influence.
Inamdar The holder of an inam.
jsk or I ska A lot; the casting of lots (also Uska and Hisk).
Jagir An assignment of land-revenue.
jagirdar Holder of an assignment of land revenue.
Jezail Matchlock.
jezailchis Tribal levies armed with jezails.
Jiliad Holy war.
J:irga A tribal assembly, council or delegation.
Kafila Caravan. A number cf animals carrying mer­
chandise or baggage.
Kafir TJnbel iever.
Kandi Section of a village; a division of an estate.
ICalang Arbitrary tax or assessment imposed by the
Sikhs.
Kalapani Perennial streams issuing from the hills.
IChalsa Revenue credited to Government from Crown lands.
47 4
IChasanrai
Khassadar
Khasra
IChel
Khula vesh
Lambardar
Lashkar
Lath
Lathband
M
A straw, dry twig used for casting lots.
Was the representative of his tribe within 
its area for carrying out its engagements 
with Government, but paid by Government. He 
was an irregular foot soldier; the police 
of the country.
Field number.
A clan.
Fresh calculation of shares at time of vesh; 
an individual share of land.
Village headman.
A tribal force which should in theory take 
the field under the tribal banner. The tribes­
men composing a lashkar were in general armed 
with rifle, bandolier and cartridges and a 
dagger or two stuck in tie waist belt. Sufficient 
food for three or four days or even more was 
carried ±1 a skin bag.
Fi&ld embankment to retain irrgation.
Occupancy tenant who acquired rights in land 
by embanking fields.
In the North-West Frontier Province, the levy 
system was applied mostly in 'the settled dis­
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Lungi
Maidan 
Maira 
Mai ilc 
Mai lie
Malilci
tricts. These levies consisted of tribesmen 
settled in British India, were armed by Govern­
ment and in receipt of a basic wage. The distinction 
between the District levies and khassadars was 
that,
1) the levy was a cis-border formation; the 
khassadar trail s-border;
2) the levy was armed by Government; the 
khassadar provided his own weapon;
3) the levy m s  employed in British India;
khassadar functioned only in tribal 
territory.
A head-dress of honour often accompanied by 
a reward or a cash payment; an annual cash 
payment.
Plain,
High land dependant for crops on rain,
A proprietor of land.
A tribal headman, who may be recognised as head 
of a whole tribe, or one of its major or minor 
sub-divisions, or of a section or sub-section. 
Fraction of the tribal allowance paid to a 
malik.
Malik kabza
Malik ana 
I
MajSat'ar
Maurusi
Mebtar
Mirab
Muaf i 
Muj alii din 
Mull a 
Munshi 
Mutabar 
Mawajib
Hahri
One who owned the land actually in his 
possession, but had no share in the common 
property of the village community.
A due taken by the superior proprietor. 
Literally 'binding up I^^ls' applied to feudal 
tenants.
Occupancy tenant.
Title of honour; a tribal chief.
Supervisor to look after the distribution 
of water for irrigation.
A Revenue-free assignment.
Holy warriors.
Muslim priest.
clerk.
Responsible head.
Gash allowance paid by the treasury in recog­
nition of family service. It was originally 
paid by the Siks as fees for colection of the 
revenue to a khan.
  Irrigated from a canal.
Naksh-i-Thakbast Rough boundary plan of an estate.
Naubat Order of turns.
Paina A term used to describe the rights in water of
of villages situated at the tail of a canal, 
or channel.
Pals Flanking embankments forming a continuation
of the main dam which prevents the water 
falling back into its old channel.
Patwari A village accountant or registrar.
Powindah ThefNomhdic Afghan ’tribesman from Eastern
Afghanistan (Ghilzai etc.).
Pucha Casting of lots: share.
Riwai-i-Abpashi Record of irrigation customs and rights.
Rodhlcohi Hill-torrent water.
Sadd Dam thrown across a ravine to catch flood
water from the hills.
Sarhang In Persia a Major, or Lieutenant-Golonel.
In Afghanistan the leader of three "bairaks1 
of khassadars.
Sarishta
Sarkar
Saroba
Sartip
The tribal organisation for the enforcement 
of Pathan custom or the apportionment of profit 
and' loss amongst tribal sections.
Government.
A term used to describe the water rights of 
villages ab the head of a stream.
In Persia a Colonel or General, In Afghanistan
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Shamil at
Shia
Sitta
Sufedposhi
Sunni
Tahsil
Tahsildar
Takavi
Tapp a 
Tag sim 
Taraf 
Tunian 
Tumandar
the leader of six or more "hair ales” of khassadar s. 
(Bair ale (Turlci) a company of lehassadars)*
It appeared to be in reality an honorary title. 
Village common land.
A Muslim sect.
A log or board of wood laid horizontally under 
water across the main and branch channels for 
regulating the flow of water for irrigation 
purposes.
Inam A reward assigned out of the revenue to
a leading man ha return for which certain ser­
vices were demanded.
A Muslim sect,
A sub-division of a district, charge of a 
tahsildar.
Official in charge of a tahsil.
Loan granted by Government to a cultivator 
for agricultural purposes.
Tribal sub-division.
Distribution•
A sub-division of an estate.
A tribe.
Chief of a tribe.
Turnami According to tribal shares.
Turnturns Two-wheeled carriage.
Ulus Body of Mahsud tribe.
Vakil Representative; a lawyer.
Vesh Periodical redistribution of land among
proprietors.
Wala Water channel.
Wand Land with known boundaries, a territorial block.
Waqat Time
War a A turn or timed share of canal water.
Warakh A small hole in the side of a water-course.
Yaghistan Land of the unruly.
Zaildar A headman in charge of a circle of villages
called a sail.
Zamindar The cultivating owner of land and true agri­
culturist.
Zamindari A form of tenure where an estate is held by a
sole proprietor or by several proprietors in 
common.
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